36

Shenovo

While Gourko was setting off from Sofia in his pursuit of Suleiman’s army, an even greater drama was being enacted in the high passes of the Balkans at Shipka. The Russian high command’s strategy for conducting a winter campaign called not only for the offensive by Gourko across the Balkans in the direction of Sofia, but a major operation by Radetzky’s army, and early in January Skobelev arrived at Gabrova with substantial reinforcements, consisting of the 16th and 30th Divisions and the 3rd and 4th Rifle Brigades. These brought the total number of infantry at Radetzky’s disposal to 56,000 men in 74 battalions in addition to artillery and cavalry. Out of these, however, Radetzky had effectively lost the use of the 24th Division; sent to the Shipka front in late November as a relief for the 14th Division, it had lost several hundred men through freezing during the severe December storms, and by Christmas Day had no less than 6,013 men unfit for duty due to frost bite and sickness caused by the extreme exposure.1

With the additional troops made available to him, Radetzky planned to take out the Turkish force at Shipka. Vessil Pasha, in command there, had some 40,000 men with 93 guns. The Turkish position had been greatly strengthened, particularly during the long period of inactivity caused by the bad weather. The village of Shipka was now the nucleus of a large fortified camp, and the pass was blocked by a series of redoubts and entrenchments. Eight redoubts lay on the west and four on the east of the road, linked by trenches, and forming a semi circle from Shenovo through Dolni Gouzovo, Gorni Gouzovo and Yanina. It could prove a very tough nut to crack.

Radetzky planned to envelop the Turkish position, and for this purpose he divided his army into three groups. On the right Skobelev, with the 16th Division, the 3rd Rifle Brigade, 7 Bulgarian battalions, and the 9th Don Cossack Regiment, with 6 guns and 6 mountain guns, was to take a mountain trail leading from Zelenodrevo to the summit of the mountains only two and a half miles to the west of the Turkish position on Bald Mountain. From there he was to descend to the village of Imetli in the Tundja valley and then swing to his left to attack the western side of the Turkish position. Meanwhile, on the left, Prince Mirsky was to advance from Triavna following a trail over the Seltsis hill, crossing into the Tundja valley at Gusevo, where he would turn to his right to attack the Turks’ eastern flank. His column consisted of the 3rd, 34th and 36th Regiments of the 9th Division, the 30th Division, the 4th Rifle Brigade, a Bulgarian battalion, the 23rd Don Cossack Regiment, 16 guns and 6 mountain guns. The operation was to commence on the morning of January 5 and it was hoped that both columns would be in a position to attack on the morning of January 8. Meanwhile the rest of Radetzky’s army, under his direct command, would remain in the Russian position in the Shipka Pass. He had there the 14th Infantry Division, and the 35th Regiment of the 9th Division. In addition to the principal operation, a small force under Major-General Kartsov, consisting of two regiments of the 3rd Division, a battalion from the 3rd Rifle Brigade and the 24th and 30th Don Cossack Regiments, was to endeavour to cross the Trojan Pass to the west and make contact with Gourko’s army.2

Russian troops resting high in the Balkans. (Ollier)

All three movements faced dreadful difficulties in their passage over the Balkans in the appalling weather conditions that prevailed, but it was Kartsov’s column that encountered the most considerable obstacles:

In the region the Balkans attain their greatest general elevation, and here its loftiest summits are found; the most conspicuous being the Maré-Haidouk, whose top is lost in clouds, fogs and snow; the few footpaths which exist are only practicable for foot-passengers or solitary horsemen, not for bodies of troops. It was not, therefore, without cause that the best military writers had considered the Trojan Balkans impassable.³

It was these conditions that presented the greatest threat to Kartsov’s mission, since the Turkish defences were modest; about 2,000 men occupied four redoubts. Kartsov split his force into three, each part setting off at intervals of one day from Koliba, his starting point, commencing on January 4. He took with him eight guns, mounted on sledges, each of which required 24 buffaloes, a company of infantry and a sotnia of Cossacks to drag it up the mountains. They reached the summit on January 5, through quagmires and snowdrifts, the sappers painfully clearing the way. Lieutenant Colonel Sosnovsky, the commander of the rifle battalion which led the advance, attempted a surprise attack on the principal Turkish redoubt, but his men were spotted within two hundred yards, and were driven back by heavy rifle fire.

The main redoubt was linked to the other three by a system of trenches, and it was evident that a frontal attack was out of the question. Two days were spent in reconnoitring a route to turn the position, and in hauling up the artillery. On January 7 Kartsov’s guns opened fire on the redoubt, while a column moved around it to the east. Once it had got to a position from which it could descend on the Turkish right, another column attacked in front. The defenders broke, and fled down the mountains, and Kartsov was able to make his way to Karlovo, where he was joined by other units of the 3rd Division which had moved along the south side of the Balkans through Slatitza.4

Even before the fall of Plevna Skobelev had turned his mind to the crossing of the Balkans, and the prolonged delay which followed was a source of intense frustration to him. Eventually he had set out for Gabrova on December 22, marching over appallingly bad roads in bitter weather. Part of his artillery was left at Plevna, as each gun required eight horses rather than six. A Russian observer described Skobelev’s troops en route:

When the detachment began the march, it defiled before its beloved chief singing gaily as it marched by. He was accustomed to greet them with great geniality, recalling the battles in which they had taken part, and talking sometimes of the soldier’s position, and sometimes of subjects far removed from the scenes of the campaign. The privates, instead of being, as usually is the case, awkward in the presence of their chief, were put perfectly at their ease, and showed themselves at their best whenever they had the kind and hearty greeting of Skobelev.⁵

Arriving at Shipka, Skobelev conferred with Radetzky and Mirsky. The planned operation was clearly going to be difficult, not least because it would be a serious problem to coordinate the attacks on the Turkish position once the Russians were through the mountains. Writing to Kuropatkin, his Chief of Staff, Skobelev disclosed his uneasiness in the minute instructions which he gave for the preparations to be made. Confidence generally, however, was high, as Pfeil, who was to accompany Mirsky, observed:

The Russian headquarters, which, owing to the ignominious defeats at Plevna, the failure at the Lom, and the conspicuous success of the Turks at Elena, had lost all power of decision, had now pulled itself together and determined to proceed with vigour. With the changeableness peculiar to the Russian character, which is despondent today and exultant tomorrow, after the events of Plevna they looked down with contempt on the adversary of whom they stood in mortal fear only a few days previously. The plan for crossing the Balkans was worked out in a corresponding spirit.⁶

Mirsky had further to travel than Skobelev, and his force began its march at dawn on January 5. He had twenty-eight miles to cover to reach Gusevo, from where he was to attack, whereas Skobelev, who started out on the evening of the same day, had to march only twelve miles to his objective at Imetli. The assumption was, therefore, that Mirsky would have to make forced marches to reach his destination, while Skobelev should pace himself to arrive at the same time. As it turned out, however, the physical obstacles encountered by the latter meant that it was his force that was behind schedule.

Russian troops bivouacking in the Balkans. (Ollier)

Mirsky’s advance was preceded by some 1,500 Bulgarians who worked to clear the snow, and for a while good progress was made. Once the force caught up with the road sweeping operation, however, the march was slowed by the need to take particular care to negotiate the steep precipices. At about noon the column halted; Mirsky came to the conclusion that it was not practicable for the field artillery to complete the march without causing enormous delay, and he decided to proceed with the mountain guns alone. Darkness had fallen at 6.30 pm, but the column trudged on, aiming to bivouac for the night on the southern slope of the mountains, while the staff were to go to Seltsis, a village marked on the map. In the pitch dark, in biting cold and a savage wind, the men had to wade knee deep through the snow. Pfeil was struck by the fortitude of the soldiers:

There was of course no possibility of lighting fires or making any kind of shelters, and cooking was out of the question; but, often as I went through the ranks of the brave fellows, I never heard a single word of discontent; only the officers abused everybody roundly and did not trouble themselves in the least about their men.7

As they struggled forward news came that Seltis consisted only of three half burnt out huts, and that in any case it appeared that the road was impracticable at night, so Mirsky was deprived of accommodation. Nearly all his staff had vanished, evidently having found bivouacs with the Bulgarians; Mirsky’s composure deserted him entirely and ‘he complained loudly that the troops had to suffer so much, and declared that he would just throw himself upon the snow and let everything take its chance.’ Pfeil, however, revived his spirits, and with the aid of three Cossacks got his commander to Seltsis where, after all, accommodation was found and where the Prince’s baggage shortly arrived with his valet; they dined on cold meat and ‘some excellent Madeira.’ Mirsky’s column rested for the whole of January 6, to allow the 30th Division, marching as the reserve, to arrive. On January 7, in much easier conditions, the force resumed its march to Gusevo, which was taken after a brief action. Mirsky sent one brigade of the 30th Division under Schnitnikov to occupy Magilish, six miles to the east of Kazanlik, to cover his left flank and rear, and settled down to prepare for the beginning of his assault on the following day, although he was, however, still in ignorance of Skobelev’s progress.

This had been by no means as rapid as had been hoped. Although making good time on January 6, marching seven miles before bivouacking for the night, next day it was possible to move only slowly. As had been the case with Mirsky’s column, movement of the field artillery created tremendous problems, and all save six guns had to be left behind; even the mountain guns demanded tremendous efforts in being dragged through the snow. The column, much of the time marching in single file, stretched for miles. The men had provisions for six days, part of which was carried in their packs, and the rest by packhorses. Cattle were driven along the track to provide sufficient meat. Each man had ninety-six cartridges, and a similar quantity was carried by the train. There were even a number of camels, brought from Central Asia; these hardy animals were of great assistance in pulling the guns.⁸

Although by January 7 the descent to Imetli had begun, and that village was occupied before nightfall, Skobelev’s troops were still strung out for miles, and by dawn on January 8 he had not yet succeeded in concentrating his force, having encountered resistance from a body of Turks entrenched in his front. Mindful of instructions that he had received from Radetzky that he was not to attack until he had his force well in hand, he sent a messenger to report that he would not have all his force up until the evening of January 8. While waiting for a response, he had to endure the frustration of hearing the sound of battle to the east, where Mirsky had began his attack. Radetzky responded to Skobelev’s report with an order to concentrate his force and attack on the morning of January 9, establishing contact with Mirsky if this was possible. He added that the 1st Cavalry Division was being sent forward to reinforce him.⁹

Radetzky had taken his stand on the morning of January 8 on the crest of St Nicholas, from where he would be able to see the advance of the columns of both Mirsky and Skobelev. He was soon able to see Mirsky’s troops moving forward to the assault. Deploying about noon, they advanced to the attack of the Turkish positions. Mirsky, like Radetzky, had heard the sound of gunfire from the west, where Skobelev was clearing away the opposition which he had encountered, but as the day wore on this died away, and there was no sign of an attack from this direction. Mirsky’s orders were, however, to attack on January 8, and this he proceeded to do. In his front line came the 4th Rifle Brigade, deployed as skirmishers, supported by the mountain guns and the 33rd Regiment. In his second line were the 34th, 36th and 117th Regiments. The 20th Regiment remained at Gusevo, and Schnitnikov’s two regiments (118th and 119th) were ordered to advance from Magilish towards Kazanlik.

The advance guard, led by Colonel Krock, took the villages of Yanina and Haskioi after a short but sharp struggle, but beyond these were held up by a small range of hills covered with several tiers of rifle pits. Under heavy shellfire from the Turkish artillery, to which only the small mountain guns were able to reply, the Russian troops advanced to the assault, sustaining heavy casualties as they did so. The colonel of the 33rd Regiment was wounded, and the line began to waver before Mirsky sent forward the 36th Regiment in support. A lucky shot from a mountain gun exploded a Turkish caisson; the Russian line moved forward and captured the Turkish trenches with three guns and 100 prisoners. These Turkish guns had been in a battery on the right flank of the Russian lines which had picked out the party of Mirsky’s headquarters staff and had caused it several casualties.10

As dusk fell the Russians approached the last line of Turkish defences, which was a series of redoubts to the south of Shipka village. The exhausted troops were running out of ammunition, and at this point the Turks launched a violent counter-attack. It failed, however, in the face of volley firing by the Russian infantry. Nonetheless, Mirsky was very exposed. Although Kazanlik had been found to be unoccupied, his left flank was in the air; his troops were pinned down only 200 yards from strong enemy positions; and his back was to a high range of mountains into which retreat would be difficult if not impossible.¹¹

Skobelev’s failure to launch an attack, for whatever reason, had caused intense bitterness among Mirsky’s staff, and it seemed to Pfeil that their commander was beginning to lose his nerve:

Prince Mirsky now began to doubt of success; his mind reverted to the defeat he had suffered at Elena, and he remarked to me that this day would bring new shame on his head. A sort of council of war was called, in which we three and the commander of artillery took part, and the Prince put his views before us. As he said, he had done his duty, and attacked at the time ordered, but had been shamefully left in the lurch, and there was nothing left for him but to save his army, and with this view to withdraw it to the Balkans. The artillery general, a fat, helpless personage, who the whole day had kept out of harm’s way, gave his unconditional support to this course.¹²

The Chief of Staff, Colonel von Raben, and Colonel Sobelev, attached to Mirsky from the General Staff, were for holding on; Pfeil agreed, suggesting that the pioneers be sent to Kazanlik to fortify the place. This last suggestion was acted upon; Mirsky accepted his subordinates’ advice, although sending off a pessimistic report to Radetzky that unless reinforced he must retreat. He had lost more than 1,500 men. Radetzky responded that he must hold on for another twenty-four hours; he would launch a frontal attack next day, when Skobelev would also attack from the west.¹³

Radetzky planned to launch his frontal attack on January 9 at noon, reckoning that if Skobelev began his advance at 8.00 am he would reach Shipka at about that time. As dawn broke, St Nicholas was enveloped in a thick mist, and nothing could be seen, but heavy firing from the east suggested that Mirsky was under attack. This was indeed the case; after a heavy artillery preparation the Turks launched an attack all along the line. The situation was critical; without support any retreat might degenerate into a rout, and Pfeil found Mirsky in a desperate state of mind:

From the Prince’s face I saw what a struggle was going on in his mind. For some moments we rode silently alongside one another, our eyes fixed on the battlefield, and then suddenly he looked round at me with an angry look, such as I never before or since saw on his face, and said, ‘I was a fool to take your advice and not insist upon following out my own plan and withdrawing my troops. You see, I shall lose my army! As I had fulfilled my orders, and attacked Shipka, and as Skobelev did not arrive, I could have withdrawn with all honour.’ He stared at me, and was silent. These were the only words we exchanged on our ride up to the scene of action.14

The Turkish attacks continued, and appeared to be making headway, to the point when it appeared that the Russians might have to retreat. At this point a message arrived from Colonel Krock on a scrap of paper: ‘Hurrah! Skobelev is advancing with bands playing. Krock.’ Pfeil thought it a moment one would have to have lived through to understand, and compared their feelings to Wellington’s when at Waterloo he heard the news of Blücher’s arrival. Prince Mirsky gave Pfeil a look which, he wrote, he would never forget.¹⁵

Early on January 8 Skobelev’s leading regiments, the 63rd and 64th, had moved on a hill to the south-east; this was soon taken by the 64th Regiment. However, although he probed towards Shenovo, Skobelev felt bound by his orders from Radetzky not to attack until all his force was in hand, and he held back from launching an attack. During the night all his force was assembled at Imetli, with the exception of the 62nd Regiment. On the morning of January 9 this unit could be seen descending the mountain, and Skobelev felt he might now reasonably launch an attack. This began with the capture, not without heavy loss, of a hill on his right flank, west of Shenovo. He also sent a force of cavalry in a wide swing to his right, and it was they who had established contact with Krock and Mirsky’s advanced guard.

Immediately in his front, Skobelev faced four Celtic tumuli, where Gourko had camped during the previous July. These the Turks had fortified, linking them by épaulements. In front of Shipka there was a semi-circular redoubt, with four guns, prolonged with a redan and three lines of trenches, while in its turn behind this lay a huge earthwork surrounding the entrenched camp, with another circular redoubt. All these works had been constructed among the woods and bushes around Shenovo, making it difficult to assess their strength.¹⁶

At 7.00 am Skobelev deployed his force. In the first line were the 63rd Regiment and the Bulgarian Legion; behind these were the 61st and 64th Regiments and the Rifle Brigade. Skobelev located his mountain guns in the centre and took up his position there. With bands playing, the assault force moved towards the redoubts, received by a very heavy fire. Response to this was difficult, for the defenders were largely concealed among the trees and bushes. As the line moved forward Major-General Count Tolstoy fell, seriously wounded, and the heavy casualties which the infantry were taking caused the attack momentarily to falter. Colonel Panioutine, of the 63rd Regiment, on seeing this formed a column of attack on a front of two companies and personally led it forward into the storm of rifle fire. Every fifty yards or so the attacking column lay down for a brief rest before springing up and rushing forward again. Finally, the base of the principal redoubt was reached, and Panioutine led his men into the earthwork, where a savage hand-to-hand fight ensued with the bayonet. Eventually, the Turks fell back to their second position, pursued by the Russian infantry. Giving them no time to regroup, Panioutine, the regimental flag in his hand, was the first over the top.

Meanwhile Skobelev had personally led forward his centre while on the left the Bulgarian Legion stormed the tumuli. In the chaotic fighting which followed the Turkish units broke, and retreated, some towards Shipka and the rest in the direction of Kazanlik. Vessil, his nerve now completely gone, sent forward an officer with a white flag, surrendering his entire force to Skobelev without attempting to negotiate any conditions.

It was an utterly spineless decision. In the east, his forces were still holding their own against Mirsky, while in the centre Radetzky’s attack had quickly run into difficulty. Advancing down the narrow road from the Shipka Pass, the attackers could only move five or six abreast. Preparations for the attack had been concealed by the thick mist, and the leading troops almost at once carried the first line of entrenchments. The attackers, however, were exposed to the cross fire of 22 battalions, 10 mortars and two batteries of howitzers, and the defenders threw hand grenades into the tightly packed masses of Russian infantry with deadly effect. Making a supreme effort, Radetzky’s men stormed the second line of trenches, but could make no impression on the third, suffering fearful casualties. Pinned down in the position which they had reached, the Russians had lost more than 1,700 men in the space of three hours.

However, although immediately unsuccessful, Radetzky’s attack had had the effect of concentrating Vessil’s attention on his centre, which he at first took to be the main focus of the assault. Half his army and almost all his artillery was engaged in the defence of this part of his position, and it was only when his left flank began to disintegrate under Skobelev’s attack that he realised his peril, upon which he panicked. Had he pulled back his troops facing Radetzky, he could probably have forced a way through to the southward, saving at least part of his army.

As it was, 12,000 men immediately in Skobelev’s front surrendered at Shenovo. Steps were immediately taken to disarm them, while Skobelev sent Stoletov to report to Radetzky. He also insisted that Vessil send an immediate order to the rest of his army to lay down their arms, an order that was only grudgingly obeyed. When the Turks in Mirsky’s front began to show white flags, Mirsky sent Pfeil off to Skobelev; as the senior officer, he wished to take control of the process of disarming the prisoners. When Pfeil reached Skobelev, he found him on the point of making a triumphal ride on his white horse to thank his troops; Skobelev invited him to accompany him, as his men crowded round their general with deafening shouts. Once this spectacular ride was completed, Skobelev rode with Pfeil to meet with Mirsky.

Prince Nicolai Ivanovich Sviatopolk-Mirsky, of an impeccably aristocratic background, was contemptuous of Russia’s great military hero and thought him an arriviste and a glory hunter, as he told Pfeil:

Prince Mirsky had always the lowest opinion of Skobelev’s character, and said that he was an officer with whom, in time of peace, no one would shake hands. His grandfather was a drummer, and under Catherine II, I know not for what reason, became an officer; and his father, who like himself, was a lieutenant general and aide de camp to the Emperor, had gathered together the whole of his great fortune in Asia and in various high posts which he had held.17

Turkish prisoners on the plains of Shipka. (Russes et Turcs)

Regrettably, Mirsky’s staff reached the unwarranted conclusion that Skobelev had delayed his advance deliberately in the hope that Mirsky would be defeated and Skobelev could then arrive to save the day.

Vessil’s army, when surrendered, consisted of 41 battalions totalling 36,000 men, of whom some 6,000 were sick and wounded. 98 guns, including twelve mortars, were captured. The Russian casualties had, however, been considerable, 1,122 being killed and 4,362 wounded. 1,755 casualties were suffered by Radetzky, while Mirsky’s losses were 2,201 and Skobelev’s 1,528.¹⁸

It had been a spectacular victory, and it has been justly described as inflicting a blow on the Ottoman Empire even more terrible than the fall of Plevna. At a stroke, its last army had been eliminated, and although many thousands of men might still be collected in front of Constantinople, there was no longer any realistic chance that the Russian advance could be halted.