The Red Army formed its first heavy tank unit, the 5th Heavy Tank Regiment, in 1935. This unit was expanded to brigade-size as more T-35s were built and eventually comprised three tank battalions and one training battalion by 1939. When the KV-1 tank entered service in 1940, additional training units were set up at Saratov and Orel, as well as a technical training course for driver–mechanics at the Kirov plant. Prior to the war, the Red Army had a requirement to create 36 heavy tank battalions, with each of the 18 tank divisions to receive two heavy tank battalions, each with 31 KV tanks. Altogether, the Red Army intended to train more than 5,000 KV tankers but despite efforts to rush new recruits through training, barely 600 had gone through basic training by June 1941. Only 17 battalions were in existence, none of which were combat-ready. In order to protect the KVs from unnecessary wear and tear, the General Staff had directed that driver training would be conducted on obsolete T-27 tankettes, rather than the new KVs. Thus, by June 1941 most KV drivers had only 3–5 hours’ worth of experience, and on dissimilar machines. Junior officers often didn’t know how to read maps and often led their platoons into ground that was too marshy for the KV, causing many tanks to become bogged down. Battalions in the western military districts had plenty of new recruits but were missing 25–50 percent of their officers and NCOs.
Most KV tankers were draftees, but in the early stages of the war – when there was a surge of patriotism – there were volunteers attracted to serving on heavy tanks. The Red Army tended to select better-educated recruits, usually high-school graduates with follow-on automotive training or experience, for service in heavy tank units. Pre-war training was typically one year long for those on track to get commissions as junior officers, although NCO and junior enlisted training was about half that. Motivations among recruits varied immensely and the recent purges had an effect on morale; KV trainee Arseni Rod’kin recalled that his uncle had been arrested in the purges and subsequently died in prison, which affected his attitude toward the regime he served. Rod’kin later said that: “The Kremlin bastards come and go, but the Motherland is forever … I was defending my country, not the Soviets.”
Once the German invasion began, both production of KVs and training of crews were disrupted. When the Kirov plant relocated to Chelyabinsk in October 1941, most KV training was also shifted there. A reserve tank training regiment was created at Chelyabinsk to conduct training, but for much of 1942 it had only two KV tanks and a few other types. Oftentimes, training was conducted on substitutes or even on foot. The period of training was reduced to eight months for officers and three months for junior NCOs. Unlike the German method, trainees were not formed into permanent crews during training, but only when they reached their operational unit. Most Soviet tankers recall that training was unrealistic and did little to prepare them for combat. Gunnery training was mostly limited to sub-caliber substitutes, namely firing a machine gun through the main gun barrel. Training against their primary opponent – concealed enemy antitank guns – was non-existent, although there was some discussion about engaging bunkers. Most KV commanders were unprepared for how little visibility they would have when buttoned-up in combat and how to work with supporting infantry, which proved quite detrimental on the battlefield. Driver training was also minimal, which meant no practical instruction on proper use of terrain for concealed movement. Instead, trainees were given large doses of mindless drills, such as loading and unloading dummy rounds into the breach, as well as hours of Communist indoctrination.
The five-man crew of the KV-1 consisted of a commander (leytenant), gunner, driver-mechanic (leytenant), auxiliary driver and radio-operator. The KV-2 had a sixth crewman added, to serve as the loader for the 152mm gun. Initially, the heavy tank battalion of 1941 was supposed to have a headquarters element with one KV tank and three companies of ten KVs each, but only six KV battalions were at full strength at the start of the German invasion. Losses in the first four weeks of combat were catastrophic. By July 1941, most surviving KVs were integrated into mixed tank battalions with T-34s, usually in company-sized groups of 7–10 tanks. By December 1941, a Soviet tank brigade was authorized only five KVs in a single half-company. Throughout much of the winter counteroffensive of 1941/42, KVs served in independent tank battalions, but only in small numbers. By mid-1942, enough KVs were available to begin re-forming larger units, beginning with army-level heavy tank regiments. Unfortunately, these regiments were often spread around between different fronts, so that there was no mass of heavy tanks concentrated in one sector to fulfill their intended breakthrough role. Throughout much of 1941–43, KVs tended to fight in platoon-size formations of 3–4 tanks.
Soviet tankers uploading ammunition onto a KV-1 in summer 1942. The caliber of individual Soviet tankers was much higher in the second year of the war, with far fewer tanks lost to inferior driving, navigation, or maintenance skills. (Author)
KV-1 crews in one of the independent heavy tank regiments in the 2nd Guards Tank Army, summer 1943. By the third year of the war, KV-1 crews had finally been sharpened into a professional force, but their tanks were no longer technically superior. (Fonds of the RGKFD)
When the Wehrmacht was created in 1935, the Panzerjäger were formed as a separate branch of service. From the beginning, the Panzerjäger were considered an elite and tended to draw upon the best personnel available. Although there were only 23,000 personnel assigned to this branch at the start of World War II, a rapid four-fold expansion occurred in 1940–41. When the Wehrmacht invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the three army groups involved included about 95,000 Panzerjäger. Most Panzerjäger units were at or near full strength and contained a large proportion of veterans from previous campaigns.
Like most of the other German branches of service, Panzerjäger personnel were primarily recruited and trained in their Wehrkreis (military district) of origin. There were a total of 15 Panzerjäger-Ersatz-Abteilung in September 1939, one for each Wehrkreis, and these training units supplied Panzerjäger replacements to all the divisions originating in their district. New recruits spent 12–16 weeks in basic training at the replacement battalion (training times were reduced after Stalingrad), receiving a heavy dose of infantry field training since the Panzerjäger were expected to operate up front with the infantry. Toward the end of their basic training, recruits were formed into gun crews under an experienced Unteroffizier and drilled on 3.7cm PaK guns, which were perfect for instruction. In March 1940, a training company for crews for the Panzerjäger I was established at the Panzer school at Wünsdorf and later, crews for Marder-series vehicles were trained there as well.
The standard towed Panzerjäger crew consisted of an NCO gun commander, an Obergefreiter as gun layer, a loader, two ammunition handlers and the driver for their prime mover. Crews were drilled until they could achieve a high rate of fire in dry runs, then shifted to local firing ranges for live fire. Trainees were taught to estimate ranges quickly and accurately and to engage a mix of moving and stationary targets. After June 1941, Panzerjäger recruits were given the opportunity to practice their gunnery skills upon captured Soviet tank hulks, including a few KV-1 and KV-2 heavy tanks. Panzerjäger training emphasized selecting firing positions with good fields of fire and then camouflaging their weapon, be it towed or self-propelled, so that it had a high probability of getting the first shot in during an anti-armor engagement. With the standard 3.7cm and 5cm PaK weapons, crews were trained not to engage targets beyond 600m since the probability of penetration against most enemy tanks was remote. Instead, Panzerjäger training emphasized using their concealed position to wait for enemy heavy tanks to pass obliquely to their PaK position, then to pour a fusillade of armor-piercing shells into the thinner side armor of the target. This tactic worked to some extent against the French Char B1 bis heavy tank in the 1940 Western campaign.
The Waffen-SS units had their own Panzerjäger units. Here, a 3.7cm PaK crew defends a road intersection. The use of local camouflage to break up the outline of the gun was emphasized in training, but deploying the weapon in the middle of the road seriously reduced this crew’s life expectancy. (Ian Barter)
A German Panzerjäger crew firing a 7.5cm PaK 40 against Soviet tank hulks on a firing range. German training was normally regarded as tough and realistic, although it should be evident that here the loader is standing at full height and the gun commander is casually sitting on the towing hitch, neither posture being likely in combat. (Ian Barter)
Once trained, a gun crew was sent in a recruit draft to join an antitank unit at the army, division or regimental level. Each German infantry and Panzer division had a Panzerjäger-Abteilung, with a typical authorized strength of around 700 men, organized in a headquarters, three Panzerjäger companies, an antiaircraft company (with 12 2cm Flak), and battalion logistic trains. At the start of Operation Barbarossa, the battalions were completely motorized and authorized about 110 vehicles, although there was little standardization and many Panzerjäger units relied upon captured British and French trucks that did not last long in the harsh Russian environment. For example, the 14./Infanterie-Regiment 437 in the 6.Armee had ten French UE Chenillette tractors to pull its PaK guns, but eight of them broke down in the first three months of the campaign. By 1942, horses were being used as substitutes to pull PaK guns in some units. In 1941, a standard German Panzerjäger-Kompanie had three platoons with three 3.7cm PaK each and one platoon with two 5cm PaK 40. The company had a total authorized strength of 159 men and 34 vehicles, with the Krupp Protze being the preferred prime mover. Tactically, the Panzerjäger-Abteilung was employed in a “fire brigade” manner to back up hard-pressed infantry regiments whenever substantial amounts of enemy armor appeared, with each company operating semi-independently. Regimental-level Panzerjäger companies provided the first layer of local antitank defense, but were stuck with the 3.7cm PaK for most of the war, while the divisional antitank units were continually upgraded with new and better PaK weapons.
A 5cm PaK 38 crew in a more realistic training posture, with the crew hunched behind the gun shield. Note the battery observer’s telescope to the right. The low profile made the PaK 38 very difficult for KV-1 tanks to spot. (Ian Barter)
All of the self-propelled antitank guns were initially operated by army-level Panzerjäger-Abteilung, each provided with three companies totaling 27 self-propelled guns. Personnel assigned to these units received the same training as their towed counterparts, although with additional training on their respective vehicles. Given the size of their vehicles, the self-propelled Panzerjäger could not rely as much on camouflage and flank shots and had to develop more mobile “shoot and scoot” tactics that gave their thinly protected vehicles a chance to survive encounters with their better-armored opponents.
At the start of Operation Barbarossa, about one-third of the German Panzerjäger had prior combat experience against enemy tanks, primarily in the French campaign. Small-unit leadership was usually very good, although some NCOs and platoon leaders lacked sufficient aggressiveness and viewed their mission as essentially defensive. Morale was high among the Panzerjäger at the start of the campaign, but early encounters with the KV-1 and T-34 shattered their confidence in the 3.7cm and 5cm PaK guns. Thereafter, the Panzerjäger felt overmatched by enemy heavy tanks and this attitude persisted until better 7.5cm weapons began arriving in quantity in mid-1942.