A Visit from Senator John McCain
DANA PITTARD
Christmas 2014
In November, I moved back to Kuwait from Iraq and resumed my position as the deputy commander of operations for 3rd Army and ARCENT. Major General Paul Funk, with his large and very talented 1st Infantry Division staff, took over as the ground commander of Iraq.
Through mid-to-late December I oversaw the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria from Kuwait while Lieutenant General Terry was in the States. As the holidays approached, I heard a rumor that U.S. Senator John McCain planned to visit Baghdad the day after Christmas to receive a briefing on the status of the fight against ISIS.
There was a bit of a freak-out from the White House to the Pentagon and Central Command. Senator McCain was a harsh critic of President Obama and the general state of the fight against ISIS up to that point.1 He was about to assume the chairmanship of the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee and he was already serving on the Senate Foreign Relations, Homeland Security, and Government Relations Committees.
Major General Funk had assumed command in Baghdad, but there was concern of the need for a CENTCOM and ARCENT senior leader to be present for the visit. Shortly after getting word of the impending visit, I received a phone call from General Austin.
“Dana, I will not be able to meet with Senator McCain in Iraq due to other commitments,” he spoke in his deep, baritone voice that sounded so much like the voice of Darth Vader. “Can you represent me and CENTCOM in Baghdad?”
“Sir, I think Paul Funk has a pretty good handle on things,” I said. “I would hate to get in his way.”
His tone deepened. “No one has your recent experience or understanding of the fight against ISIS. We need to put our best foot forward with Senator McCain.”
The Force was not with me, by any means. I could literally feel General Austin’s grip on my shoulder from thousands of miles away in his office in Tampa, Florida. When I replied, I felt like I was under the spell of a Jedi mind trick. “Yes, sir. I would be happy to go back to Baghdad and brief the Senator.”
I was a little tired from my nearly two-year deployment that had culminated in a virtual non-stop undertaking to push and support the Iraqi military to conduct offensive operations against ISIS. I’d handed off the reins to an extremely capable and competent commander in Major General Funk, and I’d hoped to spend the holidays decompressing in Kuwait. That was not to be.
Instead, I saluted my commanding officer from afar and prepared to go back to Iraq. I returned to Baghdad on Christmas Eve and spent a relatively quiet Christmas with our troops. I went to meet Senator McCain on the tarmac at the Baghdad Airport the next day.2
I was surprised to see Major General Mike Nagata, commander of the Special Operations Command Central, on the tarmac waiting for the senator’s plane as well. It was the first time I had seen Major General Nagata in Iraq since the Iraq crisis began back in June. Known as a skilled political operator and military leader, Nagata had been spending a lot of time in Washington D.C. trying to sell his New Syrian Forces (NSF) concept which many people, including me, thought was an awful idea.
I’d always had great respect for John McCain. He was an American hero in the flesh. I had first met him in 1998 when I was President Clinton’s military aide. I briefly saw him again in Iraq in 2007. Being a West Point graduate, I’d given him slack about his alma mater, the Naval Academy. I admired McCain’s grit, leadership, and bi-partisan approach over the years, his five years as a POW in North Vietnam, and the fact that he had been a Presidential candidate in 2008.
I stood in the background as Senator McCain came off the plane and met everyone. I was a little surprised at how much he’d aged since I had last seen him in 2007. Still, he appeared to be full of energy and in a good mood. He was smiling as he spoke to us.
We left the tarmac and packed into a little room at the nearby Special Forces compound. About twenty people filled the meeting room—mainly Special Forces officers and sergeants.
It was not a fancy setting. We sat on white plastic chairs and I joined Major General Nagata, one of his brigadier generals, and a colonel around a plastic table with Senator McCain. The senator made his position clear from the start: he wished President Obama and the administration had been more supportive of our efforts against ISIS. I thought it was a little strange to say that as a senator briefing senior military leaders—but I can’t say I disagreed with him.
Major General Nagata and one of his officers addressed the senator. They outlined the special operations role in the fight against ISIS up to that point. They said they wanted more boots on the ground in order to do a more effective job of advising and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces and Sunni tribes.
At that McCain proclaimed, “See, just like I said. I wish you’d gotten more help from the president to defeat ISIS. We should have sent combat troops to fight on the ground.”
Before the meeting, I’d resolved that I would not make any comments while the Special Forces officers briefed. As it turned out, I couldn’t hold back. I had a very different outlook on the state of the fight against ISIS and our best way forward than they did.
I interjected, “Senator McCain, as long as the Iraqi and Kurdish forces are fighting ISIS and getting their own country back, I think we can support them without sending in a large number of U.S. ground troops.”
The Senator appeared unhappy at my comment. Beyond that, he ignored me. He asked the group about upcoming Iraqi operations, saying there was no time to waste because ISIS had to be defeated quickly.
“Actually, time is on our side Senator,” I replied. “Each day we have been getting stronger, and ISIS has been getting weaker.”
I went on to tell him that two of ISIS’ vulnerabilities were that they needed to take over territory in Iraq and Syria to keep up their momentum and prestige, and that they were lousy at governing captured territory. We had effectively stopped most of their capability to carry out the first and, over time, the second vulnerability would require them to use more fighters to secure rear areas and control the populations under their rule. That would take away much-needed fighters from their forward battlegrounds where they faced the anti-ISIS coalition.
Senator McCain took exception to my comments. “Time is on our side?!” he yelled. “How can you say that when there are people being terrorized throughout Syria by ISIS? What are you going to do about that, General Pittard? Who is going to stand up for those innocent people in Syria?!”
I was sure the Special Forces personnel were enjoying watching a U.S. senator try to berate me. I kept my cool. I looked at him but didn’t answer his rhetorical questions. After all, it wasn’t specifically our mission to protect the people of Syria from ISIS. Our mission was to defeat ISIS—which would eventually help both the people of Syria and Iraq.
I let the heat in the room settle down a bit before I replied. “The campaign against ISIS will take a lot of time. We don’t want to rush to failure.”
That only seemed to agitate Senator McCain. His face reddened, and he grumbled something that probably wasn’t complimentary. The short briefing ended before he was able to let loose on me again, but I wasn’t out of the fire yet. I still had to go on a helicopter ride with him to the embassy.
Senator McCain said goodbye to Major General Nagata and the Special Forces staff. He and I walked with our assistants over to the tarmac and boarded the helicopters to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. During the seven-minute flight from the Baghdad airport to the embassy, I tried to build some rapport with him. I pointed out the old U.S. Camp Victory and Al Faw Palace where we’d once housed more than 60,000 troops during the “surge” in 2007.
He looked and nodded his head, but he didn’t offer any comments.
Once we arrived at the U.S. Embassy, Major General Paul Funk, U.S. Ambassador Stuart Jones, and I all met with Senator McCain at the ambassador’s residence. We intended to give the senator a briefing on the overall fight against ISIS in Syria and Iraq.
I used what we called a “placemat slide” to brief the senator. I put a single, large slide the size of a placemat on his lap and then went over our strategy and the current state of operations. I emphasized how the Iraqis and Kurds had successfully begun the counteroffensive against ISIS with strong support from our strike cells and coalition airpower.
He appeared to be impressed, but he was still skeptical.
“You act as if we are beating back ISIS. We are losing this fight!” he declared.
I looked at Major General Funk, and we both looked back at Senator McCain and smiled.
“No, Senator, we have placed ISIS on the defensive in Iraq. The Iraqis and Kurds are conducting offensive operations and beginning to regain territory. It will take years to defeat ISIS, but I think we are seeing major progress.”
McCain’s face reddened again. “Why don’t you ask for more American ground forces?” he said. “Don’t you need more forces to fight ISIS here? We had over a hundred-and-fifty-thousand troops in Iraq at the height of the surge in 2007.”
“Over time, we may need more troops to advise, assist, and train the Iraqi Security Forces,” I replied, “but I don’t think we would ever need more than about five thousand. This is a different fight than back in 2007. I was here in Iraq at that time. The Iraqis and Kurds must now take back their own country, with the help of the coalition. We now have strike cells—that are pretty impressive—to support the Iraqi Security Forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga.”
My low troop figures did not seem to fit McCain’s pre-conceived notions on how to fight a war. He insisted we needed a massive U.S. ground force in Iraq. He raised his voice at me and exclaimed, “If you really wanted to win, you would use every advantage that American military power offers—and that is with U.S. troops on the ground!”
I responded calmly. “We will defeat ISIS in time, and it will be with indigenous forces. Then the victory against ISIS will mean much more because the Iraqi Army, the Kurds, the Sunni tribes, the Shia militias, and others will have done it themselves—only with our assistance. We don’t need a massive U.S. troop presence on the ground to defeat ISIS.”
The Senator scoffed at that. He reconfirmed, “We are not winning!”
I bent forward from my seat next to him. I looked the man directly in the eyes. “That is simply not true, Senator,” I said firmly. “The counteroffensive against ISIS began almost a year earlier than most military ‘experts’ thought possible. Our advisors and strike cells are making a huge difference. ISIS is now facing pressure from at least fifteen different battlefronts in Syria and Iraq. ISIS is losing and, yes, we are making significant progress.”
I kept my eyes on his, and he scowled at me.
“Humph…I’ll see what the Iraqis and Kurds themselves tell me later today and tomorrow.”
Senator McCain spent the rest of the day meeting with senior Iraqi and Kurdish political and military leaders.
That evening, I was invited to join Senator McCain at the ambassador’s residence for dinner. Because of the intensity of the morning’s discourse with the senator, I thought of declining the invitation, but I ended up attending anyway. To my dismay, the ambassador seated me right next to McCain, putting me in the hot seat again.
I was greatly surprised when, before the first course was served, Senator McCain went out of his way to publicly apologize to me for his negative attitude and remarks earlier that day. He announced that he’d since spoken to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and many Iraqi senior leaders, and that they all thought ISIS was losing. He was far humbler than before as he proclaimed that we needed to tell the American people about the great progress we were making.
“Thank you, General Pittard—for setting me straight,” he added.
“You are welcome, sir,” I said, relieved.
I was extremely impressed that the senator publicly acknowledged his mistakes. John McCain was a powerful and respected leader who listened. That was a rare commodity. Even more important, he was a man of honor and dignity who cared about our troops and loved and served our country. I felt honored to interact with him.
The next day I received a phone call from Lieutenant General Terry back in the States. “What the hell did you do with Senator McCain yesterday?”
“Sir,” I said, “it was not the most pleasant day of briefings, but what do you mean?”
“The Washington Post and a lot of news outlets are reporting that John McCain just gave a news conference in Iraq in which he changed his view on the fight against ISIS. He now supports President Obama’s efforts! He said Iraq is heading in the right direction in the political and security spheres—especially in fighting Daesh. He praised our efforts against ISIS!”
In later months Senator McCain would renew his call for more boots on the ground and a U.S. troop surge, but at least we were able to show him that we were making significant progress against ISIS.3
Our support for Iraqi Army and Kurdish Peshmerga offensive operations continued and increased. By January 2015, under the leadership of Major General Paul Funk and the 1st Infantry Division along with the work of our special operations forces, an average of 1,000 ISIS fighters were being killed each month by our airstrikes. The month of February 2015 saw an estimated 2,000+ ISIS fighters killed.
When the Iraq crisis first kicked off in the summer of 2014, no one had expected our small team to get the fight against ISIS started so early. No one thought we would be able to force ISIS on the defensive so soon…but we did. There would still be some dark days ahead and tough fighting over the next three years, but ISIS as a state would eventually be defeated in Iraq by early 2018. All in all, I was very proud of what we collectively accomplished to stop the ISIS offensive juggernaut.