THE MANUSCRIPT was finished when Germany attacked Russia; the book was being set up when Germany, to save her face, declared war on the United States. Since the author never believed in the possibility of Russian-German collaboration, and since war with the United States—whether declared or not—had been a fact since 1939, the two events did not affect his book.
Yet even at the present writing the two events have deeply affected Germany’s domestic situation, both military and psychological.
During the First World War, Germany had to fight on two fronts not only on the battlefield, but, since 1917, psychologically as well: the two enemies were Bolshevism and Wilsonianism. Her defeat in 1918 signified the victory of these two doctrines over the semi-absolutism of the Empire, and, in the final competition between democracy and Bolshevism, Wilson’s New Freedom remained victorious. Today’s constellation is almost identical. National Socialism is again fighting a psychological two-front war. For the older generation of the German people, America still is the land of unlimited industrial possibilities; it represents a mode of life infinitely superior to a manipulated and terrorized culture. To large groups of workers, whether communist or not, Soviet Russia is the realization of old dreams—this time combined with a military efficiency as high and perhaps even higher than that of National Socialism.
A military defeat of Germany is necessary. Whether National Socialism can be crushed without a military defeat, I do not know. But of this I am certain: a military defeat will wipe it out. The military superiority of the democracies and of Soviet Russia must be demonstrated to the German people. The philosophy of National Socialism stands and falls with its alleged ‘efficiency.’ This must be proved untrue. The stab-in-the-back legend of 1918 must not be allowed to arise again. More and better planes, tanks, and guns and a complete military defeat will uproot National Socialism from the mind of the German people.
But that is not enough. The war must be shortened by dividing Germany and divorcing the large masses of the people from National Socialism. This is the task of psychological warfare, which cannot be disassociated from the domestic and foreign policies of Germany’s opponents. Psychological warfare is not propaganda. It is politics. It consists in demonstrating to the German people that military superiority can be achieved by a democracy which does not claim to be perfect but which rather admits its imperfections, and does not shun the long and arduous task of overcoming them.
I have endeavored throughout the book to use only original German sources for my analyses, which frequently differ sharply from current interpretations of National Socialism. The Introduction is not intended as a history or full critical analysis of the Weimar Republic; it seeks merely to bring out the structural defects of the system. I hope before long to publish a social history of the Republic.
The idea for the present book came from studies made at the London School of Economics and Political Science, where I had the great pleasure of working for three years. I am deeply indebted to many suggestions I received from my friend Harold J. Laski and from Professor Morris Ginsberg.
I am obligated to many friends, above all to my colleagues in the Institute of Social Research and to its directors, Dr. Max Horkheimer and Dr. Frederick Pollock. My friend Herbert Marcuse went through some parts of the manuscript; Dr. Otto Kirchheimer gave me valuable suggestions on questions of criminal law; Dr. A. R. L. Gurland placed his comprehensive knowledge of German industry at my disposal. My friend D. V. Glass helped me in the section on population problems. My former assistant, Dr. O. K. Flechtheim, now an instructor at Atlanta University, spent much time in research on the history of the Weimar Republic. Professor E. J. Gumbel, now at the New School for Social Research, lent to me his many publications on republican justice.
The Honorable Thurman W. Arnold, Assistant Attorney General of the United States, kindly permitted me to use a memorandum originally prepared for him and the lectures on the German cartel system which I delivered before the members of the Anti-Trust division in 1938 and 1939.
The Research Institute on Peace and Post-War Problems of the American Jewish Committee kindly permitted me to incorporate my memorandum on Germany’s New Order. Professor Robert M. MacIver went through the final chapter and made a number of valuable suggestions.
Professor Alfred E. Cohn of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research was kind enough to place at my disposal a sum for editing expenses. The editing was done by Messrs. D. V. Glass, M. I. Finkelstein, and Norbert Guterman, who, together with Dr. Felix Weil, also assisted me in reading the proofs.
Acknowledgments are gratefully made to the following publishers for permission to reprint:
Little, Brown & Company, Boston, from Douglas Miller, You Can’t Do Business with Hitler.
Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, from Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (published by Reynal and Hitchcock).
Alfred A. Knopf, New York, from William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism.
The Brookings Institution, Washington, from Cleona Lewis, Nazi Europe and World Trade.
The Viking Press, New York, from Thorstein Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution.
W. W. Norton, New York, from Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism, and Emil Lederer, State of the Masses. The Threat of a Classless Society.
Columbia University Press, New York, from Mildred Wertheimer, The Pan-German League.
A. J. Holman Company, Philadelphia, from their edition of Martin Luther’s Works, Vol. I, from pp. 250 and 271, Vol. IV from pp. 240, 249, and 272.
FRANZ NEUMANN
23 December 1941
UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS, the author would have written a new book. This would have made early publication impossible, as would also the present difficulties of manufacture. For these reasons, publisher and author decided to add to the first edition a comprehensive appendix. The appendix brings the development of National Socialism up to date. It also fills certain omissions of the first edition, especially in four major fields:
German administration, especially the Police
the structure of the Party
the German theory and practice of military government
the structure of economic controls
The appendix is thus a small book in itself and only the courage of the Oxford University Press made it possible to publish a much enlarged book at the old price.
Each chapter of the appendix is prefaced by a note indicating which major chapter of the book it supplements. Since, in addition, the new material is listed in detail in the table of contents and the index, it should be fairly easy to correlate the book and the appendix.
After the appendix had been completed, German generals plotted Hitler’s assassination. The attempt of 20 July 1944 failed, but it led to the complete concentration of political, legislative, and administrative powers in the hands of Göring and Goebbels under the direction of Himmler, who also controls the home (reserve) army. Himmler is thus not only the undisputed master of the home front, but through his control of the home army and of the Combat S.S., reaches deep into the fighting front.
The Hitler Edict of 25 July 1944 by which Göring was charged with the adaptation of the home front to total war and Goebbels made his deputy may lead to the disappearance of the still existing dualism of State and Party. The Party would then altogether destroy the remnants of the rational and administrative state and substitute for it the amorphous, shapeless Movement, thus transforming the little that remains of the state into more or less organized anarchy.
F. N.
1 August 1944
Washington, D. C.