It may seem clear enough why the Tlaxcalans welcomed back the Spaniards: they hated the Mexicans, they were sworn allies of Cortés. But this is too great a simplification. It suggests they were so short-sighted that they were ready to surrender their independence in order to be avenged on the Mexicans. But could they have been so muddle-headed? To defeat an enemy but lose to a friend the very thing they were fighting the enemy to retain, would have been too stupid.
The true explanation is that the Tlaxcalans had from the beginning an overriding motive for submitting to the Spaniards. When Cortés had first marched in from the coast, they had tested him to ascertain whether he was the divinity he was alleged to be, and they came to the conclusion that he was. Since that was so, prophecy declared him the future ruler of the country. He would become the ruler, whether they helped him or not. In joining him as allies, they were not surrendering their independence, for that was fated to end, but insuring a favoured treatment for themselves. So firmly were they convinced of his divinity, that the sight of him famished and battered on their frontier did not affect his reputation. What he had achieved in Mexico, Montezuma’s surrender to him, the whole extraordinary adventure, had been followed by them with the greatest admiration. No one had denied his identity with Quetzalcoatl. His misfortunes were of a passing kind. He would continue and prove the prophecy correct. It was delightful that he had appealed to them for help. His entry into Mexico without the army they had offered him had been a great disappointment. Now he would have use for their army; they would earn his gratitude and, when all others suffered tribulation, they would profit by his indulgence.
The Tlaxcalan assumption that Cortés would return to Mexico at the head of their army no doubt influenced him in coming to a decision on his next step. When in defeat he was fleeing for shelter to Tlaxcala, the best he could have hoped for was to reach the coast in safety. Now at Tlaxcala he was in a much stronger position than had he gone to Vera Cruz. To get at him the Mexicans would have to undertake the full scale invasion of an independent state. If the Tlaxcalans had always been able to repulse such invasions by themselves, with his assistance the task would be yet easier. His communications with Vera Cruz were intact. He could obtain reinforcements and military stores. His great weakness was the loss of his money. However, he had saved something of Montezuma’s treasure. Given time he saw ways of rebuilding his strength. His original objection to using the Tlaxcalan army no longer was valid. He would not be representing himself henceforth as a peaceful envoy of Charles V. His re-entry into Mexican territory would be that of an undisguised invader. To take the capital by assault would be a great feat of arms, but with the Tlaxcalan army it should not be impossible. In a broad view he saw that his position was sounder now, because better defined, than it had been when, both Montezuma’s gaoler and his prisoner, he never knew from one day to another precisely how he stood.
What occurred between the arrival of the Spaniards at Tlaxcala on 12th July 1520 and their departure for Mexico on December 28th, five and a half months later, can be shortly given. After about a month in Tlaxcala, by which time most of his men had recovered from their wounds, Cortés thought it essential to strengthen his lines of communication with the coast. On the Orizaba route, the shortest and best, there were some towns with Mexican garrisons. Spaniards going by this route had been robbed and killed. He decided to seize the towns. Marching from Tlaxcala with all his men and 2,000 Tlaxcalan auxiliaries, he made a sudden descent and took them. To secure the route for the future he built a fortified post which he called Segura de la Frontera. From there he raided certain other Mexican towns south of the route. Satisfied that he could now bring up men and supplies from Vera Cruz without risk, he returned to Tlaxcala to make his preparations for invading the valley of Mexico.
During this time some events of importance had occurred. Smallpox, hitherto unknown in Mexico, broke out. The infection had been introduced by a negro in Narváez’s army. A terrible epidemic was the result. Thousands of Mexicans died, including Montezuma’s successor Cuitlahuac. The severity of the epidemic, the death of the head of the state, and the highly ominous character of such disasters explain why the Mexicans were less active against Cortés than might have been expected. Cuitlahuac was succeeded by Quauhtemoctzin (Lord Falling Eagle). Bernal describes him as ‘a young man of about twenty-five years, very much of a gentleman and extremely brave. His wife was one of Montezuma’s daughters, a very pretty woman.’
Between August and November 1520, several ships called at Vera Cruz, some sent for Narváez by Velázquez, who did not yet know that he was Cortés’ prisoner. They contained men, horses, powder, etc. The authorities at Vera Cruz seized each in turn and sent Cortés the men and everything else of use on board. By further good luck a large ship arrived from Spain, a private trading venture. It carried quantities of powder, muskets, and crossbows. In this case Cortés bought the entire cargo. These windfalls raised his army to nearly five hundred and supplied it with munitions of war.
The money required for this purchase, as well as heavy expenses which Cortés incurred by sending envoys to the Viceregal court in Hispaniola, and fresh envoys to the court of Spain, leads Bernal to make some sarcastic remarks about his methods of raising funds. He accuses him of forcing his poor soldiers to disgorge the gold which he had allowed them to take from the heap of treasure at the last moment in Mexico. Bernal had a tremendous admiration for his Captain-General as a commander in the field, but thought him downright mean where money was concerned. Cortés, however, had to have money to carry on the conquest. That he was able to get it out of his men shows they still believed that he would make them rich in the end. When the conquest was over, Bernal found himself still a poor man, but Cortés had become enormously wealthy. Bernal’s complaint, constantly repeated, is that had it not been for the indomitable valour and endurance of the rank and file, Cortés could have done nothing. But grumbling of this sort is characteristic of old soldiers, and we like Bernal the better for it.
As part of his plan for the campaign against Mexico, Cortés directed that timber be felled for building thirteen sloops. The Mexicans had thousands of canoes. We have seen how they harassed the Spaniards on the causeways. They also served to provision the city and carry troops to the mainland. Cortés regarded sloops as the answer to the canoes. He had an excellent shipwright. Nails and tools were sent for to Vera Cruz. The Tlaxcalans provided the labour and offered to carry the sloops in sections the fifty miles to Tetzcuco, where they could be fitted together and launched. At this time one of the senior lords of the federation died of smallpox. There had been some dissensions in the Council on how far to support Cortés, and this old lord on his death-bed solemnly warned his colleagues that to withhold support would be a grave error. Bernal makes him say: ‘You must always be most careful to do what Malintzin tells you, for he is certainly the one destined by fate to govern the country.’
Accordingly, when in the latter part of December 1520 Cortés declared his intention of re-entering the valley of Mexico, the federation placed a contingent of 10,000 men at his disposal. A review was held and on the day after Christmas the army marched to its first objective, the capture of Tetzcuco on the great lake. The number of Spanish soldiers is given by Cortés as 40 horse and 450 foot, the latter including 80 crossbowmen and musketeers. There were 8 or 9 field guns. The sloops were to be sent when ready.