As an armour officer, General Adan was a keen advocate of a flexible defence that relied on a strong armoured force to mount rapid counterattacks at any point of incursion. His difficult task was to reconcile this with the requirement for a fixed linear defence along the canal itself to prevent the possibility of an Egyptian lodgement on the eastern bank. Within short order, General Adan’s team devised a comprehensive plan for the new field fortifications to be integrated with the bulk of the armoured forces deployed in the rear – the concept of Shovach Yonim. The plan called for some 20 fortifications that were to act only for early warning and self-defence against artillery and small unit infantry attack. These were to be sited and constructed to give a maximum degree of visual observation while exposing a minimum number of troops to enemy artillery fire: the need to reduce casualties remained paramount. As the canal was dead straight for much of its length, it was possible to observe to a distance of five kilometres in any direction. Accordingly, the observation posts were to be positioned at intervals of every 10km. At night, observation was to depend on an electronic warning system that tripped an alarm if enemy intruders broke the beam projected along the length of the waterline. In the event, the technology did not fulfil the requirement at the outset so night-time patrolling was necessary instead.
Each position was to have some 15 to 20 troops that could be augmented with more manpower in times of tension; in theory 30 men under the command of a field officer. Typically 75 per cent of the men would be combat infantrymen and the remainder administrative staff. Each defensive position comprised an area from as compact as 50 by 50m made of four interconnected firing posts with one at each corner of the compound to much larger complexes. Close by was an enclosed bunker for the weapons’ crews as protection against artillery fire. All the posts were connected by deep trenches, often with overhead cover of hessian material, to disguise movement and provide some much-needed shade against the sun, or curved armoured covers to provide protection against air-burst weapons. At the centre of the compound was a command bunker with strong overhead cover capable of resisting the heaviest calibre artillery weapons and most aerial bombs. In tiers beside the command bunker were the medical aid station, sleeping quarters and the mess hall. Separate latrines and showers were also provided. Each fortification had sufficient ammunition, food, water and medical supplies to enable the strongpoints to resist for several days if need be. Buried telephone wires as back-up communications augmented the radio links to headquarters.
One of the most important tasks for the soldiers of the Bar Lev Line was the continuous assessment of Egyptian troop dispositions and defence works on the west bank of the Suez Canal to forestall any incursion across the waterway. Observation towers and optical periscopes were in constant use as were the first generation of night observation devices for 24-hour surveillance. The War of Attrition was also notable for the first use of UAVs, or unmanned aerial vehicles, carrying reconnaissance cameras in combat.
During the 11 years it took to construct the Suez Canal, the spoil from the excavation was heaped along the eastern bank. Over the years this grew in height as more sand and mud from continual dredging of the canal was deposited on top. The strongpoints were built into and on top of this bank of solidified sand and mud, with further sand barriers around the positions to minimize enemy observation and protect against direct-fire weapons. In some positions, ramps were incorporated into the structure to allow attached tanks to be stationed so as to provide enfilade fire along the length of the waterway. Further tank firing positions were created in the sand rampart between the field fortifications to allow direct fire to be brought to bear against Egyptian positions on the opposite bank of the canal. Each fortified position had a parking area for vehicles, usually adjacent to the main gate, which was concealed from the enemy and where supply trucks could be unloaded and patrol vehicles kept and serviced if necessary. Extensive minefields and barbed-wire entanglements encircled each position to discourage ground attack and enemy infiltration.
In December 1968, General Adan submitted his plan to General Gavish as GOC Southern Command. The latter reiterated his requirement for more strongpoints in sensitive areas he had identified. When the plan was discussed at GHQ, the concept of combining the principles of a fixed and mobile defence was accepted by all those present, including generals Tal and Sharon although the latter suggested that the strongpoints on the canal be much smaller with only a couple of observers with infantry in bunkers further back from the waterline. In the event, the overall plan was approved with the Chief of Staff, General Bar Lev, adding a few more strongpoints at the northern and southern ends of the Canal Zone. In all, 31 field fortifications were to be built along the Suez Canal, Lake Timsah, the Bitter Lakes, the Gulf of Suez and on the Mediterranean Sea (see map on p. 27). Drawing on his experiences as a youth when he supervised the fortification of small isolated settlements in the Negev Desert during the War of Independence, General Adan called the strongpoints Maoz – the Hebrew word for a keep or the strongest structure in a castle.
Construction began immediately under the direction of the Israeli Engineering Corps employing thousands of soldiers, civilians and combat engineers and much of the plant equipment that Israel possessed. Work continued on a 24-hour basis. The design of the fortifications was kept as simple as possible to reduce costs with a layered system of overhead protection incorporating tiers of reinforced concrete blocks and steel railway ties for strength. The command bunkers and living accommodation were prefabricated and made from curved steel panels for maximum rigidity and strength; the whole structure being encased in rock gabions many metres thick in order to defeat artillery shells and direct fire weapons. In some areas such as potential crossing points, a cluster of fortifications was built with a principal position and several subsidiary observation posts. Progress was rapid due largely to the lull in the artillery bombardments of the Egyptian army. Completion of the strongpoints was scheduled for 15 March 1969.
CROSS-SECTION OF A MAOZ STRONGPOINTThis cross-section of a typical Maoz illustrates some of the principal features of a Bar Lev Line strongpoint with the Suez Canal at the extreme left. The slope of the sand rampart was designed to thwart any tracked vehicle and through the extensive use of barbed wire and anti-personnel mines to impede the progress of any heavily encumbered infantryman. Immediately overlooking the canal is an observation tower; obviously in times of tension or combat this exposed position was too dangerous to be manned. Close by is the command post buried beneath layers of rock gabions with a tall radio antenna. Deep trenches connected all the various positions to shield troops from observation and sniper fire as well as indirect weapons. The central position contains the accommodation bunker again protected by layers of rock gabions. To the right is an open firing pit, many of which dotted the Maoz while at far right is a fully protected machine-gun emplacement capable of firing in at least two directions to maximize fields of fire. Unlike most field fortifications that were built downwards into the ground for maximum protection, those of the Bar Lev Line were built upwards because of the high water table due to the Suez Canal close-by.
However, the Maozim were just one element in General Adan’s comprehensive revision of Dovecote. Along the waterline itself, the sand barrier was raised to a height of five to 10m and shaped at an angle of 45 degrees from the surface of the canal so as to impede any type of armoured fighting vehicle. The face of the sand barrier was studded with anti-personnel mines and barbed-wire entanglements to discourage fighting patrols. Patrol roads were constructed running parallel to the canal just behind the fortifications. These were paved to reduce the risks from mines planted by infiltrating Egyptian patrols. Supply roads to and from the fortifications were laid and linked up with the principal north–south road that lay some 10km inland. It was now paved along its length and widened to provide two-way traffic with numerous pre-registered artillery firing points immediately adjacent to the road. It also allowed tanks and artillery pieces to move rapidly along the length of the front. For this reason it became known as Artillery Road. It ran behind a ridge of sand hills that provided an important vantage point overlooking the canal and formed a vital defence line in time of war. A second north–south road was similarly upgraded that lay some 30km inland. Known as the Lateral Road, it linked the major supply bases of Tassa and Baluza that supported the forward field fortifications and reserve forces in time of war. It also acted as the main conduit to move large armoured formations from one sector to another while being beyond the range of Egyptian artillery. Between the Artillery and Lateral roads were a network or roads, running predominantly from east to west, underground headquarters, water storage facilities, communications bunkers, observation posts, stores depots and repair shops: indeed the whole panoply of an army in residence with the principal headquarters of Southern Command at Refidim, formerly Bir Gifgafa, in the middle of the Sinai Desert. Refidim also acted as the forward IAF base in the Sinai together with those at Etam, Etzion and Ras Nas Rani (later Ophir) on the Red Sea as well as Sharm el-Sheik as a naval base.