Introduction

Pickett’s Charge was the greatest assault of the greatest battle of America’s greatest war. Even more, this iconic attack was truly one of the most dramatic episodes and defining moments in American history. Consequently, Pickett’s Charge has earned a revered and lofty place in the American memory and popular imagination.

No chapter in the Civil War saga has become more romanticized than Gettysburg, the largest battle ever fought on North America. Likewise, no chapter of Gettysburg’s dramatic story has been more excessively glorified than the massive assault on the last day, July 3, 1863, of the three-day battle, however. Myths and stereotypes abound. Even the famous name, Pickett’s Charge, is a misnomer, because Major General Edward Pickett only commanded a single division, or barely one-third of the troops in the assault. But the most persistent myth about Pickett’s Charge has been that it was a doomed assault from the beginning.

Consequently, it is time for a more comprehensive look at the most famous charge in American history, because the unvarnished story of Pickett’s Charge and its hidden history are actually far more fascinating than the romantic legends and myths.

The North Carolina troops on Pickett’s left flank were long blamed for having failed the Virginians, sabotaging their best efforts: another myth, because the North Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi soldiers fought just as well as Pickett’s Virginians. In fact, General James Johnston Pettigrew’s division lost more men than Pickett’s division during the assault, testifying to their resolve and courage.

Pickett’s Charge also revealed an inordinate share of cowardice among many soldiers, however. Thousands of Confederate soldiers refused to go all the way in the assault, helping to thwart General Robert Edward Lee’s best-laid tactical plans. An entire brigade of Virginians (not of Pickett’s division) broke early, creating a crisis on the assault’s left flank. Clearly, Pickett’s Charge witnessed an unparalleled degree of bravery, cowardice, and tragedy.

Other commonly held perceptions about Pickett’s Charge need to be reevaluated and looked at anew, especially without the usual regional bias, stereotypes, and Lost Cause mythology. Lee fully realized that if only his foremost attackers had been provided the support as planned, decisive victory would have been won. Twentieth-century historians have erroneously portrayed Pickett’s Charge like the doomed British and French infantry assaults on German defenses in the 1916 Battle of the Somme, in France, which caused unprecedented casualties. Contrary to today’s popular consensus, Pickett’s Charge was not doomed from the beginning. Here, the technological advances of modern weaponry (machine gun and heavy artillery) truly guaranteed that frontal infantry assaults over open ground were doomed. Viewed too often within the context of the advanced technology of modern warfare, twentieth-century historians, influenced by pervasive Lost Cause romance, have been long thoroughly convinced that Pickett’s Charge was likewise doomed from the start. However, this traditional fatalistic scenario was simply not the case.

One must fully understand today the relevancy of Lee’s greatest assault, because no single episode has been more poignantly represented as the Civil War’s climactic and defining moment than Pickett’s Charge, symbolizing the central tragedy of America’s Iliad of 1861–65. On the final day of the largest and deadliest battle in American history (more than 51,000 casualties), more Americans died that day (more than 7,860) than the total American casualties during the Normandy invasion of early June 1944.

Most importantly, Pickett’s Charge also effectively sealed slavery’s fate. If Pickett’s Charge had succeeded, two sister republics might well exist to this day. Paradoxes dominate the story of Pickett’s Charge. At the assault’s most climactic moment, the much-celebrated leader of the attack (Pickett) was not leading his troops at the front, when inspired leadership was most needed—a mockery of the misnomer of Pickett’s Charge. However, the name of “Pettigrew’s Charge” (Pettigrew’s division, four brigades, on the assault’s left wing complemented Pickett’s three brigades of his Virginia division, the attack’s right wing) is equally unsuitable. The great assault was actually “Longstreet’s Charge,” as survivors called it before the influential Richmond press (five leading newspapers) conjured up the catchy name of Pickett’s Charge, as if Hollywood scripted. Not only have the vital contributions of non-Virginians been minimized by historians, but also prominent Virginians (soldiers, civilians, and the powerful Virginia press) early placed blame for the attack’s repulse on them. The early, common misconception of the all-Virginia charge (hence, the popular sobriquet Pickett’s Charge) obscured the significant fact that Pickett’s attackers were a minority. Therefore, Pickett’s Charge can be more accurately called the “Pettigrew–[Isaac] Trimble–Pickett Charge.”

Likewise shattering the self-serving myths of the influential postwar Virginia School of Civil War historiography and subsequent Virginia-first Lost Cause romanticism, it was an all-Virginia brigade—of Ambrose Powell Hill’s corps—on the far left (or north) that first broke during the assault. This early tactical setback started a disastrous chain of events (the left flank’s collapse) that helped to ensure the attack’s repulse. The truth of Lee’s greatest assault was actually the antithesis of the carefully orchestrated myth that the failures of non-Virginia attackers doomed Pickett’s Charge.

Endlessly derided by historians, Lee’s decision to unleash his last attack at Gettysburg was his only realistic one because this was the Confederacy’s last chance to win the war in one decisive stroke. Contrary to today’s traditional view that Lee’s decision to attack the Union right-center (an area weakened by General George Gordon Meade, the Army of the Potomac’s new commander, after he had shifted troops from his center to bolster his hard-pressed flanks on the previous day) was the height of folly, the truth of Pickett’s Charge was altogether different. Quite simply, the attack was Lee’s best opportunity to reap a decisive success after July 2’s tactical opportunities had passed. Based on careful calculation (instead of the stereotypical view of a gambler’s recklessness), Lee correctly targeted the weakest point in Meade’s line, a weak spot distinguished by a copse of trees located at a high point along the open Cemetery Ridge. Lee correctly calculated in striking at exactly the right place and the right time, while utilizing a bold battle plan that was as brilliant as it was innovative.

Gettysburg’s most dominant romantic myth has been that Pickett’s Charge was automatically fated for failure, the traditional explanation that has been based upon the Lost Cause romanticism of an underdog South succumbing to impossible odds. Pickett’s Charge, therefore, became the most symbolic representation of the vanquishing of a Southern Anglo-Saxon nation (still another myth) by overpowering might. In consequence, this crucifixion-like final demise of the greatest offensive effort ever launched by the South’s most primary army on July 3 became the most dominant symbol of a tragic martyrdom that served as the principal foundation of Lost Cause mythology of a defeated nation. Dismayed by postwar mythology, Colonel Armistead Lindsay Long, a talented West Pointer (Class of 1850) and Lee’s military secretary, concluded that Pickett’s Charge erroneously compared to the famous charge of the Light Brigade during the Crimean War: the traditional myth that has persisted to this day.

Lee’s tactical plan to pierce the Union right-center along Cemetery Ridge with 12,500 veteran troops of eleven brigades (and even more units if Longstreet had properly supported the assault and exploited the breakthrough) was masterful, especially with regard to its most overlooked component: the simultaneous attack of more than 6,000 Confederate cavalry, under Lee’s top cavalry commander, James Ewell Brown (Jeb) Stuart, from the east and into the rear of the Union at the clump of trees, while masses of infantry struck from the west. Significantly, these more-than-6,000 Southern cavalrymen represented a larger number than the bluecoat defenders, who manned the vulnerable right-center: the ideal tactical situation that presented Lee with his best tactical opportunity on July 3. The son of one of General George Washington’s finest cavalry commanders, “Light-Horse Harry” Lee, Robert E. Lee fully appreciated the importance of utilizing his cavalry arm to the fullest.

Unfortunately, the vast majority of today’s historians, who have loyally followed the traditional Gettysburg faithful that have kept romantic myths alive, have either minimized or ignored Stuart’s vital role. They have dismissed out of hand the importance of the Southern cavalry role partly to ensure credibility for their own past works in adhering to traditional Gettysburg gospel. However, Union leaders knew the truth. General Meade wrote that the repulse of Stuart’s bid to strike the Union rear with the bulk of the Army of Northern Virginia’s cavalry, including horse artillery, was of extreme importance. However, the excessive focus placed on Pickett’s Virginians has resulted in a myopic view that has automatically minimized Stuart’s important role.

Lee’s plan was based upon an unprecedented tactical complexity that required precise timing and close coordination of all three arms: infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Clearly, Pickett’s Charge was far from a simplistic frontal assault as long represented. This was a brilliant tactical plan that actually came surprisingly close to achieving decisive success with infantry alone, and even after the failure of two of the three central elements of his battle plan. (Stuart’s cavalry was thwarted from striking Meade’s rear, and the Confederate artillery failed to deliver a knockout blow with a massive cannonade and then to advance as “flying artillery” to protect the attacker’s flanks.)

Indeed, even after these tactics failed, Pickett’s Charge succeeded in breaking through Meade’s right-center. But early heavy pressure of Union flanking forces on the attack’s left flank on the north and on the right flank to the south played a key role in undoing the tactical success in breaking through on the right-center. The wisdom of attacking the weak right-center, in contrast to Meade’s impregnable flanks (Little Round Top on the south and Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill on the north), also becomes evident in regard to an appreciation of the most forgotten part of Lee’s plan.

Lee’s decision to launch his massive attack was based upon a complex tactical plan that was not only classically Napoleonic, but also a tactical notch above the French general, because of the novel tactical concept of simultaneously striking the same weak defensive point from two directions to negate Union advantages of weaponry (the rifled musket) and high-ground defensive positions. In fact, Napoleon failed to develop a comparably complex tactical plan that called for a massive infantry assault coinciding with a cavalry charge in the rear.

After having narrowly failed to reap a decisive success on July 2, Lee’s decision to launch an all-out assault the next day was especially wise because of the overall political and strategic situation. The manpower-short South was caught in an unwinnable war of attrition, and Lee lacked the logistical support to remain north of the Potomac any longer: a classic case of now or never for the Confederacy. In truth, no other realistic tactical option existed for Lee, because his army and nation were literally racing the clock when precious time was running out.

Consequently, Lee exploited the best tactical opportunity in the hope of scoring a psychological, strategic, and political knockout blow to reverse the inevitable fate of the slowly dying Confederacy and win the war. Pickett’s Charge was the South’s final bid to truly “conquer a peace” (the winning strategy of General Winfield Scott in capturing Mexico City during the Mexican–American War campaign, in which a young Lee had served)—to exploit the increasing vulnerabilities of a war-weary northern populace and encourage the northern peace party to negotiate a settlement.

By targeting the weak Union right-center (Cemetery Ridge’s most vulnerable sector) and enjoying a significant manpower advantage at this vulnerable point after an unprecedented bombardment had wreaked havoc among the batteries protecting the right-center, Lee was presented with his greatest tactical opportunity. To stack the odds in his favor as much as possible, Lee masterfully employed all three arms (a secret formula of Napoleon’s remarkable successes) to act in concert in going for broke in a highly favorable tactical situation.

Nevertheless, the central romantic myth that Pickett’s Charge was doomed before it was even launched has become Gettysburg’s most enduring romantic stereotype. This myth has partly resulted because of a lack of appreciation of the complexities of Lee’s battle plan that called for carefully orchestrating all three arms of his army (infantry, cavalry, and artillery): first the artillery bombardment and then for the guns to advance to closely support the infantry attackers, while thousands of Stuart’s cavalrymen struck from the rear.

Besides serving as a core foundation of Lost Cause mythology, the common assumption that the assault’s failure was inevitable from the beginning also supported the winner’s conviction that victory at Gettysburg was a great moral victory preordained by God. For a variety of reasons, no single defining moment in American history has more thoroughly captured the popular imagination, both North and South. However, fundamental truths have been hidden behind the enshrinement of the enduring romance of Pickett’s Charge. The vanquished people of the postwar South needed saintly heroes to restore lost pride. Therefore, Pickett’s Virginians, as constructed by Virginia writers, were transformed into virtuous Anglo-Saxons (a stereotype) who represented an inordinate amount of chivalry and courage. White Virginian virtues—as glorified in the heroics of Pickett’s Charge—were portrayed romantically to represent an allegedly superior Anglo-Saxon society, culture, and people. Clearly, the romantic glorification of Pickett’s Charge fulfilled a host of much-needed political, moral, racial, and psychological requirements for generations of white Southerners. The fabrication of the romantic Lost Cause mythology found its greatest fulfillment in the heroic image of Pickett’s Charge (the doomed attackers in the romantic tradition of “The Charge of the Light Brigade”) to demonstrate the superiority of Virginia virtues.

Pickett’s Charge also represented the greatest what-if of American history. Only adding to the seemingly endless mythical qualities of Pickett’s Charge, Michael Shaara, in his novel The Killer Angels (1974), gave long-existing stereotypes new life, solidifying the most romantic Lost Cause legends. Then, the film Gettysburg (1994), which was based upon the popular novel, continued the glorification of Pickett’s Charge to a new generation.

As part of the Lost Cause romance that endlessly glorified sacrifice and decisive defeat, so the most romantic of Gettysburg myths was created to explain the attack’s failure: the war’s most glorious charge that allegedly never stood a chance of succeeding against superior numbers, logistics, and economic might (rather than Union courage and fighting spirit). Portrayed in the Lost Cause romance as the moral equivalent to ancient Anglo-Saxon knights, these Southern fighting men fell in a doomed assault like martyrs, valiantly sacrificing themselves in a Christ-like crucifixion: the fundamental basis of the doomed assault stereotype that was more culturally based than historically based.

However, Pickett’s Charge can be seen very differently without the blinding haze (more disorienting than the fog of war) of regional pride, glorification, and romance. Lee was so close to winning his most important victory that Longstreet was even congratulated for the success of the assault. Lee’s faithful staff officer Colonel Walter Herron Taylor emphasized in a December 1863 letter how close Pickett’s Charge came to succeeding. Indeed, much of the real truth of Pickett’s Charge can be best understood from the words of soldiers’ letters, especially leading officers, written at the time, before the emergence of politically and self-serving postwar Lost Cause romance became holy writ.

Ironically, in still another glaring omission, the historical and tactical antecedents of Pickett’s Charge have not been adequately explored by historians—another gap filled by this work. Most importantly, the overall purpose of this book will not be to present another outdated, traditional narrative of Pickett’s Charge. Instead the primary purpose has been to focus on the hidden history and forgotten or overlooked truths of the most famous attack in American history. The overall goal has been to present as many new aspects of America’s most famous attack as possible to go well beyond the pervasive myths, stereotypes, and romantic legends to reveal the truths about Pickett’s Charge. This approach has revealed some ugly truths, including widespread cowardice in the face of the enemy even before the assault’s beginning: the human side of the story of Pickett’s Charge. Consequently, all aspects (including the blemishes) of Pickett’s Charge will be presented in this work to tell the full story of this pivotal moment in America’s story.

Appreciating exactly how close the attackers actually came to splitting the Army of the Potomac in two, one Union general emphasized how the Confederacy nearly won its independence to a captive Virginia major not long after the assault was repulsed. The 9th Virginia Infantry’s adjutant placed the attack’s repulse in the proper historical perspective by writing how Pickett’s Charge was the Confederacy’s Waterloo. Like Napoleon’s decisive defeat at Waterloo, the repulse of Pickett’s Charge altered the course of history on both sides of the Atlantic. Pickett emphasized how if the great attack had been supported, then Lee’s army would have shortly marched into Washington, DC: no exaggeration as long assumed.

In contrast to the popularity of Lost Cause mythology, there was nothing romantic to its participants about Lee’s greatest attack. Nevertheless, even today’s most recent books about Pickett’s Charge have emphasized the word “glory” in the title or subtitle. But only hell on earth was experienced by more than 6,500 Southerners, who were killed, wounded, or permanently crippled on July 3, causing endless suffering to grieving families, widows, and orphans across the South. Quite simply, there was no glory to the victims of Pickett’s Charge.

Confederate Colonel William Allen emphasized how there was absolutely nothing rash or foolhardy about Lee’s attack, which would have succeeded if properly executed as planned. Contrary to the popular doomed assault scenario against the alleged impossible odds and impregnable position, Lee’s attackers significantly outnumbered the defenders (at least eight to one), but these would have been greater if Stuart’s thousands of cavalry had struck from the rear at the targeted copse of trees as planned.

Because so much of the story of Lee’s assault has been distorted and romanticized, this book has relied heavily upon wartime letters of the common soldiers. These letters were written before the agenda-driven writings dominated the postwar period to overshadow the facts. Consequently, this book will emphasize the human-interest side of Pickett’s Charge to present a highly personalized history. The author’s overall goal has been to de-romanticize and de-glorify the assault to provide a more realistic view. This book also has been written not only to present new tactical analysis, but also to finally end a long-existing debate: Did Lee commit his greatest folly by launching Pickett’s Charge?

After more than 150 years, the full story of Pickett’s Charge has been revealed in all of its many complexities and contradictions by presenting as much of its hidden history as possible: the first true comprehensive view of Pickett’s Charge by revealing Lee’s plan of Stuart’s cavalry attacking into the defender’s rear; the forgotten mini–civil war between the Irish (and Germans to a lesser extent) in blue and gray; the Virginia Military Institution’s significant influence; how the common soldiers—not always generals—on both sides rose to the fore in splendid fashion; the assault’s tactical antecedents; etc. These are just some representative examples of fresh perspectives that have filled long-existing gaps in the historical record. Because the story of this pivotal moment in American history has been shrouded in myth to this day, it is time for a new look at the most iconic charge in the annals of American history.

Phillip Thomas Tucker, PhD

Washington, DC

January 1, 2016

This book reproduces original correspondence of many Civil War–era soldiers and civilians. We apologize for the inconsistencies in spelling and capitalization, when set in modern context. In addition, the timing of some events varies from source to source, sometimes depending on what side the soldiers were on or how their watches were set.