⁶ The effect of asserting the new sayable that is a conditional (the practices for deploying which can be elaborated from inferential practices) is not to say that an act of inferring is permissible. For that one needs normative vocabulary, and the concepts of saying and inferring—expressed by vocabulary one need not master in order to master the use of conditionals. Rather, conditionals assert explicitly that one thing that can be said follows from another thing that can be said, that the one is a consequence of the other. In Lecture 4 (and further, early in 5), I discuss various sorts of semantic inferential relations among contents and their relation to pragmatic relations among deontic statuses, and say something about how to introduce the normative vocabulary that is VP-sufficient to specify this aspect of inferential practices. What I mean to be introducing here is the notion of a genus of relations of VP-sufficiency to express different aspects of practices PV-sufficient to deploy vocabularies. The relations between the aspects of practice made explicit by logical and modal vocabulary (those pertaining to the content expressed), on the one hand, and the different but complementary aspects made explicit by normative vocabulary (those pertaining to the act of expressing), on the other hand, are the topic of Lecture 6. Detailed consideration of the sense of “making explicit what is implicit” that is invoked here by the VP-sufficiency relation that constitutes the second half of the pragmatically mediated semantic relation of one’s vocabulary being LX for another must accordingly await clarification until then.