Organized Crime and Racketeering
Sam Goodman’s experiences as a “good thief” and especially as a business fence brought him into repeated contact and dealings with individuals and operations connected to syndicated, mafia-style organized crime. More specifically, Sam had frequent business and social dealings (via the “local clique” or gambling club) with criminal entrepreneurs connected to cosa nostra elements, the American mafia, which had a substantial presence both in American City and in Tylers ville. Throughout our discussion, we refer interchangeably to cosa nostra or mafia to indicate traditional Italian-American organized crime elements having historic or current ties to “La Cosa Nostra” syndicates. Considerable ambiguity exists in many U.S. localities (including American City and Tylersville) in sorting out (1) the “reality” of the mafia versus its “reputation,” (2) the “tie” between a particular entrepreneur and a mafia group, and (3) the current strength of a Mafia network as distinct from the group’s historical stature.
Sam, of course, was not a “made” member of the local mafia network (his non-Italian ethnicity prevented membership even if he had wanted it), but he looked at them with a mixture of wariness, respect, and sometimes envy. This chapter examines what we can learn about organized crime from Sam’s experience.
Organized crime is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon that is difficult to define and analyze. It refers very broadly to the general organization of the underworld, more narrowly to the groups within its economy that plan and execute elaborate, sustained criminal activities. We use the narrower meaning here. Relative to other kinds of crime groups (e.g., a burglary crew), law enforcement practitioners and social scientists typically define an organized-crime group as (1) having some manner of formalized structure whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities; and (2) tending to dominate specific crime markets or enterprises in particular locations and to maintain its position through use of actual or threatened violence, corruption, and extortion.
Two views of Italian-American organized crime emerged during the 1960s and 1970s. The first view is identified with sociologist Donald Cressey, the second with sociologist Joseph Albini and anthropologist Francis Ianni. In recent years the enterprise model of organized crime has been proposed as an alternative to both the Cressey and Ianni views. But, as we discuss below, it is better seen as a complementary rather than a competing framework.
The view that organized crime (including Italian-American organized crime) is synonymous with the mafia or La Cosa Nostra stemmed partly from the latter’s strength and influence when compared to other crime groups. It also is shaped by the picture of organized crime that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s—especially the disclosures of the Kefauver and McClellan Senate Committees’ investigations that first directed national attention toward organized crime. Public fascination with the mafia also has been strong. Books, movies, and television series have represented the “Mob” as something akin to what is depicted in “The Godfather.” In the everyday language of the police, the press, and popular opinion, organized crime referred to a tightly knit group of Italian men who ran a business whose structure was reminiscent of feudal relationships. This perception mandated law enforcement’s focus on that group. Indeed, legislation used to counter organized crime, notably the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, was designed with cosa nostra in mind.
Donald Cressey (1967) agreed with the traditional view of cosa nostra as a nationwide criminal network and the most powerful of organized crime groups in America that had, to some extent, taken the form of a corporation. However, Cressey rejected the alien conspiracy view that the mafia is an international organization that controls organized crime, particularly in the United States. The American mafia “is not merely the Sicilian Mafia transplanted,” Cressey wrote, but “the similarities between the two organizations are direct and too great to be ignored” (ibid.:8). Cosa nostra is said to be characterized by four key features:
“family” structure with graded ranks of authority from boss to soldiers;
bosses who oversee the activities of family members and associates;
families (and their spin-off mafia networks) that are linked through understandings, obligations, and shared membership in or identification with cosa nostra; and
a “commission” of bosses that handles interfamily relations and disputes.
A very different rendition of Italian-American organized crime was offered by anthropologist Francis Ianni, based on his observations of one specific crime “family” in Brooklyn (around 1970). Ianni (1975) concluded that Italian-American organized crime does exist, but cosa nostra or mafia does not. Moreover, rather than a hierarchical structure, Italian organized crime consists of more or less organized local criminal groups held together by cultural attitudes and kinship webs peculiar to the Italian scene.
Sociologist Joseph Albini (1971) complements Ianni’s view, arguing that patron-client relationships are the key to understanding Italian-American organized crime in the United States. The patron-client relationship is based on an unbalanced exchange of favors, involving differences in power and obligation. The “patron” (or mafioso) is able to perform favors on behalf of a “client” such as providing economic aid, vital information, protection from the police, contacts, or ensuring that other criminals will not jeopardize his operations. He (the patron) acts as a power broker between the client and the wider society, both legitimate and illegitimate. The client, in return, rewards the patron with money, a “piece of the action,” loyalty, or other forms of support—thus making the relationship reciprocal.(We see aspects of this patron-client partnering, for example, in Sam’s dealings with mafia figures.)
In sharp contrast to Cressey, the Ianni/Albini approach does not acknowledge the existence of clear-cut roles and relationships coordinated by higher positions and a “shadow government” that includes a “commission,” nor does it acknowledge a national network of crime families. Instead, Italian-American organized crime (and organized crime more generally) is characterized as a series of informal, flexible, and overlapping patron-client relationships. A criminal syndicate does not exist that has a structure independent of its activities and current personnel.
Organized crime is also often described, alternatively, as an “enterprise,” that is, as a business activity that represents a deviant variation on legitimate activity. The enterprise framework is useful, and it is not at all at odds, as some commentators suggest, with hierarchical or patron-client models of organized crime. All organized crime is entrepreneurial and is shaped by market forces (Steffensmeier and Martens 2002). One key difference is that the enterprise approach focuses more on how crime activities are organized (e.g., a drug smuggling operation, a bookmaking business, an auto theft/resale operation), whereas the hierarchical and patron-client network approaches focus more on how crime groups are organized.
Cressey and Ianni both erred in viewing Italian organized crime as a unitary phenomenon. Cressey incorrectly equated Italian organized crime with cosa nostra, while Ianni mistakenly denied the existence of cosa nostra, and failed to recognize the hierarchical structure and “shadow government” of some Italian crime groups (including the one he studied). Ianni’s kinship or patron-client treatment is significant because it offers a modified view of cosa nostra and points to a form of Italian organized crime that is distinct from cosa nos-tra groups. The patron-client framework is important for another reason, as we discuss later, in that it provides a useful way of characterizing crime part-nerships and network alliances in criminal enterprise more generally.
Though analytically distinct, the two forms of Italian organized crime often overlap, thrive side by side, and cooperate and compete in many localities (in American City and Orchard Grove, for example, but less so in Tylers ville where traditional cosa nostra elements dominate). The non-cosa nostra Italian groups often draw upon mafia reputation and contacts. In practice, it often is difficult to distinguish mafia-affiliated activities from those generated by non-mafia but Italian racketeering groups. This is even more the case today as traditional cosa nostra elements (but not necessarily Italian crime networks) have weakened. Citizens, law enforcement, and criminals tend to ascribe “mafia” status to Italian racketeers whether affiliated with cosa nostra or not. In this sense, the term “mafioso” or “mafia guy” aptly refers not only to members and associates of a formal criminal association, but also to individuals who are part of Italian-based crime networks held together by traditional bonds of honor, kinship, and instrumental friendships
Today, perhaps a third recognizable group falls in between these two depictions of Italian-American organized crime. This possibility is strongly suggested by Sam’s narrative. There are persons or networks having a historic association with cosa nostra, but not necessarily current ties with them, such as the Gucci network in American City. That is, there may be a continuum of ties to cosa nostra among Italian-American crime networks: strong cosa nostra ties on the one end and few, if any, cosa nostra ties on the other end, with other Italian crime networks falling somewhere in between.
Confessions suggests a number of conclusions about the relationships between organized crime and other illicit entrepreneurs, professional criminals, corrupt or complicitous officials, and the larger underworld (see also Abadinsky 1994). First, a single member of an organized crime network (1) is likely to have an extensive criminal portfolio as well as (2) an extensive network of informants and connections, and is likely to be (3) the center of, and act as a catalyst or broker for, a large amount of criminal activity (examples in Confessions are Angelo, Louie, Phil, Lenny, and Amato). These features may sometimes characterize other illicit entrepreneurs (e.g., to a lesser degree, Sam), many of whom will have at least some ties to the local “mob” but operate mostly independently.
A mafioso controls certain resources or has contacts with people who do. More than anything else, he is able to put a client “in touch with the right people”; in doing so he acts as a broker or layer in between. In this way, too, a mafioso (and his family or network) may dominate a particular geographic area or enterprise. As described by organized crime expert Howard Abadinsky, an important mafioso will have available
a network of informants and connections, for example, with the police and other officials, as well as specialized criminal operatives such as papermen (persons who convert stolen “paper,” for example, stocks, bonds, checks, into cash), torches (professional arsonists), muscle-men or leg-breakers, and enforcers. He is in a position to fence large amounts of stolen goods or to lend out various amounts of money at usurious interest—loansharking. He will act as a center for information (providing targets for professional burglars, for example), “license” criminal activities (for example, allow a high-stakes dice game to operate), and use his position to assist criminals in linking up for specialized operations (for example, finding a driver for a robbery or hijack team), (ibid.:27)
Indeed, a major operational difference between a cosa nostra mafioso and other illicit entrepreneurs (including non-mafia Italian racketeers) is his greater connections and more extensive network. Rather than being confined to the local area or to specific criminal enterprises, mafia members or associates are more likely to have connections extending considerably beyond local boundaries and covering a broader range of criminal activities.
Second, professional criminals and illicit entrepreneurs who are independent operatives may pay financial tribute to, or do “favors” for, an organized crime member (or associate) or group, indicating appreciation or “respect” (ibid.). Rooted partly in fear but more in quid pro quo, this show of respect both protects criminal operatives from violence from a mafioso and enables them to secure vital information and other assistance, such as contact referral or intervention if arrested.
Third, to be successful, each member of a local syndicate or organized crime network (from boss down to a soldier to an associate) must display an interest in and talent for cultivating relationships with strategic persons, keeping well informed, providing services, and enhancing power and income. Since doing these deeds requires considerable time and energy, organized crime criminals usually steer clear of conventional schedules but remain free to “hang around” to pick up and disseminate important information. Somewhat like the family physician or bondsman, they are “on call.” Moreover, because building and preserving a crime network or reputation is an ongoing and inherently fragile process, ineptness or inactivity (e.g., imprisonment, semiretirement) can quickly weaken or wreck the network.
Fourth, whether the structure of the group is hierarchical or patron-client, syndicate members can be characterized as entrepreneurs on the prowl who more or less make money any way they can (although some activities like drug distribution may be off limits, depending on the views of the member or group). They stitch together partnerships and small, fluid networks for specific criminal endeavors or “enterprises.” These may be rather amorphous in structure and characterized by considerable opportunism. This fluidity, however, does not negate the overall permanence of the network ties and involvement of key entrepreneurs that often prevails across criminal ventures or ongoing criminal enterprises.
Fifth, most members or elements of a syndicate group or “local clique”— whether a mafioso, professional criminal, or illicit entrepreneur—identify with each other as a subculture and develop a long-standing careerist attitude toward a criminal lifestyle. Mutual economic interests, evasion of the law, and often the prison experience bind them together. They may combine business interests with their racketeering or criminal activity, but they tend to be full-time career criminals who would rarely be considered community leaders (even though they may be “respected”). On the other hand, some organized criminals are businessmen first, who dabble heavily in illegal activities and then plow their illicit gains back into their legitimate businesses. These “racketeer-businessmen” may be seen as respected community leaders. Indeed, one mafioso described by Sam was s elected for an “Outstanding Community Leader” award. Still others may fall somewhere along the continuum depending on circumstance and stage of the life cycle—for example, tending to become more “businessman” than “criminal” as they age.
In Confessions, examples depict the presence of varied forms of Italian organized crime, the considerable variability in organized crime from one locality to another, the dynamic nature of organized crime, and the significance of a particular mafioso or criminal entrepreneur as a hub of criminal activity. Important specifics include the following.
First, organized crime in American City in the 1950s was dominated by Jewish and Italian elements. The Italian element consisted of at least two mafia families, one headquartered in Franklintown and the other in Ocean-town, and involved a number of mostly independent Italian operators or net-works as well (e.g., the Gucci group). Today, the Jewish influence has tapered off considerably, although several Jewish racketeers—with ties going back to the “old Jewish mob”—continue to be important players in the local rackets.
By the early-1960s, Italian organized crime elements (already major players in the 1950s) increasingly dominated the rackets in American City. Their influence remained strong well into the 1990s. Key Italian racketeers (e.g., Angelo, Louie, Phil, Nicky) had strong ties with cosa nostra groups (e.g., in Oceantown) but also operated independently in many endeavors. Other Italian racketeers operated largely independent of cosa nostra but dealt with them on a guarded quid pro quo basis—and these types of racketeers became more predominant into the 1990s.
The decline in cosa nostra influence reflects, among other factors, the death or aging of key members and close associates (e.g., Mario, Angelo’s father) and the aggressive enforcement against mafia elements not only in American City but also in major localities like Oceantown. That enforcement weakened cosa nostra elements and obstructed efforts to dominate or gain reentry into the local rackets. There is an interesting historical twist here. Whereas in the past the police often stymied competition and protected mafia interests by raiding “outlaw” operations, the aggressive police action aimed at cosa nostra today is opening up racketeering opportunities for other groups (although this may be changing with the switch of many FBI and other law enforcement agents to combating terrorism). Finally, because the two main forms of Italian organized crime overlap so much (and are now at times morphing into an unsettled in-between form), it is difficult to currently assess the balance of influence between mafia and Italian but non-mafia elements in American City, as well as to assess the independence of mafiosi and racketeers with historic ties to cosa nostra elements.
Second, by comparison, Tylersville was a one-mob town from the 1950s to the mid-1980s, dominated by two Italian racketeers—at least one of whom, Sammy Terrano, was a “made man.” There were some independent racketeers and gambling operatives in Tylersville, but they frequently paid “tribute” to the Terrano group (e.g., by entering into business partnerships with him) or steered their involvement toward illicit activities unrelated to the Terrano organization. Following Terrano’s death in the early 1980s, a number of his key lieutenants of Italian descent (e.g., Freddie Amato, Bucky Travis) and a key Middle Eastern associate, Ben Silas, carved up his territory. Although they benefit from a “mafia” reputation and maintain strong linkages with cosa nostra elements (e.g., in Oceantown and Franklintown), these mostly Italian racketeers apparently do not have allegiance to a particular cosa nostra group. In this sense, again, the traditional influence of cosa nostra has been weakened, but the overall influence of Italian organized crime remains considerable.
Ben Silas has longstanding ties to the old Terrano network. His involvement reflects the growing Lebanese (or Middle Eastern) presence in Tylersville and the increasing number of Middle Eastern entrepreneurs involved in a range of local businesses, legitimate as well as quasi-legitimate. There also is evidence of some other groups (Russians, Sicilians, Dominicans) becoming more active in criminal enterprises in Tylersville. There are at least a few “nonethnics” who have been involved for a long time but they are a clear minority.
Third, Italian, non-mafia racketeers have been major players in the rackets of American City and in other localities familiar to Sam both recently and in the past. Their presence and strength depend on the unique history of the specific area, the influence and reach of cosa nostra, and the contacts, resources, size, and reputation of the non-cosa nostra group—particularly its capacity to co-opt the law and corrupt public officials. Italian racketeers who achieve leeway from the law have little to fear from competing crime groups, even cosa nostra. Thus, a key point is that present and future assessments of the American mafia must take into account: (1) not only cosa nostra as traditionally defined, but also the longstanding presence of non-mafia networks dominated by Italian involvement and influence, along with (2) the recent expansion of these noncosa nostra but mafia-like networks, which may become the dominant form of Italian organized crime in the U.S., if it has not already done so.
Important examples are the Caparella clan in the Orchard Grove area and the Gucci group in American City. Both are Italian kin networks that act independently and operate more or less alongside traditional mafia elements. The Caparella group for decades has been involved in gambling, loansharking, extortion, and fencing stolen goods, as well as a whole range of businesses (e.g., restaurants, nightclubs, vending machines, car dealerships, flea markets) and entrepreneurial activities. The Caparellas also sometimes form criminal partnerships with cosa nostra elements or with other local criminal entrepreneurs. Their relationship to the former has been based on “mutual respect”— occasional joint ventures and reciprocal exchanges of favors, but mostly steering clear of each other. The Caparellas’ reputation, influence with law enforcement, and large family size all contribute to their considerable influence and staying power in the Orchard Grove region.
The Gucci family of American City has been involved in gambling, burglary, fencing, bootlegging, and drug trafficking in that city for at least the past several decades. The family includes several brothers, and their sons and relatives. The brothers have been closely associated with Angelo and less closely with other cosa nostra elements. Like the Caparellas, the Gucci brothers operate jointly owned businesses (e.g., vending machine operations, auto repair shops, building supplies), which typically entail partnerships between various family members and their associates. The Gucci group differs from the Caparella clan in catering to cosa nostra operatives and shying away from direct competition with them.
Fourth, Angelo and Louie reveal similar yet contrasting examples of Italian racketeers. Both have extensive criminal portfolios, both own or operate several quasi-legitimate businesses, both are brokers or hubs for a great deal of criminal activity, and both have extensive ties with mafia elements and considerable influence with local law enforcement. However, they differ in some key respects. Angelo had stronger ties with local racketeers and cosa nostra elements, locally as well as nationally. Angelo’s father, Mario, was a major mafia figure in the region and a close friend of ranking mafiosi in other localities. His father’s affiliation provided Angelo with strong cosa nostra ties, but Angelo also had considerable autonomy and essentially ran independent operations. Other relatives of Angelo’s have also been involved in organized crime, including both of his sons and several first cousins (e.g., Phil, Joey Page).
In contrast, Louie was a maverick and more independent, even though he had important connections with cosa nostra elements (mainly through his uncle). Louie also was not part of a kin network extensively involved in orga-nized crime, a circumstance that contributed to the “ending” of Louie’s crime network following his imprisonment in the 1970s. In contrast, Angelo’s oper-ations remain ongoing despite his recent incarceration. While Angelo has been in prison, his sons and cousins have sustained most of his criminal enterprises. With the death of Mario and the weakening of cosa nostra, Angelo and his network have become increasingly independent from cosa nostra in recent years. So, perhaps, Angelo’s network is better characterized today as an Italian but non-cosa nostra organized crime network.
Fifth, both American City and Tylersville have been dominated by a local clique whose “members” form coalitions of partners and associates for carrying on moneymaking schemes with each other and with other criminal or quasi-legitimate entrepreneurs. Each clique member or coalition has its own spider web and sponsors its own mixture of ventures, legal and illegal, while also sometimes working together or investing money with other clique members in joint ventures. These varied business activities (legal as well as illegal) are often an important part of the normal economic life of their local areas. Which member or alliance within the clique holds greater sway in each city depends on strategic contacts, particularly those most influential with city or criminal justice officials. Although the coalitions frequently include mafia involvement, members of the clique and their business associates also engage in independent legal and illegal business enterprises.
Sixth, independent but accommodative relationships existed between professional criminals (e.g., “good thieves”) and organized crime elements. Many professional criminals had friendship or associational ties with members of the local clique, with whom they sometimes formed partnerships for specific illegal ventures. However, the professional criminals in large part operated independently. When Sam and Jesse’s burglary partnership was in full bloom, for example, they stole and sold the merchandise without interference from, or participation with, the mafia or local syndicate. Nevertheless, they occasionally received “tips” (inside information about the burglary target) from local mafiosi, fenced stolen goods through them, and so forth. After Sam became a large-scale dealer in stolen goods, he “massaged” local mafiosi and some clique members by being a “big spender” at gambling events, offering them stolen merchandise at breakeven prices, and so forth. These can be construed loosely as “tribute,” but in another sense they are a quid pro quo for the contacts and other services that Sam derived from his association with the clique.
Seven, American City contrasts with Oceantown, where cosa nostra power and influence remains strong. For example, Sam noted that the mafia still dominated Oceantown’s shipping docks and airports. This contrast may represent a difference between the large urban centers that are the central location or “headquarters” for the mafia families and the more distant cities, where overseeing and controlling “mafia” members or associates is difficult, and has evaporated or become more tenuous over time.
Finally, from Sam’s description, there seems to be a loose network of Italian and non-Italian racketeers and quasi-legitimate entrepreneurs in American City, Orchard Grove, and Tylersville who make up a kind of umwelt, or life-world. (See Adler 1993 for discussion of “unweit.”) This network seems to form an underbelly to the organized crime world. These men are involved either part-time or full-time in illicit activities. Sam could name two hundred or more people, many of whom were on the fringes of the local clique, who fairly regularly were involved in crime, vice, or illicit business activities and scams. Many of these men were Italian. Some were small businessmen (e.g., owners of stores, restaurants, motels, bars, nightclubs, private clubs, notary office, check cashing, food services, cleaning business, secondhand shops, laundries, plumbing business, auto shops, trucking, real estate). Some worked at conventional regular jobs, some freelanced at a variety of jobs. Others were employed mainly as providers or facilitators of illegal goods and services, such as the sex trade, drug distribution, or gambling. Notably, this umwelt also included some corrupt police and public officials. These individuals would “show up” and “hang around” at Sam’s shop, at Phil’s used-car place, at card or dice games, or at certain nightspots. In such places, they would cross paths with others who are part of this loose organized crime underbelly or umwelt.
Confessions suggests why some crime networks or locally based syndicates succeed and survive for a lengthy period of time. The success and durability of the Italians or cosa nostra elements is based on no single factor, but on a blend of features.
Significant upfront or quickly acquired financial capital is often needed to start up and bankroll criminal ventures or a significant criminal enterprise. Cosa nostra or Italian organized-crime figures themselves tend to be investment-oriented businessmen who run financially solvent operations. Italian-American and cosa nostra criminal networks enjoy economies of scale that come from the typically greater size of their enterprises and from the multiple social networks in which they are embedded. For example, they can share legal services, financial and tax advice, credit, office space, communication facilities, and rank-and-file staffing. Also, reduced overhead costs also may derive from a more disciplined workforce and enhanced quality control that inhere in a mafia organization or network (see below).
Cosa nostra and other Italian syndicate members have extensive access to social networks for recruiting both rank-and-file operatives and leadership personnel. These networks involve extensive contacts with the larger community as well as access to their own kin networks (which typically supply core, inner-circle operatives). These networks provide a large pool of people for staffing, partnering, and leadership succession. Network members also have the financial capital or money to buy human capital—not only rank-and-file operatives but also support persons like accountants, lawyers, and financial advisors.
Running a criminal enterprise, especially a good-sized one, relies on trust and accountability. The basis of the trust may not necessarily entail faith in the integrity and rectitude of others, but may rest as much or more on the conviction that others would not dare to violate understandings for very practical reasons, such as loss of reputation or retaliation (i.e., “enforceable” trust). As Albert Cohen (1966:5) observed long ago, successful business enterprise— whether legal or illegal—depends on effective organization and cooperation, which, in turn, depend on trust and accountability.
Mafiosi, since they benefit from the mafia reputation for violence and organizational power (and also kinship obligations), also benefit from a milieu of enforceable trust. This trust contributes to quality control by curtailing cheating or snitching by associates, by enforcing norms for fair dealings among the involved parties, and by discouraging rival operations. These together reduce costs for the enterprise, while also fostering and sustaining a reputation as “someone good to do business with.” It is more difficult for individual independent criminal entrepreneurs to do this.
Also, intimidation or the threat of strong-arm methods as a key element of enforced trust better enables mafia-associated enterprises to fend off competition in the sense that (1) competitors shy away from expanding into a territory where mob-connected operations exist, and (2) rival operations already established in a territory are less likely to contest when a mob-connected operation expands into another’s territory.
However, while it remains an important mafia resource, intimidation is largely implicit and its significance easily exaggerated. On balance, mafia resiliency seems to have more to do with organizational and business skill and resource-rich networks than intimidation. Moreover, Chubb’s (1989) description of mafia organizations as “vendors of trust” is applicable here in the sense that the underworld seems to need institutions of enforceable trust to uphold conventions and standard practices, in a manner at least somewhat like the upperworld of business. Mafia groups seem to provide such enforceable trust.
Criminal entrepreneurs of Italian heritage operate within a set of subcultural traditions and cultural capital that advantage them as providers of illegal goods and services. Although Italians may have been one in a succession of immigrant groups to become involved in organized crime in the United States, Italian-American organized crime (of which Cosa Nostra is the archetype) has achieved broader dominance over a wider range of criminal activities than that of any other ethnic group, and for a longer period of time (see Schatzberg and Kelley 1996). Organized crime groups of Italian or Sicilian heritage have centuries of cultural traditions, knowledge, and organizational templates, and cognitive schema to draw on for organizing and running criminal enterprises. This cultural body of knowledge runs from the centuries-old Mafia, Camorra, and N’drangeta groups in Italy and Sicily, through pre-cosa nostra groups such as the Black Hand in the 19th Century US, up to the present day cosa nostra.
In other words, Italian criminal entrepreneurs tend to have the know-how for organizing and sustaining illegal enterprise, an ability to make contacts and form patron-client relationships, favorable attitudes toward “bending the law,” and a greater tolerance for vices such as gambling. All this likely enables Italian mafia and non-mafia criminal entrepreneurs to more ably exploit criminal and quasi-legitimate opportunities than groups lacking such a cultural toolkit. For example, a mafia associate interviewed by Steffensmeier describes the cultural affinity for gambling enterprises: ‘The Italians will always have the gambling. They have so damn many to step in if one retires or is sent away [imprisoned]. They grow up with it. It’s second nature; like wine or pasta. They have all the pieces in place. It’s like their birthright.”
Finally, we note that durability and longevity themselves foster more of the same. Organized crime groups that have been around a long time become a fixture, an institution in the underworld. As Sam observes, cosa nostra and mafia-like groups have been around so long and have dominated the criminal enterprise field for so long, that it is hard for anyone else to break in and challenge them.
The nature of organized crime and its forms have been topics of considerable debate within law enforcement and among scholars. At one end of the spectrum, organized crime is described in terms of large hierarchical organizations structured rather like traditional corporations. The prototype of this model of organized crime is the Italian mafia or La Cosa Nostra—a national network that, according to some writers, is the foundation of organized crime in this country. At the other end, organized crime is described in terms of small, fluid networks that are rather amorphous in structure and characterized by considerable opportunism.
These tend to be erroneous dichotomies, however. First, combined with other recent evidence, we have learned from Confessions that organized crime exists but has forms other than the mafia or cosa nostra. Second, cosa nostra may be less structured and organized than it is often portrayed. Third, cosa nostra is a key part but not the sum or total of Italian-based organized crime. In fact, Italian but non-mafia groups may likely become the dominant face of Italian organized crime in America, if they have not done so already. Fourth, perhaps the most significant dimension of organized crime is local racketeering syndicates—long-standing collusion involving a local clique or network of illicit entrepreneurs, professional criminals, and corrupt officials to dominate or monopolize the local rackets. Cosa nostra or Italian gangsters are frequently key players in these local syndicates, but individuals from other ethnic backgrounds also participate. Fifth, the three main models of organized crime— hierarchical, syndicated patron-client network, and enterprise models—are better seen as complementing one another.
Three additional implications derive from our discussion of organized crime and the underworld both here and in Chapter 13. The first is a call for a new perspective on criminal enterprise that articulates the significance of a group ‘s cultural equipment in carrying out ongoing criminal enterprises, including the role of ethnicity in criminal enterprise. Ethnic culture seems to matter, and in ways that go beyond limited opportunities for social mobility in the legitimate arena. Sociocultural characteristics of ethnic subgroups define the manner in which they respond to consumer demand, with some groups better endowed for syndicated illegal enterprise than other groups. Illegal industries like gambling, upper-level drug distribution, large-scale fencing, and racketeering require resources, and those with more resources are more likely to succeed in organized crime. As with legitimate entrepreneurship, different ethnic groups have different cultural schémas, organizing templates, and stocks of knowledge that may advantage or disadvantage them in different illegal industries.
The second implication is the usefulness of the patron-client framework (which has gained prominence in discussions of mafia-style organized crime) for characterizing collaboration among offenders in other illegal-business settings or long-term criminal ventures. First, in a fashion similar to mafiosi, criminal entrepreneurs like Sam often act as patrons or “catalysts” for other crime participants for both short-term and long-term criminal ventures. Second, operators like Sam can be a patron to crime participants in some ventures, and be a client in other transactions. In this sense, the patron-client framework is a useful conceptual tool for understanding not only networking among offenders and but also how one may shift roles—from being a patron or a client, an organizer or an accomplice, etc., from one circumstance to another.
Last, a fully developed perspective on illegal enterprise will also need to distinguish between lesser and more organized forms of illegality, and the amounts and types of criminal and conventional social capital needed for each. For example, it appears plausible that criminals pursuing less organized or street-level forms of illegal enterprise will need less business-oriented social capital, but more criminal capital (e.g., conning ability, “larceny sense,” inge-nuity, violence). On the other hand, entrepreneurs involved in illegalities that entail greater organization and longevity will have to rely more heavily on more conventional business-oriented cultural and social capital.
Also, it may be that a lack of resources and legitimate employment opportunities are among the causes leading to involvement in organized crime (defined loosely) only at the low levels of its stratification. However, a similar etiology may not explain criminal entrepreneurs at or near the top of the organized-crime status system [see Ruggiero (2000) for a similar conclusion]. Their involvement and activities may instead be explained through the availability of resources, access to markets, and entrepreneurial wherewithal. Sociocultural characteristics, then, may affect the manner in which provider groups respond to lucrative business opportunities whether the industry is legal or illegal, but perhaps even more so in the illegal realm.
We turn now to Sam’s account of mafia-style organized crime as he experienced it in the varied settings where his criminal career unfolded.