Keeping the Iraqis on the Offensive
DANA PITTARD
WITH REMARKS FROM WES BRYANT
The liberation of Haditha gave hope to the Iraqi people that ISIS could be defeated even within a Sunni-dominated area like Al Anbar Province. The newly elected Iraqi Prime Minister, Haidar al-Abadi, declared Haditha to be a great victory for Iraq.
I knew we needed to keep the Iraqis on the offensive, so we were already planning the next set of operations. Following the victory over Haditha, I met with General Kenani and his staff at the Ministry of Defense.
“We must work our way to re-taking Mosul as soon as possible, sadey,” I told him.
Kenani answered, “Isn’t that a Kurdish problem?”
“No, sadey,” I replied. “Just like the Mosul Dam, it’s an Iraqi problem. We now have momentum, and ISIS is running scared. They are fearful of where the Iraqi Army will strike next. We must relieve the pressure on the Bayji Oil Refinery first, then take back Tikrit, Quyarrah, and on to Mosul and Tal Afar. Then we can retake Fallujah after Mosul is back in Iraqi hands.”
“General Pittard, we need more equipment, vehicles, and weapons before we are in a position to retake Mosul.”
“We will do our best to get you the equipment you need, sadey,” I said, “but the most important thing you have to maintain is the will to fight and defeat ISIS.”
General Kenani nodded. “Of course, general. But we will also need more troops. As you know, over seventy percent of our units are around Baghdad and not even under my command. They are under the command of Lieutenant General Abdul Amir. He is the Baghdad Operations Commander, and he reports directly to the prime minister. If you can help us get Lieutenant General Amir to send us some troops, I think we can support an offensive to the Bayji Oil Refinery.”
Inwardly I rolled my eyes. “Sadey, I will meet with Lieutenant General Abdul Amir and get more troops, but you must continue to plan and focus on Bayji.”
I met with Lieutenant General Abdul Amir at his headquarters on the other side of the Green Zone. He was a powerful man and a well-respected Iraqi military leader among both Sunnis and Shias. Amir introduced me to several Sunni sheiks who’d been fighting alongside his forces and who wanted U.S. airstrikes in support of their local tribal fights against ISIS. Unfortunately, I had to politely refuse because we barely had enough airpower to cover our major operations against ISIS. I recommended that they ask the Iraqi Air Force for support. Lieutenant General Abdul Amir also had good relations with Shia militias.
Amir informed me that the new Iraqi prime minister would only approve his sending Iraqi units to General Kenani if he felt that Baghdad was absolutely secure. I smiled as he spoke; I knew the next thing Lieutenant General Amir would be asking for was airstrikes against ISIS within his area of operations.
Like clockwork, he told me that he could possibly give up an Iraqi Army or Federal Police brigade from Baghdad—if I could help him with airstrikes to push out ISIS forces threatening the outskirts of Baghdad Province to the southwest and southeast of Baghdad.1 He didn’t beat around the bush. Amir showed me his operational plans for securing southwest and southeast Baghdad. They looked pretty sound; however, they would need to be modified by our American operations planners to maximize the effects of our airstrikes.
I had a broader plan—to get the Iraqis to conduct a major offensive against ISIS in Bayji—but supporting offensive ground operations in the greater Baghdad area was proving to be the ticket to that show. We began drawing plans to support the Iraqi Army clearing ISIS fighters from their strongholds in southwest Baghdad, southeast Baghdad, and southeast of Fallujah.
At the same time, other special operations teams were supporting the Peshmerga in northern Iraq. They’d recently taken a key ISIS headquarters compound near the town of Zumar. And the Kurdish Peshmerga, Iranians, and Shia militias had been fighting some very tough battles against ISIS in the towns of Sadiyah and Jalula in northwest Diyala Province. All of this was in addition to the fighting against ISIS in several regions in Syria—the most significant of which was in the town of Kobani near the Syrian-Turkish border.
The senior leadership of ISIS was being forced to react not only to multiple attacks against their fighters in Iraq and Syria, but also to our relentless targeting against them with airstrikes. ISIS had been thrown off balance.
We planned the south Baghdad operation for mid-to-late September. It would be the first real test for the BIAP Strike Cell.
Remarks from Wes Bryant
A few days prior to the kickoff of the first operations of the BIAP Strike Cell, our newly-formed team huddled in the small trailer, talking through various game plans for the upcoming operations. General Pittard coolly walked in. Chatter quickly tapered off into silence as we all turned our attention to the ground commander of Iraq. It was my first time meeting General Pittard, or even seeing him in person.
The general was unpretentious but composed. He was tall, and under the short ceiling seemed even taller. He shook hands with each of us, smiling warmly as he did, and he projected an air of humility and dignity and respect toward all of us that I found comforting. I was relieved, because I typically found myself detesting and wary of officers—especially senior ones.
We listened intently as General Pittard relayed his vision for the BIAP Strike Cell and his operational plans for the first mission. As he spoke, eloquently and intelligently, any doubts I’d previously had in my mind about how well our special operations team might integrate with the general and his staff were completely dispelled.
I knew right then that we were going to get some good work done.
1 Lizzie Dearden, “Isis ‘just one mile from Baghdad’ as al-Qaeda fighters join forces against Syria air strikes,” The Independent, September 29, 2014, accessed April 24, 2018, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/islamic-state-crisis-al-qaeda-fighters-joining-forces-with-isis-against-air-strikes -in-syria-9761392.html.