⁴ First published in 1948; reprinted at pp. 87–124 in J. Sicha (ed.), Pure Pragmatics and Possible Worlds: The Early Essays of Wilfrid Sellars (Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1980), hereafter PPPW. This slogan is a good place to start in thinking about Kant’s point, but in fact Sellars’s own view is subtly but importantly different from Kant’s. For Sellars, the laws determining the truth of counterfactuals involving the application of a concept are part of the content of the concept. For Kant, modal concepts make explicit not something implicit in the content of determinate concepts, but something implicit in their empirical use, in applying them to make empirical judgments. That is why the pure concepts of the understanding—what he calls ‘categories’, such as possibility and necessity—both are to be understood in terms of the forms of judgment (the table of categories derives from the table of judgments) and express synthetic, rather than analytic, necessities. From Kant’s point of view, a better slogan than Sellars’s would be “The Use of Concepts in Empirical Judgments as Involving Laws and Inconceivable Without Them.”