⁴ Put somewhat more carefully, I explore here an intimate sort of connection between (some) deontic modalities and (some) alethic modalities. Only ‘some’ in the first case, because (for instance) moral normativity can also be put in deontic terms, and I am only addressing the conceptual variety of normativity: norms governing the application of concepts. And only ‘some’ in the second case because the alethic modalities (necessities and possibilities) I am discussing are not, or are not restricted to, metaphysical necessities in the Kripkean sense. They include those involved in laws of nature that support counterfactuals that may not be metaphysically, but only physically, necessary. And they include other conceptual necessities such as those involving the incompatibility of color and shape properties that are harder to pin down. (I take it that it is a geometrical, rather than a physical fact that being rectangular and being circular are incompatible properties of plane figures. And it is not clear how to characterize the incompatibility of red and green.) The kind of alethic modality (because the kind of modal incompatibility) I am after cuts across a lot of the usual categorizations, because it is in play wherever material inferences have a range of counterfactual robustness. Any such range corresponds to a judgment as to what is and what is not possible, in the sense that matters for the kind of semantic contents I am concerned to think about vocabulary as expressing.