In 1970, American pilots in South Vietnam knew exactly where Cambodia was. It bordered three-fourths of South Vietnam and stretched from the Gulf of Thailand northeast nearly to Dak To. On all maps, the border was plainly marked with a heavy red line and its jagged appearance spawned nicknames like the Parrot’s Beak, the Fish Hook, and the Dog’s Head. The Cambodian side of the border was the terminus of the Ho Chi Minh trail, which originated in North Vietnam and came down like a giant fire hose through Laos and Cambodia. Instead of spewing water, though, it was spewing munitions and supplies to support the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.
There were occasional clandestine missions across the border in an attempt to stop this flow of supplies and, in 1969, President Richard Nixon authorized B-52 strikes along the border inside Cambodia. These activities seldom penetrated more than 15 miles (25 kilometers) from the border.
Other pilots treated the border with caution as openly crossing it was a violation of the U.S. Rules of Engagement and could result in serious discipline. That usually meant being grounded pending an investigation. American radar controllers watched the border closely and potential violators were warned on the emergency radio frequency. “Aircraft in the vicinity of ——, you are about to cross the Cambodian border. Turn immediately to heading —— and identify yourself.”
The aircraft would turn, but there was no identification or even acknowledgment. If the radar controller couldn’t identify the plane, he couldn’t write much of a report.
Southeast Asia.
On April 30, 1970, the situation changed. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and the U.S. Army “invaded” Cambodia with full air support from the U.S. Air Force. The U.S. Army could only stay in Cambodia for two months without congressional approval as that was the maximum time permitted the president under the War Powers Act. The U.S. Air Force, though, continued to operate over Cambodia for the next three years. Because it was highly classified and the directions were coming straight from the White House, there was no official Air Force history of that operation. It never happened.
Here is the story, though, told by the people who were there and did it. It is a story deeply rooted in the politics of the time.
Since 1863 Cambodia had been part of French Indochina and a colony of France. In 1941, the French installed Norodom Sihanouk on the throne of the monarchy believing that he would support the French during World War II. In that war, the Japanese took over most of French Indochina, but allowed the Vichy French1 to remain in nominal control of Cambodia. In 1945, the Japanese took full control from the French and ordered the royal rulers of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos to declare their independence from France. That independence was short-lived, as the French returned after World War II and reclaimed their colonies. In 1953, the French allowed Sihanouk to once again proclaim independence for his country.2
Sihanouk’s politics were described as a policy of “nonalignment” that was strongly anti-American and pro-Communist. In 1965, he formally broke diplomatic relations with the United States when it sent combat troops to Vietnam in support of the South Vietnamese. In addition, Sihanouk permitted North Vietnam to move supplies down the Cambodian side of the border to South Vietnam. He also allowed supplies to be shipped by sea to Cambodia’s only seaport at Sihanoukville (Kompong Som). From there, they were moved by truck to Phnom Penh and eastward to the border with South Vietnam. Some historians estimate that this route carried 80 percent of the supplies reaching the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam.3
Meanwhile, a communist party had formed in Cambodia. Initially, this was known as the Kampuchea Communist Party (KCP), but it was soon named the Khmer Rouge (Red Cambodians) by Sihanouk himself. The name stuck and was applied to all Cambodian insurgents opposing the government.4 For a number of good reasons, Sihanouk felt that his country was facing significant danger from the communists and, in 1967, he offered to reestablish relations with the United States. This did not include permission to put American troops in his country to cut off the flow of supplies and munitions into South Vietnam.5
In 1970, Richard M. Nixon was president and “Vietnamization” was in progress. This was a program to get the United States out of the war with a measure of honor and turn all the active fighting over to the South Vietnamese. Americans stationed in Vietnam at that time were involved in a hopeless situation and they knew it.
By 1969, Cambodia’s economy was a shambles and political opposition to Sihanouk was growing. Gen. Lon Nol, prime minister and chief of staff of the army, was particularly disaffected. In March 1970, while Sihanouk was on a holiday in France, Lon Nol overthrew the government and took control of the country.6 Lon Nol was staunchly anticommunist and one of his first acts was to close Cambodia’s seaport to communist supply ships and cancel Sihanouk’s agreement to allow supplies to be transported down Cambodia’s eastern border. He gave the communists seventy-two hours to leave the country.7
Lon Nol lacked the military strength to successfully oppose the Khmer Rouge, the Viet Cong, and the North Vietnamese. His entire army consisted of only thirty-five thousand poorly equipped soldiers8 and his air force had fewer than thirty aircraft with almost no air support capability. He sought American assistance.
On April 30, 1970, assistance came in the form of the previously mentioned invasion as American troops crossed the border to cut the supply lines and eliminate communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. Back in the United States, this was called an “invasion” but it really wasn’t. The Americans were there with the full knowledge and approval of Lon Nol.9
In the United States, this support of Cambodia was strongly opposed by the Congress, the news media, and much of the public. At Kent State University, four students involved in a demonstration were killed by National Guardsmen. President Nixon could not keep troops in Cambodia beyond the end of June without the approval of Congress—which was not to be had.
The incursion into Cambodia was a tactical success, but it had little lasting value. It destroyed about a year’s worth of communist supplies and munitions, but it did not permanently destroy the communist sanctuaries nor did it close down the Ho Chi Minh trail. Both were rapidly rebuilt.
Although President Nixon was forced to remove the troops by the end of June, he did not want to desert the Lon Nol regime, which he now regarded as an ally. He reasoned that he could provide American air support to the Cambodian army as long as there were no American troops on the ground in Cambodia. He needed a group of forward air controllers (FACs) who could maintain a round-the-clock presence over Cambodia, work with the Cambodians, and provide them with American air support.
That was the birth of the Rustics. Almost overnight a group of pilots, airmen, and airplanes were assembled, assigned the Rustic call sign, and launched on missions deep into Cambodia. Over the three years of their existence, about 250 U.S. Air Force officers and airmen flew as Rustics. This is their story.