TITLE PAGE. See Supplement, p. 234 (Pap. IV B 2:1, 3a:1).
Narrative. See Supplement, pp. 234-35 (Pap. IV B 16, 6).
EPIGRAPH. Benedict Spinoza, On the Improvement of the Understanding; Opera philosophica omnia, ed. August Gfroerer (Stuttgart: 1830; ASKB 788), p. 511; The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, I-II, tr. R.H.M. Elwes (London: Bell, 1909-12), II, p. 29. See Supplement, p. 235 (Pap. IV B 2:13).
1. The Hegelian system of philosophy.
2. A common Danish expression about any extraordinary situation or imminent overwhelming event. See Ludvig Holberg, Jule-Stue, V, and Hexerie Eller Blind Allarm, I, 3, Den Danske Skue-Plads, I-VII (Copenhagen: 1788; ASKB 1566-67), II, IV, no pagination. See also Postscript, KW XII (SV VII 314).
3. The phrases “without authority” and “does not have authority” appear in many of Kierkegaard’s works. See, for example, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, KW V (SV III 11, 271; IV 7, 73, 121; V 79).
1. Presumably Hafnia (harbor), the Latin name for Copenhagen (in Danish, København: market harbor). See Supplement, p. 235 (Pap. IV B 2:2).
2. See Fragments, title page.
3. See Historical Introduction, p. ix and note 2.
4. Frederiksberg Castle and Gardens, on the west side of what is now greater Copenhagen.
5. With reference to the following two sentences, see Supplement, p. 235 (Pap. IV B 3a:7); Stages, KW XI (SV VI 194).
6. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 236 (Pap. IV B 5:2).
7. Frederik O. Lange taught Greek in the Borgerdydsskole, which Kierkegaard attended. His doctoral dissertation was De casuum universis causis et rationibus commentatio grammatica (Copenhagen: 1836; ASKB 610). His Greek grammar for use in Danish schools, Det græske Sprogs Grammatik (3 ed., Copenhagen: 1830; ASKB 992), pp. 243-44, 249, 250, 262-64, covers the relations referred to in the following sentences.
8. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 236 (Pap. IV B 3a:9).
9. See Supplement, p. 236 (Pap. IV B 3a:10); also, for example, Anxiety, pp. 32, 129-32, KW VIII (SV IV 304, 396-99); Stages, KW XI (SV VI 171, 307, 353, 355).
10. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 236 (Pap. IV B 3a:11).
11. With reference to the following two sentences, see Supplement, p. 237 (Pap. IV B 3a:12).
12. See JP III 2309-15.
13. See Point of View, KW XXII (SV XIII 565).
14. Cf. Postscript, KW XII (SV VII 279-80, 335-36).
15. With reference to the following seven lines, see Supplement, p. 237 (Pap. IV B 3c).
1. See Supplement, p. 238 (Pap. IV B 2:18).
2. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 238 (Pap. IV B 4, 5:1).
3. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following two paragraphs, see Supplement, p. 238 (Pap. IV B 5:2).
4. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 239 (Pap. IV B 7:1).
5. See John 16:21.
6. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 239 (Pap. IV B 5:10).
7. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 239 (Pap. IV B 5:3, 7:2).
8. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 239 (Pap. IV B 7:3).
9. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, pp. 239-40 (Pap. IV B 5:4).
10. See Supplement, pp. 239-40 (Pap. IV B 5:4); G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, III, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, I-XVIII, ed. Philipp Marheineke et al. (Berlin: 1832-45; ASKB 549-65), XV, p. 335; Jubiläumsausgabe [J.A.], I-XXVI, ed. Hermann Glockner (Stuttgart: 1927-40), XIX, p. 335; Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy (tr. of G.P., 2 ed., 1843; Kierkegaard had 1 ed., 1833-36), I-III, tr. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (New York: Humanities Press, 1955), III, p. 224:
Descartes expresses the fact that we must begin from thought as such alone, by saying that we must doubt everything (De omnibus dubitandum est); and that is an absolute beginning. He thus makes the abolition of all determinations the first condition of Philosophy. This first proposition has not, however, the same signification as Scepticism, which sets before it no other aim than doubt itself, and requires that we should remain in this indecision of mind, an indecision wherein mind finds its freedom.
For Descartes’s view of doubt, see, for example, Discourse on Method, II, and Meditations on First Philosophy, I; Renati Des-Cartes opera philosophica (Amsterdam: 1678; ASKB 473), pp. 8, 11-12, 5; Descartes’ Philosophical Writings, ed. and tr. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1952), pp. 126, 129, 196:
In respect, however, of the opinions which I have hitherto been entertaining, I thought that I could not do better than decide on emptying my mind of them one and all, with a view to the replacing of them by others more tenable, or, it may be, to the readmitting of them, on their being shown to be in conformity with reason.
So, in like manner, in place of the numerous precepts which have gone to constitute logic, I came to believe that the four following rules would be found sufficient, always provided I took the firm and unswerving resolve never in a single instance to fail in observing them.
The first was to accept nothing as true which I did not evidently know to be such, that is to say, scrupulously to avoid precipitance and prejudice, and in the judgments I passed to include nothing additional to what had presented itself to my mind so clearly and so distinctly that I could have no occasion for doubting it.
It is now several years since I first became aware how many false opinions I had from my childhood been admitting as true, and how doubtful was everything I have subsequently based on them. Accordingly I have ever since been convinced that if I am to establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences, I must once for all, and by a deliberate effort, rid myself of all those opinions to which I have hitherto given credence, starting entirely anew, and building from the foundations up.
11. With reference to the following two sentences, see Supplement, p. 240 (Pap. IV B 5:5).
12. See Aristotle, Politics, 1312 a; Aristoteles graece, I-II, ed. Immanuel Bekker (Berlin: 1831; ASKB 1074-75), II, p. 1312; The Works of Aristotle, I-XII, ed. J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1908-52), X; JP IV 4418 (Pap. IV A 10).
13. See, for example, Hans Lassen Martensen, in a review article (Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, XVI, 1836, pp. 518-19) on Johan Ludvig Heiberg’s Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole (ed. tr.): “doubt is the beginning of wisdom. . . . Descartes had indeed expressed this thought and advanced the demand for a presuppositionless philosophy, but a long time was needed before the thought could be developed into a concept and before the expressed demand for a presuppositionless philosophy could actually be realized. The demand ‘de omnibus dubitandum est’ is not as easily done as said, because it does not demand a finite doubt, the popular doubt about this or that, whereby one always keeps something in reserve that is not drawn into the doubt.”
Kierkegaard’s notes (Pap. II C 18, p. 328) on Martensen’s lecture (Nov. 29, 1837) on Kant’s predecessors begin with a reference to Descartes: “Descartes (d. 1650) said: cogito ergo sum and de omnibus dubitandum est. He thereby produced the principle for modern Protestant subjectivity. By means of the latter proposition—de omnibus dubitandum est—he gave his essential watchword, for he thereby denoted a doubt not about this or that but about everything . . . .”
14. See, for example, Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke, II, pp. 64-65; J.A., II, pp. 72-73; The Phenomenology of Mind (tr. of P.G., 3 ed., 1841; Kierkegaard had 2 ed., 1832), tr. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper, 1967), pp. 136-37:
If we stick to a system of opinion and prejudice resting on the authority of others, or upon personal conviction, the one differs from the other merely in the conceit which animates the latter. Scepticism, directed to the whole compass of phenomenal consciousness, on the contrary, makes mind for the first time qualified to test what truth is; since it brings about a despair regarding what are called natural views, thoughts, and opinions, which it is a matter of indifference to call personal or belonging to others, and with which the consciousness, that proceeds straight away to criticize and test, is still filled and hampered, thus being, as a matter of fact, incapable of what it wants to undertake. . . . —The scepticism which ends with the abstraction “nothing” or “emptiness” can advance from this not a step farther, but must wait and see whether there is possibly anything new offered, and what that is—in order to cast it into the same abysmal void. When once, on the other hand, the result is apprehended, as it truly is, as determinate negation, a new form has thereby immediately arisen; and in the negation the transition is made by which the progress through the complete succession of forms comes about of itself.
See Supplement, p. 246 (Pap. IV B 2:4).
15. See, for example, Hegel, Geschichte der Philosophie, III, Werke, XV, pp. 334-35; J.A., XIX, pp. 334-35; History of Philosophy, III, pp. 223-24:
In Philosophy Descartes struck out quite original lines; with him the new epoch in Philosophy begins, whereby it was permitted to culture to grasp in the form of universality the principle of its higher spirit in thought, just as Boehme grasped it in sensuous perceptions and forms. Descartes started by saying that thought must necessarily commence from itself; all the philosophy which came before this, and specially what proceeded from the authority of the Church, was for ever after set aside. . . . In order to do justice to Descartes’ thoughts it is necessary for us to be assured of the necessity for his appearance; the spirit of his philosophy is simply knowledge as the unity of Thought and Being. . . . Descartes expresses the fact that we must begin from thought as such alone, by saying that we must doubt everything (De omnibus dubitandum est); and that is an absolute beginning. He thus makes the abolition of all determinations the first condition of Philosophy.
1. For a draft version of the opening of Chapter I, see Supplement, p. 240 (Pap. IV B 7:5).
2. See Supplement, p. 240 (Pap. IV B 7:6).
3. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, pp. 240-41 (Pap. IV B 7:7).
4. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the first line of the next paragraph, see Supplement, p. 241 (Pap. IV B 7:8).
5. With reference to the remainder of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 241 (Pap. IV B 7:9).
6. See Supplement, p. 241 (Pap. IV B 7:10).
7. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 241 (Pap. IV B 5:7).
8. According to legend, purple or violet-red dye was discovered by a dog rooting among sea-snails. See Practice in Christianity, KW XX (SV XII 191).
9. On the concept of “leap” in Kierkegaard’s writings and in his journals and papers, see JP III 2338-59 and p. 794; VII, p. 56.
10. With reference to the following three sentences, see Supplement, p. 242 (Pap. IV B 7:11).
11. With reference to the following two paragraphs, see Supplement, p. 242 (Pap. IV B 2:10).
12. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 242 (Pap. IV B 7:12).
13. With reference to an extended draft version of the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 242 (Pap. IV B 7:13).
14. The Danish term here is Moment, not Øieblik, which is usually translated “moment” and usually has a special meaning in Kierkegaard’s writings (see JP III 2739-44 and p. 821; VII, p. 62). Here “moment” is used as it is found in Hegel’s works: an element, a factor, or a particular in a whole, a constituent or a part of a unity. See, for example, Wissenschaft der Logik, Werke, III, pp. 108, 111, 121; J.A., IV, pp. 118, 121, 131; Hegel’s Science of Logic (tr. of W.L., Lasson ed., 1923; Kierkegaard had 2 ed., 1833-34), tr. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 105, 107, 116:
Becoming is the unseparatedness of being and nothing, not the unity which abstracts from being and nothing; but as the unity of being and nothing it is this determinate unity in which there is both being and nothing. But in so far as being and nothing, each unseparated from its other, is, each is not. They are therefore in this unity but only as vanishing, sublated moments. They sink from their initially imagined self-subsistence to the status of moments, which are still distinct but at the same time are sublated.
Grasped as thus distinguished, each moment is in this distinguishedness as a unity with the other. Becoming therefore contains being and nothing as two such unities, each of which is itself a unity of being and nothing; the one is being as immediate and as relation to nothing; and the other is nothing as immediate and as relation to being; the determinations are of unequal values in these unities.
Something is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity with its opposite; in this more particular signification as something reflected, it may fittingly be called a moment. In the case of the lever, weight and distance from a point are called its mechanical moments on account of the sameness of their effect, in spite of the contrast otherwise between something real, such as a weight, and something ideal, such as a mere spatial determination, a line. We shall often have occasion to notice that the technical language of philosophy employs Latin terms for reflected determinations, either because the mother tongue has no words for them or if it has, as here, because its expression calls to mind more that is immediate, whereas the foreign language suggests more what is reflected.
The more precise meaning and expression which being and nothing receive, now that they are moments, is to be ascertained from the consideration of determinate being as the unity in which they are preserved.
This mediation with itself which something is in itself, taken only as negation of the negation, has no concrete determinations for its sides; it thus collapses into the simple oneness which is being. Something is, and is, then, also a determinate being; further, it is in itself also becoming, which, however, no longer has only being and nothing for its moments. One of these, being, is now determinate being, and, further a determinate being. The second is equally a determinate being, but determined as a negative of the something—an other. Something as a becoming is a transition, the moments of which are themselves somethings, so that the transition is alternation—a becoming which has already become concrete.
15. With reference to the remainder of the sentence and the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 242 (Pap. IV B 7:14).
16. The issues of possibility and necessity, past, present, and future, only touched upon here, become an important part of Fragments. See especially “Interlude,” pp. 73-88 (SV IV 235-51).
17. For a continuation of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 243 (Pap. IV B 7:15).
18. With reference to the end of the paragraph and the following chapter heading, see Supplement, p. 243 (Pap. IV B 7:16).
1. With reference to the chapter title and the following three paragraphs, see Supplement, pp. 239-40, 243 (Pap. IV B 5:4, 2:17).
2. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 243 (Pap. IV B 7:17).
3. See p. 80 and note 35; Anxiety, p. 146, KW VIII (SV IV 411).
4. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 243 (Pap. IV B 2:6).
5. See Supplement, pp. 239-40 (Pap. IV B 5:4).
6. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 244 (Pap. IV B 7:19).
7. See Diogenes Laertius, IX, 63; Diogenis Laertii de vitis philosophorum, III (Leipzig: 1833; ASKB 1109), II, pp. 160-61; Diogen Laërtses filosofiske Historie, I-II, tr. Børge Riisbrigh (Copenhagen: 1812; ASKB 1110-11), I, p. 429; Lives of Eminent Philosophers, I-II, tr. R. D. Hicks (Loeb, New York: Putnam, 1925), II, p. 477.
8. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 244 (Pap. IV B 7:20).
9. See p. 95 and note 11.
10. See Supplement, p. 244 (Pap. IV B 7:21).
11. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 246 (Pap. IV B 2:4).
12. With reference to the following two sentences, see Supplement, p. 245 (Pap. IV B 7:22).
13. See Peter Michael Stilling, Philosophiske Betragtninger over den spekulative Logiks Betydning for Videnskaben (Copenhagen: 1842), pp. 9-11, 19-21, 38-42, 68-69.
14. See Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Perseus, no. 1, 1837 (ASKB 569), pp. 36-37, 39-40.
15. See, for example, Hegel, Phänomenologie, Werke, II, pp. 402-03; J.A., II, pp. 410-11; Phenomenology, pp. 554-55:
. . . here the first and foremost moment is Absolute Being, spirit absolutely self-contained, so far as it is simple eternal substance. But in the process of realizing its constitutive notion, which consists in being spirit, that substance passes over into a form where it exists for an other; its self-identity becomes actual Absolute Being, actualized in self-sacrifice; it becomes a self, but a self that is transitory and passes away. Hence the third stage is the return of self thus alienated, the substance thus abased, into its first primal simplicity. Only when this is done is spirit presented and manifested as spirit.
16. See Hegel, Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, Erster Theil, Die Logik,, para. 86, VI, p. 165; J.A. (System der Philosophie), VIII, p. 203; Hegel’s Logic (tr. of L., 3 ed., 1830; Kierkegaard’s ed., 1840, had the same text, plus Zusätze), tr. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 124:
Pure Being makes the beginning: because it is on one hand pure thought, and on the other immediacy itself, simple and indeterminate; and the first beginning cannot be mediated by anything, or be further determined.
All doubts and admonitions, which might be brought against beginning the science with abstract empty being, will disappear if we only perceive what a beginning naturally implies.
17. A servant in Ludvig Holberg’s Jean de France, Danske Skue-Plads, I, no pagination. See Irony, KW II (SV XIII 325, 484); Stages, KW XI (SV VI 88).
18. With reference to the following two sentences, see Supplement, p. 245 (Pap. IV B 7:26).
19. On the theme of authority, see JP I 182-92; VII, p. 8.
20. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 245 (Pap. IV B 7:27).
21. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 245 (Pap. IV B 7:28).
22. See Supplement, p. 246 (Pap. IV B 2:9).
23. See Supplement, p. 246 (Pap. IV B 2:4).
24. See Supplement, p. 246 (Pap. IV B 2:16).
25. See JP V 5209 (Pap. II A 36).
26. See p. 99 and note 21.
1. With reference to the following eight sentences, see Supplement, pp. 246-47 (Pap. IV B 2:3, 8:2,11).
2. See Diogenes Laertius, VIII, 10; Vitis, II, pp. 94-95; Riisbrigh, I, p. 368; Loeb, II, p. 329: “For five whole years they had to keep silence, merely listening to his discourses without seeing him, until they passed an examination, and thenceforward they were admitted to his house and allowed to see him.”
3. Diogenes of Sinope (c. 4 B.C.), archetype of the Greek Cynics. See Diogenes Laertius, VI, 36-37; Vitis, I, pp. 264-65; Riisbrigh, I, pp. 244-45; Loeb, II, pp. 37-39.
4. With reference to the following two sentences, see Supplement, p. 247 (Pap. IV B 8:4).
5. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 247 (Pap. IV B 8:6).
6. The source of this line has not been located. See Stages, KW XI (SV VI 163); Christian Discourses, KW XVII (SV X 77). Cf. Pap. X2 A 442; JP IV 4460 (Pap. X2 A 642).
1. See Supplement, pp. 247-48 (Pap. IV B 13:1, 9:2).
2. Theodor Gottlieb von Hippel, Lebensläufe nach aufsteigender Linie, I-III (Berlin: 1778-81; ASKB 1706-09).
3. For a continuation of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 248 (Pap. IV B 9:3).
4. With reference to the following four sentences, see Supplement, p. 248 (Pap. IV B 8:13).
5. With reference to the following two sentences, see Supplement, pp. 248-49 (Pap. IV B 5:9, 8:5, 8:12).
6. With reference to the remainder of the Introduction, see Supplement, p. 249 (Pap. IV B 8:10).
7. See Supplement, pp. 249-50 (Pap. IV B 2:5,7, 8:9).
1. See Supplement, pp. 250-51 (Pap. IV B 5:6, 13:4,12).
2. With reference to the remainder of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 252 (Pap. IV B 14:1).
3. With reference to the following ten paragraphs, see Supplement, p. 252 (Pap. IV B 10:6).
4. See Supplement, p. 252 (Pap. IV B 14:3).
5. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following eleven paragraphs, see Supplement, pp. 252-53 (Pap. IV B 10a).
6. With reference to the following seven paragraphs, see Supplement, p. 254 (Pap. IV B 10:1,9).
7. See pp. 81-83.
8. See Plato, Sophist, 236 e-264 b; Platonis quae exstant opera, I-XI, ed. Friedrich Ast (Leipzig: 1819-32; ASKB 1144-54), II, pp. 266-351; The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 979-1011, especially 237 a-b, 264 a-b, pp. 979-80, 1011:
STRANGER: . . . It is extremely hard, Theaetetus, to find correct terms in which one may say or think that falsehoods have a real existence, without being caught in a contradiction by the mere utterance of such words.
THEAETETUS: Why?
STRANGER: The audacity of the statement lies in its implication that ‘what is not’ has being, for in no other way could a falsehood come to have being. But, my young friend, when we were of your age the great Parmenides from beginning to end testified against this, constantly telling us what he also says in his poem, ‘Never shall this be proved—that things that are not are, but do thou, in thy inquiry, hold back thy thought from this way.
So we have the great man’s testimony, and the best way to obtain a confession of the truth may be to put the statement itself to a mild degree of torture. So, if it makes no difference to you, let us begin by studying it on its own merits.
STRANGER: Well then, since we have seen that there is true and false statement, and of these mental processes we have found thinking to be a dialogue of the mind with itself, and judgment to be the conclusion of thinking, and what we mean by ‘it appears’ a blend of perception and judgment, it follows that these also, being of the same nature as statement, must be, some of them and on some occasions, false.
9. See Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube, I-II (3 ed., Berlin: 1835; ASKB 258), I, pp. 27-30; The Christian Faith, tr. H. R. MacKIntosh and J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: Clark, 1928), pp. 22-24. On feelings and truth, see Schleiermacher, Ueber die Religion (Berlin: 1843; ASKB 271), p. 91; On Religion: Addresses in Response to Its Cultured Critics, tr. Terrence N. Tice (Richmond: Knox, 1969), p. 99: “Everything caught up in the immediacy of religion is true, for how could it be otherwise? But what is immediate? Only what has not yet been filtered through concepts but has emerged in feeling, fresh and uncontaminated.”
10. Zeitschrift für spekulative Theologie, 1838 (ASKB 354-57).
11. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1012 a; Bekker, II, p. 1012; Aristoteles Metaphysik, I-II, tr. Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg (Bonn: 1824; ASKB 1084), I, p. 77; Works, VIII: “While the doctrine of Heraclitus, that all things are and are not, seems to make everything true, that of Anaxagoras, that there is an intermediate between the terms of a contradiction, seems to make everything false; for when things are mixed, the mixture is neither good nor not-good, so that one cannot say anything that is true.” See Supplement, p. 254 (Pap. IV B 2:15).
12. Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, I-XI (Leipzig: 1798-1819; ASKB 815-26).
13. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 254 (Pap. IV B 10:10).
14. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 255 (Pap. IV B 10:14).
15. Vitis, I, p. 16; Riisbrigh, I, p. 15; Loeb, I, pp. 35-39, especially p. 37:
He held there was no difference between life and death. “Why then,” said one, “do you not die?” “Because,” said he, “there is no difference.” To the question which is older, day or night, he replied: “Night is the older by one day.” Some one asked him whether a man could hide an evil deed from the gods: “No,” he replied, “nor yet an evil thought.” To the adulterer who inquired if he should deny the charge upon oath he replied that perjury was no worse than adultery. Being asked what is difficult, he replied, “To know oneself.” “What is easy?” “To give advice to another.” “What is most pleasant?” “Success.” “What is the divine?” “That which has neither beginning nor end.”
16. With reference to the following three paragraphs, see Supplement, p. 255 (Pap. IV B 14:6). With reference to the remainder of the chapter, see Supplement, pp. 255-56 (Pap. IV B 10:11).
17. In De omnibus, Johannes Climacus uses “actuality” and “reality” (Virkelighed, Realitet) synonymously, a practice not followed in the other pseudonymous and signed works. Here “reality” signifies “actuality” (the spatial-temporal). See JP III 3651-55 and pp. 900-03.
18. With reference to the following five paragraphs, see Supplement, p. 256 (Pap. IV B 13:18).
19. See JP III 3281 (Pap. III A 11).
20. In Fragments, pp. 46, 101, 108-09, and Postscript, KW XII (SV VII 20, 170-72, 261, 264, 271, 284, 287, 299, 301, 365-66, 389, 497, 526), Johannes Climacus uses the terms “contradiction” (Modsigelse), “principle of contradiction” (Contradictionsprincip, Modsigelsens Grundsætning), and “self-contradiction” (Selvmodsigelse) to designate a logical principle governing the relation of ideas. Here in De omnibus, Climacus uses “contradiction” in discussing the nature of consciousness and the relation of thought (and language) and thing, ideality and reality (actuality).
In discussing “the purely ideal” and the “object of immediate perception or intuition,” the abstract (ideal) and the concrete (real), Frederik Christian Sibbern (1785-1872), professor of philosophy at the University of Copenhagen when Kierkegaard was a student, used the term “opposition” or “contrast” (Modsætning) rather than “contradiction” in his Logik som Tænkelære (Copenhagen: 1835; ASKB 777; pp. 61-64, 89-90). Inasmuch as “contrast” rather than “contradiction” seems to be a more appropriate term here in De omnibus, a clue to the use of “contradiction” must be sought elsewhere than in Sibbern. The most likely source is Hegel’s Phänomenologie, Werke, II, p. 67; J.A., II, p. 75; Phenomenology, p. 139, to which Climacus refers without mentioning the title (see note 26 below). The first section is on “consciousness,” and in the Introduction Hegel states that the entire work is concerned with “relating science to phenomenal knowledge,” which in other terms is Climacus’s question.
This exposition, viewed as a process of relating science to phenomenal knowledge, and as an inquiry and critical examination into the reality of knowing, does not seem able to be effected without some presupposition which is laid down as an ultimate criterion. For an examination consists in applying an accepted standard, and, on the final agreement or disagreement therewith of what is tested, deciding whether the latter is right or wrong; and the standard in general, and so science, were this the criterion, is thereby accepted as the essence or inherently real (Ansich). But, here, where science first appears on the scene, neither science nor any sort of standard has justified itself as the essence or ultimate reality; and without this no examination seems able to be instituted.
This contradiction [ed. italics] and the removal of it will become more definite if, to begin with, we call to mind the abstract determinations of knowledge and of truth as they are found in consciousness. Consciousness, we find, distinguishes from itself something, to which at the same time it relates itself; or, to use the current expression, there is something for consciousness; and the determinate form of this process of relating, or of there being something for a consciousness, is knowledge. But from this being for another we distinguish being in itself or per se; what is related to knowledge is likewise distinguished from it, and posited as also existing outside this relation; the aspect of being per se or in itself is called Truth.
21. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 256 (Pap. IV B 14:7).
22. See note 17 above.
23. For an extension of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 256 (Pap. IV B 14:8).
24. With reference to the following two sentences, see Supplement, p. 257 (Pap. IV B 14:9).
25. With reference to the following three sentences, see Supplement, p. 257 (Pap. IV B 10:5,7). With reference to the following paragraph and footnote, see Supplement, pp. 257-58 (Pap. IV B 10:12).
26. See Hegel, Phänomenologie, Werke, II, pp. 73, 131, 174; J.A., II, pp. 81, 139, 182; Phenomenology, pp. 147, 215, 269: “A Consciousness”; “B Self-Consciousness”; “C [Free Concrete Mind] (AA) Reason.”
27. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 258 (Pap. IV B 10:2,13; 13:2).
28. With reference to the following three sentences, see Supplement, p. 258 (Pap. IV B 10:15).
29. See, for example, Postscript, KW XII (SV VII 161, 165, 269-72); JP I 197; II 2283 (Pap. IV C 100, 99).
30. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, pp. 259-60 (Pap. IV B 2:12; 5:8,13,15; 13:2,9,10,18,19). Cf., for example, JP I 778 (Pap. VIII1 A 7): “It is claimed that arguments against Christianity arise out of doubt. This is a total misunderstanding. The arguments against Christianity arise out of insubordination, reluctance to obey, mutiny against all authority. Therefore, until now the battle against objections has been shadowboxing, because it has been intellectual combat with doubt instead of being ethical combat against mutiny.”
31. See pp. 81-83.
32. With reference to the following sentence and the next paragraph, see Supplement, p. 260 (Pap. IV B 10:3,4,8).
33. On the Hegelian term “moment,” see p. 140 and note 14.
34. The work was not completed. For items from sketches of contemplated portions, see Supplement, pp. 260-66.