Chapter Three

Towards the Escaut

15–18 May 1940

‘The threat of tanks coloured all disposition. Water lines became all important and the obstacles they offered was deemed to outweigh the disadvantages imposed by the awkward alignment of a river and the holding of the forward slopes, portions of which were necessarily commanded from the high ground on the far bank.’

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Ryan, Royal Artillery Journal,

October 1943.

The German breakthrough at Sedan on the River Meuse was serious enough for the French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud to wake Winston Churchill at 7.30am on 15 May 1940. Churchill listened gravely as Reynaud told him that France was defeated. That morning, as the German panzer divisions began their breakout from the Meuse bridgehead, a weeping General Alphonse Georges had announced to his chief of staff that ‘our front has been broken at Sedan’. Adding to the gloom and despondency that now gripped the French senior command was the surrender of Dutch forces after the bombing of Rotterdam – the first occasion in history that aerial bombing had prompted a national surrender.

Churchill’s decision to fly to Paris with Sir John Dill, who was now Deputy CIGS, came a mere five days after he had formed a national coalition government. In Paris General Gamelin told him that German armour had broken through both north and south of Sedan on a 50-mile front and was advancing at incredible speed either towards Amiens and the coast or to Paris itself. Churchill’s question as to the whereabouts of the French strategic reserve was met with a shrug from Gamelin – ‘Aucun’ he replied (there is none). Churchill admitted to being taken aback by this rather blunt statement but was left with the distinct impression that there were no answers to be had.

While Churchill and Dill were in Paris the 2nd Division was reforming along its new line with 4 Brigade between Genval and Tombeek on the west bank of the River Lasne south-east of Brussels, while the units of 6 Brigade continued the line north-east to Terlaenen. Covering the right flank, which was still exposed to enemy incursion, were the three battalions of 5 Brigade positioned between Genval and Hanonsart. Fortunately the Germans did not follow the withdrawal too closely, only coming into contact on the morning of 16 May after announcing their arrival with artillery fire. But there was to be no fighting stand here as orders were soon received for a further withdrawal – this time to the line of the River Dendre, passing, en-route, through the 48th Division which had been brought forward in support.

The 48th Division – commanded by Major General Andrew ‘Bulgy’ Thorne – moved up towards the Dyle late on 13 May and after travelling all night were east of Hal by the next morning. The 2/Royal Warwicks of 144 Brigade were expecting to stand and fight in the Waterloo area and having made a reconnaissance of the ground in preparation for the battalion’s move forward, Captain Dick Tomes, the battalion adjutant, was surprised to receive orders for an immediate move to Ohain Wood, 2 miles south west of Genval:

‘We were told to withdraw to a ridge a mile behind us and hold it while the 2nd Division withdrew through us. I read the order and handed it to the CO. He remarked, “Dick, remember this day – 16 May. It will go down in history as the day on which another classic strategic withdrawal of the British Army began.” I did not believe him at the time.’1

Lieutenant Colonel Piers Dunn’s assessment of the situation may have come as a shock to Tomes, but to an old soldier like Dunn the rumours of an enemy breakthrough and the crumbling of the French line south of Wavre were classic signs that the chaos of retreat was not far away. It was a situation which he had seen before during the great German offensive of March 1918 and was certainly one which Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Whitfeld, commanding the 1/Ox and Bucks, would have recognised. Like Dunn he had been through most of the previous war and had won the MC in May 1915. The 43rd – as 1/Ox and Bucks liked to call themselves – were bivouacked in the woods north of Alsemberg where they were placed under the temporary command of the 2nd Division and ordered to move to the Hippodrome Racecourse in the centre of the Forêt de Soignes. Here they formed a check line with units of 5 Brigade along the line of the main road running south-east through the forest and awaited the appearance of German infantry.

Although they were never in direct contact with the enemy, the next morning they came under repeated air attack during which ‘the tremendous scream from at least one diving machine’ was enough to send the troops on the ground scurrying for shelter. For many this was their first introduction to the Junkers 87 Stuka dive bomber as they ‘dropped like cormorants from about four thousand feet to within a few feet of the ground with an ear piercing scream’.²

The 2nd Division units which withdrew through the forest found the going difficult, their progress hindered by the inaccuracy of the maps they had been issued with resulting in brigade columns becoming mixed up and disorientated by the numerous tracks and paths in the forest. When the River Senne was eventually reached, the crossing points were blocked by a mass of terror-stricken refugees. ‘It was’, wrote Captain Edward Woolsey of 2/Manchesters, ‘useless to attempt to force them out of the way, for we knew the column was twenty miles long and more.’

Rumours of a disaster along the French line had already been circulating amongst the staff of 145 Brigade as they crossed the Senne at Hal on 15 May. The 2/Gloucesters, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Hon Nigel Somerset, continued to Alsemberg where they billeted on the ridge overlooking the town. It was to be Nigel Somerset’s last day as commanding officer – an unexpected summons to brigade headquarters the next day resulted in his promotion to brigade command in place of Brigadier Archie Hughes, who joined the ranks of those elderly senior officers who were not up to the rigours of battlefield leadership. Somerset’s return to the battalion not only confirmed Major Maurice Gilmore as commanding officer but corroborated the disturbing rumours that all was not well on the right flank of the Dyle. The not unexpected warning that a move was imminent to support the 2nd Division arrived shortly afterwards.

Captain Eric Jones remembered the order to move east was given at 11.00pm on 15 May, almost exactly the time that orders were received by the 2nd Division units to withdraw from the Dyle. ‘The CO issued his orders – verbal. The battalion was to move to Joli Bois, 2 miles south of Waterloo by march route, and be in position by 7.00am, 16 May.’ Jones recalls everything was in a state of flux when they arrived, no one knew if they were to remain there for long or whether a further move to the Forêt de Soignes was imminent. In the event A Company, which included Jones, was sent off to Waterloo to hold the eastern edge of the village and the battalion dispersed around Joli Bois.

The Gloucesters’ front was so extensive that D Company of 1/Buckinghamshire Battalion was lent to the Gloucesters and C Company moved to the east side of Roussart. B Company occupied a large building complex known as Les Six Maisons, a building that can still be seen today on the N5b running south from Belle-Vue to Joli Bois. According to the war diary A Company were deployed to the west of the stone bridge at Waterloo where they were joined by the two batteries of 68/Field Regiment which established their headquarters in the luxurious Château d’Argenteuil along with Nigel Somerset and 145 Brigade. The war diary reported air attacks by Junkers 87 aircraft continuing through the day and the Gloucesters lost their first man that afternoon: Private Arthur Hammond killed by a bomb splinter.3

Lance Corporal Turner and his company of 4/Ox and Bucks found themselves in a small farm on ‘the edge of a large wood’. Turner’s account unfortunately lacks detail but he was probably east of Waterloo on the edge of the Forêt de Soignes where they came under air attack:

‘I heard a drone in the sky and saw fifty German aircraft approaching in perfect formation, bombers in the centre with waves of fighter escort neatly dispersed in a protective screen. The aircraft passed to the right but soon returned with a vengeance. A very liberal supply of bombs was let loose and I felt anxious about the reserve ammunition.’4

Turner recalled that they soon came under attack from infantry before withdrawing to a small wood 3 miles to the west where there was a large country mansion. Here the battalion was shelled, the German gunners plastering ‘the area of the country mansion with heavy shells and the margin by which we escaped their concussion and splinters must have been quite small.’

German advance units were certainly in evidence around the Waterloo area from late on 16 May and by early the next day had advanced in places up to the line of the railway. Although an attack was not immediately forthcoming, intelligence provided by the 12/Lancers patrols suggested to Lieutenant Colonel Lumsden that it was just a matter of time before a major effort would come from the build up of enemy forces in the southern corner of the Forêt de Soignes. As a result Lumsden instructed the bridges spanning the railway in his sector to be prepared for demolition. At Waterloo Lieutenant Smith and his detachment of Sappers from 101/Field Company began work on the stone bridge which crossed the railway line west of Waterloo. Smith’s work that night was just beginning and still under random enemy fire he moved up the railway line to a second bridge that Sergeant Earl was working on. Earl had already laid the charges when Smith arrived with Lance Corporal Hourigan and Driver Roach. Pushing their way through the volume of retreating troops and civilian refugees, Smith decided to leave the bridge intact for the time being and moved up to the level crossing further north:

‘Fortunately in this instance there were two very conveniently sited manholes, one each side of the crossing, and the charges were laid in these. L/Sgt Earl now returned to his bridge to await instructions to fire and [I] remained at the level crossing ... In the early hours of the morning [17 May] the Germans tested the front at several points such as Waterloo and Braine l’Alleud, but [were] met at all points by our fire and withheld further attacks until [they were] able to make a large scale effort. Later in the morning, as soon as the British troops had withdrawn, the prepared demolitions were fired and the detachment withdrew with the 12/Lancers.’⁵

There is little doubt that there was considerable confusion as the 48th Division units deployed in and around the Forêt de Soignes. If Smith’s recollections of the dates are accurate, then the German attacks on the 48th Division units on 16 May could only mean that they had already penetrated the tenuous British line. At Rixensart, some 8 miles to the east of Waterloo, two troops of C Squadron, 4/7 Royal Dragoon Guards with their Mark VIb light tanks were in action during the afternoon of 16 May on both flanks of the village. Reinforced by A Squadron the engagement was broken off with no casualties or vehicles lost but for a short time the war diary described the situation as ‘unhealthy’. We also know that the 1/Ox and Bucks did not finally leave the Forêt de Soignes until early on 17 May by which time the Gloucesters – and presumably the 1/Buckinghams – were already under attack at Waterloo. Fortunately these attacks were not followed up in any great force and were fairly easily beaten off but they did indicate the degree to which the British line had been penetrated.

The 145 Brigade withdrawal began at 10.00pm on 16 May although it was after 8.00am on 17 May before Captain Bill Wilson and B Company of the Gloucesters arrived at Waterloo where they were greeted by an unseen enemy: ‘We pushed on to the railway line running north, approaching which we were fired on from both sides.’ Wilson and his men crossed the Senne by the Hal bridge ‘just before it was blown’.6 Presuming the diary account written by Second Lieutenant Wallis is correct, the whole of 145 Brigade was across the Senne at Hal by that afternoon. On two occasions during the march from Waterloo to Alsemberg the 4/Ox and Bucks reported being machine gunned by enemy aircraft, Turner recalling vividly ‘the thud of machine gun bullets which entered the earth near my head. The holes in the ground were easily traceable when I got up.’ Fortunately for Turner and his men there were very few casualties.⁷

Michael Duncan’s memories of the withdrawal with the 4/Ox and Bucks to the Dendre were shrouded in a haze of exhaustion. ‘Most of us were already drugged almost to a coma by lack of food and sleep and I remember the withdrawal as a series of vivid, but disjointed, pictures.’ His fears for the wounded from the skirmish at Waterloo being pushed along in wheelbarrows and the dusty, sun-scorched road to Hal and Enghien were only eased when he crossed the river at Ath where the bridges were blown behind them.⁸

Further north on the night of 16 May, the 1st Division units were withdrawing from the Dyle. The 3/Grenadier Guards were covering the departure of 3 Infantry Brigade and after seeing them across the Lasne, blew the bridges behind them:

‘It was a nervous business, as the enemy were close on the heels of the 3rd Brigade and well forward on the battalion’s right flank. At 11.50pm the forward companies began to thin out and successfully broke contact with the enemy after an exchange of a few shots in the darkness. The bridge at Huldenberg was blown up on schedule, and the battalion tramped back to the Forest of Soignes, to be greeted by a swelling chorus of nightingales. The commander of the 3rd Brigade, recorded Major [Allan] Adair, almost wept with relief when I reported that the battalion was safely away.’⁹

At the same time as Major General George Alexander’s 1st Division units were leaving the Dyle valley the 3rd Division was leaving Louvain and heading towards Brussels. In 7 Guards Brigade 2/Grenadier Guards were detailed as rearguard and were waiting on the Brussels-Louvain road to check the units through. The withdrawal from the Guards’ positions north of Louvain had been difficult and it was with some anxiety that Major Rupert Colvin, second-in-command of the battalion, waited for the Coldstream to arrive:

‘It was a queer experience as one did not know if the first arrivals would be Guardsmen or Germans. I had two lambs with me who bleated pathetically, and all sorts of other animals turned up looking for a saviour who could give them food and water. The men were all tired and out of two Coldstream companies which had born the brunt of the fighting, no more than one officer and sixty-three men survived.’10

In the event, Colvin’s fears were unfounded. Captain Dick Walker, the 3rd Division RE adjutant, put the failure of any serious German opposition to the British withdrawal from Louvain down to the cratering of roads, which was carried out across the city. Walker does not give any further details but without doubt the delaying effect of the demolitions was very marked and the enemy almost completely lost touch with the rearguards during the night of 16 May as the 3rd Division approached Brussels.

But just as there was further south, a general and very disagreeable air of disappointment shrouded the retiring BEF. When the orders reached Lieutenant Colonel Lionel Bootle-Wilbraham at the 2/Coldstream Guards Headquarters his reaction was one of exasperation. Having witnessed the British Third Army’s retreat in March 1918, whilst serving as adjutant of the 4th Battalion, his sardonic remark to Captain Roddy Hill, that the campaign was starting ‘in the traditional British manner, with a retreat,’ disguised his real concern as to what the next few days would bring. Giving orders for the battalion to begin the 17-mile march to Brussels, it crossed the Senne at Ruysbroeck, reaching Zuen just as day was breaking. The 44-year-old Bootle-Wilbraham lost little time in deploying his men:

‘Nos 1, 2 and 3 Companies were on the line of the canal, while 4 Company was in reserve near Battalion Headquarters. There was a double obstacle on our front, where the River Senne ran to the east of the canal. In our area there were seven bridges to be prepared for demolition. The men were in good heart and showed no signs of weariness ... A constant flow of refugee traffic over the bridges made it difficult to decide exactly when to blow them up. One could never be sure there were no British troops on the wrong side of the river. However, by 5.00pm the bridges were blown.’¹¹

Second Lieutenant Hugh Taylor had some difficulty explaining to his men of 7 Platoon that the Suffolks were withdrawing along with the rest of the 3rd Division and to make matters worse, they would be getting no sleep that night. Taylor described the march to the outskirts of Brussels as one he would ‘never forget’. Already exhausted, the monotony of the straight, dusty roads was only broken by bully beef and biscuits and the continual stream of refugees which accompanied them:

‘About midday we reached Brussels where there were obvious signs of war. Machine gun marks could be seen across some of the houses, bomb craters had to be negotiated. And windows were broken by the dozen, in fact, as one walked along the road it was difficult to stop slipping on the broken glass. Here and there was a house completely demolished by a bomb and people looking for their belongings in the ruins. As we got further on, the roads became narrower and the inhabitants looked out of their doors and windows to watch us go past ... They seemed incredulous about our tales of the approach of the Germans, they laughed and said, why then were we retreating? We comforted them by telling them there were more of us behind and that the Germans were some way off yet, though we knew they were only twelve miles away.’12

But there was to be no rest along the line of the Senne which, for the retreating British units, was only the first stage of three which would eventually see them fighting on the line of the River Escaut. The 2/Coldstream hardly had time to draw breath before fresh orders sent them towards Ninvove on the River Dendre. Arriving at 10.00am on Saturday 18 May the battalion at least had some rest before Bootle-Wilbraham received yet more orders to move to Pecq on the Escaut:

‘I remember being appalled at the idea of withdrawing by daylight across the bare face of the hill under enemy observation ... My problem was to decide how best to withdraw over the open fields of a convex hill. It seemed likely that the enemy would be on the river [Dendre] by first light. The alternative was to slip away to a flank under cover of some trees and a village that was in the Hampshires’ area.’¹³

At 8.00am on 19 May the battalion moved quickly through Eychen and Bootle-Wilbraham confessed to being highly relieved when the withdrawal was completed successfully with the loss of only one man who was a victim of German air activity.¹⁴

The 2/Hampshires abandoned their positions on the Senne at midnight on 17 May and marched the 20 miles back to Ninvove deploying along the west bank of the canal where they were subjected to a violent mortar and machine-gun attack from across the water. Holding their positions all night in the expectation of an enemy attack, they finally abandoned the canal the next morning and marched to Nederbrakel where Ben Duncan and his mates found transport was waiting for them:

‘The journey was long and tedious and made more so by the condition of the roads. The crowds of civilians that were packed on the road constantly held us up. Also the result of enemy bombing was very much in evidence. Horses lying by the side of the road and in some instances almost blocking it, their innards hanging out; small children sitting crying beside the torn bodies of their parents and too young to know how to fend for themselves.’15

The 4th Division had some trouble breaking clear of the enemy on the night of 17/18 May with 10 and 11 Brigades fighting hard to hold off advancing infantry units. Detailed as rearguard, the 15/19 King’s Hussars were ordered to hold their positions west of Brussels until early on 18 May to allow 10 Brigade to retire through their lines. It was at 8.45am that permission was given for the regiment to move back to Assche and the first hint of ‘trouble’ – heard by C Squadron – was the unmistakeable sound of tracked vehicles coming from the direction of the main road from Vilvorde. Having failed to get in touch with the Belgian 5th Division, which was thought to be retiring north of Merchtem, it quickly dawned on Major Sir Henry Floyd, commanding C Squadron, just who was driving the tracked vehicles. Unbeknown to the British the Belgians were by now safely on the Dendre and the northern flank was wide open; circumstances the Germans were quick to exploit. The full extent of the German advance was discovered almost inadvertently by a patrol from the 5/Inniskilling Dragoon Guards who found Assche in German hands. It was in Assche that some of the most desperate fighting took place as four troops of A Squadron attempted to force their way through the town:

‘As Squadron Headquarters entered the town, Major Frith’s tank was destroyed by an anti-tank gun and he and his crew were killed. The rest of the force, under Captain Mytton, then tried to force a way through Assche and after twenty minutes’ street fighting they succeeded in retaking nearly half the town and in reaching 4th Troop. By now every AFV of this force had been knocked out and the fighting developed into individual actions by small bodies of survivors. By the end Major Frith and his crew were all killed, Captain Mytton and SSM Laing were wounded and taken prisoner, and the main body of the Squadron was outnumbered and surrounded.’¹⁶

Major Colin Cokayne-Frith managed to warn the remaining squadrons that he was surrounded before he and his crew were knocked out but the regiment, in the words of Second Lieutenant Guy Courage, ‘never stood a chance’. The 40-year-old Cokayne-Frith was the most senior officer of the regiment to be killed that day. He had served with Guy Courage’s father in the 15/Hussars during the First World War and had celebrated the end of hostilities in November 1918 only 40 miles or so to the southeast of the town in which he lost his life.

Ordered to split up and break out in groups by the second-in command, Major ‘Loony’ Hinde – who himself was wounded and forced to swim the Dendre in order to return to British lines – the Hussars fought a very one-sided battle against German mobile infantry armed with the Panzerabwehrkanone (Pak) 36 anti-tank gun against which the lightly armoured vehicles of the 15/19 King’s Hussars stood little chance. The commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Donald Frazer and the French liaison officer managed to evade capture for 24 hours before being taken prisoner. Of the reported 157 casualties, 21 officers and men were killed in action or died of wounds over the next twenty-four hours and that evening, as the remnants of the regiment gathered in a field at Alost, they could barely put together one squadron and were subsequently reorganized into a composite squadron under the command of Major Sir Henry Floyd. One remarkable episode involving Captain Anthony Taylor, the regimental adjutant, saw him escape from his German captors – he would be captured again on two further occasions and escape again – to finally reach Le Touquet on 5 June 1940 where he set sail and was picked up by the Royal Navy off the French coast. His award of the MC was well deserved.17

The I Corps retreat continued unabated and by nightfall on 17 May, 4 and 5 Brigades of the 2nd Division had reached the line of the Dendre where they were met by the welcome sight of transport. Not so fortunate were the men of 6 Brigade whose transport failed to materialise giving the luckless battalions little choice but to continue on foot. The exhaustion of these men who had fought so hard on the Dyle and had marched almost continuously since leaving their valley positions on 15 May was experienced by Michael Farr who was footslogging along with the Durhams:

‘The remnants marched on; it seemed about 35 miles in 48 hours. The men had become so tired, some were falling asleep on the march and it was difficult to get them on the march again. Each man carried his Lee Enfield .303 rifle (this was over 8lbs in weight), his gas mask, haversack, mess tin and water bottle, and of course, steel helmet. We marched on by day and by night. The troop-carrying vehicles which were supposed to lift us never arrived. We were now just four groups of 100 men. A half strength battalion, not properly organised either due to the sudden withdrawal.’¹⁸

Farr failed to mention the additional weight of Bren guns and Boys anti-tank rifles which the Durhams clung to determinedly.¹⁹ Captain Cyril Townsend recalls the battalion reaching Gammerages at dawn on 18 May and his estimation of the distance marched – 48 miles in 48 hours – is probably more accurate. Here the battalion finally fell into the waiting trucks and crossed the Dendre at Grammont to be off-loaded at Ogy. ‘No one’, wrote Townsend, ‘quite knew how close the enemy was and how much the troops behind had delayed their advance.’

When the 2nd Division reached the Dendre orders were given that the line of the river should be held between Grammont and Lessines with the 48th Division holding the river below the latter settlement. Yet despite the urgency, Grammont – the key to the whole position – was undefended for several hours apart from a few section outposts manned by the 2/Royal Norfolks. In fact it was not until late that evening that troops arrived to hold the town. The Norfolks’ war diary for 18 May notes wryly that ‘there was a certain amount of excitement’ at 7.00pm that evening when contact with the enemy was established. With no relief in sight, orders were just about to be sent out to companies to extend their frontage to include Grammont. Fortunately the Cameron Highlanders turned up at about 10.00pm allowing the Norfolks to hold fast in the positions they had already taken up. One can only guess the content and quantity of the ‘banter’ dished out to the newly-arrived Scotsmen by the weary wags in the ranks of the Norfolks.

But the story does not end there. It wasn’t until the early hours of 19 May that Lieutenant Colonel Lumsden was summoned to the church at Ghoy where Brigadier Ian Gartland, commanding 5 Infantry Brigade, explained that all attempts to inform the Grammont garrison of the withdrawal had failed and requested Lumsden’s help. With enemy infantry already in the wooded area to south of Grammont, Lumsden’s men, together with a squadron of 13/18 Hussars, moved quickly to provide the necessary rearguard to allow all troops in the town to break contact with the Germans. Despite drawing a heavy fire onto his command Lumsden finally reported to Gartland that all troops were clear of Grammont by 12.05pm.

At Ath there was what Captain Mark Henniker called a hiccup over the demolition of the bridge north of the town. Apparently no one at 2nd Divisional R E Headquarters was sure that arrangements had been made to blow the bridge and Henniker was sent to ensure all was in order. Arriving at Ath he located the bridge a mile north of the town:

‘The bridge was visible a few hundred yards down the road and it occurred to me that it might be on the point of demolition with the defenders taking cover to avoid the falling debris. I looked anxiously for some cover for myself and saw, to my relief, an armoured car from the Divisional Cavalry Regiment, the 4/7th Dragoon Guards. Sitting in a deck chair was the CO of the regiment. He was reading The Times with a teacup in the other hand. He was a man of medium build, I should think in the mid-forties. His cap was pushed back and a pair of earphones were resting loosely around his neck ... He was in fact the embodiment of a cavalry officer of the old school – perhaps a bit of a blimp.’20

The 44-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Misa was anything but a blimp. A veteran of the previous war, the calm exterior which so impressed Henniker belied the anxiety he was feeling for his regiment which was fighting hard against advancing enemy infantry between Ath and Lessines. Having reached the Dendre on 17 May the Dragoons were ordered to hold the river line until midday on 19th to allow the 48th Division time to withdraw.

Misa had deployed his squadrons along the 6 miles of the canalised Dendre between Ath and Lessines. Contact with the enemy was first reported at 8.45am that morning and B Squadron was soon in action against an ‘enemy [who] kept on approaching the opposite bank of the canal in parties of 12 and 14 and attempted to inflate and launch rubber pontoons’. Finding no lack of targets the Hussars foiled further German attempts to cross the water. At 11.30am 3 Troop was pinned down by enemy machine-gun fire with Lieutenant Denis Atkinson and Corporal Edmundson still on an island in the middle of the canal. Unable to return, it was left to the bravery of Trooper Albert Argyle to paddle a boat across to the two men and bring them to safety. Argyle was awarded the MM but died later in the morning of wounds gained during his feat and Denis Atkinson was last seen in his carrier ‘going over a fence and across a cropped field under heavy fire’. Those of his troop who were not killed were taken prisoner.21

The German assault across the canal was also being countered by A Squadron which, reinforced by a company of Cheshires machine gunners and a battery of anti-tank guns, was inflicting ‘heavy casualties’ on the enemy. The squadron diary recording a variety of targets which included infantry, cavalry patrols, artillery and rubber boats. At Lessines C Squadron were having ‘a very sticky time with the Germans trying to enter the town by a bridge which was only partly blown and also working around the flank’. By 10.00am 3 Troop in particular was under severe pressure but despite reporting being ‘harried considerably by 5th Column activities’ still managed to put the weapon and crew of a German anti-tank gun out of action. Lieutenant Ian Gill was later awarded the MC whilst Trooper Alfred Charman received the MM for their part in 3 Troop’s defence of Lessines.

It was at around this point in the battle that Henniker arrived at Ath to hear from Lawrence Misa that there was still a troop of his armoured cars on the far side of the canal and he was waiting for them to arrive. Sharing a cup of tea with the colonel ‘which a trooper brought on a tray’, Henniker quite rightly wondered for a second time that week if the Germans would arrive first:

‘The CO was speaking to his rearguard troop commander, who told him there were some enemy in sight. The Colonel replied on his wireless; well you had better drive them away ... Soon, however, the armoured cars started retreating over the bridge and the young officer in command waved cheerfully to us, saying he would tell the CO that he had got all the troops to our side of the river.’²²

The bridge was blown with a deafening crash and ‘the entire bridge sprang into the air’, leaving a very happy Henniker to report to his headquarters and a much relieved Lawrence Misa to continue the retreat to the Escaut.

Meanwhile 2/Gloucesters were withdrawing towards Tournai when their convoy of lorried transport was held up by traffic congestion at Leuze. According to Captain Eric Jones the chaos was caused by the sheer volume of traffic. ‘Vehicles were three and four abreast whenever the road permitted; pavements were driven along; drivers became separated from their columns, then anxious to rejoin them.’23 Finally the Gloucesters’ convoy got clear of the town and left the main Tournai road towards Ramecroix where they turned left for Bruyelle. At Ramecroix they met yet more traffic congestion which Jones says forced the drivers to decrease the gap between each vehicle in order not to become separated from the column. It was an error that was to cost the battalion dearly. There is no record of what first drew Captain Wilkinson’s attention to the low flying aircraft but it was probably the drone of aircraft engines:

‘I saw nine bombers at low level coming over our position, and had just decided that they were enemy aeroplanes and ordered the AA Bren in the truck behind me to fire, when the bombs started dropping. This was followed by machine-gun fire. An ammunition truck went up near me, and bombs seemed to explode on part of A Company, who were just behind me.’²⁴

Eric Jones’ account points to the battalion being caught completely by surprise as the first three aircraft scored direct hits on five lorries, two of which were troop-carrying vehicles. Wilkinson was badly injured in the chest and arm and the road was completely blocked by blazing trucks, a situation rendered far more dangerous by exploding ammunition. Captain Bill Wilson, commanding B Company, felt the attack was the inevitable result of travelling in daylight: ‘There was poor cover,’ he wrote, ‘for we were now in a village and no ditches on the road, but it was all there was.’

Unfortunately the accuracy of the casualty returns for this incident remains unclear. The war diary records 70 men killed, wounded or missing, David Scott Daniell in Cap of Honour writes that 194 men of the battalion were killed or wounded and the CWGC database identifies only 23 men of the 2nd Battalion recorded as being killed on 19 May, but has another three recorded as dying of wounds over the next two days. These figures do not take into account the unidentified that were either too badly burned or killed in the initial explosions.²⁵

The BEF was now grouping on the Escaut, along a line running from Oudenaarde to Bléhairies but before examining the BEF’s defence of the Escaut in more detail the focus must shift south, to the old Somme battlefields of the First World War, where the Territorial battalions of the 12th and 23rd Divisions were about to collide with Heinz Guderian’s crack XIX Panzer Korps.