The whip came whistling down and cracked across the bloody, raw back of the young colonial dangling by his wrists from the tripod. “Five hundred,” said the drum major.
“No, it’s not,” thought the barely conscious victim. “It’s only 499. That’s one lash left, but instead of taking it, I’ll give it. One day I’ll pay you Lobsterbacks with interest.” In 1781 Daniel Morgan would do just that; indeed, he would give the British army “a devil of a whipping” at Cowpens, South Carolina.
Morgan received his flogging at the hands of the British Army during the Seven Years’ War, during which he served as a wagon driver, hauling supplies for the army. A dispute arose between Morgan and a young officer. Morgan’s behavior was judged to be insubordinate, and the officer ordered punishment. This kind of treatment helped convince Morgan that independence and self-government might be a good idea.
During the tumultuous years between 1761, when the Seven Years’ War ended, and 1775, Morgan lived on his farm in Frederick County, Virginia, and supplemented his income by keeping a tavern. He also became a leading local spokesman for independence.
When the conflict with Britain began in 1775, Morgan took decisive action, raising a company of riflemen to serve at the Siege of Boston. He later led his frontier marksmen in action at Quebec and Saratoga. Although a devoted and skillful soldier, Morgan was passed over for promotion time and again. His humble background, a source of pride for him, prevented the leaders in Congress from seeing his worth and ability. Finally, disgusted with his treatment, Morgan returned to his home in July 1779 and went back to farming. In August 1780 the Patriot army in South Carolina suffered a crushing defeat at Camden, leaving all the southern states open to British invasion. In the face of this emergency, Morgan rejoined the army.
The new Patriot commander in the South was Gen. Nathanael Greene. This Rhode Island native recognized the innate talent of Morgan and gave him command of half the army. The army was quite small, however, and this grand-sounding command actually meant Morgan had only about nine hundred men under him.
Greene made a bold decision as he surveyed the strategic situation. Although his army was smaller than the British force under Lord Cornwallis, Greene separated his forces. Morgan, with his half of the army, was sent to the west to hold in check the British attempts to expand on the frontier. Greene stayed in the east with a slightly larger force. If Cornwallis moved ahead in the middle, both Morgan and Greene would close in behind him. If Cornwallis attacked Greene, Morgan could counterattack on the frontier. If Cornwallis came after Morgan, Greene would be free to move on Charleston. This plan had a potential for success, but it was risky. Cornwallis, by a bold move, might manage to pin down and defeat the smaller Patriot units one at a time.
Confronting Morgan was the British cavalry leader Banistre Tarleton, a fierce man who commanded a mixed force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Many of Tarleton’s soldiers were Loyalists from New Jersey and New York.
Morgan commanded a small group of Patriot regulars— Continentals—from Maryland and Delaware, and a larger body of militia from North Carolina, Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia. Some of the militia had no combat experience, and Morgan was uncertain of their fighting ability, but many of the militiamen were veterans who had served a term as Continentals and had then reenlisted in the militia.
In a move much like poking a hornet’s nest with a stick, Morgan sent his cavalry under William Washington to attack British foraging parties and to wipe out small outposts. The cavalry attacks had the desired effect, and soon Banistre Tarleton was pounding down the available roads in pursuit of the Patriot forces.
Morgan was ready to fight Tarleton, but he knew he had to find the proper location. If there were swamps or heavy woods for cover, his raw militia would melt away to be seen no more. If the ground were too open, Tarleton’s horsemen would sweep around his flanks and overrun his men from the rear. So Morgan fell back, all the while looking for a place to fight. He found that place at Cowpens on January 17, 1781.
Cowpens was an open grazing ground where cattle were allowed to roam freely. The browsing animals kept down undergrowth and provided open views in all directions over several acres of ground. Also, the terrain gradually swept up toward a crest as one moved into the area. Morgan liked the location immediately. He could have his men under visual observation, and they would have clear fields of fire, but there were no swamps or thickets to tempt the raw militia to run for cover.
Morgan’s plan took advantage of the strengths of his men and minimized their weakness. The smallest group of militia, men from North Carolina and Georgia under Col. Charles McDowell, were placed in the front line. These men were told they were expected to fire two shots and then they were free to retreat. They were specifically asked to fire at British officers. Because many of these men were armed with rifles, they could fire at a long range and be safely out of the way of the enemy before the British came close enough for a bayonet attack. A second line of more experienced militia under Colonel Pickens would also damage the British advance with two shots before falling back behind the main line, which was composed of Continentals and seasoned militia under Colonel Howard and Major Triplett. William Washington had about one hundred twenty-five cavalry in reserve.
COL. LAOMMI BALDWIN of the twenty-sixth Massachusetts Infantry was the horticulturalist who developed the Baldwin apple. For nearly 150 years this was the most widely grown of all American apples.
Banistre Tarleton, in his typical fashion, marched his men all night in order to close in on the enemy. When the Patriot position was sighted, an attack was ordered without scouting. Tarleton expected his usual success against militia. When the British approached the advanced Patriot line under McDowell, many of the men fired several shots before falling back instead of only the two requested by Morgan. Many of the shots took British officers out of action—some reports say as many as 30 percent of the commanders fell. As McDowell’s line fell back, the advance of the British inevitably became disordered as some men went forward faster than others. Colonel Pickens’s experienced line was something of a surprise to these men, so Tarleton ordered a charge of his cavalry, his superweapon that had brought him victory so often before. This time the British cavalry met a counter-charge by Colonel Washington, and the Patriot dragoons swept the field.
With his cavalry in disarray, Tarleton still had to face the final line, the Continentals and Virginia militia. An exchange of musket volleys was followed by a bayonet charge by the Patriots. Fifteen minutes after the first shots were fired, the British survivors were in full flight. Tarleton had lost 841 out of 936 men. The Old Wagon Driver had paid back the missing lash—in Tarleton’s own words, Morgan had delivered “a devil of a whipping.”