The Obama Administration
and Iran
Since the 1979 Revolution in Iran and the end of a symbiotic relationship between the US and the Shah, successive American administrations have tried to contain Iran by various means, particularly sanctions and military threats. This includes the Obama Administration. Even though President Barack Obama came to office promising engaging Iran, in reality his administration has followed the policy of “tough diplomacy,” which has included, among other hostile acts, imposing “crippling sanctions” against Iran. Indeed, a close look at the Obama Administration’s policy toward Iran reveals a continuity between its policy and what was pursued by the administration of George W. Bush. Before looking at the policy of “tough diplomacy,” however, a brief history of the containment of Iran is in order.
Containing Iran originally began during the Carter Administration with the so-called hostage crisis and the freezing of Iranian assets in 1979. But soon after it morphed into the policy of dual containment of Iran and Iraq, as the Carter Administration gave Saddam Hussein the green light to invade Iran. It was hoped that the war between Iran and Iraq would lead to the resolution of the hostage crisis and the overthrow of the Iranian government. But the US also hoped that down the line there would be a regime change in Iraq. This was evident in the fact that while the US was helping the Iraqi government, the Israelis were selling arms to Iran with the full knowledge of the US. Indeed, the Carter Administration itself was considering the possibility of providing Iran with military spare parts.
The dual containment policy became more overt and intense under the Reagan Administration. While the US blatantly supported Saddam Hussein in the war and even went as far as engaging Iran at the behest of Hussein, at the same time it took measures to assure that Hussein was not victorious either. Giving false information to both sides and selling arms to Iran, mostly with the help of the Israelis in the “Iran-Contra scandal,” were examples of this double role that the Reagan Administration played in the Iran-Iraq war. After the war, the US and Israel concentrated primarily on containing Iraq.
Following the US invasion of Iraq in 1990–91, and the temporary containment of Saddam Hussein, once again, Iran became the main target of containment by means of sanctions. During the Clinton Administration the Israeli lobby groups, especially the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and its affiliate the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), became the main architects of US foreign policy toward Iran and underwriters of sanctions. Actually, it was in this period that Martin Indyk, the former head of WINEP and subsequently the national security advisor to President Clinton, claimed to have devised the policy of dual containment of Iran and Iraq. Indyk, along with other theoreticians of the Israeli lobby groups, formulated three sins of Iran as the main reasons for containing it: Iran’s support for international terrorism, opposition to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.
The containment of Iran, as well as Iraq, became more intensified with the election of George W. Bush and the takeover of the Middle East policy making process by the neoconservatives. Individuals affiliated with the Israeli lobby groups, such as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle (both on the Board of Advisors of WINEP) and David Wurmser, became instrumental in turning the policy of dual containment into the policy of “dual rollback.” Iraq was targeted for invasion in the hope of splitting its Shia from Iran. Thereafter, it was hoped, it would become easier to contain Iran by means of more severe unilateral and multilateral sanctions and, if necessary, military actions by the US, Israel or both. Israeli leaders, however, were more interested in targeting Iran rather than Iraq. But they ultimately settled for the neoconservative policy, hoping that after Iraq they could push Iran to the top of the US’s “to do list,” to use Ariel Sharon’s words (The Times, November 5, 2002). Similar to the case of Iraq, the US and Israel used the allegation that Iran is developing weapons of mass destruction as the main reason to impose more severe sanctions and to prepare the ground for an eventual military operation.
The opportunity arose when in 2002 the Mujahedin-e-Khalq-e-Iran, an Iranian exile group working closely with the US and Israel, claimed that Iran is constructing an illegal uranium enrichment facility and a heavy water production plant. Following these claims, a case was made for reporting Iran to the UN Security Council and imposing sanctions. In July of 2006 the Security Council Resolution 1696 was passed, demanding that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. Iran did not halt its enrichment and the Security Council Resolution 1737, the first UN sanctions resolution against Iran, was enacted in December of 2006. This was the crown jewel of the US-Israeli policy of containment of Iran, the result of years of effort to pass multilateral sanctions against Iran. Subsequently, the Bush Administration managed to pass two additional sets of sanctions against Iran in the Security Council, Resolutions 1747 in March of 2007, and 1803 in March of 2008. Toward the end of the second term of the Bush Administration, there was a push for a fourth set of UN sanctions against Iran. Israel was also pushing the US to wage an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Yet, the Bush Administration was running out of time as the 2008 presidential election was approaching. Containment of Iran was left to the next administration.
Given the history of containment policy, it was not difficult to predict prior to the 2008 presidential election that regardless of the outcome, the US foreign policy toward Iran will be determined largely by Israel and its various lobby groups in the US, especially AIPAC and WINEP. Indeed, it was easy to foresee that if Obama became president, Dennis Ross, Obama’s closest advisor on Iran and the former director of WINEP, will play a leading role in determining the policy. Based on Ross’s writings and WINEP’s publications, one could expect that Obama would pursue a “tough” or “aggressive diplomacy” with Iran. The diplomacy, as Ross and WINEP had formulated, was intended to give an ultimatum to Iran in some face to face meetings, telling Iran to either accept the US-Israeli demands or face aggression, including, ultimately, a naval blockade and military actions. The meetings were also intended to create the illusion of engaging Iran and, in so doing, gaining international support for aggressive actions.
Once Obama came to office Dennis Ross became special advisor to the Secretary of State for the “Gulf and Southwest Asia,” then special assistant to President Obama and his senior director for the “Central Region.” Thus, once more, an individual associated with WINEP became the main architect of Iran policy and in that capacity continued, with some modifications, the same policy that had been pursued by the Bush Administration.
It should, of course, be noted that beside Ross there have been other Iran policy makers in the Obama Administration close to Israel and its lobby groups. One such person, who left office in 2011, is Stuart A. Levey, the former Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. Levey, a leftover from the Bush Administration, managed to carry on a crusade against Iran by formulating and implementing financial sanctions against Iran. Nevertheless, for the most part the Obama Administration policy toward Iran has proceeded along Ross’s policy of “tough” or “aggressive diplomacy.” How the policy has been implemented so far is briefly discussed below.
As mentioned earlier, one of the main aims of the policy of “tough diplomacy” was to create the impression that the US is trying its best to engage Iran. This was tried soon after President Obama took office. For example, Obama’s message of March 21, 2009, on the occasion of the Persian New Year, was intended to create such an impression. To the uninitiated the message appeared to be conciliatory. But to those familiar with the history of the US-Iran relations, the message contained nothing that was essentially new and, indeed, accused Iran of some of the same charges that the Israeli lobby had concocted since the 1990s. Actually, a few days later Obama showed how little the US policy had changed when in his trip to Prague he spoke about a “real threat” posed by Iran to its “neighbors and our allies” and advocated the same missile defense system proposed by the Bush Administration.
By summer of 2009, while numerous unilateral sanctions were being renewed, passed or contemplated, the Obama Administration was working hard to pass the fourth multilateral, United Nations Security Council sanctions resolution against Iran. In order to get the Russian vote in the Security Council, in July of 2009 Obama offered the Russians a quid pro quo: in exchange for a deal on the expiring 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and postponing the US deployment of an anti-missile system in Europe, Russia would agree to impose harsher sanctions against Iran. Later, the Obama Administration sweetened the deal by promising to drop the deployment of an anti-missile system in Europe altogether.
On October 1, 2009, Iran held a meeting with five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany, commonly referred to as P5+1. This, and three other meetings—one on October 19, 2009, and two others in December of 2010 and January of 2011—were the only formal “engagements” that Iran had with the Obama Administration. The first two meetings centered mainly on the swap of Iran’s low enriched uranium for higher enriched uranium intended to be used by a reactor in Tehran that produces isotopes for medical purposes. The swap deal was viewed by many, both inside and outside of Iran, as a ploy by the US to get enriched uranium out of Iran and then give Iran an ultimatum to stop any further enrichment or face the fourth round of UN sanctions. Even some US officials described the deal as a clever ploy.
Under massive pressure at home, President Ahmadinejad’s government, who had originally agreed to the swap, tried to modify the deal. Yet, the Obama Administration rejected any modification and began the final push for the fourth round of UN sanctions. By this time many US officials, including Secretary Clinton, were admitting openly that the Obama Administration’s policy had been, throughout, not just an “engagement policy” but a “two-track policy” and that it was now time for the “pressure track.” This was, indeed, similar to the “carrot and stick policy” of the Bush Administration, which was always no more than offering Iran a stick.
What stood between Iran and a new Security Council resolution, however, was China, which was opposed to additional UN sanctions. The Obama Administration therefore twisted China’s arm, cajoled them and even threatened them financially, to go along with the new set of sanctions. By mid March 2010 China’s resistance to slow down the US-Israeli push had weakened, and toward the end of March China joined the P4+1 to discuss the US proposal for the fourth round of UN sanctions. Now, the only stumbling block in getting a near unanimous vote in the Security Council was the presence of three non-permanent members on the Security Council, Turkey, Brazil and Lebanon, who opposed the sanctions despite massive pressure by the US to make them go along.
On May 17, 2010, Brazil and Turkey struck a deal with Iran for swapping enriched uranium, almost the same deal that had been offered by the P5+1 to Iran in October of 2009. The only difference between this so-called tripartite agreement and the US proposed swap deal was that Iran would send the low enriched uranium to Turkey rather than Russia, as it had been initially proposed. The Obama Administration rejected the tripartite agreement, making it clear that the original swap deal proposed was a ploy and that the ultimate intention of the US had been, all along, to use the deal to impose, in the language of Benjamin Netanyahu and Hillary Clinton, “crippling sanctions” against Iran.
On June 9, 2010, Resolution 1929, the fourth UN sanctions resolution against Iran was passed by the Security Council, with Brazil and Turkey voting “no” and Lebanon abstaining. This was, of course, the same resolution that the Bush Administration was unable to pass due to time running out. The passage of the resolution officially ended the “tough diplomacy” phase of the Obama Administration’s Iran policy. After this multilateral sanction the US and EU intensified their unilateral sanctions, despite Russia’s protest that the measures were exceeding the parameters agreed upon and reflected in the UN Security Council resolution.
With the Obama Administration giving the green light, the US Congress passed, on June 24, 2010, one of the most severe unilateral sanctions acts against Iran, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISAD). The act had been in the pipeline for some time, but had been held back until the passage of the UN Resolution 1929. CISAD, which was signed by President Obama on July 1, 2010, strengthened the harshest sanctions act passed during the Clinton era, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act.
After CISAD much of the new sanctions against Iran were enacted by the State and Treasury Departments, particularly under the leadership of Stuart Levey and his successor, David Cohen. In addition, there were once again repeated talk of possible military attacks on Iran by Israel, the US or both. This was not the usual talk by the Israelis, neoconservatives or media pundits, but threats made by some high officials in the Obama Administration, such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen who stated on NBC’s Meet The Press on August 1, 2010, that “military actions have been on the table and remain on the table.” The push for attacking Iran intensified in late October and early November of 2010 as more Israeli and American officials and media pundits appealed to President Obama.
The combination of continuous threats and increasing sanctions affected the Iranian economy. In fall of 2010 the value of Iran’s currency wildly fluctuated. The fluctuation was clearly a manifestation of uncertainty, speculation and fear that were caused by the cumulative effect of sanctions. The sanctions were also exacerbating the rate of inflation in Iran and reducing the rate of growth of the economy. For example, while the rate of growth in Iran’s real GDP in 2007 was 7.8 percent, the rate for 2010, according to the April 2011 report of the International Monetary Fund, was only 1.0 percent. The same report forecasted the rate of growth in Iran’s real GDP for 2011 to be 0 percent.
The Obama Administration appeared to be fully aware of the toll that the sanctions were taking on the Iranian economy and adopted a wait-and-see attitude, despite the pressure exerted on it to engage in military adventures against Iran. It also appears that the current administration found various forms of sabotage, such as the introduction of the Stuxnet computer worm in the Iranian nuclear facilities, assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists and agitation by separatist movements in Iran, quite useful in containing Iran. The issue of human rights violations in Iran also became a convenient tool in the hands of the Obama Administration to mount verbal attacks against Iran.
By the end of 2010 the US policy toward Iran was back on the same track that it had been for over thirty years, a blatant containment policy. In other words, the policy of “tough diplomacy” had no more “diplomacy” left in it; it was simply a tough policy. The last two meetings between Iran and P5+1, on December 6, 2010, and January 21, 2011, were therefore devoid of any substance and merely provided a forum for the two sides to express their grievances.
With the advent of the so-called Arab Spring and the preoccupation of the US, Europe and Israel with the revolutionary upheavals in the Middle East, there was less news in the popular US media about Iran and the need to contain it. Indeed, to the extent that the Arab Spring challenged some aspects of the old order in the Middle East and created uncertainty about the future of this order, the pressure on Iran slightly subsided. Yet, as this essay is being concluded in summer of 2011, the containment policy continues and more and more sanctions are being devised, particularly by the US Department of Treasury. The push by Israel, its lobby groups and supporters in the US Congress, to intensify sanctions and threaten Iran militarily also continues. In addition, there is increasing pressure on Iran by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to accept the US demands. Under IAEA’s new director, Yukiya Amano—who was the preferred candidate of the West to replace Mohamed ElBaradei as the General Director of IAEA in 2010—Iran has faced harsh and confrontational reports about its nuclear activities.
In sum, the Obama Administration’s policy of “tough diplomacy” has so far mostly followed the script written by individuals associated with Israel and its lobby groups. The policy is similar to those pursued by the neoconservatives under the previous administration. But while the “carrot and stick policy” of the Bush Administration was implemented in a brutish and dim-witted way, the Obama Administration’s “two-track policy” has been carried out in a more refined and sophisticated way. Whether this policy will succeed to contain Iran, particularly by means of military confrontations at some point, remains to be seen. Much depends on such unforeseeable factors as the outcome of the Arab Spring, internal political dynamics in Iran and Iran’s ability to develop its economy and military forces despite the crippling sanctions imposed upon it.