After the Caliphate
DANA PITTARD
The fight against ISIS was fundamentally different than the counterinsurgency operations conducted by the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq previously. Specifically, with ISIS’ claim of establishing its own state—its caliphate—and seizing territory from existing nations.
On the battlefield, the territory-owning caliphate made ISIS an easier target for us than if it had simply remained a terrorist organization with no intention of establishing its own state. From the U.S. military’s perspective, waging war against the ISIS “state” within territory it took from Iraq and Syria played to our strengths. The U.S. military is very good at overrunning enemy states and nations.
ISIS’ success in seizing so much land so quickly in 2014 served it well on social media and enhanced its coveted international image that the new threat of ISIS was a force to be reckoned with. The fact remains, however, that ISIS simply did not have the capability to adequately defend its newly won territory, and ISIS leaders were never really prepared to provide sustainable governance to large and diverse populations in their newly captured lands.
The coalition’s comprehensive campaign against ISIS on the ground—its targeting of their leaders, finances, and governance as well as the information campaign to deny ISIS’ Islamic legitimacy—contributed to weakening and defeating the ISIS caliphate. By placing immense pressure on ISIS in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, and elsewhere, the U.S. and anti-ISIS forces quickly put ISIS on the defensive. Now, ISIS’ capability to govern, seize new territory, or even attack areas outside of the Middle East, has become extremely limited.
After the Defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria
What should happen after ISIS’ defeat? Our strategic end-state has continued to be murky. There are major questions that have still not been answered:
· What is the government, populace, and infrastructure in Iraq and Syria supposed to look like after the defeat of ISIS?
· In a post-ISIS Iraq, will the U.S.-led coalition ensure the Shia-dominated Iraqi government in Baghdad respects the rights of the Sunni minority population?
· In a post-ISIS Syria, will the U.S.-led coalition, as well as both Russia and Iran, press the Assad Regime to power-share and respect the rights of the Syrian Sunni majority population?
· What happens to the Syrian Kurds (YPG), who were crucial to ISIS’ defeat—considering Turkey, Russia, and Syria generally view the Kurds as enemies?
· How can we possibly achieve our operational intent or end-state in Iraq and Syria without, in some way, cooperating with Iran and Russia?
ISIS’ establishment of a caliphate is significant. The concept of an Islamic caliphate resonated with many Muslims both in the Middle East and throughout the world. It brought forth echoes of the past from the first thousand years of Islam’s existence. Accordingly, some believed it was the duty of all Muslims to support the caliphate. Fortunately, most governments throughout the Arab Middle East vehemently denounced the very idea of an ISIS “caliphate.”
However, the ideas of ISIS were initially supported by many Sunnis throughout the Middle East. This was because the movement was anti-Assad in Syria and anti-Shia in Iraq—opposing the Iranian influence and the Shia-led Iraqi government. The root causes that helped fuel the rise of ISIS in the Sunni areas of Iraq and Syria must still be addressed.
The iron-fisted policies of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki between 2010 and 2014 caused many Iraqi Sunnis to become disenchanted with the Shia-led Iraqi government in Baghdad. The Sunni provinces in Iraq ultimately became breeding grounds of support for ISIS. The Iraqi government must develop a more even-handed policy with the Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish provinces. It must do a better job in reaching out to disenfranchised Sunni minority populations. Perhaps the Iraqi government in Baghdad should consider allowing more independence to the Sunni provinces similar to what they currently give the Kurdish region.
Iraq will also need significant monetary assistance from nations throughout the world to help rebuild its infrastructure in a post-ISIS environment. Additionally, the U.S.-led coalition partners and Iran must support security sector reform among all the Iraqi Security Forces.
In Syria, there is little doubt that the unfair policies of Bashar al-Assad and his Alawite minority regime enacted against the Sunni-majority population were one of the main causes of the Syrian Civil War. His government’s actions propelled ISIS in Syria. Though the Syrian government appears to be winning the civil war, a brokered peace is desirable in which the Syrian regime remains—ideally without Bashar al-Assad—but shares power with the Sunni majority population.
Russia and Iran must be a part of the conversation of this future brokered peace. Some level of compromise and cooperation between Russia, Iran, and our Sunni Arab allies will be essential in creating stability in a post-ISIS era both in Syria and Iraq.
The single most important strategic objective in the region, though, must be to help end the Sunni-Shia schism and the veritable proxy war that exists between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran. That proxy war has been helping to fuel conflicts throughout the region—to include Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and potentially Bahrain. The proxy war has also fueled a huge and dangerous arms race in the Middle East. It is time for normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran and an end to the proxy war that has helped to spawn, or at least support, ISIS and worldwide Islamic terrorism.
Radical Islamic Terrorism Will Continue After the Caliphate
By the beginning of 2018, with the loss of its largest city of Mosul in Iraq and its capital of Ar Raqqa in Syria, ISIS as a state and caliphate was essentially defeated on the ground. This was the result of the combined efforts of a U.S.-led coalition as well as anti-ISIS forces from the Iraqi Security Forces, Sunni tribes, Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, Turkey, Iran, Russia, and the Syrian Army.
Unfortunately, ISIS may become even more dangerous to the U.S. and the West as a terrorist organization without a “state.” The military defeat of ISIS will not end the threat of radical Islamic terrorism or the jihadist movement to the Middle East, the West, or America. ISIS will continue to coordinate and carry out terrorist activities. And it will re-form and survive in places like Libya, Somalia, Afghanistan, and other failed states.
If there is to be peace in the Middle East in a post-ISIS era, America and her allies must remain firmly engaged in the region. We have seen what can happen when the United States leaves an unstable area too early. Our exodus from Iraq in 2011 is perhaps the most palpable example.
Similar to what happened with al-Qaeda, ISIS will be made less militarily relevant over the next several years. But we must continue to keep the pressure on, so their leaders spend more time focused on personal safety and evading the U.S. and its coalition partners than planning and overseeing attacks.
The U.S. must maintain a military and diplomatic presence in Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Afghanistan, and other selected countries in the Middle East. We should consider, as well, establishing a small semi-permanent base in the Kurdish area of northeastern Syria. President Trump’s call for removal of U.S. troops from Syria in early 2019 may have been both unwise and premature. Time will tell. But we must continue to maintain and enhance worldwide cooperation and collaboration against terrorism.
Hope for the Future
In June of 2014, ISIS seemed nearly unstoppable. Then, a small group of Americans and their coalition partners, backed by U.S. and coalition airpower, supported anti-ISIS forces on the ground and changed the myth of ISIS invincibility forever. A relatively small group of professionals helped sow the seeds of a larger campaign waged by the United States and an anti-ISIS coalition that eventually hunted down and defeated the ISIS caliphate in Iraq and Syria.
What that small group of dedicated Americans accomplished in a relatively short period of time could one day become a model for how the U.S. could support partner nations in the future without committing a large military footprint on the ground. We hope and pray that the hard-fought combat lessons from 2014, and the successes and setbacks of our fight against ISIS throughout the region since, will be heeded in the future.