By the summer of 1973, it seemed to many that the fall of Phnom Penh and the rest of Cambodia was likely if not inevitable.1 The Khmer Rouge were emerging as a potent force and American air support was not going to be available much longer. A cease-fire had been established in both Vietnam and Laos, but there was still intense fighting in Cambodia and the Rustics were as busy as ever. Congressional criticism was mounting, though, and President Nixon realized that if he didn’t offer Congress a timetable for withdrawal from Cambodia, they were likely to require an immediate halt to all actions there. If he attempted to veto any such legislation, it would be overturned. In June, Nixon informed the Congress that he would not oppose legislation calling for a halt of the bombing in Cambodia in forty-five days, on the fifteenth of August. Congress accepted that and, on July 1, passed Public Law 93-52, which cut off all funds “to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.” Nixon signed the bill that same day. Suddenly the Rustics knew exactly when it would all be over. It would officially end at noon, Cambodian time, on August 15, 1973. At that time, all American combat planes had to be out of Cambodia.
Although it had nothing to do with the Rustics, there was to be one more air disaster in Cambodia. Clandestine B-52 strikes had been used during 1969 and early 1970 inside the border of Cambodia to interdict the Ho Chi Minh trail. With the incursion into Cambodia in April 1970, those strikes were halted. As soon as Cambodia was accepted as an ally and air support procedures were established, the B-52s returned sporadically to Cambodia to strike enemy strongholds in areas where there were no friendly forces or population centers. The procedures were that the Cambodia military staff in Phnom Penh would select the targets and Seventh Air Force would approve them based on their knowledge of enemy activities. The Rustics were not involved, because there were no friendly forces involved. The Rustics seldom knew when or where the B-52s would strike.
After the cease fire in Vietnam and Laos, there were more B-52s available to strike Cambodian targets and the number of strikes increased significantly.
The B-52 radar bombing system required an identifiable aiming point that could be seen on their radar. If the target itself could be identified on radar, it could be bombed directly. If not, a nearby identifiable point could be used. This was called an offset aiming point (OAP) and the north-south and east-west distances from the OAP to the target would be set into the bombing computer. The radar bombing cross hairs would be placed on the OAP, but the bombs would actually be dropped on the target. This was very accurate providing the system was in “offset” mode. If the system was in “direct” mode, the bombs would be dropped where the crosshairs were placed.
In Cambodia, the targets themselves were seldom identifiable on radar. The common solution to this was to place a small battery-powered radar beacon at a known location so that the B-52s could use the beacon as the OAP. One such beacon was placed in the town of Neak Luong, which was a ferry crossing southeast of Phnom Penh.2 The actual target was several miles away.
On August 6, 1973, a B-52 dropped 20 tons of bombs on the radar beacon and Neak Luong because the bomber’s system was in “direct” mode instead of “offset” mode. There were four hundred casualties, both killed and wounded. It was a bomb delivery error and there was nothing anyone outside of the B-52 could have done to prevent it.
Nevertheless, one result of this was that Colonel Oum (who had returned from Taiwan) got involved in the development of a Direct Air Support Center (DASC) at the Cambodian Air Force (KAF) headquarters in Phnom Penh. This was primarily because no one else had his knowledge of needed communications equipment. While involved in that, Colonel Oum met USAF Lt. Col. Dave Sands, who had been sent from Seventh Air Force to help set up the DASC. Dave would later sponsor Colonel Oum and his family for residence in the United States.
The Cambodian chief of staff wanted Oum to run the Direct Air Support Center, but he declined. He knew that whoever ran it had to be from the Air Force and have some knowledge of aviation. Although Oum started his career as an Air Force communications officer, most of his current training was from the Army General Staff College in Cambodia. His expertise was in ground warfare. Oum had one other problem with being in charge of a major operation: Corruption in Phnom Penh was rampant and getting worse.
“They cannot keep me there for I was very straight. I am not a crook, so if I see something wrong, I have to say something. So they say, ‘OK, we send you to Bangkok (Thailand) to be Defense Attaché.’ I say, ‘OK, that’s nice.’ ”
Meanwhile, the final date of August 15 moved inexorably closer. The Rustics were determined to finish strong and have planes in the air over Cambodia right up until the last minute. On August 14, the day before the cessation of all air activities, the Rustics flew the final “Phnom Penh Turn.” Randy Hetherington (Rustic 18) and Jon Wroblewski (Nail 58) launched from Ubon with Randy in the front seat. They flew a support mission for the ground commander at Kompong Cham and recovered at Phnom Penh for fuel and lunch.
The final combat flight of the Rustics and the Nails, August 15, 1973. The pilots were (Lead) Howie Pierson and Bob Negley, (Two) Charlie Yates and Woody Baker, (Three) Bill Powers and Wayne Wroten, and (Four) Darrell Whitcomb and Bob Haley. Si Dahle collection.
While there, we visited with the local commander who was anxious about tomorrow being the last day of American air support. We assured him that the Cambodian Air Force could handle the air support and that if things got really bad, we would come back. That speech got me a hug, a handshake, and a temple-rubbing from Angkor Wat as a gift. When we got back to the plane, Jon took the front seat and we took off for our next mission. Since I was in the backseat, I can say that the last American FAC out of Phnom Penh was a Rustic.
The next day, the combined Rustic/Nail operation flew thirty-one sorties before the noon deadline. A Nail FAC was the last U.S. Forward Air controller to expend ordnance in Cambodia. The U.S. Air Force officially credited an A-7 fighter pilot based in Thailand with dropping the last bomb, marking an end to the nation’s longest war. Perhaps so, but he did it under the supervision of a FAC.
The last four Rustic/Nail OV-10s joined in formation and crossed the Cambodian border outbound at exactly noon. At Ubon, they flew a “missing man” formation down the runway before peeling off and landing. There was a celebration, but not a very big one. They knew they were abandoning friends who needed their help and were not likely to survive without it.
On September 10, 1973, Capt. Tom Yarborough (Rustic 21) led the last three Rustic OV-10s from Ubon to Nakhon Phanom, where they were deactivated.
That was the last time the Rustic call sign was used.
It was over.