Nobody in Germany knew anything about these [KV heavy] tanks, even that they were under construction.
Major Joachim von Kielmansegg, Chief of Staff 6.Panzer-Division, June 1941
The Northwest Front had two mechanized corps available to counterattack Heeresgruppe Nord’s invasion of the Baltic States on June 22, 1941, but only two battalions of KV-1 and KV-2 tanks in the 2nd Tank Division. At 1730 hours on June 22, the 2nd Tank Division was ordered to advance westward toward Raseiniai, as part of a larger counterattack against the German spearhead, Panzergruppe 1. After an approach march of over 100km (62mi) along dusty side roads, the division approached Raseiniai from the east on the evening of June 23. However, the KVs had suffered badly on the road march from clogged air filters and balky transmissions, with most of the KV-2s and about ten of the KV-1s falling out along the way. On the positive side, the German 6. Panzer-Division was caught spread out after capturing Raseiniai, with Kampfgruppe Raus and Kampfgruppe Seckendorff having thrown bridgeheads across the nearby Dubysa River. The 2nd Tank Division concentrated all available armor, including 21 KV-1s and a few KV-2s, against Seckendorff’s bridgehead.
As expected, the Panzerjäger made short work of the handful of T-35 heavy tanks, most of which broke down before they even met the enemy. (Author)
The battle of Raseiniai, June 24, 1941
The Soviet 2nd Tank Division attacked Kampfgruppe Seckendorff’s bridgehead over the Dubysa River at sunrise, with BT and T-26 light tanks of the 4th Tank Regiment in the lead, followed by a mixed battalion of KV-1 and KV-2 tanks of the 3rd Tank Regiment (1). By 0900 hours, the German units were overrun and forced to retreat across the river. Some Soviet tanks and infantry advanced across the river around 1200 hours and engaged the rest of Kampfgruppe Seckendorff, which was hard-pressed (2). A small group of Soviet tanks, including three KVs, crossed the Dubysa at an unguarded point and headed toward Raseiniai. However, two were immobilized by German heavy artillery firing in direct lay (3). A single KV-2 bypassed Kampfgruppe Koll and managed to reach the road supplying Kampfgruppe Raus before running out of fuel (4). Kampfgruppe Raus attacked the stranded KV-2 with 5cm PaK and engineers, but failed to destroy it (5). A two-gun battery of 8.8cm Flak arrived at dusk (6) and engaged the KV-2 at first light the next day.
The Soviet attack began just after dawn on June 24. Kampfgruppe Seckendorff had the Kradschützen-Abteilung 6 and the 2.Kompanie of Panzerjäger-Abteilung 41 in its bridgehead, with 12 3.7cm PaK and four 5cm PaK. The Panzerjäger were stunned by the appearance of the huge enemy tanks approaching, but waited until they were within 200m before opening fire. However, they were even more shocked when the standard armor-piercing rounds bounced off the thick frontal armor of the KVs, with no effect. Despite the fire of all weapons, including artillery, the KV-1 tanks managed to overrun most of the German motorcycle troops and their accompanying PaK unit – the first time during World War II that German infantry had been overrun by enemy tanks. Many of the surviving German troops were so terrified that they simply hid, although one Leutnant immobilized a KV-1 with Teller mines. Even worse, a number of KV-1 and KV-2 tanks got across the Dubysa River with some Soviet infantry and smashed into Schützen-Regiment 114 (mot.) and overran some of the divisional artillery. A KV-1 platoon led by Major Dmitri I. Osadchy pushed toward Raseiniai:
The column [of the 1st Platoon], consisting of four tanks moved in the direction where the recent fighting was. Examining the next grove of trees, we came upon the enemy’s artillery firing positions. Advancing from the flank, we poured fire from the machine guns and the enemy gunners began to panic. When we hit the fourth artillery piece something unexpected happened: my tank was off the ground and hanging on it. The driver, Sergeant Andrei Yasnyuk, worked hard to shake the tank, and move it. Finally, after crushing the cannon, the tank treads touched solid ground again. Once the artillery firing positions were eliminated, we moved into a clearing to return to the starting area.
After hours of the KV-1 tanks running rampage on Kampfgruppe Seckendorff the Germans were able to get a few 15cm howitzers and 8.8cm Flak guns into action, which succeeded in immobilizing some of the Soviet heavy tanks. One KV required 13 hits from an 8.8cm Flak before it was stopped. Major Ivan Ragochy, commander of the 3rd Tank Regiment, was killed by splinters when a heavy shell hit the side of his KV-1’s turret; the round did not penetrate but caused spalling on the interior. By late afternoon the Soviet tanks were running out of fuel and ammunition and those still capable of moving retired back across the Dubysa River. A lone KV-2 that managed to bypass the German artillery pressed on toward Raseiniai and managed to infiltrate behind Kampfgruppe Raus before it, too, ran out of fuel.
A 3.7cm PaK crushed flat by a KV heavy tank. German troops had almost no experience of being overrun by enemy tanks and were horrified to see their PaK guns crushed underneath the Soviet KVs’ tracks – exactly the psychological effect that Stalin had intended. (Author)
The actions of Kampfgruppe Raus against this single KV-2, probably commanded by Leytenant Vladimir A. Smirnov, are well known. Beginning at 1200 hours on June 24, this KV-2 defied all efforts to neutralize it for more than a day and succeeded in interdicting Kampfgruppe Raus’ supply lines. Initially, a platoon of 5cm PaK 38 guns under Leutnant Wengenroth from the 3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 41 was able to quietly maneuver within about 200–400m of the immobilized KV-2 – demonstrating the mobility of the weapon – before scoring eight direct hits on the turret and hull. Wengenroth’s gunners had some PzGr 40 rounds, but even these had no effect. In response, the KV-2 accurately fired back with several 152mm high-explosive rounds, which destroyed two 5cm PaK 38 guns and disabled the other two. The Panzerjäger were shocked that their newest weapon, the 5cm PaK 38, was totally ineffective. Kampfgruppe Raus then tried to maneuver an 8.8cm Flak gun into position but before it could fire, the alert KV-2 crew spotted it and knocked it out as well. Finally, the KV-2 was knocked out the next day when another 8.8cm Flak gun was brought up and managed to fire seven armor-piercing rounds into the rear of the tank from 800m. By this point, the German XXXXI Armeekorps (mot.) had swung the 1.Panzer-Division behind the right flank of the 2nd Tank Division near Saukotas, in an effort to encircle the Soviet armored group. On June 25, the remaining KV heavy tanks tried to break through the German envelopment and overrun the II./Schützen-Regiment 1. Frantic, Kampfgruppe Westhoven reported that: “Neither the infantry’s antitank guns nor those of our own Panzerjäger platoons (six 5cm PaK) … are able to pierce the plating of the heavy Russian tanks. What can be done to stop those heavy Russian tanks?”6
The appearance of the KV-2 on the battlefield was one of the greatest technical shocks that the Wehrmacht experienced in World War II. The fact that the Red Army – regarded as technically backward – had deployed a tank that was virtually invulnerable to all German PaK weapons was unnerving. (Ian Barter)
A KV-1 destroyed by three 8.8cm armor-piercing rounds which struck the turret, penetrated and detonated the ammunition inside, blowing out the roof. The 8.8cm Flak 18 antiaircraft gun could defeat the KV-1 but was poorly suited to frontline antitank combat due to its size and weight. (Author)
Once again, the 1.Panzer-Division was able to get a few 8.8cm Flak guns and a battery of 10.5cm howitzers into the fight, and these were able to immobilize some KVs. The battle of Raseiniai ended with the 2nd Tank Division surrounded and 29 of the KV heavy tanks belonging to the Northwest Front lost, but the Panzerjäger had failed in their primary mission and allowed both friendly infantry and artillery to be overrun. Furthermore, many of the Soviet tankers survived the battle and retreated northward, where they would soon receive new tanks. On June 27, a special commission from the OKH arrived in Heeresgruppe Nord to investigate these first encounters with the KV heavy tanks; as soon as they returned to Berlin, the Heereswaffenamt was directed to award contracts to Krupp and Rheinmetall immediately to deliver 7.5cm PaK guns as soon as possible.
In the Western Military District, a total of 112 KV heavy tanks were concentrated in the 4th and 7th Tank Divisions of the 6th Mechanized Corps stationed near Bialystok. However, the four KV battalions in this corps were handicapped by severe shortages of fuel and ammunition; most had only a single load of fuel and many had no 76.2mm ammunition at all. Nevertheless, when the German invasion began, the 6th Mechanized Corps was ordered to concentrate its armor and launch a counterattack toward Grodno. Instead, the 140km (87mi) approach march merely consumed the limited fuel available and caused more than a dozen KVs to drop out with transmission defects. In spite of this, the 6th Mechanized Corps attacked the 256.Infanterie-Division on June 24–25 and the remaining KVs went into action. A German war correspondent was present and witnessed the fight between the KVs and Panzerjäger-Abteilung 256:
And then the cannon barrels rise above the horizon, a high turret becomes visible, a gigantic tank body. Tanks! Giant tanks such as we have never yet seen! Russian 52-ton tanks with 15 cm guns! Crippling fear strikes us. Then the PaK guns are turned around, our fire bursts from all their barrels, but the light armor-piercing weapons can do nothing here. The shots bounce off the mighty steel walls like rubber balls … The Panzerjäger fight with wild intensity. They let it come to the shortest ranges, firing cold-bloodedly, as they have learned, at its weakest points.7
Although many PaK guns were destroyed at little cost to the KVs, the heavy tank battalions could not accomplish their breakthrough mission without adequate fuel and ammunition. Eventually, all of the Western Front KVs were lost within a week of the beginning of the war, primarily due to fuel shortages and mechanical defects. In response, the Stavka directed on June 30 that 44 brand-new KVs from the Kirov plant be sent directly to the Western Front to reequip the 7th Mechanized Corps for a counterattack. But the untrained drivers burned out the clutches on seven KVs moving just 5km (3mi) from the railhead to an assembly area. When the 7th Mechanized Corps launched a counterattack near Polotsk on July 7, it lost seven KVs in a swamp and all but one KV-2 was out of action within two weeks. This Soviet counterattack was a fiasco and squandered most of the Western Front’s remaining KVs.
Born in Sachsenhausen, just north of Berlin, in 1921, Rudolf Bittner was the son of a plumber. After a stint in the Reich Labor Service (RAD), the 17-year-old Bittner joined the Wehrmacht in late August 1939 and trained at the PanzerAbwehr-Ersatz-Abteilung 3 in Potsdam. By Christmas 1939, Bittner was assigned to the 2./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 561, an army-level antitank unit equipped with 3.7cm PaK guns. During the 1940 campaign in the West, Bittner was involved in operations against the Maginot Line but saw no significant action against French tanks.
Rudolf Bittner (1921–45). (Author)
After the French campaign, Bittner was promoted to Obergefreiter and made a gunner in the 2.Kompanie, while his battalion was reequipped with Panzerjäger I self-propelled 4.7cm guns. At the outset of Operation Barbarossa, Bittner’s unit supported the 9.Armee and he was involved in his first antitank duels. Bittner fought in the bitter defensive battles around the Rzhev salient throughout the winter of 1941/42. In May 1942, his battalion received 12 of the new 7.5cm PaK 41 guns and Bittner was assigned to one as a gunner. In early August, the Soviet Western Front began a major offensive pushing toward Rzhev and Bittner’s company was sent to defend the town of Zubstov. Zhukov committed the 6th and 8th Tank Corps, which had over 300 tanks including 48 KV-1s, to take this town on August 6. Equipped with the best antitank gun on the planet and adequate tungsten-core rounds, Bittner knocked out seven KV-1s. Although Zubstov eventually fell, the German Panzerjäger defense knocked out nearly 50 percent of the Soviet armor in a three-day duel. Soviet attacks continued to hammer away against the Rzhev salient and on September 9, a group of five KV-1s threatened another sector. On his own initiative, Bittner repositioned his PaK and engaged the KV-1s, destroying four of them and damaging the fifth. For his prowess against Soviet heavy tanks, Bittner was awarded the Ritterkreuz (Knight’s Cross) and promoted to Unteroffizier in November 1942.
The Marder II Ausf C with 7.5cm PaK 40 was the best self-propelled Panzerjäger weapon available during the winter of 1942/43. Almost 300 of these excellent weapons were built by the end of 1942. (Ian Barter)
Due to the reliance of the PaK 41 on scarce tungsten-core rounds, this weapon was withdrawn from service in mid-1943 and Bittner’s unit was reequipped with Marder IIs. Bittner was made a platoon leader and spent the next two years trying to slow the advance of Soviet armor westward. In January 1945, while his unit was retreating in Upper Silesia, Bittner went missing in action.
Pavel Gudz was born into a peasant family in the Ukrainian Kamyanets–Podilskiy region. Although his father died when he was young, Pavel was a talented youth and managed to not only complete high school but then attend a technical college. He joined the Communist Party and then volunteered for service in the Red Army.
In August 1939, the 20-year-old Pavel Gudz entered the Saratov Heavy Tank School, where he spent the next 22 months training first on the T-35 and then the KV-1. He graduated in early June 1941 and was posted as a platoon leader to the 1st Battalion/63rd Tank Regiment in the 4th Mechanized Corps in the Kiev Military District. Gudz was fortunate that his battalion missed the disastrous battle of Dubno, where so many KVs were lost, but he was involved in the delaying actions fought south of Kiev in July 1941. He also missed encirclement in the Kiev Pocket. His battalion was dissolved in August and Gudz was sent to Moscow with other survivors to form one of the new heavy tank units. Leytenant Gudz was assigned to the 89th Separate Tank Battalion, which, after participating in the parade in Moscow on November 7, was sent to reinforce Rokossovsky’s 16th Army near Volokolamsk. Gudz’s battalion played a major role in halting the German advance toward Moscow, but in the process it lost all but two KV-1 tanks in a month of combat. When the Soviet winter counteroffensive began on December 5, Gudz commanded one of the two remaining KV-1 tanks and conducted a single-tank attack upon a German-held village. During a three-hour fight, Gudz’s KV-1 was hit 29 times but not penetrated, while he managed to knock out four PaK guns. In recognition of his success, Gudz was awarded the Order of Lenin and was soon promoted to Kapitan and deputy commander of the 89th Separate Tank Battalion. Over the next six months, Gudz was involved in numerous actions around Vyazma against German PaK guns.
In July 1942, Kapitan Gudz was assigned to command the 574th Tank Battalion in the 212th Tank Brigade belonging to the Don Front. By November, he was promoted to Major and commanded the 8th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment during Operation Uranus. However, Gudz was badly wounded during the subsequent reduction of the Stalingrad pocket and he did not return to action until May 1943, when he became deputy commander of the 5th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment. During the advance across the Ukraine after the battle of Kursk, Gudz was promoted to Podpolkovnik, but lost an arm when his tank was destroyed at Zaporozhe. Gudz managed to return to his regiment briefly, just as it was converting to IS-1 (IS-85) heavy tanks in April 1944, but his health was fragile so he was sent to join the staff at the Military Academy of Armored Forces in Moscow.
Pavel Gudz (1919–2008). (Author)
After World War II, Gudz spent the next 40 years at the Military Academy of Armored Forces and thrived in the academic arena. He completed his scientific education and then played a major role in shaping post-war Soviet armored doctrine, including participation in the development of the BMP infantry fighting vehicle. Gudz also became a specialist in nuclear weapons and participated in the Red Army’s first major above-ground nuclear tests in 1954. When he retired in 1989 after 50 years of service, Gudz had risen to be Colonel-General of Armored Forces and an honored Soviet scientist. Gudz died in Moscow in May 2008.
German troops examine a KV-1 that lost its turret after a catastrophic explosion. It was rare that the Germans could inflict this kind of damage on a KV-1 in 1941 and this tank might have been destroyed by its own crew after running out of fuel. (Ian Barter)
It was in the south that the Germans would face the greatest threat from KV heavy tanks, since the Kiev Military District had over 260 KVs within the 4th, 8th, 15th and 22nd Mechanized Corps. Although the Southwest Front attempted to mass these corps into an armored fist to counterattack the spearheads of Panzergruppe 1 between Brody and Dubno on June 23–28, due to poor command and control they ended up fighting a piecemeal battle. A number of KVs were lost due to transmission and brake failures, and poor map-reading resulted in several KVs being lost in the marshy terrain around Dubno. Consequently, only about 120 KVs from the 8th and 15th Mechanized Corps were able to strike the flank of Panzergruppe 1 north of Brody on June 26. The 1st Battalion/24th Tank Regiment enjoyed particular success by overrunning part of the 57.Infanterie-Division in Leshnev, including a Panzerjäger unit. Some KVs were hit over 100 times by 3.7cm and 5cm fire without a single penetration. Both the commander of the 8th Mechanized Corps, General Rybayshev, and of the 12th Tank Division, General Mishanin, decided to use KV-1 tanks as their command vehicles in this attack, but the KVs proved unsuited for this role since they tended to attract fire. Mishanin was seriously wounded when an air attack caught his KV in the streets of Brody. For about 24 hours, the Soviet advance made good progress and appeared poised to encircle the 11. and 16.Panzer-Divisionen. When the German Panzerjäger failed to stop the KVs, 8.8cm Flak guns and heavy howitzers were employed, but even these weapons could not always penetrate the KV’s armor. Kapitan Zinoviev K. Slyusarenko, commander of the 1st Battalion/19th Tank Regiment, noted that: “The enemy shells could not penetrate our armor, but damaged treads, knocked off turrets. KV tanks were powerful vehicles, but sorely lacking in speed and maneuverability.”
However, Panzergruppe 1 displayed considerable flexibility by shifting the 75. Infanterie-Division to block the path of the advancing 8th Mechanized Corps, while sending the 16.Panzer-Division against the flanks of the Soviet penetration. After several days of combat, the KVs were running short of fuel and ammunition and were barely aware that they were being enveloped. By late on June 28, the bulk of the 8th Mechanized Corps was itself encircled and the Soviet counteroffensive fell apart. By the end of the battle of Brody, only about 20 out of 120 KV tanks from the 8th and 15th Mechanized Corps were still operational. Less than 25 percent of the losses had been due to enemy action; the rest due to mechanical defects and fuel shortages. Since repair units and spare parts for the KVs were non-existent, even minor problems caused tanks to be abandoned. After the counterattacks at Brody and Dubno, all but 13 KVs were lost in retreats and played a negligible role in combat around Kiev.
Despite their enormous advantage over German Panzerjäger capabilities, the bulk of the pre-war KV force was eliminated within six weeks of the German invasion. Thereafter, only small numbers of KVs were left in the field, while new units were being formed in Leningrad. However, since the Kirov plant built just 414 KVs in July–September 1941, the Red Army received only a trickle of heavy tanks when they needed them most. With KV production centered in Leningrad, it was relatively straightforward for the Northwest Front to form several independent companies of 7–10 KVs each and dispatch them to augment local counterattacks. The Northwest Front was able to gather 250 tanks from the 1st Mechanized Corps, including ten KV-1 tanks, to strike the German XXXXI Armeekorps (mot.) at Ostrov on July 5. Around 1400 hours, Kampfgruppe Krüger of the 1. Panzer-Division was attacked by a mixed company of KV-1 and KV-2 tanks, which overwhelmed the 3.7cm PaK of the 1./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 37. A number of 3.7cm PaK guns were crushed under the KVs and the attack was not stopped until direct fire from the 10.5cm howitzers of the III./Artillerie-Regiment 73 immobilized two KVs. However, the Soviet counterattack at Ostrov failed to stop the German advance on Leningrad. Ten days later, the Northwest Front committed 150 tanks (including two KV-1 tanks) against von Manstein’s LVI Armeekorps (mot.) at Soltsy on July 15, 1941. Another counteroffensive at Staraya Russa in August involved company-size units of KVs. During July–August, the few KVs at the front were severely handicapped by fuel and ammunition shortages, particularly the OF-350 HE-FRAG rounds best suited to engage German Panzerjäger.
Tank panic! Soviet KV heavy tanks counterattack on the Pulkovo Heights, September 13, 1941 (overleaf)
As the German Panzer spearheads closed in on Leningrad from the south and southwest, Zhukov used his remaining KV heavy tanks to launch a series of sudden counterattacks against the German forces closing in on Leningrad from the south and southwest. Since the most dangerous threat was posed by the German XXXXI Armeekorps (mot.), which had reached the Pulkovo Heights overlooking Leningrad, the Red Army massed three KV-1 and five KV-2 tanks, 15 light tanks and a battalion of infantry against a Kampfgruppe from the 36.Infanterie-Division (mot.).
The German infantry from the I./Schützen-Regiment 118 had just established combat outposts on Hill 66 near the Pulkovo Observatory, when the Soviet heavy tanks appeared coming up the slopes. Moving in wedge formation, the KVs overran some of the regimental-level 3.7cm PaK guns, whose shells merely bounced off the KVs’ thick armor. The German PaK guns were crushed under the tracks of the KV-1s, their crews killed, and their prime movers blown to pieces by HE-FRAG rounds. Seeing their regimental Panzerjäger annihilated, the German infantry momentarily panicked and the I./Schützen-Regiment 118 fell back in some disorder.
Elements of the division-level Panzerjäger-Abteilung 36 arrived and began to engage the KVs at close range. Here, a PaK 38 hits the frontal armor of a KV-1 at under 100m, which sends up a shower of sparks, but causes no serious damage. After losing several 5cm guns and their prime movers, the German division commander granted permission to use the limited number of PzGr 40 “arrowhead” tungsten-core rounds. Eventually, two KV-2s and one KV-1 were immobilized, which caused the Soviet attack to falter. However, the realization that more KV heavy tanks awaited them inside Leningrad helped to dampen the enthusiasm of Heeresgruppe Nord’s soldiers to fight their way into the Soviet city. Thus, the inability of the Panzerjäger to attack and defeat large numbers of dug-in KVs was a contributing factor to the German failure to seize Leningrad in 1941.
KV-1 tanks from the 1st Tank Division maneuver into hull-down ambush positions south of Leningrad, August 1941. When operated by experienced reservist crews, the KV-1 proved to be an excellent defensive tank. (Author)
Many of the reservists who had served in the 20th Heavy Tank Brigade in the Russo-Finnish War were called up immediately once the war began and sent to Leningrad to receive new KV tanks at the Kirov plant. One such reservist was Leytenant Zinovy Kolobanov, who had seen considerable action in a T-28 medium tank against the Mannerheim Line. In early August, Kolobanov was put in command of a company of brand-new KV-1 tanks, equipped with extra bolt-on armor, and assigned to the 1st Tank Division. As Heeresgruppe Nord lunged northward, the Red Army was able to establish a fortified position at Krasnogvardeisk, only 40km (25mi) from Leningrad. Kolobanov’s KV-1 company was sent to Krasnogvardeisk and he deployed his three KV platoons to cover the likely enemy avenues of approach. On the morning of August 19, Kolobanov spotted the advance guard of the 8.Panzer-Division advancing in column and he initiated the ambush at a range of 450m. In quick succession, Kolobanov knocked out the lead vehicles in the column, but German Panzerjäger were quick to unlimber several PaK guns and deploy them on the road. At a distance of 450m, the PaK guns could not hope to penetrate the thick frontal armor of Kolobanov’s KV-1, but they poured a barrage of fire at the stationary heavy tank, which was hit a total of 156 times. Although the KV-1 was not penetrated, the panoramic sight was demolished and the turret was jammed by multiple concussions. Kolobanov’s gunner, Sergeant Andrei Usov, fired off the entire basic load of 98 rounds at the German column and then Kolobanov broke off the action and withdrew to rejoin the rest of his company. While the KV had not demonstrated the mechanical reliability to perform well in its intended role as a breakthrough tank, it proved to be very well suited as a defensive tank.
Despite the successful ambush at Krasnogvardeisk, Heeresgruppe Nord continued to make good progress toward Leningrad and were at the gates of the city by early September. Most of the remaining KV tanks produced at the Kirov plant in August– September were earmarked for the defense of Leningrad and the Germans started to notice increasing numbers of “52-ton tanks” as they drew closer to the city. A breakthrough by the XXXXI Armeekorps (mot.) reached the Pulkovo Heights just south of the city, which prompted the defenders to launch a battalion-sized counterattack supported by eight KV tanks on September 13. The duel between the KVs and Panzerjäger-Abteilung 36 went badly for the Germans, forcing Heeresgruppe Nord to reconsider a direct attack into the city. The 3.7cm and 5cm PaK guns could not defeat multiple KVs, particularly when the tanks were supported by infantry and artillery, and it was impractical to try to bring heavy artillery up to the frontline to engage them. The counterattacks on the Pulkovo Heights bought precious time to evacuate the Kirov plant to Chelyabinsk before Leningrad was encircled; and to organize a defense of the city. Afterwards, two heavy tank brigades, the 122nd and the 124th, were formed with over 60 KVs – the largest concentration of Soviet heavy tanks in the fall of 1941.
Despite the rarity of KVs after the defeats on the border, in sectors where they did appear, the Panzerjäger usually faced a one-sided duel. Standard Panzerjäger tactics of engaging attacking enemy armor at distances of 200–400m simply did not work against KVs. The only tactic that appeared to offer any hope was to let attacking KVs pass by a concealed PaK, then engage it from the rear – assuming that it had no infantry support. If rounds could be made to ricochet into the 30mm belly armor, the 3.7cm PzGr (Panzergranate) rounds might inflict impact damage on the engine or final drive. Amazingly, Gefreiter Wilhelm Brückner, a regimental PaK gunner in the 14./Infanterie-Regiment 253, managed to accomplish this feat on September 3 near Bryansk, immobilizing two KVs with lucky hits from his 3.7cm gun. A week later, he repeated this by immobilizing two more KVs – which attacked individually and without infantry support – with a fusillade of 3.7cm rounds poured into the rear of the passing tanks at point-blank range. In each case, Brückner’s rounds failed to penetrate the KV’s armor, but caused enough damage that the tank was immobilized. However, in each case the crew remained with the tank and continued to operate its weapons, the tanks essentially becoming bunkers. Brückner was awarded the Ritterkreuz, but his phenomenal luck ran out two months later and he was killed in action during Operation Typhoon.
When German forces began their final advance against Moscow in October 1941, the number of KVs available to defend the Soviet capital was still only a tiny fraction of the Red Army’s remaining tank strength. On October 1, 1941, the Western Front had 19 KVs and the Bryansk Front had 22 KVs, out of a total of 700 tanks deployed on the Moscow axis. Throughout the fighting around Moscow in October–November, the Red Army never had more than 33 KVs available at any one time and often only half that number. By this point, KVs were usually grouped in platoon-size units and attached to independent tank battalions or brigades, which diluted their influence on the battle. On October 13, a small number of KVs counterattacked the German 34 Infanterie-Division, causing considerable alarm. Günther von Kluge, commander of the 4.Armee, reported that: “these tanks absorbed a lot of armor-piercing shells and projectiles up to 10.5cm.” Three 10.5cm howitzers were lost trying to stop the KV attack and Panzerjäger-Abteilung 34 lost one 3.7cm and seven 5cm PaK guns. Kluge commented that: “despite the numerous hits of armor-piercing projectiles, including on the turret, we could not penetrate the enemy tanks. In the event of an attack by a large number of such tanks, we could suffer a local defeat.”
The first Chelyabinsk-built KV-1 tanks, equipped with the ZIS-5 gun, were sent to Moscow in November 1941, but most were used as semi-stationary strongpoints. Indeed, the KVs proved to be an excellent defensive weapon, when properly led and supplied. In September, the 4th Tank Brigade formed at Stalingrad under Polkovnik Mikhail Katukov, one of the most capable Soviet tank tacticians. While most of the new tank brigades were formed from odds and ends, the Stavka intended that the 4th Tank Brigade would be fully outfitted with the best equipment, which included a company of ten KV-1 tanks, a T-34 battalion and a BT-7 battalion. Katukov’s brigade was husbanded in reserve near Moscow as a mobile counterattack reserve and when Panzergruppe Guderian stormed into Orel in early October, the brigade was deployed as a blocking force near Mtensk. Katukov was able to ambush the 4.Panzer-Division near Mtensk on October 6 and inflict painful losses on Guderian’s spearhead. Although the Germans had faced both KVs and T-34s before, the battle of Mtensk was a very different experience; this time the Soviet tankers had adequate fuel and ammunition, as well as a commander who knew how to use them. Kampfgruppe Eberbach faced a well-planned counterattack by both KVs and T-34s, which the attached Panzerjäger from Panzerjäger-Abteilung 49 were helpless to stop. Eberbach had made some provision for the appearance of Soviet heavy tanks by attaching two 8.8cm Flak guns and a battery of heavy howitzers to his Kampfgruppe, which were pressed into service as antitank guns to stop Katukov’s tanks. While these guns did knock out a number of KVs and T-34s, their height made them easy to identify and the Soviet tankers destroyed both 8.8cm Flak guns and one of the howitzers, thus illustrating the inherent risk of using antitank substitutes.
The Germans were forced to rely almost completely upon the 3.7cm PaK during the desperate winter battles of 1941/42, since the 5cm PaK proved less reliable in extreme cold weather and the 7.5cm PaK were not yet available. (Ian Barter)
By the end of 1941, KVs had virtually vanished from the battlefield, except on the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts. On the Volkhov Front, KVs from the 122nd and 124th Heavy Tank Brigades would assemble in the open within full view of German positions 600–800m away and then begin shelling anything that moved, which unnerved the German infantry who lacked an effective means to reply. Soviet troops dubbed the KVs “White Mammoths” and appreciated their ability to intimidate the Germans. Indeed, German morale was seriously undermined by the brute strength of the KV tank, and a program was under way in Germany to get better antitank weapons to the front as soon as possible. On each occasion on which KVs had appeared on the battlefield, the Panzerjäger had proved virtually impotent and local commanders had been forced to use Flak guns and heavy artillery as substitutes. Even when equipped with PzGr 40 rounds, 5cm PaK gunners were often forced to engage KV tanks at ranges of just 20–30m, firing wildly before they were crushed under the tracks. Meanwhile, Kotin’s team at Chelyabinsk struggled to ramp up KV-1 production. Further production of the KV-2 was canceled due to its poor mechanical reliability; but despite some critical reports from Soviet tankers about the KVs’ problematic transmission and brakes, the Stavka believed that the KV-1 could still be a decisive weapon if they could mass enough of them at the right time. As 1941 ended, the Germans were frantically trying to get new PaK guns to the front, while the Soviets were preparing to deliver large numbers of KV-1 tanks to rebuild their depleted tank units.
The impotence of Panzerjäger units against Soviet heavy tanks in the first year of the war in the East forced infantry units to develop expedient combat methods, including flaming fuel, blinding the sights on KVs with mud, and efforts to damage the track or jam the turret. These tactics of desperation resulted in the creation of the Panzer Destruction Badge in early 1942 and the sobriquet of Panzerknacker (tank breaker), for which Panzerjäger were not eligible.
Too few KVs were available to play a decisive role in the winter counteroffensive, but even small numbers were able to strike great fear into German troops when they appeared. A typical combat action occurred near the village of Klepenino northwest of Rzhev, when a single KV-1 appeared around 0500 hours on February 5, 1942, and began to shell buildings occupied by German troops. It took over three hours for Leutnant Höfer from Panzerjäger-Abteilung 256 to maneuver a single 5cm PaK through the deep snow and get it into a firing position on the flank of the KV-1. Firing from a range of 150m, the 5cm gun hit the KV-1 26 times but ran out of ammunition without destroying the tank. With its armor plate cracked in many places, the KV-1, its own ammunition exhausted, waddled back to Soviet lines. Despite incidents such as this, the first signs were beginning to appear that the KV’s days of operating with impunity on the battlefield were numbered. A small quantity of 7.5cm HEAT rounds reached Heeresgruppe Nord in mid-January 1942 and four KV-1 tanks were knocked out on the Volkhov Front at ranges heretofore considered impossible. Soviet KV crews had become accustomed to moving with impunity in full view of German positions, but this unpleasant experience made them more cautious.
In March 1942, the OKH conducted firing trials on captured KV-1 tanks at Rzhev. Firing tungsten-core PzGr 40 tungsten-core rounds at a range of 60m, the 5cm PaK 38 achieved successful penetrations on only five out of ten shots. The 2.8cm sPzB 41 was able to penetrate KV-1 turret armor from a range of 60m in five of 15 shots. The OKH ordnance officers were also eager to see the effects of the new 3.7cm Stielgranate 41 against the KV-1 and gleefully reported that: “Each direct hit with the Stielgranate 41 causes the absolute destruction of the heaviest tanks. The moral effect is immense. A thick black explosive effect envelops the whole tank and the blackened armor is burnt.” In fact, only one of three Stielgranaten 41 fired penetrated the KV-1’s turret and the other two rounds damaged the road wheels. Even under perfect range conditions and fired at a range of just 60m, the Stielgranate 41 proved not terribly accurate and required considerable operator skill. The tests concluded with 7.5cm IG 18 artillery firing HEAT ammunition against the KV-1 from 250m and a 10.5cm lFH 18 firing PzGr rot armor-piercing rounds from 750m, which inflicted moderate damage on the KV’s track and road wheels. In direct fire, the 10.5cm gun crew achieved eight hits in 15 shots, indicating the limitations of artillery in the antitank role.
After the first winter in Russia, the Germans no longer had sufficient wheeled vehicles left to keep all their Panzerjäger units motorized. Increasingly, units were forced to use horses to move their PaK guns around. Furthermore, the PaK 38 was too heavy for its crew to manhandle into position, which made it less tactically flexible than the 3.7cm PaK. (Ian Barter)
A dramatic stack of KV-1 tanks forms the backdrop for German fighting positions, spring 1942. (Author)
A true duel between Panzerjäger and KV-1 tanks occurred during February–May 1942 at the encircled town of Kholm. Kampfgruppe Scherer, which rarely had more than three or four PaK guns operational, was under constant Soviet tank attack for three months. During the siege, the Luftwaffe managed to fly in ten 5cm PaK and four 4.2cm PaK guns by glider, although seven of the 5cm PaK were subsequently lost in action. Kampfgruppe Scherer also received 109 Stielgranate 41 rounds for its 3.7cm PaK, but the results were disappointing: of 18 rounds fired, only nine hit the target and no enemy tanks were destroyed outright. Using PzGr 40 rounds, the 5cm PaK were able to disable KV-1 tanks on several occasions, but the Soviets were able to recover and repair them. Due to the inability of the Panzerjäger at Kholm to destroy Soviet heavy tanks, the garrison suffered constant losses from KV-1 tanks that would sit with near-impunity a few hundred meters from German-occupied buildings and pulverize them with high-explosive rounds.
As part of the effort to reorganize the Red Army’s armored striking power, in February 1942 the Stavka began forming the first of 25 tank corps, which were each expected to have 169 tanks, including 24 KVs. With Chelyabinsk building over 250 new KV-1 tanks per month, a good number of these new tank corps would be ready for the spring battles. Unfortunately, the Stavka reduced the potential impact of the KV-1 on the battlefield by dispersing the limited numbers available across too many fronts and too many units. In early May 1942, for example, 28 were sent to the Bryansk Front, 20 to the Kalinin Front, 40 to the Southwest Front and 30 to the Crimea. Furthermore, the KV-1 Model 1942 tanks were significantly slower than the T-34s and T-70s in the tank corps, which made it impossible for them to keep up in fast-moving operations. A number of Soviet tank officers, such as Katukov, were dissatisfied with the KV’s mobility and preferred that it be relegated to separate infantry-support battalions. Eventually, the Stavka authorized the creation of several heavy tank brigades, each equipped with between 24 and 40 KV-1 tanks.
Fight to the death at Demyansk. A KV-1 has run over a 5cm PaK 38 antitank gun but has itself been immobilized by damage to its right track. (Author)
The 7.5cm PaK 40 began to reach units on the Eastern Front in February 1942, but only 130 were delivered over the next three months. It was not until late 1942 that the PaK 40 was available in sufficient numbers to provide the Panzerjäger with a reliable means of defeating Soviet heavy tanks. (Ian Barter)
The German Panzerjäger units were also undergoing significant upgrades during spring 1942. A trickle of 7.5cm PaK guns began arriving in February–March and by May 1, 1942, there were 130 7.5cm PaK 40, 12 PaK 41, a few PaK 97/38 and several hundred PaK 36(r) guns on the Eastern Front. Six army-level Panzerjäger battalions began converting to self-propelled Marder IIs, while increased production of 5cm PaK 38s allowed a reorganization of the standard Panzerjäger company into two platoons of 3.7cm PaK and two platoons of 5cm PaK. However, losses of PaK guns had been so heavy in 1941 that many infantry divisions had few if any 5cm PaK left, and the OKH was forced to accept that the 3.7cm PaK would remain in service for some time. HEAT and tungsten-core PzGr 40 ammunition also began to appear in quantity, and the Stielgranate 41 provided the remaining 3.7cm guns with a last-ditch capability to engage KV-1 and T-34 tanks. However, the PaK 36(r) proved to be the best short-term answer to the KV-1; this was ironic, given that this weapon was based on an earlier Rheinmetall-Borsig design dating back to 1930. A good example of the depleted condition of German Panzerjäger units was the 256.Infanterie-Division in the 9 Armee, which on March 8, 1942 had only 20 3.7cm PaK and one 7.62cm PaK 36(r), with no operational 5cm PaK.
By January 1942 Chelyabinsk was completing over 200 KV-1 tanks per month and both Stalin and the Stavka were eager to get new heavy tank battalions to the front to lead powerful breakthrough attacks. Some 40 new KV-1 tanks were sent to join the 51st Army in the Crimea in late February, with the objective of breaking through the German 46.Infanterie-Division’s defenses at Parpach. The German division defending the narrow neck of the Kerch Peninsula was particularly weak in antitank defenses, with no 5cm PaK 38 remaining. However, the Germans had a wide antitank ditch, backed up by minefields. When the Soviets attacked on February 27, the KV-1 company in the 56th Tank Brigade was able to get across the antitank ditch near Ak Monay and advance several kilometers into the German defenses, but became separated from their infantry support. A lone 10.5cm lFH 18 howitzer deployed in the antitank role began pounding the slow-moving KVs with the improved PzGr rot armor-piercing rounds, causing damage. Then, Panzerknacker teams from the division pioneer battalion spearheaded a counterattack that managed to destroy two KV-1 tanks with demolition charges. By the end of the first day, most of the KV tanks were out of action and the Soviet offensive began to falter.
KV-1 tanks abandoned in the Crimea, May 1942. Efforts to break through the German defenses at the Parpach Narrows were frustrated by antitank ditches and minefields, rather than PaK fire. (Ian Barter)
German 3.7cm PaK guns cleverly hidden behind the hulks of two knocked-out KV-1 tanks, summer 1942. The Panzerjäger were only able to hold back the KV-1 companies at the battle of Kharkov in May 1942 by adopting unconventional ambush tactics. (Ian Barter)
Disappointed by the failure in the Crimea, the Stavka intended to conduct a major counteroffensive with the Southwest Front at Kharkov in mid-May 1942. When the offensive began on May 12, the 21st and 28th Armies were supported by about 25 KV-1 tanks from the 10th Heavy Tank Brigade and several other tank brigades. The 10th Tank Brigade succeeded in smashing through the right flank of the German 79.Infanterie-Division and advanced 18km (11mi) on May 13–14. Panzerjäger-Abteilung 179 was virtually helpless against large numbers of KVs, since it had only 16 3.7cm PaK and four 5cm PaK guns at the start of the Soviet offensive. Instead, the 6.Armee was forced to rely upon minefields, 8.8cm Flak guns, heavy artillery and Stuka attacks to slow down the Soviet armored wedges. Infantrymen from the 79. Infanterie-Division were able to disable two KV-1 tanks by getting close enough to wedge T-mines under their turret overhang, and 3.7cm PaK gunners employed the Stielgranate 41 with some success. Eventually, the offensive by the 21st and 28th Armies began to run out of steam. After more than a week of heavy fighting, the two Soviet armies were forced onto the defensive and eventually defeated by German counterattacks. Losses of KV tanks approached 80 percent. However on the tactical level, the battle of Kharkov showed that the German Panzerjäger could not stop KV tanks on their own.
The KV-1 commander and gunner were hampered by the restricted view from inside the tank for most of the war, which made it almost impossible to detect and engage small, camouflaged enemy PaK guns first. Most KV-1 engagement sequences began in response to their own hull or turret being struck ineffectually by enemy shells, then trying to find the PaK gun with the PT-4-7 panoramic sight. However, as the German PaK guns grew larger in size and required larger prime movers to pull them, detecting them became less difficult for the KV-1 gunners.
Here, the commander of a KV-1 lying hull-down outside a village has spotted movement through his PT-4-7 panoramic sight (left) – a German half-track has brought a 7.5cm PaK 40 to an emplacement 600m distant on the edge of town. As the Germans finish setting up the PaK 40, the KV-1 commander informs his gunner, who lays on the target with his TMFD-7 sight (right). The loader sets the range fuse on the OF-350 HE-FRAG round to 600m and slams it into the breech. The gunner arms the main gun and when the commander says “Fire!” the gunner fires the ZIS-5 with his foot pedal. When the round impacts behind the target, the commander tells the gunner to drop 5 degrees and reengage. Even with an average crew, the KV-1 can fire off five rounds in a minute, which is sufficient to suppress and then damage the PaK 40 before it can reply.
After the Soviet defeat at Kharkov, Heeresgruppe Süd moved into high gear in late June with Operation Blue, boldly advancing toward Voronezh, Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Units like the 79.Infanterie-Division in the 6.Armee had a high priority for new antitank weapons and received eight 7.5cm PaK 40 and 12 7.62cm PaK 36(r). On July 4, Stalin ordered the newly formed 5th Tank Army to counterattack Panzergruppe 4 in the Don Bend, west of Voronezh. The 5th Tank Army had 641 tanks of which 83 were KV-1 tanks, but its tank brigades were committed piecemeal against the flank of the German XXIV Panzerkorps. Despite the fact that the two German Panzer divisions in the path of the Soviet armored phalanx were still armed with 5cm PaK 38s, no Marders and only 32 PzKpfw IVF2 tanks with long 7.5cm guns, the Germans won a lopsided five-day tank melee. Even in good weather and on flat terrain, the KVs failed to make any impression on the German defensive positions and suffered over 90 percent losses in the battle. The KVs were defeated by a second-rate German antitank defense and Voronezh quickly fell despite the counterstroke. Stalin was so disappointed with the performance of the KV-1 in the May battles that he stated on June 5 that: “this tank is not needed. Its weight should be reduced and if this is not possible – retire it.” Chelyabinsk was ordered to design a lighter version of the KV-1 quickly, in order to improve mobility and to correct some of the more egregious design flaws.
Kotin’s team in Chelyabinsk, led by Nikolay Shashmurin, redesigned the KV-1 by shaving off 5 tons, which required thinning out the turret armor to only 80mm. Efforts were also made to upgrade the inadequate transmission and the air-cooling system in order to improve mobility. Although the 76.2mm ZIS-5 gun remained the same, an improved commander’s cupola was added to enhance visibility. The new tank was dubbed the KV-1S (“speedy”), and its off-road speed was 8km/h (5mph) faster than earlier KV-1 models. However, KV-1S production would not begin until August and it would be fall before it would appear on the battlefield.
A KV-1 destroyed near Voronezh, July 1942. The KV-1 heavy tanks were too slow to keep up with T-34 medium tanks in the new tank corps and often ended up operating without much infantry or artillery support, which made them vulnerable to antitank ambushes. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-216-0412-07, Foto: Klintzsch)
In July, the Stavka began preparing for a series of offensives on other parts of the Eastern Front in order to draw German reserves away from Stalingrad. Despite his growing disillusionment with the KV, Stalin himself ensured that these Soviet operations would receive adequate numbers of KV-1 tanks to create breakthroughs. The first such Red Army offensive occurred on the Bryansk Front, where over 100 KV-1 tanks were massed to support an attack against the German 2.Panzerarmee north of Orel. However, after two weeks of combat near Zhizdra, the KV-1 tanks failed to break through the German antitank defenses. One Soviet unit, the 4th Guards Tank Brigade, lost all 24 of its KV-1 tanks in the offensive.
In an effort to stop the Germans short of Stalingrad, the Soviet 1st Tank Army launched a counterattack into the flank of the 6.Armee northwest of Kalach on July 27. Leytenant Vasiliy Krysov commanded a KV-1 in a set-piece attack by the 158th Heavy Tank Brigade against the village of Lozhki, held by part of the 60.Infanterie-Division (mot.). He recounted that: “A series of green flares soared into the sky! Our engine roared and our KV moved out towards the enemy… There was still about a kilometer and a half until we reached the enemy positions, it was beginning to grow lighter, and we could now make out the outlines of trees and the buildings of the collective farm. The Germans hadn’t opened fire yet either, apparently conserving ammunition.”
Once Krysov’s brigade approached to within less than a kilometer of the village, “[they] opened a storm of fire. The German fire was extremely accurate! Almost immediately a shell glanced off our left side; our 47-ton vehicle rocked and the flame of the explosion illuminated the fighting compartment. I saw the flash of the gunshot but failed to spot the well-camouflaged gun…”
Krysov’s platoon leader’s KV was immobilized by an antitank mine but the rest of the KVs continued to close the distance. “Shell strikes continued glancing off the right and left sides, doing no serious damage to the hull – the machine kept rushing toward the enemy guns! All our tanks fired their main guns and machine guns on the move and during short halts… The Germans managed to hit us three times before we reached the enemy trenches, but the shells hadn’t penetrated the armor.” Reaching the edge of the village, Krysov spotted a PaK gun concealed behind a shack and ordered his driver to accelerate and crush it. He recounted, “less than a minute later, the tank heavily rocked and we could hear the loud sound of grinding metal from beneath the tank.”8
A 5cm PaK 38 camouflaged in an urban environment. The Germans had not anticipated much antitank combat in cities but this became the norm in places such as Voronezh and Stalingrad in 1942. (Ian Barter)
In August, the Western Front attacked the eastern side of the Rzhev salient with two tank corps, equipped with over 300 tanks including 48 KV-1 tanks. However, the 9.Armee had received over two dozen of the superb 7.5cm PaK 41 weapons prior to the Soviet offensive and these much-improved PaK guns knocked out nearly half the Soviet tanks in a three-day battle around Zubtsov. Panzerjäger-Abteilung 561, equipped with 12 7.5cm PaK 41s, virtually brought two Soviet tank corps to a halt after minimal gains. Soviet KV tankers were stunned that PaK 41 gunners could penetrate their thick frontal armor at distances in excess of 1,000m. By the end of the battle, the Soviets had failed to achieve a breakthrough and had lost 41 of 48 KV-1 tanks. On August 10, the Soviet Northwest Front launched a major offensive against the narrow Ramushevo Corridor connecting the Demyansk salient to the 16.Armee. One KV-1 under Senior Leytenant Ivan Parshkova of the 33rd Tank Brigade managed to penetrate the tough German defenses near Rykalovo but was then immobilized. Parshkova’s KV fought a six-day battle with local German troops and managed to knock out four PaK guns before he was forced to abandon the tank. However, this Soviet offensive failed as well, with the majority of KVs immobilized in the German minefields and then shot to pieces by concealed PaK guns. Soviet commanders were beginning to note that something had changed on the battlefield, with the German antitank defenses increasingly able to knock out KV-1 tanks at longer ranges and before the Soviet heavy tanks could even find the hidden PaK guns.
Between August and November 1942, five German infantry divisions – all in Heeresgruppe Mitte – each received a company of Marders for their Panzerjäger battalions. Sufficient 7.5cm and 7.62cm PaK guns were available to provide most German divisions with at least 8–10 heavy guns, and HEAT ammunition was more available. However, the number of tungsten-core rounds fell sharply after June 1942.
The KV-1S was introduced in August 1942 in an effort to rectify the mobility problems associated with previous models. Unfortunately, the “improved” KV-1S had less armor than its predecessors, which only made it more vulnerable to the new German antitank weapons. (Author)
Based upon the tanks’ lackluster performance in the summer battles, the Stavka decided in October to pull the remaining KVs out of the tank corps and place them in 14 separate guards tank regiments, each with 21 KV-1 tanks. From this point, the KV-1’s tactical mission shifted from breakthrough tank to infantry-support tank. In December 1942, the new lighter KV-1S tanks finally began arriving in quantity and seven regiments of them were sent to the Don Front to participate in Operation Koltso – the reduction of the trapped German 6.Armee in the Stalingrad pocket. On January 10, 1943, the Soviet 21st and 65th Armies attacked the Marinovka salient on the west side of the pocket with over 100 KV tanks. Everything seemed in favor of the KV-1S tanks scoring a real success, since the terrain was relatively hard and flat. Furthermore, the three tattered German infantry divisions in their path were desperately short of fuel and ammunition. Yet incredibly, the German defenses knocked our more than half the Soviet armor. The 44.Infanterie-Division’s Panzerjäger-Abteilung 46 made a desperate last stand, based around a platoon of three 7.62cm PaK 36(r) guns, which inflicted heavy losses on the advancing Soviet tanks. Eventually, the German defense collapsed after three days and the survivors were forced to abandon their PaK guns as they retreated back across the steppe toward Stalingrad. Inside Stalingrad, all of the German Marder self-propelled guns were immobilized by lack of fuel and many were captured intact. By the end of the battle, the 6.Armee was crushed; but the KV-1S model had had an unspectacular combat debut, with over 80 percent lost to enemy action or mechanical failures within three weeks. Nevertheless, the German Panzerjäger could take no comfort from the problems experienced by the KV-1S tanks since their own losses at Stalingrad were catastrophic; three of the Marder II-equipped army-level battalions and 21 division-level Panzerjäger battalions were completely destroyed.
The appearance of the KV-1 forced the Panzerjäger to adopt close-range ambush tactics, rather than the standard method of engaging enemy armor at 400–500m. Furthermore, even with the PzGr 40 tungsten-core round, the 5cm PaK 38’s best chance of survival was to engage the KV-1 from the side or rear.
Here, a KV-1 advancing under low-light conditions at dusk has passed by a camouflaged 5cm PaK 38 position. When a flare from local German infantry goes up, the PaK 38 crew engages the KV-1 from a range of about 100m (left). At this range, the target practically fills the gunner’s ZF 3 x 8 sight. The gunner places his aiming point on the KV-1’s left final drive wheel. The Panzerjäger fire as fast as they can, hitting the KV-1 five times in rapid succession, which immobilizes but does not destroy the target. The engagement now becomes a frantic duel as the KV-1 brings its turret around to respond to its tormentor, while the PaK 38 crew rushes to finish off the wounded enemy before they are detected (right). At this range, neither side can miss.
With their fuel and ammunition exhausted, the Marder II companies were unable to assist in the final defense of the Stalingrad pocket. Instead, many like these were captured nearly intact when the 6.Armee surrendered. (Author)
The reequipping of the Ostheer’s Panzerjäger battalions continued unevenly throughout the winter of 1942/43, with large numbers of 3.7cm and 5cm weapons continuing to form the bulk of antitank weaponry well into 1943. For example, in the relatively well-equipped XXVII Armeekorps in the 9.Armee in the Rzhev salient in January 1943, only 29 percent of the 255 available PaK guns were 7.5cm or 7.62cm weapons, the majority of which were the sub-standard PaK 97/38. Even by the time of the battle of Kursk in July 1943, most infantry divisions had just 5–8 high-velocity heavy PaK guns, but retained 12 5cm and 40 3.7cm PaK guns. As Panzerjäger units received the new PaK weapons, the 7.5cm and 7.62cm guns were deployed as heavy platoons within companies that retained both 3.7cm and 5cm PaK guns.
Meanwhile, the Red Army was reconsidering the viability of the KV-1 after the tank’s generally poor performance in 1942. While the need for a heavy breakthrough tank was now questioned by senior tank commanders, there was clearly a need for self-propelled heavy artillery to support the Red Army’s offensive strategy. Noting the German success in mounting large-caliber guns on surplus tank chassis, Kotin proposed the KV-14, which consisted of a 152mm ML-20 howitzer mounted on a KV hull. The vehicle was ready for production in February 1943 and entered service as the SU-152. Once Chelyabinsk began diverting KV hulls to the SU-152 line, production of the KV-1S model dropped off to fewer than 100 units per month.
During the post-Stalingrad period of early 1943, the remaining KV-1 tanks were not used in the rapidly moving advance toward Kharkov and Rostov. Instead, the independent guards tank regiments were rebuilt and husbanded in the Stavka reserve. When the German offensive against the Kursk salient began on July 5, 1943, it was Koshkin’s T-34 that was the dominant Soviet tank on the battlefield. It was not until the German offensive had exhausted itself and the Red Army prepared for a counterblow against the 9.Armee in the Orel salient that the KV-1S regiments were committed. The Bryansk Front massed over 300 tanks, including 80 KV-1 tanks, against the eastern face of the Orel salient, which was held by the German XXXV Armeekorps. The four infantry divisions in the corps had only 31 heavy PaK guns – 15 PaK 40, seven PaK 41 and nine PaK 36(r) – to defend a 140km (87mi) front, although the 9.Armee had three companies of tank destroyers in local reserve, including ten of the new Hornisse (Hornet) 8.8cm self-propelled guns. After a two-hour artillery preparation on the morning of July 12, the Bryansk Front committed six rifle divisions supported by three KV-1 regiments at the junction of the German 56. and 262.Infanterie-Divisionen. The Soviet attack succeeded in penetrating several kilometers into the German defenses and even overran some German artillery, but the slowness of the KV-1 wedges gave the 9.Armee sufficient time to reinforce XXXV Armeekorps with 30 self-propelled heavy PaK. Soviet tankers found it much harder going on July 13, with Hornisse and Marder platoons deployed to block their advance. Advancing into the German engagement areas, KV-1 crews suddenly found that their invulnerability was a thing of the past, as their armor was ripped asunder by high-velocity 7.5cm and 8.8cm PaK rounds. Even the 3.7cm PaK – long derided as useless – managed to destroy one of the attacking KV-1 tanks with a Stielgranate 41 round. After three days of trying to bash their way through the German antitank barrier, the KV regiments were virtually destroyed.
A destroyed 7.5cm PaK 97/38. This weapon was introduced because the Germans needed a low-velocity gun that could fire their hollow-charge ammunition, and so the venerable French 75mm cannon was pressed into service as an interim solution. (Courtesy of the Central Museum of the Armed Forces, Moscow via Stavka, K 176)
The battle of the Orel salient represented the end for the KV-1-series heavy tank, for it was now obvious that it could not undertake its breakthrough role and it was less versatile than the T-34. The last KV-1 tanks were built in August and then Chelyabinsk switched entirely to production of the SU-152. By July 1943, the remaining KV-1 tanks were simply large, slow targets that could be readily dispatched at distances up to 1,500m by the growing number of German heavy PaK guns. The appearance of the Hornisse 8.8cm self-propelled gun indicated that the days of the Panzerjäger having to rely entirely upon underpowered armament and near-suicidal tactics were drawing to a close, and that Soviet heavy tanks would no longer operate with near impunity – if they could be seen, they could be killed.
The KV’s swan song – German XXXV Armeekorps’ antitank defense slaughters KV-led attack on the Orel salient, July 13, 1943 (overleaf)
After the culmination of the German Heeresgruppe Mitte’s offensive against the northern side of the Kursk salient in July 1943, the Stavka ordered three Soviet fronts to launch concentric attacks against the Orel salient. Since the German infantry divisions defending the salient had over a year to prepare their defenses, the Red Army expected to conduct powerful breakthrough attacks to punch through the German defensive lines in several places, then roll them up. The Bryansk Front massed six rifle divisions and about 300 tanks against the German XXXV Armeekorps defending the eastern side of the salient, near Novosil. Three separate regiments of KV-1 tanks would spearhead the assault, concentrating against the boundary between the 56. and 262.Infanterie-Divisionen. Awaiting them, the 262.Infanterie-Division had 61 antitank guns, including four PaK 36(r), three PaK 41 and one PaK 40.
On the morning of July 12, the 3rd Army fired a heavy artillery preparation and then attacked with its infantry, who managed to claw their way into the German first line of defense. Encouraged by this success, the Soviets committed 200 tanks, hoping to crush the last German resistance and create a decisive breakthrough. Initially, the Soviet heavy tanks were able to eliminate five 5cm PaK and then overrun some artillery units, but the Germans quickly redeployed Panzerjäger-Kompanie 521 with nine Hornisse 8.8cm self-propelled guns to Arkhangel’skoye. When the 114th Separate Tank Regiment renewed its attack across the open terrain east of the town on the morning of July 13, the KV-1 tanks came under intense and accurate PaK fire from several sides. A German 7.5cm PaK 41 deployed in the woods south of the town proceeded methodically to pick off the slow-moving KV-1 tanks, piercing their hulls with high-velocity 7.5cm PzGr 41 Hartkern (hard-core) rounds. Nevertheless, the brave KV tankers pressed on through the kill zone and managed to close in on German 5cm PaK positions on the edge of town. However, the Germans had learned about KV overrun tactics and surrounded their PaK guns with barbed-wire obstacles and Teller mines; when two KV-1 tanks attempted to crush PaK guns, they had their tracks blown off. The Soviet heavy tank regiment was massacred by the heavy German PaK guns and the attack in this sector was defeated.
6 A. D. von Plato, “1st Panzer Division Operations,” in David Glantz (ed.), The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front, London: Frank Cass, 1993, p. 145.
7 Horst Slesina, Soldaten gegen Tod und Teufel, Düsseldorf, 1942.
8 Vasiliy Krysov, Panzer Destroyer: Memoirs of a Red Army Tank Commander, Pen & Sword, Barnsley (2010), pp. 8–11