Farewell to Epistemic Angst
The goal in this final part of the book is to bring together the main threads of discussion from the previous three parts to offer a unified solution—a biscopic proposal, as I describe it (for reasons that will become apparent)—to the two formulations of the radical skeptical problem that we have been engaging with. To this end, we will need to revisit some of the key points raised in the previous three parts in order to set the scene for our resolution of radical skepticism. Once the solution has been expounded, we will then explore it further by considering some natural objections that might be raised for the view and comparing it with rival proposals.
1. Recap: The Problem of Radical Skepticism
We will begin by reminding ourselves of the main features of the radical skeptical problem that we have set out. First, let’s look again at the two formulations of the radical skeptical paradox that we offered. Here is the triad of collectively inconsistent claims that is at issue in the closureRK-based version of the radical skeptical paradox:
THE CLOSURERK-BASED RADICAL SKEPTICAL PARADOX
(SC1) One is unable to have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses.
(SC2) The closureRK principle.
(SC3) One has widespread rationally grounded everyday knowledge.
The closureRK principle at issue in (SC2) is in turn formulated as follows:
THE CLOSURERK PRINCIPLE
If S has rationally grounded knowledge that p, and S competently deduces from p that q, thereby forming a belief that q on this basis while retaining her rationally grounded knowledge that p, then S has rationally grounded knowledge that q.
The closureRK-based version of the radical skeptical problem is a putative paradox precisely because all three of the claims that make up this problem are highly intuitive (especially given that this puzzle is cast in terms of rationally grounded knowledge). And yet, of course, they can’t possibly all be true.
Now consider the collectively inconsistent triad of claims that we saw constitutes the underdeterminationRK-based version of the radical skeptical paradox:
THE UNDERDETERMINATIONRK-BASED SKEPTICAL PARADOX
(SU1) One cannot have rational support that favors one’s belief in an everyday proposition over an incompatible radical skeptical hypothesis.
(SU2) The underdeterminationRK principle.
(SU3) One has widespread rationally grounded everyday knowledge.
The underdeterminationRK principle at issue in (SU2) is formulated as follows:
THE UNDERDETERMINATIONRK PRINCIPLE
If S knows that p and q describe incompatible scenarios, and yet S lacks a rational basis that favors p over q, then S lacks rationally grounded knowledge that p.
Again, we have a putative paradox on our hands here, in that all three claims that make up the underdeterminationRK-based version of the radical skeptical problem are highly intuitive (especially given that this puzzle is cast in terms of rationally grounded knowledge), and yet they can’t all be true.
We saw in part 1 that although these two skeptical puzzles are closely related to one another, they are in fact logically distinct. In particular, we argued that the closureRK principle is in an important sense logically stronger than the underdeterminationRK principle, in that it in effect demands that one be able to have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses as opposed to merely being in possession of rational support that favors one’s everyday beliefs over radical skeptical alternatives. More generally, we noted that the logical differences between these two radical skeptical puzzles meant that we shouldn’t take it for granted that an adequate response to the one form of radical skeptical paradox was thereby a response to the other.
We noted too that the underdeterminationRK principle is a very weak epistemic principle, in that it is equivalent to what we termed the rational ground* principle:
THE RATIONAL GROUND* PRINCIPLE
If S has a rationally grounded belief that p, and S knows that p entails q, then S lacks a rational basis for belief that not-q.
This principle demands that one cannot have an all-things-considered rational basis to believe both a proposition and a known to be incompatible alternative, and hence that having such a rational basis for believing a proposition entails lacking a rational basis for believing the alternative. So, for example, one cannot have an all-things-considered rational basis for believing both that one has hands and that one is a handless BIV, such that if one has such a rational basis for believing that one has hands, then one lacks a rational basis for believing that one is a handless BIV. Note just how weak this claim is. It is not the claim that one has a rational basis for believing that one is not a handless BIV, but rather the claim that one lacks a rational basis for believing that one is a handless BIV. And yet such an undemanding principle turns out to be logically equivalent to the underdeterminationRK principle, which demonstrates just how weak the latter principle is.
We also noted that these two logically distinct radical skeptical paradoxes trade on two very different core ideas about the nature of rational support. The closureRK-based radical skeptical paradox appeals to what we called the universality of rational evaluation thesis. This is the idea that there is no in principle limitation on rational evaluation, such that global rational evaluations are perfectly legitimate. A commitment to this thesis is reflected in the closureRK-based skeptical challenge in that it makes use of closureRK-based inferences that take us from the kind of local rational evaluations at issue when we rationally evaluate our everyday beliefs to the wholesale rational evaluations that are in play when we consider the radical skeptical hypotheses that are known to be inconsistent with these everyday beliefs.
In contrast, the underdeterminationRK-based radical skeptical paradox turns on a very different idea about the nature of reasons, which we labeled the insularity of reasons thesis. This is the claim that the rational support that we have for our everyday beliefs about the world around us is by its nature such that it is compatible with one’s beliefs being radically false. As we saw, this thesis is manifested in terms of the widespread endorsement of the new evil demon intuition. It is a commitment to the insularity of reasons thesis that underwrites (SU1) in the underdeterminationRK-based radical skeptical paradox. More specifically, underdeterminationRK-based radical skepticism turns upon this thesis since without it the underdeterminationRK principle doesn’t have any radical skeptical import.
We also distinguished between responses to radical skepticism that are undercutting and those that are overriding. In short, what makes a response radical skepticism undercutting is that it maintains that it is not a bona fide paradox at all, but rather smuggles contentious theoretical claims into the setup of the skeptical argument, disguised as common sense. Overriding anti-skeptical strategies, in contrast, grant that the skeptical problem is a genuine paradox—in the sense that it is arising out of our most fundamental epistemological commitments, but argue nonetheless that we have adequate independent grounds to offer the kind of epistemic revisionism that would block the skeptical argument. We argued that undercutting anti-skeptical strategies are to be preferred to overriding anti-skeptical strategies, all things considered.
We offered some further desiderata when it came to anti-skeptical strategies. Given the plausibility of the underdeterminationRK and closureRK principles, we would ideally want a response to radical skepticism that found a way of retaining these principles. In particular, we argued that an optimal response would enable us to exploit the logical difference between the two skeptical arguments noted above. That is, we would find a way to argue, contra the insularity of reasons thesis, that we do have rational support for our quotidian knowledge that favors the proposition believed over radical skeptical alternatives. We would thus be able to block underdeterminationRK-based radical skepticism without having to reject the underdeterminationRK principle. At the same time, it would be preferable to nonetheless demur from claiming that we have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses. The challenge would therefore be to find a way of taking this line while at the same time retaining the closureRK principle and yet even so evading the closureRK-based radical skeptical paradox.
On the face of it this looks to be an impossible set of desiderata, particularly this last move regarding closureRK-based radical skepticism. On this score, the thought would be to somehow disentangle the closureRK principle from the universality of rational evaluation thesis, such that we could retain the former while denying the latter. That is, we allow the general principle that where belief is acquired by making competent deductions from one’s rationally grounded knowledge, then that belief amounts to rationally grounded knowledge, while nonetheless insisting, on a principled basis, that there are limits to the extent of one’s rational evaluations, such that one cannot acquire rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses in this fashion.
Finally, we noted that we would ideally want an integrated treatment of these two radical skeptical problems. For even though these problems turn on epistemic principles that are logically distinct, they are nonetheless clearly closely related difficulties. In particular, an anti-skeptical strategy that dealt with only one of these problems would not be intellectually satisfying. Furthermore, if one offered responses to each of these problems that turned out to be in tension with one another, then that would clearly be problematic.
We thus have two radical skeptical paradoxes, both of which look on the face of it hard to respond to (and which will almost certainly require their own anti-skeptical strategy). Moreover, we also have a set of anti-skeptical desiderata that looks like an aspiration for the impossible. Nonetheless, we will now see that there is a way of offering a response to these two radical skeptical paradoxes that adequately disarms both skeptical puzzles, and does so in an integrated and mutually supportive fashion.
2. The Biscopic Proposal: Epistemic Angst Avoided
Recall the Wittgensteinian position that we outlined in part 2. This was primarily a response to the closureRK-based formulation of the skeptical paradox. On the specific rendering of the position that we settled upon it responded to this paradox in a distinctive way by arguing that one could reject (SC2) while nonetheless retaining the closureRK principle that is alleged to underwrite it. With (SC2) rejected, one is then in a position to endorse the highly intuitive (SC1). Indeed, it was an explicit part of this Wittgensteinian position to embrace (SC1), since on this view it was part of the very nature of the rational support that our beliefs enjoy that one could not have rationally supported knowledge of the denials of skeptical hypotheses. This was because the denials of skeptical hypotheses codify our über hinge commitment that we are not radically and fundamentally mistaken in our beliefs, and we saw that it was core to this proposal that our commitments to propositions which codify the über hinge commitment—that is, our hinge commitments—were by their nature exempt from rational evaluation.
Interestingly, it was precisely because of the essentially arational nature of our hinge commitments that our inability to know the denials of skeptical hypotheses was not, via the closureRK principle, in tension with our widespread rationally grounded knowledge of everyday propositions. The closureRK principle, after all, concerns rationally grounded knowledge, and thus rationally grounded belief, that is acquired via the rational process of competent deduction from prior rationally grounded knowledge. And yet our hinge commitments cannot be the result of any rational process, but rather express prior visceral commitments on our part, commitments that must be in place in order to create the rational arena in which rational evaluations function. This is why it is a mistake to even conceive of our hinge commitments as being (knowledge-apt) beliefs, since a propositional attitude that is in principle insensitive to rational considerations cannot be a (knowledge-apt) belief.
The upshot is that one can retain the closureRK principle while also endorsing (SC1) and (SC3). The problem lies rather with (SC2), and in particular with the claim that (SC2) is underwritten by the closureRK principle. The closureRK principle has application only to competent deductions that generate rationally grounded knowledge, and thus rationally grounded belief, from prior rationally grounded knowledge. But this means that this principle simply has no application to our hinge commitments, such as our commitments to the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses. It follows that one cannot derive, via the closureRK principle, the claim at issue in (SC2) that if one is unable to have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of skeptical hypotheses, then one must lack rationally grounded knowledge of everyday propositions.
At the heart of this Wittgensteinian anti-skeptical proposal is the idea that all rational evaluation is an essentially local phenomenon. More specifically, the claim is that the very possibility of rationally evaluating one’s beliefs presupposes arational hinge commitments that are beyond rational evaluation. Indeed, Wittgenstein argues that it is in the nature of rational support that it be local in this fashion, such that the very idea of a universal rational evaluation (whether positive or negative, Moorean or radically skeptical) is simply incoherent, and the product of faulty theorizing. This is why our commitments to the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses are not in the market for being rationally grounded knowledge (indeed, given that these commitments are not knowledge-apt beliefs, they are not in the market for knowledge simpliciter).
More generally, on this view the universality of rational evaluation thesis—which we have seen is presupposed in closureRK-based radical skepticism—is rejected, and rejected because it is exposed as being the product of defective philosophy masquerading under the guise of common sense. The shift from ordinary local rational evaluations to the kind of wholesale rational evaluations that take place when one, for example, considers radical skeptical hypotheses is not a harmless extension of scope, but rather a shift from an intelligible practice rooted in our ordinary epistemic practices to one that is simply incoherent. Since all rational evaluation presupposes arational hinge commitments that are by their nature exempt from rational evaluation, this puts an in principle constraint on the extent of rational evaluations. In particular, it excludes the kind of wholesale rational evaluations that call into question our hinge commitments, and that are the stock in trade of the radical skeptic.
Hence, the universality of rational evaluation thesis has to go. The Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation shows us why an unrestricted version of this thesis is untenable, since it exposes its dubious philosophical commitments. But rejecting this thesis (so construed) does not require us to reject, or otherwise refine, the closureRK principle since, as we have just noted, when our hinge commitments are properly understood they cannot play the role required by the radical skeptic in closureRK-based inferences.1
On the face of it, the Wittgensteinian conception of the structure of rational evaluation is antithetical to the epistemological disjunctivist account according to which rational support can be factive. Whereas the former view emphasizes the essential limitations of rational evaluation, the latter view holds in contrast that in an important sense reasons are not as limited as we hitherto (guided by a faulty philosophical picture) supposed. On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that there is no essential conflict between these two accounts. Rational evaluation could be essentially local in the Wittgensteinian sense, and yet reasons could also be factive in the way that epistemological disjunctivism describes. What would be ruled out by combining these views would be the possibility that our hinge commitments could be rationally evaluated, such that we can have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses. On the combined view, reasons could still be factive, but only when set within local rational evaluations.
The mere logical compatibility of these two views is not primarily what interests us, however. Rather, what we seek is a way of combining these proposals such that they are mutually supportive. We have already seen in outline how thinking of factive reasons as also being embedded within essentially local rational evaluations can help epistemological disjunctivism. In particular, we noted in the last chapter that epistemological disjunctivists would ideally like to exploit the logical gap between the following two claims:
(i) The rational support one’s everyday perceptual beliefs enjoy factively favors those beliefs over radical skeptical alternatives.
(ii) One’s commitments to the denials of skeptical hypotheses are to be understood in terms of rationally grounded—indeed, factively rationally grounded—knowledge.
Epistemological disjunctivists actively endorse (i), but would rather avoid thereby also endorsing (ii), which is a far less plausible claim, one that seems to incorporate an undue degree of epistemic immodesty.
Treating rational support, even factive rational support, as embedded within essentially local rational evaluations offers a way of retaining (i) while rejecting (ii). The route to (ii), after all, goes via a closureRK-style inference, and on the Wittgensteinian account of rational evaluation this principle simply has no application to hinge commitments such as our commitments to the denials of skeptical hypotheses. By allying themselves to the Wittgensteinian account of rational evaluations, then, epistemological disjunctivists are thereby free to respond to the closureRK-based skeptical argument by rejecting not (SC1) but rather (SC2). Moreover, they can do so while retaining their support for the closureRK principle. What is rejected is thus not our powerful intuitions in support of (SC1) or the closureRK principle, but rather the theoretical presuppositions about the nature of rational evaluations (i.e., their universality) that inform the way in which the closureRK principle is held to generate (SC2).
The Wittgensteinian account of rational evaluations can thus be combined with epistemological disjunctivism in order to make the latter a more compelling response to the problem of radical skepticism, one that can accommodate both closureRK-and underdeterminationRK-based formulations of radical skepticism. Importantly, the support relations between these two anti-skeptical proposals also flow in the opposite direction, in that by adding epistemological disjunctivism to the Wittgensteinian account of rational evaluations the latter is better placed to deal with some of the difficulties that it faces.
In particular, recall from part 2 that one fundamental worry about the Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation is that while it fares well when applied to closureRK-based radical skepticism (because it offers a principled basis on which to reject the universality of rational evaluation thesis), it struggles with underdeterminationRK-based radical skepticism. As we saw, merely noting the essential locality of rational evaluations does not give one any purchase at all on the concern that the rational support that our everyday beliefs enjoy fails to favor those beliefs over skeptical alternatives. Relatedly, noting that our commitments to the denials of skeptical hypotheses are not in the market for knowledge (much less rationally grounded knowledge) is by the by in this regard, since the underdeterminationRK claim employed by the radical skeptic does not presuppose that one should be able to have knowledge of these propositions (the latter being a logically stronger claim).
But when the thesis that rational evaluations are essentially local is combined with the factivity of reasons thesis as expressed by epistemological disjunctivism, a response to the underdeterminationRK-based skeptical argument immediately becomes available. In particular, it is now no longer true that the rational support one’s everyday beliefs enjoy must be such as to fail to favor those beliefs over radical skeptical alternatives, as this formulation of the skeptical problem contends. By allying the Wittgensteinian account of rational evaluations to epistemological disjunctivism, one can in a principled way reject the insularity of rational evaluation thesis and thereby resist underdeterminationRK-based radical skepticism.
The addition of epistemological disjunctivism to the Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluations is also advantageous on another front. To be told that all rational evaluation is essentially local can at least sound like a fairly fundamental concession to radical skepticism. As we saw in part 2, we need to understand this claim in terms of a wider thesis about how radical skepticism, and standard forms of anti-skepticism too, are buying into a theoretical picture about the nature of rational evaluations which is simply untenable. Thus what looks like a severe limitation on the nature of the rational support enjoyed by our beliefs is in fact no such thing, as rational evaluations simply could not function as the radical skeptic/traditional anti-skeptic supposes. Even so, the claim that rational evaluations are essentially local is much easier to live with if it is combined with the claim that reasons can be factive. For if it is both the case that all rational evaluations are local and that all rational support is insular (in line with the insularity of reasons thesis), then that is clearly to offer a much weaker thesis about the nature of the rational support enjoyed by our beliefs than would be the case if factive rational support were held to be available.
Notice too that the undercutting elements of these two anti-skeptical strategies are also mutually supportive. On the one hand, the Wittgensteinian claim that the closureRK-based skeptical argument trades on an illicit commitment to (an unrestricted version of) the universality of rational evaluation thesis undercuts the motivation for the closureRK-based skeptical paradox. On the other hand, the epistemological disjunctivist claim that the underdeterminationRK-based skeptical argument trades on an unsupported commitment to the insularity of reasons thesis undercuts the motivation for the underdeterminationRK-based skeptical paradox. Collectively, then, both formulations of the skeptical paradox are shown to rest on contentious theoretical assumptions that we should discard.
I call this combined account a biscopic proposal. The reason for this is that it conveys the essential features of how I understand the skeptical problem and its resolution. For if my take on the skeptical paradox is correct, then we have in effect been viewing it hitherto through, as it were, one eye only. Without realizing, we have been inspecting the skeptical problem first through the lens of closureRK-based skepticism (unwittingly guided by the universality of rational evaluation thesis), and then again through the different lens of underdeterminationRK-based skepticism (unwittingly guided, this time, by the insularity of reasons thesis), without realizing that these are importantly different formulations of the skeptical problem. In short, we have been engaging with the relevant philosophical terrain while lacking an accurate representation of that terrain. This has meant, for example, that we have evaluated the effectiveness of different anti-skeptical approaches without both eyes on the problem, which is why we have tended to overestimate—and in some cases, such as the Wittgensteinian and epistemological disjunctivist approaches, underestimate, or at least misunderstand—their import to this philosophical difficulty.
The biscopic approach to the problem set out here, in contrast, recognizes that there are two distinct formulations of the skeptical problem on display. Accordingly, it explicitly acknowledges that this problem needs a dual solution, one where the two anti-skeptical proposals are not merely combined, but also fully integrated, as two lines of sight might be. The result is a fully fledged response to the problem of radical skepticism, at least as that problem is typically understood in contemporary epistemology. Epistemic angst has thus been avoided.
3. Some Anti-skeptical Contrasts
We are now in a position to revisit some of the specific anti-skeptical accounts that we have encountered while setting out our own stall to see exactly how they are deficient relative to the biscopic proposal offered here. In particular, it will be useful to reconsider those views that we saw in chapter 6 offered some anti-skeptical mileage with regard to at least one of the formulations of radical skepticism.
Let’s begin with rational support contextualism. Recall that this proposal contended that the extent of the rational support enjoyed by one’s beliefs depended on the context of epistemic appraisal. In particular, relative to everyday contexts of epistemic appraisal, this rational support can be factive, but relative to skeptical contexts of epistemic appraisal it will be nonfactive. The upshot of this point is that whether or not an ascription of knowledge expresses a truth will depend on whether the context of epistemic appraisal is skeptical or everyday. In particular, if it is the former, then the ascription will likely express a falsehood. We thus get a particular rendering of the attributer contextualism that we encountered in chapter 2.
We saw that this proposal struggles to deal with underdeterminationRK-based radical skepticism, at least when compared with epistemological disjunctivism. If we can make sense of the idea that agents can have factive rational support for their beliefs, then what is gained by incorporating this thesis into a contextualist proposal that makes core concessions to the radical skeptic? In particular, if we buy the undercutting anti-skeptical line that epistemological disjunctivism offers us as regards the underdeterminationRK-based radical skeptical paradox, then what possible motivation could there be to concede that relative to skeptical contexts of epistemic appraisal ascriptions of knowledge tend to express falsehoods?
We also noted, however, that the dialectical situation becomes much more complicated once we bring in closureRK-based radical skepticism, and it is easy to see why. After all, if the epistemological disjunctivist extends her anti-skeptical line to this form of radical skepticism by contending that we can have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses, then it can look like an unduly strong response to the problem of radical skepticism. As we noted, epistemological disjunctivism, so construed, seems committed to embracing a kind of epistemic immodesty, in that intuitively we are unable to have rationally grounded knowledge of these propositions.
In contrast, according to rational support contextualism, the context of epistemic appraisal in which radical skeptical hypotheses are raised is one in which factive rational support is no longer possessed, and thus one in which ascriptions of knowledge will tend to express falsehoods. As a result, this proposal can avoid making the kind of unduly bold anti-skeptical claim that the epistemological disjunctivist seems committed to. Rational support contextualism is thus on this front at least epistemically modest.
Rational support contextualism therefore has advantages over epistemological disjunctivism when it comes specifically to closureRK-based radical skepticism. The dialectical situation changes somewhat, however, once we combine epistemological disjunctivism with the Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation as part of our biscopic proposal. For on the biscopic view we are now in a position to also demur from the epistemically immodest claim that we can have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses. It remains the case that the rational support paradigmatically enjoyed by one’s perceptual beliefs is factive, and of course such factive rational support will provide the agent with a rational basis that decisively favors those everyday perceptual beliefs over skeptical alternatives. But, crucially, there is now no route from this claim to the stronger, and epistemically immodest, thesis that one has a factive rational basis for believing the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses. This claim is blocked by the Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation. There is thus no reason for preferring rational support contextualism over our biscopic anti-skeptical proposal, since the latter fares better than the former as regards both formulations of radical skepticism.
Moreover, notice that the Wittgensteinian account of why we are unable to have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses engages with the radical skeptical problem at a much greater level of depth than rational support contextualism. The Wittgensteinian claim is motivated via appeal to a rich undercutting anti-skeptical diagnosis that highlights the essential role of hinge commitments in our systems of rational evaluation. Rational support contextualism, in contrast, merely offers us a relatively thin anti-skeptical diagnosis that appeals to the very particular epistemic standards that are at issue in specifically skeptical contexts of epistemic appraisal. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the way rational support contextualism grants the legitimacy of the skeptical context of epistemic appraisal, whereas the Wittgensteinian approach explains why the very idea of such a kind of universal epistemic appraisal is incoherent.
Inferential contextualism, which we encountered in chapter 4, arguably fares better than rational support contextualism on this score, in that at least it recognizes the relevance of Wittgenstein’s discussion of hinge commitments to the radical skeptical problem. As we saw in chapter 4, however, this proposal goes awry in offering a faulty conception of these commitments, in particular to the extent that it allows that the radical skeptic inhabits a legitimate context of epistemic appraisal that incorporates its own specific hinge commitments. We argued in chapter 4 that the very idea of such a legitimate skeptical context of epistemic assessment is problematic even by the lights of inferential contextualism (because even the skeptical hinge commitments need to be at least true if the context is to be legitimate, and yet if inferential contextualism is right then they simply cannot be true). In any case, it is certainly problematic by our lights, since on the account of hinge commitments that we have offered the radical skeptic is attempting a kind of rational evaluation that is simply impossible. As we just noted with regard to rational support contextualism, we can thus straightforwardly dismiss such a context of epistemic appraisal as incoherent.
We also noted in chapter 4 that at the root of the problems facing inferential contextualism was a failure to properly distinguish between closureRK-based and underdeterminationRK-based radical skepticism. While the inferential contextualist’s rejection of universal rational evaluations offers a way of dealing with the former problem, in order to deal with the latter problem one needs to confront the insularity of reasons thesis. We saw that there was a partial, and implicit, recognition of this point in terms of how proponents of inferential contextualism try to extract a claim about epistemic priority from the Wittgensteinian thesis that all rational evaluation is local. In particular, they argue that there is no fixed epistemic priority in play when it comes to empirical knowledge, such that it is not necessary that knowledge of the external world should be ultimately based on knowledge of one’s own mental states.
In response, we argued that one in fact cannot extract epistemic priority from the Wittgensteinian thesis, in that there was nothing to prevent the possibility that it is both true that all rational evaluation is local and that all worldly knowledge is ultimately based on knowledge of one’s own mental states. Furthermore, while one might initially suppose that allowing that the rejection of such a fixed epistemic priority might give one a handle on underdeterminationRK-based radical skepticism—in that one could argue that the source of this problem is that one is forced to ground one’s empirical knowledge in knowledge of one’s mental states—this proved to be illusory. What matters for underdeterminationRK-based radical skepticism is that one can deny the insularity of reasons thesis, and such a denial does not follow from a rejection of a fixed epistemic priority regarding empirical knowledge. In particular, it could be true that one’s rational support in the good case is no better than in the corresponding skeptical bad case, and yet it is possible nonetheless to sometimes ground knowledge of the external world in knowledge other than of one’s own mental states.
It is thus crucial that the Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation is both allied to the right conception of our hinge commitments, and also wedded to epistemological disjunctivism such that it offers us the dialectical resources to reject the insularity of reasons thesis. The crucial point is that one cannot derive the rejection of this thesis from the Wittgensteinian account of hinge commitments alone. The structure of rational evaluation can be essentially local and yet nonetheless also accord with the insularity of reasons of thesis. When it comes to radical skepticism, we thus need Wittgenstein and epistemological disjunctivism—namely, the biscopic proposal.2
Now consider the dialectical situation with regard to contrastivism. Recall that contrastivists hold that knowledge is to be understood not as a binary relation between a subject and a proposition, but rather as a ternary relation among a subject, a proposition, and a contrast proposition. In short, there is no such thing as knowledge that p simpliciter; there is, rather, knowledge that p rather than q.
We saw in chapter 6 that epistemological disjunctivism fares much better than contrastivism when it comes to underdeterminationRK-based radical skepticism. In particular, we argued that much of the impetus toward adopting such a revisionary proposal is removed once we recognize the important distinction between favoring and discriminating epistemic support, a distinction that we claimed all epistemologists should endorse (i.e., and not just epistemological disjunctivists). For example, this distinction enables us to explain why a subject can know that the creature before her is a zebra and not a cleverly disguised mule even though she cannot perceptually discriminate between zebras and cleverly disguised mules. There is thus no need to retreat, in line with contrastivism, to the claim that there is no such thing as the subject knowing simpliciter that the creature before her is a zebra, much less do we need to claim (as the contrastivist contends) that the subject’s knowledge is relative only to certain very specific contrast propositions (e.g., that she knows only that the creature before her is a zebra rather than an elephant, and so on).
Once we extend our focus to the closureRK-based radical skeptical problem, however, one might think that contrastivism is on stronger ground. After all, the contrastivist has an explanation of why one can never have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses, since no one has binary knowledge of this sort. Moreover, no one has the relevant ternary knowledge either, given that it’s impossible to perceptually discriminate between good cases and corresponding skeptical bad cases. So, for example, according to contrastivism one can know that one has hands as opposed to having stumps (since one can discriminate between the two scenarios), but one cannot know that one has hands as opposed to being a handless BIV (since one cannot discriminate between the two scenarios). Contrastivism can thus accommodate the kind of epistemic modesty that we noted was desirable in this regard, in contrast to the manifest epistemic immodesty that epistemological disjunctivism seems committed to when applied by itself to the closureRK-based radical skeptical problem.
One issue that we might raise for contrastivism on this score is whether it can sufficiently accommodate the intuitions that underlie closure-style principles, such as the closureRK principle. In line with our discussion of contrastivism in chapter 6, however, let us grant for the sake of argument that contrastivists have a successful story to tell in this regard.3 Even if we grant this much to contrastivism, it loses any dialectical advantage it might gain over epistemological disjunctivism as an anti-skeptical proposal once the latter view is wedded to the Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation as part of our biscopic proposal. For one can now avoid the epistemic immodesty that epistemological disjunctivism alone was committed to, and do so without having to deny the closureRK principle or adopt the revisionism of contrastivism. In particular, one can claim that one’s everyday perceptual beliefs enjoy rational support that decisively favors those beliefs over radical skeptical alternatives without thereby having to suppose that one’s hinge commitments to the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses are in the market for (rationally grounded) knowledge.
Finally, we come to the dogmatist position. Recall that dogmatism is the view that its perceptual seeming to one as if p can provide one with a defeasible justification for believing that p, and thus rationally grounded perceptual knowledge that p. Moreover, recall that the dogmatist contends that one can legitimately infer from this rationally grounded perceptual knowledge that p, via a closureRK-style inference, that one has rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses that are inconsistent with p.
As we noted in chapter 6, one of the striking features of dogmatism is how epistemically immodest it is. Epistemological disjunctivism when not wedded to the Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation draws a similar epistemically immodest conclusion, of course, but at least it does so on a much stronger rational basis—namely, factive reflectively accessible reasons rather than mere perceptual seemings. Accordingly, dogmatism does not seem any better off than a straightforward epistemological disjunctivist anti-skeptical strategy on this score. Once epistemological disjunctivism is wedded to the Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation, however, then the view is at a severe dialectical disadvantage, since our combined biscopic anti-skeptical proposal completely avoids the epistemic immodesty advocated by dogmatism.
The biscopic combination of epistemological disjunctivism and the Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation thus offers us not just a compelling response to the skeptical problem in its own right, but also a response that fares much better than its anti-skeptical rivals, even those proposals that gain a purchase on at least one of the formulations of the skeptical problem.
4. Concluding Postscript: Epistemic Vertigo
We began this book with epistemic angst; we have concluded with its cure.
Nonetheless, I want to close with a question regarding the nature of our epistemic condition, given this resolution to the radical skeptical problem. With the radical skeptical problem dealt with, does this mean that we can return to a state of epistemic innocence, on par with how we conceived of our epistemic position prior to engaging with the skeptical problem? One might think that the answer to this question is straightforwardly yes, but, as we will see, I’m not convinced that matters are quite so straightforward.
One point that we should note from the beginning is that it clearly does follow from the fact that the paradox is resolved that there is nothing epistemically amiss (on this score at any rate) with the beliefs and commitments held by those who have never engaged with this problem, and who thus never left a state of epistemic innocence. But, of course, this point is inapplicable to us, since we have engaged with this problem, and therein lies the rub.
Still, one might protest that engagement with the problem of radical skepticism shouldn’t make a difference on this score. After all, one point that we have noted in our dealings with the skeptical puzzle is that at a most basic level we are psychologically incapable of taking skeptical doubt seriously. We are, if you like, “hardwired” to be anti-skeptics. This fact, coupled with our possession of an undercutting response to the skeptical problem, may well seem to suffice to expunge all trace of the skeptical problematic from our intellectual lives.4
I don’t think that matters are quite so simple, however. The reason for this lies in the Wittgensteinian element of our anti-skeptical approach. For notice that in the state of epistemic innocence we are completely unaware of the essential locality of rational evaluation. This is not to say, of course, that we instead take it for granted that rational evaluation can be universal; rather, the point is that we just do not have any theoretical beliefs about our overall epistemic standing. Once we have engaged with the skeptical problem and appreciated how it should be resolved, however, then we also have to take on board the essential locality of rational evaluation. Recognizing this limitation, even while at the same time understanding that it is an unavoidable feature of our epistemic position, is bound to have an impact on how we conceive of our epistemic condition. In short, it is one thing to quite properly employ an essentially local system of rational evaluation without ever recognizing that it is essentially local, and another thing entirely to come to realize that one’s system of rational evaluation is local in this fashion (even if one is at the same time convinced that systems of rational evaluation are by their nature local).
Elsewhere, I have referred to this intellectual anxiety induced by radical skepticism, even when in possession of an undercutting solution to the problem, as epistemic vertigo.5 Roughly, the idea is that a by-product of the very process of engaging with radical skepticism, even when successfully engaging with this problem, is that it involves a kind of reflection—a kind of epistemic ascent, if you will—that can induce intellectual anxiety. Just like normal vertigo—or acrophobia, to be more accurate—it can be tremendously difficult, if not impossible (practically speaking), to shake off the fear in question, even once one recognizes that one has nothing to be afraid of (the best that one can hope for is usually a way of managing this fear, not of removing it altogether).6 I think something very similar often occurs after our engagement with radical skepticism, even when the problem is resolved. Our engagement with the problem, and the associated epistemic ascent, leads us to seek an overall perspective on our epistemic position, and this generates intellectual anxiety. But even once we are assured that there is nothing to fear and that our epistemic position is as secure as one might reasonably expect (and certainly not subject to the specific threats outlined by the radical skeptic anyway), the anxiety might well remain.
Note too that epistemic vertigo is analogous to vertigo simpliciter in another respect, in that they are both rooted in perfectly rational fears. Being high up when unsecured is obviously a source of immediate risk, and hence something to be feared. No wonder, then, that it is common to be afraid of heights even when knowing full well that there is no risk involved. Similarly, having a commitment that lacks a proper rational grounding is a legitimate source of epistemic anxiety, and we witness this phenomenon all the time when it comes to particular commitments that we hold (“Can I really trust what X is telling me about Y, given that I know so little about X?”; “Can it really be true that p, given that the media are currently reporting otherwise?”; and so on). Following the analogy through, epistemic vertigo plays on a perfectly legitimate anxiety about epistemic risk, but is in effect the pathological form of this anxiety, which is to say that it is no longer reflecting rational concerns.7
This may well seem to be courting mystery. If the problem is resolved, then why isn’t that the end of the matter? Well, in the most important sense it is an end of the matter, at least to the extent that there is now no philosophical problem to be resolved. And as I noted above, the epistemic position of those who haven’t engaged with this problem is not just perfectly in order as it is (in this regard anyway), but they also will not be subject to epistemic vertigo. The point I am trying to make by appeal to the phenomenon of epistemic vertigo is more psychological than philosophical, in that it describes the particular phenomenology involved when one has resolved the skeptical puzzle.
Moreover, notice that I am not suggesting, as others have done in the debate about radical skepticism, that there is something inherently dubious, in the sense of skepticism-inducing, about taking a detached perspective on one’s epistemic position, at least in some specific respect (e.g., as regards a certain subject matter).8 More precisely, my view is that there is nothing essentially problematic about adopting a detached perspective on one’s epistemic position so long as it does not lead one to attempt to undertake universal rational evaluations, and I take it to be at least possible to do the former without succumbing to the latter temptation (even though, as Wittgenstein reminds us, it is very easy to slip from the former to the latter).
Hence on my view the radical skeptical problem we have been discussing really is resolved, period. So why should there be any phenomenological vestige of intellectual anxiety remaining? I think the answer to this question lies in the fact that radical skepticism, while being in many ways very unnatural (e.g., in attempting to doubt even our hinge commitments, and in being illicitly based upon contentious theoretical assumptions), nonetheless arises out of very natural intellectual inclinations and aspirations (just as vertigo arises out very rational considerations, as we noted above). The drive to step out of one’s ordinary ways of believing and reasoning—and, more generally, one’s ordinary ways of thinking and acting—and thereby effect a detached perspective on those particular ways of believing and reasoning, is an entirely natural intellectual inclination, after all, one that underpins much of philosophy (indeed, it underlies most, if not all, intellectual enterprises). Moreover, once we have adopted this perspective, the aspiration to go on to discover the universal rational foundations of our beliefs—and thereby adopt a completely detached perspective—is very natural too. Indeed, the latter aspiration can look on the surface of things to be little more than a variant of taking a detached perspective on some aspect of one’s epistemic position. It takes the philosophical skill of someone like Wittgenstein to help us to see how the project of undertaking a fully general rational evaluation of one’s beliefs is in fact very different from the (epistemologically benign) project of taking a detached perspective on some aspect of one’s epistemic position, in that it covertly buys into a dubious theoretical picture.
Given that such natural intellectual inclinations underlie the ascent to skepticism-friendly reasoning, it should be no wonder that our recognition that the kind of rational support at issue in a universal rational evaluation is unavailable can have such a giddying effect, even once we explicitly disengage the detached epistemic perspective from the attempt to undertake universal rational evaluations. Natural aspirations are hard to shake, and one cannot in any straightforward way unlearn what one has discovered about one’s epistemic position. If reason cannot alter our hinge commitments, then it is unsurprising that it is also unable to completely eradicate our naturally arising anxieties, whether they be phobias like acrophobia or intellectual anxieties like epistemic vertigo. So even though there is a cure available for epistemic angst, there is also a sense in which angst of a certain kind—that is, epistemic vertigo—may remain even once the cure has been swallowed.9
Still, we should not allow this talk of epistemic vertigo to sidetrack us from the central point in hand, which is that the kind of radical skepticism that we have been engaging with has been neutralized. Insofar as epistemic vertigo is a genuine phenomenon—that is, not simply a description of my own idiosyncratic psychological state when engaging with the skeptical problem—then it would explain why resolving the radical skeptical problem does not return one back to the state of epistemic innocence. It would not show that there is anything amiss with the biscopic resolution of radical skepticism on offer. To repeat: we began with epistemic angst, and we have concluded with its cure.