German Panzerjäger units gained a fair amount of combat experience against Allied medium and heavy tanks during the Western campaign of May–June 1940, but the level of threat was generally manageable. During the campaign, the German divisions had to rely upon the 3.7cm PaK (only recently equipped with PzGr 40 tungsten-core rounds) and four battalions of self-propelled 4.7cm guns with APC ammunition. Although none of the German antitank guns could penetrate the frontal armor of either the French Char B1 bis or British Matilda tanks much beyond 100m even with PzGr 40, the generally passive tactics of Allied tanks saved the Panzerjäger from humiliation, except at the battle of Arras. Since victory came so quickly, the inadequacy of German antitank weapons was not made apparent. The 5cm PaK 38 was tested after the campaign on French tank hulks and was judged to be more than adequate to deal with the likely future opposition.
By mid-June 1941, Germany had three army groups with 123 divisions poised to invade the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa. In addition to the division-level Panzerjäger battalions, there were 14 army-level Panzerjäger battalions equipped with the bulk of the available self-propelled guns. All told, the German forces had 9,000 antitank guns, including 7,782 3.7cm PaK, 216 4.7cm PaK 36(t), 783 5cm PaK 38 and 178 2.8cm sPzB 41. No HEAT ammunition was yet available and the 5cm PzGr 40 tungsten-core rounds for the PaK 38 only entered production a month before Barbarossa; they were so scarce that PaK gunners needed permission from regimental commanders to use them. Initially, the three primary German strategic objectives were Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. The German Army invaded the Soviet Union with the arrogant belief that its weapons were as good as or superior to those of the Red Army. In fact, the German Abwehr (Military Intelligence) had done a poor job gathering information about the Red Army’s tank force, underestimating both its quality and quantity. Although the Germans were aware of the T-35 heavy tank, the existence of both the KV and T-34 were unknown. Since the T-35 only had a maximum of only 30mm of armor and took years to develop, the Abwehr believed that Soviet industry would be unable to deploy better heavy tanks prior to Operation Barbarossa. Thus, the primary opposition was expected to come from thinly armored T-26 and BT-7 light tanks, which the Panzerjäger’s 3.7cm and 5cm PaK could easily defeat. When this faith in German technical superiority was shattered on the second day of the invasion, the effect on German frontline morale was devastating.
At the start of the German invasion, the Red Army had roughly 24,000 tanks in its inventory, but only 5 percent were T-34s and 2 percent KVs. In the summer of 1941 the Red Army was in a period of rapid expansion after Stalin’s decision in July 1940 to start forming mechanized corps. Once formed, these corps would each have a total of 126 KV and 420 T-34 tanks, making them greatly superior to German Panzer divisions, at least on paper. Over the course of less than a year, the heavy tank force expanded from three battalions to more than 20. By June 1941, ten tank divisions had received KV tanks, which enabled them to form 18 heavy tank battalions with a total of 433 KVs. Another 70 KVs were either in training units or not yet issued. However, only one-third of the KV battalions were near full strength in either equipment or personnel. Furthermore, the level of combat readiness among KV-equipped battalions in June 1941 was negligible, with most units lacking sufficient ammunition and fuel to conduct sustained operations. Personnel manning averaged 75 percent, with shortages of junior officers, NCOs and mechanics. Due to Marshal Kulik’s interference, the production of both 76.2mm and 152mm tank ammunition had been minimal prior to the war and reserve stockpiles were non-existent. The lack of crew training was also a serious constraint, since only the KV battalions in the 8th Tank Division had been involved in the fall 1940 maneuvers; the remaining units had no training above company level. Most KVs, after delivery to units in the winter of 1940/41, were covered with tarpaulins in motor pools, to await summer maneuver training in 1941. Worst of all, the command and staff of the newly formed mechanized corps were unable to direct or sustain their tank units properly. Two-thirds of the frontline KV tanks were deployed in the Kiev Military District (see table on page 27). The 7th Tank Division was one of the few Red Army tank formations in relatively decent shape at the start of the war, with 50 KVs and 150 T-34s. Yet its tanks had only 1.5 loads of 76.2mm ammunition (only HE-FRAG, no APHE) and one load of diesel fuel on hand. Not surprisingly, the fuel ran out in the first two days of the war just moving to the front, after which the tanks were immobilized. The KV-2s in the 41st Tank Division didn’t have a single shell between them and the drivers had not yet been trained. All of these deficiencies might still have been overcome had not Soviet war plans required the mechanized corps to launch immediate counterattacks in case of invasion, which robbed the KV battalions of any chance to prepare for combat.
Once the Wehrmacht became aware of the KV heavy tank, the realization that the Red Army could produce tanks that were virtually immune to standard Panzerjäger weaponry led to hesitation among some German operational-level commanders. The KVs posed a threat both on the offense and in defense due to their near-invulnerability and even small numbers of them could act as hindrances and deterrents to the German ability to advance. Reports that enemy “52-ton tanks” were in the vicinity prompted German commanders to shift from offense to hasty defense, in anticipation of major counterattacks, or to advance more cautiously. Wherever KVs showed up in any strength, the German advance tended to slow down.
In theory, two existing German weapons could counter the KV heavy tank, but in reality these were not practical solutions. Both the 8.8cm Flak 18/36 antiaircraft gun and the schwere 10cm K18 cannon demonstrated their ability to damage or destroy KV tanks at ranges of 500m with AP or APHE ammunition. In June 1941, the Germans deployed 622 8.8cm Flak guns and 300 10cm cannon with the invasion force, which seemed adequate to deal with any enemy heavy tanks. However, both these weapons weighed over 5 tons and were more than double the height of the 5cm PaK, which meant they required a large SdKfz 7 half-track to move them into position. Unless they were already in position, these large, conspicuous weapons could not safely move to the forward edge of the battlefield to engage Soviet tanks without risk of detection and once spotted, heavy artillery had no real protection. Furthermore, since both Flak and heavy artillery were usually well to the rear, their response time to move to counter KV-1 attacks typically required hours.
If Germany had possessed enough tungsten carbide, the threat posed by KV heavy tanks and T-34s might have evaporated rather quickly. Prior to Barbarossa, Germany had only used about 100 tons of tungsten ore annually for antitank ammunition, but this figure increased 800 percent after encounters with Soviet heavy tanks. Germany was totally dependent upon foreign suppliers for access to tungsten ore. During 1941–42, Germany annually received 3,100 tons or 90 percent of its tungsten ore requirement from Spain and Portugal. Allied economic warfare successfully managed to pressure Spain and Portugal to restrict tungsten exports to the Third Reich just as demand rose exponentially. When Albert Speer took over as Minister of Armaments in February 1942, he realized that Germany’s small reserves of tungsten were being rapidly consumed by the Panzerjäger on the Eastern Front, leaving little for use in machine tools needed to produce the weapons. Speer was able to convince Hitler to choose between antitank ammunition and machine tools. In June 1942, Hitler decreed that no more tungsten would be used for antitank ammunition, with a temporary exception granted to 5cm PzGr 40 ammunition since that was still the primary division-level antitank weapon. Much of the existing hard-core ammunition was also ordered to be turned in for disassembly in order to recover tungsten, which must have done wonders for the morale of frontline Panzerjäger. Thereafter, larger PaK guns and HEAT ammunition became the preferred solution to the problem posed by Soviet heavy tanks.
A 5cm PaK 38 being towed through a stream in Russia. The German Panzerjäger units were expected to keep up with the advance units, but most of their prime movers were designed for European roads, not the muddy tracks in Russia. (Ian Barter)
The opening stages
This map depicts the opposing dispositions of German Panzerjäger-Abteilungen and Soviet KV-equipped battalions in the opening stages of the war in the East, as well as the three main German strategic objectives. The map also depicts the location of the most important Panzerjäger vs KV tank actions in the 1941 campaign, which indicates that most occurred in the border areas and on the approaches to Leningrad.
German troops pulling a 3.7cm PaK up an icy slope during the winter of 1941/42. Although the weapon was clearly overmatched by the KV-1, the OKH was forced to retain the 3.7cm PaK well into 1943 due to Rheinmetall’s inability to fully reequip the Panzerjäger with better weapons. (Ian Barter)