ERICH VERMEHREN
The SIME view of PRECIOUS is that, while anti-Nazi, he appears to retain patriotic German sentiments and they also estimate that he or his wife may later develop patriotic or religious scruples which may interfere with any genuine employment of them by you.
Guy Liddell to Felix Cowgill,
13 March 1944
It might have been imagined that, if the Second World War was an authentic conflict between the clearly delineated forces of good and evil, with the Allies representing democratic values, and the Axis, personifying genocide, atrocities and fascism, that there would have been a constant flow of intelligence defectors seeking to escape Nazi oppression. Yet this was not the case, even though there were plenty of opportunities for German intelligence officers posted in neutral countries, such as Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey, to make contact with their adversaries and negotiate their desertion. In fact, the numbers involved are astonishingly small, with one in Stockholm (Hans Zech-Nantwich), three in Madrid (Hans Ruser, Otto John and Peter Schagen), five in Istanbul (Erich Vermehren, Willi Hamburger, Kurt Beigl and the Kleczkowskis) and none in either Lisbon or Berne. The explanation for these extraordinarily low numbers is likely a combination of factors, such as the impact of the Venlo incident, in which a pair of SIS officers had been duped in November 1939 into meeting a supposed group of anti-Nazi officers, a rendezvous that resulted in their abduction. Understandably, having been deeply shaken by this early coup-de-main, the British intelligence community would become extremely risk-averse in its future dealings with alleged political dissidents. The Axis was also cautious in its deployment of well-informed staff on what amounted to the frontlines of the intelligence war, posting only the most reliable of personnel to cities perceived to be teeming with enemy agents and, perhaps most significantly, family members were to be considered potential hostages. In addition to these disincentives, the Allied intelligence agencies themselves were hesitant to enter into discussions with the enemy because the information offered by some putative defectors might prove counter-productive, especially where the individual involved possessed a knowledge of sources who might turn out to be double agents already under Allied control. In those circumstances the Abwehr would be likely to assume that the defector would compromise everything he knew, and would therefore take the appropriate counter- measures, which would probably include terminating the sources thought to have been contaminated.
Born in Lubeck in December 1919, Erich Vermehren was the son of a well-connected Hamburg lawyer whose wife, Petra, was a correspondent for Das Reich. After graduating with a law degree, his refusal to join the Hitler Youth movement had prevented him from taking up a Rhodes Scholarship at the University of Oxford, and in 1939 he converted to Roman Catholicism after meeting his future wife, Gräfin Elisabeth von Plettenberg, an anti-Nazi activist, six years his senior, who had been imprisoned briefly by the Gestapo for distributing subversive religious literature.
In late 1942, despite an exemption from military service because of a childhood injury, and following the influence of his diplomat cousin, Adam von Trott, Vermehren joined the Abwehr and worked as an interpreter at Oflag VI-B, a camp for British officer prisoners of war in Dössel. His transfer to Turkey came at the request of his father’s friend, Paul Leverkühn, and he arrived in Istanbul in December 1942, ostensibly to negotiate the release of fifty Societé Francais de Navigation Danubienne tugs, which French-built and destined for use on the river Danube, had been interned by the Turkish authorities. In reality, Vermehren was assisting in the management of Abwehr agents active in Iran and Iraq that were run by the local Abwehr headquarters, known as the KriegsOrganisation NeheOrient, which was accommodated in the consulate general.
In summer 1942, Vermehren’s request for permission to have his wife join him was refused by Berlin but, undeterred, he made another application while on home leave in November 1943 and obtained a passport for her through the intervention of Monsignore Angelo Roncalli, the Papal Nuncio in Istanbul. Then, following influence exercised by a family friend, Marshal von Bieberstein, she travelled to Sofia where she initially was refused an onward air passage to Turkey. However, on Christmas Day 1943 she completed her journey, despite Leverkühn’s disapproval, and was granted two weeks’ sick leave by the German ambassador to Turkey, Franz von Papen, who happened to be her cousin.
In January 1944, Vermehren approached the British assistant military attaché who put him in touch with Section V’s local representative, Nicholas Elliott, and the two men met for the first time on Monday, 18 January. Over the next three days Vermehren removed a large quantity of secret papers from his office to prove his bona fides and, having been photographed by Elliott and sent to London, they were assessed as authentic. In his report to the head of Section V, Felix Cowgill, Elliott described Vermehren as ‘a highly-strung, cultivated, self-confident, extremely clever, logically minded, slightly precious young German of good family’. Accordingly, Vermehren was codenamed PRECIOUS by SIS.
Three days later, Vermehren reported to his office that he was ill and would not return on Monday, also that he was moving to a new address in Istanbul. When he did not appear at the KONO suite as promised a messenger was sent to the new address, which could not be found with the aid of a deliberately misleading map supplied by Vermehren. On 27 January 1944, from the safety of Cairo, a jubilant SIS issued its first assessment, entitled The German Secret Service in Turkey,
1. A well placed and reliable source whose previous information has been substantiated by our records, has produced the following information on the organization and personalities of the Abwehr station known as Kriegsorganisation Nahe Osten, the headquarters of which are situated in the German Embassy building in Istanbul. This organisation is usually known in Abwehr circles by the short title ‘KO NO’.
2. The Dienstellenleiter Hptm Dr Paul Leverkuehn [Leverkühn], who succeeded Major Shulze-Bennett, is responsible for coordinating the activities of the various Abwehr sections in KO NO and maintaining general supervision over them.
3. The staff directly under the control of Dr Leverkuehn [Leverkühn] consists of two sections known as the Aussendienst which might perhaps be described as an administrative section. The Aussendienst consists of Abw. I Heer officers and the Leiter I/H is Leverkuehn’s deputy.
4. The other sections of KO NO, the Abs. I. Marine, Abw. I. Luft, Verwaltung, Abw. III and Abw. II, whilst under the general supervision and coordination of the Dienstellenleiter enjoy a very large measure of autonomy and receive their instructions direct to their own headquarter sections in the Abwehr Amt., and also render their reports direct to their own headquarter sections, only passing a copy to Leverkuehn [Leverkühn] for his information and not necessarily his approval.
5. W/T traffic between KO NO and the OKW is passed by the W/T station in the German Embassy building in Istanbul; the staff of which are under the command, for discipline and administration, of Vice Admiral von der Marwitz whose office is also situated in that building. All incoming and outgoing messages are decoded and encoded by the W/T staff and all messages are handled by the Naval Attaché’s office which passes the enclair texts by special office servants (and not by consular officials) to the KO NO. OKW messages which include Abwehr messages are encoded by a special procedure. Messages for the Consulate General, however, are sent in the normal foreign office code which is kept in the safe of the Chancellor.
6. It is the general policy of the Abwehr to appoint the Leiters I/H, I/M, I/Luft to the posts of Assistant Military Attaché, Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Air Attaché, respectively. Source has produced a chart shown in Appendix ‘D’ which is largely self-explanatory. The German Foreign Office naturally provided the staff (diplomatic) for their Embassy in Ankara, Consulate General in Istanbul and various consulates in Turkey. The Attaché Department of the OKW naturally provided the service attachés who have their main offices in the Embassy in Ankara with the exception of the Naval Attaché whose office is situated in Istanbul. The Abwehr appoint officers for the I/H, I/M, and I/Luft to their respective attaché departments under which cover they work. In the case of Turkey, the Abw. II representative works under the cover of the ‘Regierungs Rat’. The Abw. III representative works in Istanbul under the cover of ‘Konsulats Sekretaer’.
7. Under the control of the Dienstellenleiter there are aussenstellen at Izmir, Ankara, Adana, Iskendeun and Trabzon, for details of which see Appendix ‘C’.
8. Source states that the KO NO has the strictest instructions not on any account to engage in espionage against Turkey and that even if sources should offer them information on the Turkish armed forces they should refuse to handle it. Source adds that KO Bulgaria is responsible for espionage against Turkey and as far as the source is aware none of the KO NO representatives in Turkey hold German diplomatic cover.
9. At Appendix ‘E’ is attached a list of cover names supplied by the source and used by KO NO, Aussenstellen, and officers and at Appendix ‘F’ is a further list of various Abwehr cover names.
Attached to this summary were four pages of diagrams created by Vermehren to illustrate KONO’s internal structure and its links to Berlin. The other appendices included some forty cover names which, when delivered to the Radio Security Service cryptanalysts, opened up the accumulated and current ISOS traffic by identifying each individual referred to. He also listed five Abwehr officers active outside KONO, headed by Willi Hamburger.
This first interrogation report amounted to a significant breakthrough for SIME and its parent agency, MI5, because, for the reasons previously described, SIS had exercised great caution in its direct contact with Abwehr personnel. In fact, such engagement as there had been, was limited to just two individuals. The first was Major Richard Wurmann, who had been captured on the Tunisian border in November 1942 as he fled the Allied liberation of Algiers, where he had headed the local Abwehrstellen. Brought to London for interrogation, Wurmann agreed to cooperate with his captors and in January 1943, codenamed HARLEQUIN, he acquired the status of ‘a reference library for all matters affecting the Abwehr’. Much of Wurmann’s value lay in the fact that none of his German colleagues had the slightest inkling that he had switched allegiance, and every reason to believe that his cover, as part of the German Armistice Commission in Algiers, had remained intact. Thus, HARLEQUIN became a walking encyclopedia on all aspects of the Abwehr. Indeed, measures were taken to ensure that his subordinates, who had also been taken into custody in North Africa, never learned of Wurmann’s defection, and accepted the fiction that he had been hospitalised for medical treatment.
The second Abwehr inside source, Johnny Jebsen, was active from September 1943 until his arrest in May 1944. Codenamed ARTIST, Jebsen was based at the Lisbon KriegsOrganisation where he had handled the Popov brothers, Ivo and Dusan (DREADNOUGHT and TRICYCLE respectively). Jebsen was a delicate source because he had come to suspect that the Popovs were really double agents, working for the Allies. Although Jebsen was never under British control physically, and had been discouraged from defecting, he did hand over ‘much useful information’, but nothing akin to the material disclosed by Wurmann. Against this background, Vermehren represented a major coup, even if it was anticipated that the Abwehr were bound to take counter-measures to mitigate the damage inflicted on its networks.
On 27 January, the same day that SIS circulated its first interrogation report based on the first round of interviews with Vermehren, the III/F (Abwehr counter-espionage) representative, Thomas Ludwig, learned from a Turkish MIT contact that Leverkühn’s subordinate had defected to the British, accompanied by his wife. He immediately reported the incident to Berlin and repeated that, as he had warned previously, he had harboured grave suspicions about the loyalty and intentions of another Abwehr staff member, Willi Hamburger. Ludwig’s cable resulted in the arrival of Hans Milo Freund from Berlin who spent two weeks investigating the circumstances of Vermehren’s defection, and the subsequent disappearance of both Hamburger and two other III/F agents, Karl and Stella von Kleczkowski. While KONO was in the midst of this crisis, Ludwig Moyzisch’s former secretary, Cornelia Kapp, whose father was a German diplomat, defected to the Americans in Ankara. Consequently, Leverkühn was recalled to Berlin and replaced temporarily by Admiral von der Marwitz before the SD took over. In the Gestapo complaint against Leverkühn he was accused of
having created an Anglo-Saxon atmosphere at the KO, giving too much freedom to his people to make controlled contact with the enemy, and having strong homosexual tendencies.
MI5 was unsure of Leverkühn’s fate, as there were rumours that he had been shot in Germany. Naturally, Berlin was stunned by these events and in May 1944 Erich Pfeiffer was appointed as head of KONO. Pfeiffer was a seasoned Abwehr officer whose naval career had begun as a gunnery officer on the battleship König at Jutland. At the time, in 1944, Pfeiffer was engaged in negotiating with the Reich Foreign Ministry about Abwehr representation at the German Embassy in Ankara, having been recently promoted to Georg Hansen’s deputy at Amt. I. In November 1943, he had conducted a brief four-day inspection tour of KONO at Hansen’s request, because of concerns about Leverkühn’s leadership style. On that occasion
he had set out from Zossen well primed with the results achieved in Turkey recently, and he impressed on Leverkuehn [Leverkühn] the need to apply himself exclusively to military intelligence work, pointing out also that he observed a certain lack of coordination in the work of the several sections. It appeared that only the I/H section took direct orders from Leverkuehn; I/M, I/L, II, III, and Vermultung enjoyed considerable independence and took their orders directly from headquarters. The few Aussenstellen worked in a haphazard fashion.
According to the British-controlled double agent BLACKGUARD, who retained his access to KONO, the organisation was ‘in pandemonium’ with Kurt Zaehringer in particular apparently convinced that there was another traitor at large who had been responsible for the recent arrests of Fotuhi and KISS, threatening to exercise his own discipline and shoot Leverkühn and Ludwig.
After lengthy interrogation Leverkühn and his colleague Gottfried Schenker-Angerer were dismissed from the Abwehr, Leo von Koblensky was posted to Denmark and Eberhardt Momm was returned to the Luftwaffe to serve in an anti-aircraft unit. Meanwhile, Vermehren was undergoing questioning by SIME professionals whose task was to extract maximum information from their prisoner without even hinting at their access to ISOS, or to knowledge gathered by the management of double agents. Any question or approach that might betray a degree of insight had to be attributed to another prisoner, Otto Mayer, an Abwehr officer who had been wounded and captured by Partisans in an ambush near the Dalmatian coast in November 1943 and flown to Brindisi. However, although 40-year-old Mayer had undergone a preliminary interrogation by CSDIC in Bari, where a bullet was removed from a wound in his neck, he had not reached Camp 020, via Algiers and Prestwick, until after Vermehren had defected. It turned out that Mayer had also served in Istanbul, so information disclosed by Vermehren’s interrogators gave the impression that they were seeking corroboration for his assertions, rather than material from infinitely more sensitive sources. Even better, the Abwehr (and Vermehren) were unaware of Mayer’s exact fate and had no idea he had been handed over to the British for questioning, thus setting the scene for a classic triangulation strategy, pitting Mayer against Vermehren, and vice versa. Meanwhile, ISOS revealed that Ast Belgrade knew Mayer had been captured by Partisans but planned to negotiate his release in a prisoner exchange, an event then not uncommon in the Balkans.
While the Abwehr imploded in Istanbul, MI5 analysts were able to monitor Berlin’s reactions through ISOS intercepts, and MI5’s Herbert Hart assembled all the relevant texts in August 1944. The material was often hard to interpret as the original message was usually encrypted employing an internal code to conceal names and places. Staff identities were hidden behind codenames but some of the characters became very familiar to the analysts who translated the German clear text derived from Enigma encipherment. Chronologically, the first message was dated 2 February 1944, and was part of a longer signal from Istanbul to Berlin.
Part 2. For this reason he wished to obtain from country under all circumstances; after our letter of refusal 1196. This was sanctioned through agency of Herrn von Trott zu Sulsa in the AA and Marschall, Chief of Henke service, under pretext of I[ntelligence. S[evice]. activity on (corrupt) political sector in Turkey. (5 corrupt) NUNTIUS RONCALLI (6 corrupt) Proselytizer of Greek Orthodox Church. As reported in letter 7085/1464 the [von] Plettenberg woman entered country on 20 December with service passport of AA. Return journey was intended by 6998 on 28/2. Hereby Vermehren saw his plans endangered; he and his wife went over to the English. Was taken to Izmir, intended to fly direct to London by British special plane from neighbourhood of Bandirma. Turks are reported to have prevented his departure up to now, and have ordered closing of frontier. In this connection also VM of 6098 Dr. Hamburger working for British and American I[ntelligence] S[ervices]. Was given assignment by British to take over Vermehren’s post with 6998, to carry on deception. According to investigations of VM of AST there also belonged to the traitor clique Herr and Frau Klekzkowski, further VM of SCHENKERA GERER HEROCK, also RIDIGER, In addition to those already reported by) 7082 also (6 corrupt); Director of Deutsche Bank Dr. BARTH, With exception of Vermehren all are Ostmaerker and absolutely opposed to NSDAP. Motive of traitors probably creation of a free Austria under Catholic leadership. Treason of group also for USA I[ntelligence] S[ervice], Hamburger, with Earle and director 0WI BIT, with whom Frau Kletchkowski is supposed to have intimate relations and who is continually negotiating with group. BRITT is expected on 3rd February for further meeting with group in Istanbul. If Vermehren and his wife reach London, important political actions may he expected from enemy side, (part of msg. not rec’d.) Ast is trying to get Kleczkowskis to leave on pretext of meeting with MILO in Sofia, then Hamburger also, if necessary by use of special means, 6998 informed OKW today of Vermehren disappearance, will not however communicate above details until further investigation. Urgently request that you do not fail to take this into consideration in evaluation. I warned AST months ago about all those implicated and demanded their expulsion on grounds of unreliability, ALADIN too, applied without success, in Berlin for recall of Hamburger and the Kletczkowskis on basis of cur and other reports. Whole activity of the AST here exposed and nullified as far as Anglo Americans are concerned. Our Stelle is the least incriminated because as you know, we refused from the first to collaborate closely with Buero 6998 for reasons of security. Irresponsible behaviour of AA of HENCKE service. It is highly probably that eventual interplay of certain circles … (continued).
Although badly fragmented, the text refers to the anti-Nazi diplomat Adam zu Trott and mentions the other defectors, Willi Hamburger (linked to the American minister George Earle) and the Klekzkowskis, but seems ill-informed, perhaps by the Turks, on Vermehren’s escape plan as executed by the British. Four days later, on 6 February 1944, Berlin was in touch with Lisbon on the subject of Vermehren’s mother, Petra. Doubtless the intention was to get her back to Germany so she could be used against her son as a hostage.
The mother of the lawyer Dr. Vermehren, who went over to the English in Turkey is a correspondent for Das Reich in Lisbon. By order of Amtschef, Frau V[ermehren] is to be persuaded to cane back to Germany at once by suitable means, BELLING.
The next day, 7 February 1944, Lisbon replied to Berlin, concerning Vermehren’s mother:
No. 217. To PELLIS. 1) As reported confidentially by POLMANN representative here the son of Frau Vermehren in Lisbon has gone over to the English in Turkey. She herself is suspected of being an accessory. Frau Vermehren is as I worker and in contact with Ruser. A subsidiary of Ruser is said to have been arrested and to have declared that Ruser works for the Russian Officers’ Committee. 2) Portugal friends warn us against an important V-mann of the English in Berlin who has access to our correspondence. With reference to communication of Portugal friends we think (he has access) to HERKULES’s correspondence. Please treat POLMAN report as confidential. Details by courier.
This was the first ISOS intercept to disclose the news of Vermehren’s defection, and it warned Berlin that his mother, Petra, then the local Das Reich correspondent in Lisbon (and an Abwehr Eins agent), was in contact with Hans Ruser, another newspaperman and putative defector. Codenamed JUNIOR by SIS, Ruser had been dismissed from the Madrid Abwehr in September 1942, and was then exfiltrated to England in November 1943. Perhaps significantly, The Lisbon KO also warned that some past communications had been compromised. On the following day, 8 February 1944, Berlin speculated about the Vermehrens’ travel plans informed Lisbon:
40. Most secret. For CIRO. Confidential. Vermehren with wife, nee [sic] Graefin [von] Plettenberg, is probably flying within the next few days via Lisbon to London from Turkey. V[ermehren] was a solider with German Military Attaché and has taken flight as a traitor. Will probably meet in Lisbon his mother, the German journalist Petro or Carola Vermehren. Arrange for strict observation of the married couple and the mother. Ascertain with what papers V[ermehren] and his wife are travelling. If it is possible to prevent departure to London by legal means, on the ground that V[ermehren] has embezzled German service funds, use every means possible to obtain this. In any case radio for Freund whatever is ascertained at your end. PELLIS 222.
On 9 February, the Lisbon KO responded to Berlin, warning that Verhehren, now codenamed DELFTER, who had deserted to the British, could compromise an asset, Viktor Bogomolz. The information came from LUDOVICO, actually Ludwig von Auenrode, the head of the KriegsOrgaisation. Evidently, von Auenrode believed Vermehren could endanger Bogomolz, a White Russian who had worked for the British for many years, first in Istanbul, and then in Paris.
(Contd) Vermehren knows [Viktor] BOGM’OLEZ. B[OGMOLEZ] was previously a for (Roman) I. About 2 years ago LUDOVICO received orders from Berlin to resume contact with B[OGMOLEZ]. B[OGMOLEZ] refused. Portugal friends now reveal that GUILLERMO’s journeys to Lisbon were reported by B[OGMOLEZ] to the English and the Americans further that HIOBI’s intended meeting at the beginning of October last year with important worker at a quinta (a country house) at this end when he (HIOB) was in Lisbon with GUILLERMO was betrayed to the Allies by the same route. Place and time of the meeting were transmitted by Berlin by W/T to this end. [The] Meeting place was kept under surveillance by the Allies and the police, but a day later. Activity of the worker BALLHORN I AST II was largely betrayed t the Allies and Portugal friends through the same channel. BALLHORN is in the know about this and (will be) in Berlin in the next few days. (possibly part missing). The journalist Koester who is suspected of espionage and who is being called up at present through Wehrbezirkskommando Ausland in Germany was also in contact at this end with Vermehren’s wife.
On 9 February, Berlin sent instructions to Lisbon:
Ref Petra Vermehren. Ref your signal of 8/2. The son of Petra V[ermehren] has gone over to the English in Turkey and they intend to take him to London. This may happen any date. Hence there is no time left to recall Vermehren through the Reich. You are therefore to instruct Vermehren at once from your end to return to the Reich.
Also, on 9 February, the Bucharest to Vienna channel disclosed:
11. For BAUER. Most Secret. Urgently notify SCHILL (ROBERT) that Dr Vermehren has probably deserted. Ast Vienna Liter I.
On the next day, 10 February, Lisbon sent further news:
Urgent 55. To ERBE for BELLING. Petra Vermehren leaves RODING [Lisbon] by plane on 11/2, arrives TOR 12/2. NERBACK ACHERN has been requested to arrange for her to fly on. I recommend that arrest should not be carried out at either MOENICH, STUTTGART or at ROT. Because of my suggestions to her she is expecting MOENICH Leiter at TOR to indicate a hotel to spend the night. She will therefore not be surprised if a representative of STRAUCH or EICH offers to escort her. I have forbidden her to communicate with relatives beforehand. She has learned through Reuter report of her son’s high treason, but in spite of this has declared herself ready for journey to Reich. To allay the greater part of her suspicions I gave her a card of recommendation for STRAUCH-Leiter. ENZMANN.
Also, on 10 February, Berlin was in contact with Sofia:
Most Secret. No. 43. From VERA No. 13. AST Vienna Leiter I For CARA for Chief personally. The following W/T message has been received from Istanbul. Strictly confidential. Dr Vermehren. POSTER’s first Milarbeiter, has probably deserted to the English. He is informed about SCHILL’s activity. Checkup (or: We are checking up) to see whether it is advisable, in the circumstances for SCHILL to enter Turkey. All transmissions ISOLIE, MIMI, DIANA, KASSAK stopped until the situation is clarified.
Also, on 10 February 1944, Lisbon confirmed to Berlin that Colonel Hans Milo Freund was to begin his inquiries in Istanbul:
257. It is communicated for information that Oberstleutnant Freund is flying to Istanbul on 11/2 in the matter of Vermehren.
On 11 February 1944, Lisbon reported to Berlin:
To ERBE BELLING. Petra Vermehren left RODING by air at 1500 hours today. Search for Erich Vermehren and wife instituted as early as 7/2. The agents (Agenten) available on the airfields have been ordered to report every air-passenger landing here from Cairo, Halma or Vetschau. Any possibility of preventing Erich V[ermehren] from leaving the country will be by illegal means only. Please radio a personal description of Erich V[ermehren] and wife. ENZMANN.
Also, on 11 February 1944, Berlin to Lisbon:
1. Most Secret. No. 148. For ELCANO. For DON I. Ref. Dr. Vermehren.
Dr. Vermehren is traveling [sic] with his wife, nee [sic] Graefin [von] Plettenberg from Istanbul to London via Spain – Portugal at the beginning of February 1944, on behalf of the English. He will probably meet his mother, the German journalist Petra Vermehren in Lisbon. Vermehren has close (?) personal contacts with worker Jebsen of (ROM.) I, who is controlled by HOEFLINGER. Keep observation on any intercourse between Jebsen and Vermehren. Jebsen should on no account be informed. CIRO has been informed. JUNTA No. 1478 Most Secret of 11/2/44. Berlin-Lisbon, No. 62. For CIRO. Ref. Dr. Vermehren. Ref our W/T message of 8/2/44 (see previous sheet). Dr. Vermehren has personal connections with worker Jebsen of (Rom) I, who is controlled by HOEFINGER. Keep observation of any intercourse between Jebsen and Vermehren. PELLIS No. 337.
On 14 February 1944, Berlin replied:
To ENZMANN. Ref. Married couple Vermehren. Ref above message. SOMMERHAUS has instructed Konto RODING to prevent by all possible means the Vermehrens traveling [sic] on. Compromising of Konto is however to be avoided. On enquiry it was stated that ‘by all possible means’ everything except the most extreme measures. On ENZER’s orders also the married couple are to be prevented from continuing their journey within the limits of the means stated above. Christian name not Erich but Kurt. Following personal description of married couple. Continued …
Berlin to Lisbon. Dr, V 25 year of age, height 165, slim, medium-fair, long hair, blue eyes. Neither have any special distinguishing marks. Photographs follow with BAUER. TURM.
On 15 February 1944, Lisbon replied:
To RUEM. Ref. Above message. ‘Plane air-line Cairo SUND AG (England) did not fly this time via RODING (Lisbon) but direct SUND AG from Gibraltar on 12/2. VM ascertained from British Overseas in RODING that there were in this (plane) SUND AG military commission from Turkey whose personalities are not in hand at British Overseas at this end. It must be expected that the Vermehren couple travelled in this ‘plane or are using another ‘plane to SUND AG which is not starting from this end. Measures at this end will nevertheless be continued. ENZANNIN JNR.
On 16 February 1944, Sofia to Berlin:
80. ANDREAS HOLM 1) Correct name and activities of BACH given away by Dr. Vermehren to English and Turks. I immediately ordered him to leave country for this end and asked YOK to find some other means of carrying on the network in the meantime.
Addendum to address: For PASA, CARA 618.
Also, on 16 February 1944, Lisbon-Berlin.
257. To PELLIS. Ref. FETUS No. 337 of 11/2/44 (above of 12/2/44). Worker JONNY, after [an] interview with Petra Vermehren who informed him of the affair, reported his personal acquaintance with the Vermehren family. The departure of Petra Vermehren invalidates assignment of shadowing JONNY. HARRY considers JONNY reliable. LUDOVICO CIRO.
On 17 February 1944, British intercept operators monitored a signal on the Zagreb to Prague channel:
To RHSA AMT IV and VI Berlin. Ref. Kleckowsky and Hamburger. Radio Ankara reports om 14/2/44 that according to SSO EXPRESS the 2 German secret agents Kleckowsky and Hamburger, both Austrians, have come over to the enemy. They were working in Istanbul. The alleged head of the German Secret Service in Istanbul, Vermehren, had already fled from Turkey and is said to have gone to Lisbon. According to [an] earlier radio report from Ankara V[ermehren] was deputy Military Attache. His wife is nearly related to ambassador von Papen. After 6 months preparation for flight and making contact with Secret Service he hid for a few days before his flight in the English Embassy. His wife was with him. Ankara further reports that the German Military Attaché has been taken to the Reich by 4 Gestapo agents on account of V[ermehren]’s flight. Sgd. BLUHM.
On 19 February 1944, on the Istanbul-Sofia circuit:
CAA for PASA. 1) If PASA enters the country here, he will be compromised as he has been betrayed by Vermehren. Do not enter under any circumstances. 2) SQUA’s journey now impossible. MILO YOK.1120.
On 22 February 1944, Berlin-Istanbul:
To 7085. Please send with this week’s courier post detailed collective report about Vermehren case. From this it must be clearly recognisable above all which are your own discoveries and which those from outside. AST, etc. 6986.
To 7085. Paul Sternkowski born 18/7/87 Berlin and his wife Martha Sternkowski born 5/10/90 Berlin formerly domiciled Istanbul, Galata Poste Kutusu 1449, are trying to establish contact with me. I request your estimation of the persons mentioned. DR. SCHMITZ.
On 28 February 1944, Sofia responded to Berlin:
124 for FLETT. RASCHID, SHEIKH and Hamburger in internment camp at Damascus. Vermehren has been in service of England for some considerable time. Source: KAPFEN of GIBSON. MILO. KUKS 777 C.
On 8 March 1944, Istanbul to Sofia:
14. Assignment of SCHILL and BACH betrayed to the Turkish and English I[ntelligence] S[ervices]. by Vermehren. Both were also known exactly to RASCIHD. Grave objections therefore to entry. YOIC 1135.
On 4 September 1944, Lisbon-Madrid 2:
534. To VI Z PELLIS. And DON 1. MARTIN reports that the Allied I[ntelligence] S[ervices] at this end have now received instructions not to accept any more deserters, the Vermehrens mentioned (as an instance – text d’ful). Reich Germans who offer themselves can be interrogated but not supported or taken over. CIRO.
On 12 August 1944, Istanbul signaled Berlin to give an assurance that the recent defection of Kurt Beigl was entirely unexpected:
After the desertion of [Kurt] Beigl KO is trying to make this Dienstelle responsible because of the extension of his sojourn. Beigl came here in connection with AST MOB network. He worked until the last of AST W/T stations which had already been betrayed by Vermehren and built up again with old VM because the police (took) no action. KO attached MOB contacts to these owing to lack of other W/T stations. Attitude of Beigl could not be foreseen even by KO. A fortnight previously, also, he had not returned, it was said, and this was not expected on account of the AST W/T stations, can now be asserted. 504.
Although an Austrian, Beigl had a long history of loyal service to the Abwehr, since his recruitment in 1937, having joined the Brandenburger regiment in February 1940, and had been a party member for many years. However, as he explained to his SIME interrogators, he had been posted to Abwehr II in Bucharest in February 1942, and then had been selected to build a stay-behind network in Turkey, run from Sofia, and equipped with transmitters in Erzerum, Adana and Istanbul, which he felt certain must have been betrayed by Vermehren. Clearly the rot had set in if men of Beigl’s calibre were willing to desert to the Allies. Having made contact with SIS in Istanbul in August 1944, Beigl and his wife, Hildegard, caught a train to Aleppo to be interned. He was then transferred to Cairo and during his interviews with SIME he was asked about his friendship with Vermehren and, specifically, why his controller, Schnick, had left Turkey on 29 January1944, so soon after Vermehren’s defection.
Beigl replied that Schnick rarely stayed more than eight or ten days in Turkey after which he returned to Bucharest. He did not think this particular journey had anything to do with the Vermehren affair; Schnick had never discussed it, and had not mentioned receiving any special orders to report back to his Headquarters.
On Feb 21st or 23rd, Beigl received orders from Ludwig to report to Sofia because of Vermehren’s defection. In Sofia Beigl was not questioned about Vermehren but was told that he might return to Turkey. He asked if he might visit his father in Grenzen near Vienna.
DELIUS told him to go for two or three weeks, after which he must report to Abwehr Headquarters in Zossen, near Berlin to speak to Obst Holman (believed to be Abw. I-H).
Holman asked Beigl if he knew Vermehren. Beigl replied that they had been good friends. Holman said he did not know how things were going. Beigl was to return to his mother, and would receive further instructions through Zvirner, now of Ast-Vienna, as to whether he was to return to Turkey or to remain in Austria. Beigl spent only about ten minutes with Holman and only one day in Berlin, after which he returned to his mother. Sometime in April Zvirner telephoned that Beigl was to report to his office. On his arrival, Zvirner told him to go to Bucharest and pick up Schnick, with whom he would return to Turkey. They arrived in Istanbul on 25 April. Schnick did not say whether he had been in contact with the Abwehr concerning Vermehren, but only mentioned that they had to restart work on their story-behind organisation. [Thomas] Ludwig was very annoyed, with Schnick, and Beigl for returning to Turkey, and said they must return to Bucharest because everything about their W/T network had been discovered. Schnick left Turkey for the last time, after his usual ten or fourteen day sojourn, but Beigl had to wait until his papers had gone through the official closing. They did not arrive until July, when Uppenborm told him to hurry away because they still had to arrange the transfer of one set from Dijatrbekir to Istanbul.
Beigl was not the last of the defectors to be inspired by the haemorrhage from Istanbul. Soon afterwards the German consul general in Geneva, named Kraul, followed their example and defected to the Allies, although this particular episode was never revealed publicly.
Over the next two months Vermehren was questioned by Security Intelligence Middle East in Cairo and provided his interrogators with enough detailed information to complete six lengthy reports, which were circulated and resulted in the identification of virtually every Abwehr asset in the region. Also compromised were their secret writing and other communications techniques. Meanwhile, his mother Petra returned voluntarily to Germany where she was incarcerated at the Oranienburg concentration camp neat Berlin.
Vermehren would not reach England until 13 April 1944, when he landed at RAF Lyneham, beading a British passport in the name of Eric Vollmer, on a flight from Gibraltar, his wife having fallen ill with pneumonia in Algiers. He was escorted to SIS’s headquarters in Broadway for a brief interview, and then was accommodated in the Chelsea flat owned by Kim Philby’s mother, at 7 Grove Court, Drayton Gardens. There he remained for the next seventeen months until September 1945, initially employed as a consultant by the Political Warfare Executive, and then as a teacher at the Roman Catholic schools at Beaumont College, Crawley and then Worth Priory. At this point, in October 1945, Vermehren made contact with his family in Germany to explain himself and his ‘breach of trust’. His sister, Isa, who had become a nun, and elder brother, Michael, had survived imprisonment, as had Elisabeth’s youngest sister, Gisela, who later wrote a memoir, A Journey Through the Final Act, about her experiences in Ravensbrück, Buchenwald and Dachau concentration camps.
After the Second World War, the Vermehrens acquired British nationality and, changing their surname to de Saventham, lived in Switzerland. When interviewed in April 1982 Vermehren claimed not to have known that many observers considered that his defection had been the catalyst for the SD takeover of the Abwehr, and the momentous events that followed. He seemed reluctant to accept any responsibility for the collapse of the KONO networks across the Middle East, although he remained annoyed at the publicity his defection had received at the time. Evidently he had imagined that he could simply switch sides without attracting any attention, and perhaps had not considered the propaganda value of his desertion. He died in Bonn in April 2005, seven years after losing his wife, and before his extensive SIME file was declassified and released to The National Archives in Kew.
As the Cold War developed, some of the key figures in the British intelligence community drew on their experience gained during the Second World War to cope with other adversaries, directed from Moscow. Maurice Oldfield, Myles Ponsonby, Harry Shergold, Alex Kellar, Bill Magan, Dick White, Arthur Martin and Douglas Roberts, among many others, learned their trade in the Middle East and understood the immense, incomparable value of the self-recruited defector who has accumulated enough information to betray not just a few agents or their networks, but an entire intelligence organisation. Vermehren fatally undermined KONO and in the three months before D-Day the Abwehr was in a state of collapse, its staff distracted by the SD or preoccupied with plotting the Führer’s (Adolf Hitler’s) assassination.
There were many intelligence lessons learned in the Middle East, such as strategic deception, the management of double agents, and the exploitation of signals intelligence during a ground campaign, and all would be applied with great effect in Normandy, four years after the British Expeditionary Force had been evacuated from the European continent. In the intervening period the conflict in Europe had been fought largely at sea and in the air, so the North African campaign provided the only opportunity to acquire and hone the skills that would become so relevant during and after D-Day, and then be applied against the Soviets.