The Greek City and its Institutions

DEMOCRACY AND ITS MAGISTRATES

EVEN with the aid of its permanent Council the people could only secure the execution of its orders by delegating a portion of its sovereignty to certain magistrates. It was thus led to distinguish among the public offices magistracies properly so called, of a governmental or political nature (άρχαί), and purely administrative functions (έπιμλείαι), without counting the minor offices (ύττηρεσίαι) which might be given to metics and slaves as well as to citizens.

By virtue of this delegation of sovereignty the great magistrates possessed, within their several spheres, the following powers:¹ (1) The right of acting on their own initiative in accordance with the laws which qualified them, or of consulting the Assembly or the Council with regard to new decisions (βονΧεύσασθαι); (2) the fundamental right of giving orders and of passing obligatory measures (επιτάξαι), which implied the right of punishing the delinquent (επιβολας επιβάΧλειν) by the imposition of a fine whose maximum varied, according to the magistrature, from fifty to five hundred drachmas, or else of sending him before the courts for severer punishment ;² (3) judical competence in specified cases (κρίναή, a competence which no longer carried the right of decision, but only that of receiving pleas, of making investigation and of presiding over the tribunal (ηγεμονία).

Since the power of the magistrates emanated from popular sovereignty, democratic principle demanded that every citizen should be able to exercise it. But one must not apply to this precept the hackneyed interpretation which there is a temptation to give to it to-day. It did not merely signify that everyone had the right to attain to the exercise of the highest public functions ; it proclaimed that everyone ought to attain to it as far as possible. “ The first characteristic of liberty,” says Aristotle, “ is that all should command each and each in his turn all” (τò èv μέρβί αργεσθαυ teal αρχειρ).3 It is also, according to the author of the Menexenus, the first condition of equality; for “ among brothers born of a common mother, there are neither slaves nor masters.”⁴ The result is that in a democracy, “ no one is compelled to obey unless he may in his turn command: thus liberty and equality are combined.” No citizen, therefore, was excluded from honours, whatever his birth or fortune ; such was actual fact. The only superiority which might be recognized was that of merit and ability, with the result that the republic would be governed by an aristocracy with the assent of the people : such was the ideal.⁵

In order to accelerate the alternating movement which was to bring citizens to offices of State and then send them back into the ordinary ranks, magistracies were of short duration. Most of them were annual. As a general rule citizens were forbidden to exercise the same function in several successive years or to hold more than one in the same year.⁶ These two rules were, however, capable of exceptions. A man might sit for two years in the Council, while with military offices, especially with that of the strategos, power might be renewed from year to year indefinitely.⁷ But that such repeated tenure had to be justified by exceptional reasons is shown by the fact that in practice hardly ever could even two different magistracies be held in two succeeding years: for before putting oneself forward as a candidate for the second account must have been given of the first; a thing which could only be done by seeking for the second office one of the rare ones which were entered upon, not at the beginning of the civil year, the 1st of Hecatombaion, but at the Panathenæa, on the 20th of the same month. On the other hand an extraordinary function might be attached to an ordinary magistracy, and ex-archons, although they sat in the Areopagus, might obtain an additional office. Thus Pericles, fifteen times in succession a strategos, was at intervals chosen as epistates of public works, and Aristides and Themistocles were elected strategoi after having been archons.

The same motive which subjected the magistracies to the constitutional rule of yearly office made them also collegiate. The colleges were all independent of one another, and when co-operation was necessary it was effected through the Council The only exception was in the case of colleges with military functions, where it was essential to have a hierarchy. The strategoi, generals in chief, gave orders to the taxiarchs, commanders of the infantry, and, through the medium of the hipparchs, to the phylarchs, commanders of the cavalry.8 As to the civil magistracies they were all equal in public law. But in practice there was a general and clearly marked distinction between the great offices (ai μέγισταν άρχαί)⁹ and the minor ones (άρχίδια).¹⁰ And with good reason. The magistracies which involved heavy responsibilities, those whose holders directed the principal affairs of State and exercised command over the army, were not paid. The citizens of the lower classes did not aspire to them, but, on the contrary, found it wholly to their advantage to maintain the property qualification which made effective the pecuniary responsibility of these magistrates. The offices which they aspired to were those which were profitable.¹¹

The salaries were, however, very small. For the fifth century we have only rare indications ; but they are significant. According to the accounts of the Erectheum (409-8), the working day for labourers and artisans was worth a drachma. The architect responsible for the direction of works and the sub-recorder who kept the accounts were only better off in one respect—they were paid by the year or rather by the prytany, without deduction for non-working days; but the architect likewise received only a drachma per day, and the subrecorder only five obols.12 Eighty years later when the pay for skilled work was doubled, one learns from the accounts of Eleusis that the architect was paid two drachmas per day; but the keeper of the accounts now received only a single obol.¹³ At the same period whilst the presence-token of the Assembly was equivalent to a drachma or a drachma and a half, the archons each received four obols per day as allowance for keep, as did the epheboi, but out of that they had to feed their herald and their flute player; one of the nine, isolated at Salamis, received a drachma, as did the sophronistai of the epheboi.¹⁴ The athlothetai were paid in kind, they took their meals at the Prytaneum, but only during the sixteen days when all their time was occupied with preparations for the Panathenæic games. The amphictyons sent to Delos received a drachma per day from the Delian treasury; the magistrates sent out to the cleruchies of Samos, of Skyros, of Lemnos or of Imbros received in money or by a bare allowance for food.¹⁵ Though there were exceptions to the law forbidding the exercise of two offices in the same year, there was none in connection with paid offices (μη Βιχόθβν μισθοφορείν).¹⁶

According to the Athenian conception the principle of equality was to be applied not only to individuals, but also to territorial divisions. It was for that reason that, since the time of Cleisthenes, the number of magistrates had been in almost all colleges in relation to the decimal system of the tribes. Whether elected or drawn by lot they were usually ten in number. If not, some way was contrived to complete the mystic number. The disappointment of the tribe unrepresented in the college of archons was tempered by giving it a secretary. Were the epistatai of Eleusis only seven in number ? Then a secretary and two treasurers of the goddesses were added to them.¹⁷ When more than ten were needed the number was not infrequently raised to thirty, in order that the three divisions of each tribe might be represented: thus there had been thirty tribal judges¹⁸ before the Thirty Tyrants had rendered this number odious. When a great number of candidates were needed for the drawing of lots, the total allotted to each tribe was divided among the demes which composed it. For quite a long time this system was applied to the nomination of archons; but, since it readily lent itself to abuse in the small demes, it had to be abandoned except for the appointment by lot of the five hundred councillors and the five hundred keepers of the arsenals.19 When, on the other hand, ten magistrates was too large a number sometimes only five were appointed, in the proportion of one to two tribes, as for example in the case of road surveyors (οδοποιοί) and introducers of cases to be judged within the month (εισαγωγείς).²⁰ For the selection of extraordinary magistrates the Cleisthenian rule could not always be followed: for instance the ambassadors sent to foreign countries were chosen in varying numbers from the whole body of citizens (εξ ’Αθηναίων απάντων); but whenever it was possible the Athenian democrats adhered to the general custom. It is worthy of notice that the revolutionary oligarchs of 413-11 and of 404 observed it themselves, when they caused the constitution of the Four Hundred to be prepared by ten, then by thirty probouloi and when they organized the tyranny of the Thirty. Finally, certain magistracies were taken from the ten tribes in a body: thus the secretary of the Council was supplied from year to year by each tribe in turn.²¹

APPOINTMENT OF MAGISTRATES

Magistrates were appointed either by lot or by election.

At the close of the fifth century drawing of lots became the democratic procedure par excellence, and by its means were chosen all magistrates whom it was not absolutely necessary to select according to their political ideas or their abilities. One must not think, however, that the drawing of lots was a device invented by the democrats and that it had always possessed the egalitarian character which it in fact acquired. In order to investigate this subject thoroughly it is profitable to examine the method of appointment employed in the case of the archons throughout the centuries.

The majority of authors have tended to regard the drawing of lots as a relatively late practice and have attributed the idea either to Cleisthenes or Aristides, or even to Ephialtes and Pericles. But Fustel de Coulanges, faithful to his general conception and always tracing back institutions to religious origins, maintained that the drawing of lots, a veritable judgment of God, was used for the appointment of the archons from the beginning.22 His view was correct. Aristotle says, indeed, in the Politics that Solon preserved as he found it the method of appointing magistrates and that this method was essentially aristocratic;²³ while in the Athenian Constitution he says that Solon decided that the drawing of lots for the magistrates should be made from lists of candidates previously chosen by the tribes (πρόκριτοι), then four in number, and that for the nine archons, each tribe should put forward ten candidates selected from the wealthiest, the pentacosiomedimni.²⁴ Aristotle does not contradict himself; he merely tells us that while conserving the old method of appointment Solon adapted it to the new constitution: the forty candidates whose names were to be placed in the urn were no longer chosen only by the chiefs of great families and according to birth, but by all the citizens and according to fortune.

The reformer no doubt congratulated himself on having made the drawing of lots a reality; for the Council of ex- archons, the Areopagus, to which was entrusted the recruiting of magistrates,²⁵ had found it too easy to manipulate the drawing of lots and to turn it for all practical purposes into co-optation. But in that Solon was deceived. Intrigues and frauds continued. During the whole of the sixth century the office of chief archon was the goal of the ambitious. From time to time great men such as Dropides, the friend of Solon, and the leader of the nobility, the Philaïd Hippo- cleides, might hold it; sometimes sedition and usurpation might prevent it from being regularly filled, whence the years of “ anarchy.”26 Later Pisistratus and his sons, just as if it were a question of ordinary appointment, agreed to fill it with intimate friends such as Pisistratus the Younger, Miltiades and Hebron, and after the expulsion of the tyrants it was given to the leader of the oligarchic party, Isagoras. Then came the reform of Cleisthenes. It changed the old system in two particulars. In order not to depart from the decimal system which was applied to political organization, the secretary of the thesmothetai was added in subordination to the nine archons, and the ten members of the college were drawn by lot, one from each tribe in turn.²⁷ Ten candidates from each of the ten new tribes were to be put forward in place of the ten candidates required from each of the four old tribes. But as in the past it was always eminent citizens, politicians, who were nominated, Alcmæon, Hipparchus, Themistocles, Aristides. How was it possible for a magistracy filled by lot to provoke so many conflicts, and to fall regularly to the strongest or the ablest ? Aristotle supplies the explanation of this fact: “ There is also a danger in electing the magistrates out of a body who are themselves elected ; for if but a small number choose to combine, the elections will always go as they desire.”²⁸ It was quite possible, for example, that a tribe might use its right of presentation in putting forward only one candidate and thus render the drawing of lots meaningless. After the first Persian war the drawing of lots for the archons was equivalent for the most part to an election, but—it must not be forgotten—an election which was a privilege of the Athenians of the first class.

In 487-6 a great reform was achieved in the appointment of the archons. It was the time when the people was issuing writ after writ of ostracism against persons suspected of having dealings with the exiled tyrants and the Persians. It was essential that their partisans should be prevented from continuing the electoral manipulations which had so often won for them the archonship, and that the lot should be made a reality. Such a reform was not dangerous since the reins of government were in the hands of elected strategoi. The choice of candidates for the archonship might, therefore, be extended over a wider range. From the tribe the right of presentation passed to the demes. In order that all the demes should have their candidates and in a number proportionate to their population, they were allowed for the archonship, as for the Boule, fifty candidates for each tribe : making a total of five hundred. But the first class which could easily put forward forty, could not present twelve and a half times that number; moreover a reward was conferred on at least one of the other classes which had fought at Marathon: the privilege of participating in the drawing of lots for the archonship was extended to the knights.29 It is possible that after the double invasion of the Persians which had impoverished the landowners and after the victories of Salamis and Platæa won by the patriotic alliance of all classes, a decree proposed by Aristides in 478 allowed the five hundred candidates to be taken from the people as a whole, without distinction of income; but this was in any case an exceptional measure; the law was ignored but not changed.³⁰ Even the reform of Ephialtes allowed it to remain as it was.

It was only in 457-6 that a further reduction in the property qualification took place. Athens, at war with the Boeotians and the Spartans, had been compelled to make exacting demands on the zeugitai, not only in the infantry, according to the established rule, but also in the cavalry. By way of compensation it gave them access to the archonship.³¹ Henceforth one class only, that of the thetes, was excluded, and that distinction could not be maintained much longer. Not even a law was needed to abolish it. Men agreed to close their eyes to the declarations of income made during the dokimasia. Aristotle mentions it not without irony: “ When the candidates who presented themselves for the drawing of lots for an office were asked what was their class, no one bethought himself to reply: that of the thetes.”³²

As soon as every citizen became eligible for the archonship it seemed in harmony with strict democratic principle to suppress the method of election for the nomination of candidates proposed by the demes and to replace it by a preliminary drawing of lots in the demes.33 It was this double drawing of lots, already employed in the recruiting of the Council, which was, par excellence, appointment “ by the bean.” It was certainly used as early as the fifth century and probably shortly after the reform which deprived the two first classes of their exclusive privilege.³⁴ The principal motive which actuated this reform was the desire to put an end to electoral jobbery which voting by ballot encouraged in the small areas of the demes. But the urns continued to be tampered with as much in the case of the lot as in election. What was to be done ? It was decided towards the end of the fifth century, perhaps in 403, to take the drawing of lots for candidates no longer by demes but by the tribe as a whole.³⁵ When this was done there was no longer any reason for retaining the enormous number of five hundred candidates. Since the tribe had not to provide for all its demes it was enough for it to put forward ten. The principle remained intact, for no limits were set to the number of citizens who might present themselves for the lot, and the two operations were much simplified. Thus was finally fixed a method of appointment which fraud and the necessity of counteracting it had caused to vary so much for two centuries.

The drawing of lots for magistrates seems to us to-day so patent an absurdity that we can hardly conceive that an intelligent people should have devised and maintained such a system. In that we are at one with the oligarchs and philosophers of antiquity. “It is foolish,” as Xenophon makes Socrates say, “ that the magistrates of the city should be chosen by the bean, when no one would dream of drawing lots for a pilot, a mason, a flute-player, or any craftsman at all, whose faults are far less harmful than those which are committed in the government.”³⁶

But it is better to attempt to understand than to criticize. The drawing of lots had been invented in far distant times when men knew no better method of appointing their leaders than by the judgment of their gods. It was retained by later generations to whom the judgment of God offered the advantage of appeasing the bloody rivalries of great families. And now it did not fail, even in oligarchic cities, to allay the dissensions of parties, by preventing a victorious faction from making the tyranny of a majority prevail in the whole government, in all the administrative departments, and thus exasperating the opposition; it suppressed the disgrace of electoral jobbery, and Aristotle cites the example of Heraia in Arcadia where election was abolished because it favoured intrigue.37 Democracy was certainly not going to renounce it because in addition it gave to all citizens an equal right of access to the magistracies. It must be remembered, moreover, that the disadvantages of the lot were much diminished in practice. The incapable were withheld from participating from fear of ridicule and people of doubtful honesty by the prospect of the dokimasia; the collegial character of the magistracies ensured an average mean of intelligence, and the nomination of a president introduced the selective principle into the lot itself; the collaboration of the assessors and especially the presence of an experienced personnel in government departments counteracted the inexperience of the leaders ; and finally, in spite of the progress of the system of the lot, the system of election retained an important position.

All the magistrates who were required to have professional knowledge or pecuniary guarantees were appointed by a vote by show of hands. These were, since the fifth century, military officials: the ten strategoi, the ten taxiarchs, the two hipparchs, the ten phylarchs and the ten recruiting officers or katalogeis ;³⁸ and, in addition, the heads of technical departments: in the fifth century, probably the Hellenotamiai or treasurers of the federal exchequer; in the fourth, the administrators of the théorie fund and the epimeletes of waters and fountains.³⁹ Aristotle also mentions in that category the treasurers of the two State triremes, the Paralus and the Ammonis; he tells us that the Ecclesia elected the architects in charge of the construction of ships of the fleet and the naval engineers, and that the Council chose from its own number the ten commissioners whose duty it was to super intend the trier opoioi; finally he gives us many details of the method in which the directors and masters of the epheboi were appointed.40 But there were many other elective magistracies. In the first rank, in the second half of the fourth century, was the high office which the orator Lycurgus rendered illustrious, an office which was almost a ministry of public finance, whose holder, called “the keeper of the dioikesis” (óεπί διοικήσει), was elected for four years.⁴¹ Then came extraordinary functions. When the people ordered the execution of public works it elected the architect by show of hands and attached to him by the same method of appointment a commission of epistatai provided with a secretary and sometimes with a treasurer.⁴² Often it divided the works of naval construction or of fortification between the ten tribes; in this case the tribes each named one or more commissioners (the τειχοποιοί, the ταφροττοιοί, the τριηροττοιοί), but they were none the less public officials.⁴³ Finally, the majority of magistrates whose duty it was to preside over great festivals were elected from the citizens who were in a position to enhance their splendour by drawing upon their own incomes. Such were the four epimeletai of the mysteries, two of whom were chosen from the whole body of the Athenians, and two from the sacerdotal families of the Eumolpidæ and the Kerykes.⁴⁴ It was the same with the ten epimeletai of the Dionysia until 451, when it became possible to select them by lot since henceforth a considerable sum was put aside for their expenses.⁴⁵ Though the majority of the priesthoods were filled by lot, the oldest were hereditary in certain families, and there were some exceptional ones filled by election.⁴⁶ In other religious offices election was more prominent.⁴⁷

The election day (άρχαιρεσίαι) was fixed by soothsayers (κατά την μαντείαν): it took place in the first prytany, after the sixth, when the auspices were favourable.48 Even when the electoral session had opened it was suspended if the gods manifested their disapproval. Thus on the 21st of March, 424, at eight o’clock in the morning preparations were being made for the taking of the vote when, to the great joy of the opponents of Cleon, an eclipse of the sun caused the matter to be postponed to a later meeting.⁴⁹ The elections then, unless the gods prohibited it, might be entered upon after the opening of the seventh prytany (the middle of February), but, on the other hand, they might not be delayed beyond the ninth, because sufficient time had to be left for accomplishing the formalities of the dokimasia and for settling the suits which sometimes ensued. For the same reason the drawing of lots was held at about the same time as the elections.⁵⁰ It was just at the beginning of spring in “0, if one is to trust a piquant anecdote, that the elections which brought Sophocles to the office of strategos took place : it was a mark of favour for the success of his Antigone,⁵¹ and, therefore, after the Dionysia which were celebrated from the tenth to the fifteenth of Elaphebolion (the end of March), that is to say at a meeting of the eighth prytany. If the anecdote is not authentic, on the question of date, at any rate, it is completely in accordance with the facts.

The elections were always held on the Pnyx, in the open air, even when at the end of 332 the people adopted the practice of holding their ordinary assemblies in the theatre.⁵² As with all the proceedings of the Ecclesia the session opened with the reading of the probouleuma which authorized it (μηδέν άττροβούλευτον).⁵³ Election was never made otherwise than by show of hands (χειροτονεί»). When it was a question of appointing colleges of ten magistrates there were two methods of procedure : either (and this was the more frequent) they were chosen in the proportion of one from each tribe (άφ⁵⁴ εκάστης φνΧψ ενα)₉ or else they were taken indiscriminately from the whole body of Athenians (εξ απάντων ‘Αθηναίων). As the army was divided into ten tribes (phylai), the first only of these systems was applicable to the ten commanders of the infantry, the taxiarchs, as well as to the ten commanders and the ten recruiters of the cavalry, the phylarchs and the katalogeis, whilst the two generals of the cavalry, the hipparchs, each appointed for five tribes, were necessarily taken from “ among all the Athenians.”55 But the strategoi, at first elected according to the first system, were elected later according to the second.⁵⁶ The change was probably effected during the epoch when Pericles was re-elected year after year. As he could not pass for the qualified representative of his tribe, the Acamantis, but was indeed the representative of the whole city, the Acamantis obtained from time to time a second representative: this happened three times in ten years. Force of circumstances, therefore, prevented the ancient rule from being rigorously observed, so much so that we know for the fifth and fourth centuries eleven cases in which the same tribe was doubly represented in the college.⁵⁷ Even if, however, for one reason or another a tribe found itself thus favoured, an effort was made to give representation to the greatest possible number of tribes.

As one would expect candidates for the magistracies had recourse to all manner of contrivances. At the time when the lot was preceded by elections in the demes corruption ran riot in these ⁵⁸ stagnant pools,” and so it was for reasons of political morality that democracy preferred the two-fold drawing of lots. But elections always gave scope to skilful jobbery. Every year the spectacle described by Demosthenes was witnessed: ⁵⁹ Those who aspired to elective offices and the rank which they bestowed, slaves of the approval which assured them their votes, went from one to another, each dreaming of being sworn a strategos.”⁶⁰ Some employed pathetic devices: an old soldier would uncover his breast and display his scars;⁶¹ others in cynical fashion would appeal to the venality of the electors: their expenses were only ⁶² advances,” it was a question of spending ⁶³ in order to reimburse themselves doubly.”⁶⁴ Parties organized themselves in support of their candidates; committees came into being, each with its agents and its funds; the oligarchs of the fifth century were grouped in strong hetaireiai, which may be compared with the Tammany clubs of America.65

But one must not think that jobbery was a greater evil among the Athenians than among any other peoples of antiquity or of modern times. In many elections there was no trace of it. Intrigue could do nothing, for instance, in the recruiting of the ephebic officials. The fathers of the youths assembled by tribes, and, after having taken an oath, elected from the members of their tribe who were over forty the three citizens whom they deemed most honourable and most capable of taking care of their sons; from these three the people elected one for each tribe as sophronistes or censor, after which it selected from all the Athenians the kosmetes or principal, the head of all the epheboi.⁶⁶⁶⁷ Even in elections of a political nature the Athenians were not incapable of wise choice. One student of antiquity has investigated the social position of persons who held office in the time of Demosthenes : he has reached the conclusion that the highest functions, those which involved the greatest responsibility, were generally confided to men of high birth, rich or well-informed. Plutarch⁶⁸ remarks that this people, who used the demagogues as kings their flatterers and fools, as a means of distraction, was wise enough to call to the most important positions true statesmen and, above all, to appoint the most capable to military commands. He makes that remark in connection with Phocion who, in spite of his loathing of the multitude and although he never put himself forward, was appointed strategos forty-five times. He might have added that a democracy capable of conferring supreme power for more than thirty years on a Pericles was assuredly lacking in neither seriousness nor clearness of purpose, but on the contrary gave a proof of it unique in the history of the world.

When they had been appointed by lot or by election, the magistrates did not enter upon their duties until they had been subjected to the test of the dokimasia. In the time of Aristotle this procedure was in general carried out before the tribunal, but for the nine archons there was a preliminary examination in the Council of the Five Hundred. In the fifth century the Council could alone pronounce judgment; in the fourth, however, the magistrate rejected by it could appeal to the tribunal, which gave the final decision.69 The dokimasia of the archons is well known to us. It began by questioning the future magistrate on his birth: “Who is your father, and of what deme ? Who is your father’s father ? Who is your mother ? Who is your mother’s father and of what deme ?” By further questions it was ascertained whether he was a member of a phratry, the issue of a good and ancient line, whether he participated in a cult of Apollo Patroos and of Zeus Herkeios and where were his temples, whether he possessed family tombs and where they were. Finally he was catechized as to his public and his private life; he was asked whether he behaved well towards his parents, whether he paid his contributions and whether he had performed his military obligations.⁷⁰ When he had answered all these questions the president ordered him to produce witnesses in support of his statements. If one of the witnesses turned accuser the president heard the statements for the accusation and for the defence; after that a vote was taken, by show of hands in the Council, by secret ballot in the tribunal. If no accuser presented himself the vote was immediately taken. Originally this vote was a pure formality : a single judge gave in his voting paper. But later all the judges were required to vote, in order that if a dishonest candidate had succeeded in escaping accusation it might still be in the power of the judges to exclude him.⁷¹

Besides all the questions of a general order which were put to the magistrates elect, specific questions were put according to the magistracies, since for a great number of them special conditions were imposed. The archons were to have no physical defect ; the king had to have a wife who was alive and who had not been previously married; the strategoi had to have children born in wedlock and to possess landed property in Attica; the treasurers of “the other gods” were to belong by their wealth to the class of the pentacosiomedimni.⁷² The conditions imposed on the members of the two last colleges have an aristocratic character which at first seems surprising; but one can understand that the people should demand from magistrates who might gravely compromise the finances of the city guarantees analogous to those which we demand to-day as security. In addition, though the questionnaire was restricted in form it was not so in reality. It was easy to extend it indefinitely : the whole life of the new member was submitted to the scrutiny of all the citizens. And that was thought good, since it kept back the unworthy—undutiful sons, bad soldiers, bad tax-payers, all citizens overshadowed by the menace of atimia, all the enemies of democracy.73

III

Functioning of the Colleges of Magistrates

The majority of magistrates entered into office on the first day of the year. But during the whole of the century which followed the reform of Cleisthenes the official calendar was conformed to ; this divided the ordinary year of 360 days and the intercalary year of 390 days into ten prytanies and, as a consequence, did not correspond to the civil calendar whose year had 354 or 384 days divided into twelve and thirteen months. There existed, therefore, between the two calendars a difference which sometimes amounted to twenty days. In 408-7, or rather a little earlier, when democratic institutions were reorganized after the fall of the Four Hundred, it was decided that the magistrates should henceforth enter into office at the beginning of the civil year, on the 1st of Heca- tombaion. But after as before 408-7 certain magistracies commenced on the 20th of the same month, at the Panathenæa· The ten athlothetai who directed the games of these festivals held office for four years from one celebration of the Great Panathenæa to the next.⁷⁴ Other magistracies, though annual, began on the same day : in the fifth century, the treasurers of the goddess and those of the other gods ; in the fourth century, the treasurer of the military funds, the guardians of the théorie fund and the epimeletes of waters.75

All magistrates before entering upon their duties were required to take an oath of investiture. This oath varied according to the office, but it always included a promise to conform to the laws and not to allow them to be broken. The archons swore to consecrate a golden statue of their own stature if they should accept presents.⁷⁶ They took their oath twice in succession: the first time they swore standing on the “ pledging-stone “ erected in the agora before the royal portico; then, in company with the strategoi and doubtless other magistrates, on the Acropolis, before the image of the goddess and a table on which were placed the crowns of myrtle.⁷⁷ These crowns, insignia of their office, gave them sacrosanctity.⁷⁸ Thus invested they offered to the gods an inaugural sacrifice (βίσιτήρια).⁷⁹

Each college had its άρχείον, the building or premises where the magistrates took their meals and where the Assembly room (συνέδρων) and the offices were.⁸⁰

Certain magistrates had assistants, paredroi, who were equally magistrates, since they could take the place of the officeholders, and they, too, had to undergo the examination of the dokimasia and render account at the end of the year.⁸¹ Each of the three archons with special functions had two paredroi; he chose them himself, often from his own family, and co-operated with them in certain matters so as to form within the great college of the archons a special small college such as that of the thesmothetai.⁸² To the ten Hellenotamiai were attached ten paredroi who could act separately in conjunction with their superior, or altogether with the Hellenotamiai united in a body. Since there were paredroi for the strategoi and the euthynoi as well, we may conclude that the institution was more or less general.83

In the same way as the Council, the supreme magistrature, the colleges of even the most minor officials had their “ secretary-registrar,” the grammateus. His office was annual. The secretaries of the most important colleges (those of the strategoi, the treasurers, etc.), and even those who were attached to the epistatai of public works, were citizens and had the rank of magistrates.⁸⁴ The secretary of the thesmothetai must be placed in a higher category. He was associated with the archons as the tenth, in order that each tribe might be represented in the college. Although in his case the dokimasia was not invested with such solemn formalities as in that of the thesmothetai, and although he had not the right of inflicting fines or of presiding over a tribunal, it was quite an adequate position by way of stop-gap.⁸⁵

Beneath these secretaries who formed a select body, were a multitude of secretaries and sub-clerks (ύπογραμματβΐς) attached to the magistrates.⁸⁶ Most frequently they were metics or freedmen, but sometimes they were humble citizens who had to earn their living. They had a bad reputation. By their knowledge of government departments and of the records they acquired familiarity with official documents and an experience which enabled them to direct, honestly or not, the amateur leaders appointed for a year.⁸⁷ Hence the law forbade the minor clerks to retain the same office for more than a year:⁸⁸ they passed, therefore, from one department to another in order not to lose their salary. Finally, the chief magistrates had their heralds for summonses and proclamations, and flute players to play during the sacrifices offered under their presidency.⁸⁹ All these people belonged to the category of salaried employees to whom a name little esteemed was given (ύπηρέται).

Others in great number were attached to certain administrations as servants. They were never citizens, rarely freemen, almost always public slaves (δημόσιοι)90 The officials responsible for the execution of criminal sentences were the object of universal loathing; recourse had to be had to slaves for the recruiting of the personnel which the Eleven required, the executioner, that unclean being who was not allowed to dwell within the city, and torturers and gaolers.⁹¹ Public slaves served as apparitors for the thesmothetai, who employed them in all the material transactions necessitated by the organization and the functioning of the tribunals.⁹² Others formed the gangs employed by the astynomoi for the policing of the streets, by the surveyors for the upkeep of the roads, by the epistatai for public works.⁹³ We know, finally, of slaves whose administrative duties were of a higher order: book-keepers in charge of the papers of the treasurers and the strategoi; the archivist of the Metroon; the archivist of the Boule, who had charge of the documents necessary for the exercise of its financial functions (statistics of property let by the poletai and the king, containing details of rents and expirations and returns of special taxes).⁹⁴

Democratic equality would not suffer any difference to be made between members of the same college. But the nine archons, created at different epochs and united by an artificial tie, did not form a college as the others did: the six thesmothetai, it is true, followed the general rule; but the archon, the king and the polemarch had their special functions and acted independently of each other; the archon properly so called might be regarded as the chief of them all, inasmuch as he gave his name to the year and had by virtue of that a moral pre-eminence over all the magistrates without exception. In the other colleges in spite of equality in principle there was usually need for a president. Sometimes he was appointed for the whole year, as in the case of the treasurers; sometimes he was chosen by turns; for example, in the earliest days, each strategos exercised the presidency and the supreme command one day out of ten.

Business was despatched either by the whole college or by one of the members acting in its name. The magistrates of a college were, therefore, collectively and individually responsible, as well in each prytany before the Assembly as at the conclusion of their office before the logistai and the euthynoi. 95 In the college of the strategoi the principle of collective administration and responsibility could not withstand the exigencies of war. The Assembly designated one or more strategoi for each expedition, allotted to each one his powers and sometimes appointed a generalissimo: it is obvious that in this case there would be either personal or partially collective responsibility.⁹⁶

Power and Responsibility of the Magistrates

The magistrates enjoyed numerous prerogatives. It is possible that the State granted them a suspensive immunity against certain actions; for we know of no instance in which a magistrate was the object of an action in civil law.⁹⁷ In any case they were assured of special protection in the performance of their duties. “ Any outrage offered to them,” says Demosthenes, “ extends to the laws, to the crown, the symbol of public authority, to the very name of the city.”⁹⁸ An insult thus became an offence liable to heavy punishment. The injured magistrate might inflict a fine on the delinquent, as was done, for example, by a strategos to a soldier, according to a counsel’s address which has come down to us.⁹⁹ If the legal maximum of the epibole seemed to him inadequate he might send the offender before the courts and secure a severer sentence, such as the total deprivation of civil rights. The magistrates had, in addition, honorific privileges. They occupied a special place in processions and in ceremonies of every kind. Their seats were reserved in the theatre. In the banquets which followed the sacrifices they were offered the choicest morsels, as were the chiefs of Homeric times. One decree enumerates the number of joints to be set aside from the victims of the Panathenaeic hecatomb in honour of the prytaneis, the archons, the treasurers of the goddess, the hieropoioi, the strategoi and the taxiarchs100

The democratic spirit, however, was not very conducive to a profound respect for the magistrates. The idea that the citizen ought alternately to obey and to command led each one to consider himself in all respects the equal of those who had succeeded to the command and who demanded his obedience. Such was the attitude of the majority towards the magistrates that carping critics thought it was commendable to despise them.¹⁰¹ As one might expect, however, the party men who reproached the people on this account fully deserved reproach themselves : it was for their benefit that, in 426, Aristophanes in the Babylonians vilified Cleon, then a councillor, and, in 425, in the Acharnians, Lamachus, then strategos.¹⁰²

It was impossible, besides, for the people to show much deference towards magistrates who were always subject to its authority. In order to provide against abuse of power the sovereign people exercised a perpetual control over its servants. Any citizen could independently superintend the activities of any official. Moreover, everything was done by order of the Council or the Assembly, or at the least, was done before their eyes. No administrative department whatever could take any initiative without seeking the advice or the collaboration of the Council.¹⁰³ The majority of the magistrates, especially those who had the management of public funds, were subjected to its penal jurisdiction, and in each prytany they had to render account to a commission of ten auditors (logistai) drawn by lot from the members of the Council.¹⁰⁴ On the recommendation of the logistai or on its own initiative the Council could try any magistrate on the charge of malversation ; but if he were condemned the magistrate was entitled to appeal to the tribunal. It was also lawful for any citizen to bring an eisangelia before the Council against any magistrate who was accused of failing to conform to the laws, and, in this case again, the condemned man had the right of appeal to popular justice.105 But the Ecclesia retained a direct and a much more far-reaching power over all those who were merely the temporary executors of its will. In the principal assembly of each prytany it proceeded to the epicheirotonia, that is it voted by show of hands on the question of the administration of the magistrates : it confirmed them in their power if it considered that they had acquitted themselves well; if not it deposed them and sent them before the court.¹⁰⁶ But even before the vote of confidence had been taken in the ordinary and customary way of procedure the Ecclesia did not hesitate to depose strategoi with whose conduct it was dissatisfied,¹⁰⁷ nor to prosecute them by means of the eisangelia for any offence committed in the exercise of their office;¹⁰⁸ and when the epicheirotonia was regularly inscribed in the order of the day of the chief assemblies, arraignment might either precede or follow the deposition. In the fifth century the Ecclesia itself usually judged eisangeliai, whilst in the fourth it sent them for preference to the heliasts.¹⁰⁹ If he were acquitted the deposed magistrate resumed his office; if he were condemned his punishment was arbitrarily fixed by the people, in the Heliæa as in the Ecclesia, and it was often very terrible.¹¹⁰

Save in grave cases which were almost always of a political nature, the magistrates remained in office until the end of their year; but then a searching trial awaited them. Each of them was responsible (υπεύθυνος), collectively with his college, and individually with his person and his property, for any crime, delinquency or fault committed in his administration. In order that this responsibility might not be rendered nugatory he was not allowed to leave the country, to dispose of his property and to pass into another family by adoption—in brief to withdraw or conceal any sum which might in certain circumstances be claimed by the State— before obtaining his discharge.111 And until that formality had been accomplished he was forbidden to initiate any proposal for the bestowal of a reward on a magistrate in recognition of the manner in which he had fulfilled his duties. The whole of the action brought by Æschines concerning the crown prematurely conferred on Demosthenes was based on this legal prohibition.

The responsibility of the magistrates was two-fold, first financial, and then moral and political.

Every official on relinquishing his duties had to furnish either an account of the public funds he had administered or a written declaration attesting that he had not had the control of any.¹¹² If he evaded this obligation by illicit means or failed to acquit himself of it within the legal period, he became liable to a public action (γραφή άλογίον) or to eisangelia.¹¹³ The account was called the logos and the auditors who had to check it logistai. This college of magistrates must not be confused with the commission of the Boule which bore the same name and which facilitated the work of the Council by audits carried out from prytany to prytany.¹¹⁴ The logistai numbered thirty in the fifth century and they were appointed by lot ; in the fourth they numbered only ten, but were assisted by ten synegoroi or agents, likewise elected by lot.¹¹⁵ When the dossiers had been divided among them in the chambers of accounts (λογιστήρια), they had to be checked within thirty days.¹¹⁶ They had not only to ensure that the accounts tallied with the official documents preserved in the archives of the Metroon, but, if occasion should arise, they had to get from the persons concerned explanations, with proofs. If it emerged from the examination of the documents and from the inquiry that an accountable official had committed a reprehensible or indictable action the logistai charged the synegoroi to deal with such conclusions according to law, and if the latter accepted the charge as well-founded, in concert with the logistai they brought before a tribunal of heliasts an action either in respect of misappropriation (κλοπής δημοσίων χρημάτων), venality (δωρων), or offences committed in the exercise of their office (άδικίου). If, on the other hand, the logistai and the synegoroi found the accounts in order, they drew up an audit certificate and brought it before the tribunal, which alone had the power to grant discharge. Whether there was a suit or not, therefore, it was for a jury of at least five hundred members to pronounce the last Word. In the tribunal over which the logistai presided the synegoroi acted as public prosecutor; but every citizen was entitled, on a claim being made by the herald of the logistai, to plead his cause with regard to the accounts under discussion.117 There was no appeal from the decision of the tribunal. In cases of simple negligence in the administration of the public funds the guilty official had to make good the amount of which the treasury had been deprived; in case of serious error he was condemned to tenfold restitution.¹¹⁸ If he were discharged he was doubly protected by the judicial sovereignty of the people and by the inviolable principle of Attic law, μη δϊς προς τον αύτον π€ρΙ των αυτών, non bis contra eumdem in idem.¹¹⁹

But although he was irrevocably discharged in so far as accountability was concerned, he remained responsible for every other act of his administration. Besides the rendering of accounts in the narrow and precise sense there was in the public law of Athens a rendering of accounts in the wider and vaguer sense, the euthyna in the presence of the euthynoi. These “ redressers “ were ten in number, one for each tribe, and each of them had two assistants or paredroi. The whole thirty were drawn by lot from members of the Council. During the three days which followed the judgment rendered by the logistai and the synegoroi, the euthynos sat with his assistants, for the duration of the market, before the statue of the eponymous hero of his tribe. Any citizen might lodge with him against a magistrate already judged in the matter of his financial transactions a private or public suit in respect of his other actions: he inscribed on a white tablet his name, the name of the defendant, the alleged injury with an assessment of the damage caused and the required penalty, and delivered it to the euthynos. The latter examined the claim, and if after investigation he deemed it admissible, he delivered it to the competent authorities: the private suit was transmitted to the judges of the demes responsible for prosecution in tribal affairs; the public suit was brought before the thesmothetai. If the thesmothetai likewise deemed it admissible, they brought it before the popular tribunal whose decision was sovereign.120

The ordinary procedure of rendering account could not be applied to the strategoi: war often caused them to be absent from Athens at the end of the year, that is in July, and they might even have been re-elected many months before, although they were away. They were not, therefore, compelled to render account until they relinquished their powers, at the end of one or several years, or in the course of the year if they had been deposed by an epicheirotonia which was aimed at them in particular.¹²¹ Moreover they had only to justify the acts of their administration before the thesmothetai. The latter in all probability went to the logistai for assistance on the financial side,¹²² but they did not consult the euthynoi upon the remaining questions. Nevertheless they were restricted to the drawing up of a report which they introduced before the tribunal.¹²³ Popular justice alone could approve or condemn the retiring strategoi.

The magistrates, therefore, were subjected to an unremitting and detailed supervision. They could do nothing without the consent of the Council, instructed by a permanent directing committee. Nine times every year they had to obtain the vote of confidence of the Assembly, under pain of being suspended and sent before the courts. At the end of the year all the financial documents of their administration were examined by this court of accounts which the logistai formed ; every one of their actions was scrutinized, upon the request of anyone, by the euthynoi acting as the grand jury. Often even the laws and decrees whose execution was entrusted to them contained punishments to which they were liable in case of neglect.¹²⁴ They were hourly exposed to the insults and calumnies of demagogues and sycophants, they were jealously watched by the hatred of their opponents, and they saw ever suspended over their heads the terrible penalties of eisangelia and the action against illegality. It was inevitable that the people should adopt towards its officials the domineering attitude of a master since it meant to keep for itself all the functions of sovereignty. The very principle of democratic government demanded this control over executive power.

Thus a veritable tyranny was exercised over the magistrates. The literature and history of the fourth and fifth centuries are full of illustrations of it. There is, for instance, the characteristic scene in the Knights in which the Paphla- gonian and the Sausage-seller contest, the one in order to retain, the other to win, the favour of Demos, as to who shall best provide for his needs. They excite his longing with promises of barley, of fine flour, of delicious cakes, of cooked meats; for they have been warned that “ the control of the Pnyx will fall to the man who shall treat him the best,” “ to the man who shall have deserved best of the Demos and his belly.” But let the one who wins the day himself beware ! Demos is ready enough “ on condition that he swallows his daily mess to flatter a thief with the title of sole prostates “; but when he sees it come to an end he gives him the coup de grâce.125 And the ruck of officials was treated no more gently than the politician who was exalted to the rank of first minister. “ The cities,” as Xenophon makes one Athenian say, “ treat their magistrates as I treat my servants. I wish my servants to supply me with all I require in abundance and to take nothing themselves; the cities wish their magistrates to procure for them as much profit as possible and to refrain from taking anything at all.”¹²⁶

There is obviously an element of exaggeration in the buffooneries of the comedies and in the recriminations of the intellectuals. A philosopher—probably Democritus of Abdera —goes still further when he says: “ In the political organization which to-day prevails, it is impossible for the governments not to do wrong, even if they are excellent in all respects ; for their plight is that of the eagle preyed on by vermin.”127 Nevertheless the exaggeration is only one of language. We touch there upon the common vice of democracies. In fact the meddling distrust of the Athenian people spared no one. Pericles himself in the end could not escape it. He rendered account, year by year, obol by obol, of the sums which passed through his hands. But he required secret funds for his diplomacy. That fact was sufficient to cause him to be accused of malversation; in vain did he declare that he had used the money for “ necessary expenses,”—he was duly condemned.¹²⁸ Party spirit and personal rivalries multiplied the suits which, moreover, were not always brought by democrats : fines and capital penalties rained thick and fast.¹²⁹ Doubtless the business of accuser had its dangers: the sycophant laid himself open to a lashing if he did not obtain a fifth of the votes ; the accused did not content himself with parrying his blows, but retaliated, and we see Æschines, prosecuted by Timarchus in connection with his financial administration, causing his adversary to be condemned for an offence against established customs. But this did not prevent unsuccessful generals and ambassadors, dishonest or incapable financial administrators, negligent governors of prisons, nay even the officials responsible for supplies who failed to enforce the laws dealing with the traffic in corn, from being very often treated as criminals and sent to death.¹³⁰

Thus exposed at all times to suspicion, people of ordinary ability and of a timorous nature were obsessed and overpowered by consciousness of their responsibility. The example of Nicias shows what depressing effects fear of the Ecclesia might have. He was a good general, but the thought of the Pnyx paralysed him. After the first checks in the Silician campaign he dared not give the order for retreat which would have saved the army. We learn from Thucydides the cause of his hesitation.¹³¹ He was certain that the Athenians would disapprove of a measure which they had not sanctioned, that they would pass judgment on the strategoi without having witnessed the situation with their own eyes, that they would believe the assertions of eloquent speakers. He told himself, too, that his soldiers, on their return to Athens, would throw the responsibility for their sufferings on their generals and would paint them as traitors, bribed by the enemy. Rather than be thç victim of an unjust and ignominious accusation he chose to perish sword in hand. He pushed military bravery to the limits of temerity, because civic courage was made too difficult for him. How many magistrates must in this way have lost the spirit of initiative and the security indispensable for the proper discharging of their functions !