VLADIMIR PETROV AND EVDOKIA PETROVA
I saw the sufferings of my own peasant folk under collectivization, and the ruin of my native village of Larikha. After that, the horrors of the purges, the victimization of innocent people, the desperate poverty of the Soviet masses, followed by the striking contrast of conditions in other countries – all these had destroyed my faith in the professions of our regime, long before I came to the point of action.
Vladimir Petrov, Empire of Fear1
The defection of the Canberra rezident Vladimir Petrov in April 1954 was unquestionably one of the great turning-points in the intelligence Cold War, although the entire operation, which included three years of cultivation, before his actual application for political asylum, was really an immense gamble as right up until the last moment, ASIO’s management was not entirely certain of the precise nature of his role in the embassy.
The Western intelligence community took the issue of Soviet intelligence operations in Australia very seriously for three reasons. Firstly, British atomic weapons had been tested at Montebello in Western Australia since October 1952, so information from the site could reasonably be expected to be regarded as a collection priority for Moscow. Likewise, the rocket range at Woomera had accommodated British guided missile tests since 1947 and also would have been bound to attract Moscow’s attention. Finally, there was the certainty, provided by the VENONA traffic, that the Soviets had already built and exploited the Communist Party of Australia by building a large spy- ring controlled by a succession of intelligence professionals, including Valentin Sudovnikov and Fedor Nosov. Their CPA intermediary was Walter Clayton, who had been in frequent contact with CPA cells inside the Civil Service, academics, journalists and other well-placed sources. The fact that a British classified report, circulated by the Post- Hostilities Planning Committee in Whitehall, had turned up in the Canberra VENONA channel dated 16 March 1946 was eloquent proof of a massive security problem in Australia, and had acted as the trigger for the Australian government to create a security apparatus based on the MI5 model to plug the leaks. Although VENONA had not revealed any specific breaches relating to atomic weapons or guided missiles, the intercepts had proved the existence of a well-organised Soviet spy- ring which had the means to collect secrets and communicate them efficiently to Moscow.
The VENONA material consisted of 329 pages of messages exchanged with Moscow between August 1943 and June 1948, so when MI5’s Director-General Sir Percy Sillitoe visited Sydney in mid-February 1948, accompanied by his director of F Division, Roger Hollis, the source was still contemporaneous. Their task was to persuade the (initially reluctant) Australian government to create a security apparatus on British lines so the continuing damage could be properly dealt with. The issue was a delicate one because one of the active VENONA spies had served in the current security unit, the Commonwealth Investigation Branch, was BEN, soon to be identified as Detective Sergeant Alf Hughes of the Vice Squad. Clearly the CIB was not fit for purpose. Furthermore, Sillitoe and Hollis possessed some significant leverage: unless the Australians agreed to the British plan, they would be cut off from all Allied classified information. In particular, the Americans were unwilling to take any risks with delicate information, sources and methods, which included the VENONA secret.
Accordingly, when ASIO came into being in March 1949, it did so with the support from an MI5 security liaison officer, Courtenay Young. He would act as an intermediary, passing the new organisation espionage leads from London without compromising the source, although several ASIO officers would guess the source was likely cryptographic. Thereafter, Young’s role would be continued by Derek Hamblen who in April 1952 arranged for ASIO’s Ron Richards to visit London in September and be briefed on VENONA.
Apart from the establishment of ASIO, little had been accomplished in terms of plugging the leaks, and it was clear from VENONA that, for example, the country’s external affairs department had been thoroughly penetrated, as had the leader of the Opposition’s private office. Sir Charles Spry, who had supervised ASIO’s development, saw the Petrovs as an opportunity to alert the government and the wider population to the espionage challenge through a Canadian- style Royal Commission, and regarded the defectors as a heaven-sent pretext for exploiting the VENONA leads and thereby neutralising the Soviet threat. However, only a few of the individuals compromised by Petrov’s documents (such as Rupert Lockwood and Frank O’Sullivan) had appeared in the VENONA traffic, and the commissioners’ remit was far wider than the documents purloined by Petrov. Those items consisted of Russian language papers, known as the G Series; Document H, in English, written by O’Sullivan and Document J, typed by Lockwood.
These documents were the very heart of the Royal Commission and represented the hard evidence of the allegations of espionage under consideration. Oral testimony from the Petrovs might be dismissed as hearsay, exaggeration or embroidery, but the actual sheets of paper were harder to refute, although a sustained effort was made to undermine the Petrovs’ credibility, impugn their motives and infer the documents were not to be taken at face value. For example, on 17 January 1955, Petrov was cross-examined at length about the documents, all of which were originals (with one exception, designated G4) that had been placed in a sealed envelope by the previous rezident, Valentin Sadovnikov, and then handed over to Ivan Pakhomov, who in turn passed it on to Petrov in February 1952.
Each handover had involved a brief ceremony when the envelope was removed from an inner safe and the wax seal marked with a swan was inspected. The first ten documents, G1 to G10, were in Sadovnikov’s handwriting, and the remainder, G11 to G18, had been written by Petrov, who at the end of March 1954 had opened the package, removed all the documents and then replaced them with some allegedly innocuous paperwork that referred to Rose-Marie Ollier, a 47-year-old cipher clerk at the French Embassy codenamed OLGA.
The irrefutable fact was that the handwriting on some of the most incriminating items was Sadovnikov’s and not Petrov’s, and the envelope had lain undisturbed for two years until Petrov had decided to employ the material as leverage in his defection.
While Petrov’s papers were interesting and even embarrassing, they were by themselves inconclusive, and in comparison to the VENONA intercepts, almost irrelevant. However, the secret of VENONA had to be maintained at all costs, so the commission was briefed in private session about some of the VENONA decrypts in order to establish a link between some of the principal suspects, such as Jim Hill, Ian Milner of external affairs, and Wally Clayton, where there was a gap in the evidence. The problem arose in the commission’s conclusions, which could hardly condemn the spies without disclosing the evidence or admit that Petrov had failed to deliver the proof required to bring criminal charges. In his testimony Clayton denied ever having met either Hill or Milner and admitted only that he had been shown some low-level papers by a typist, Frances Bernie, who made a limited confession, having accepted immunity from prosecution. Bernie worked for Dr Evatt’s secretary, Allan Dalziel, who appeared in the VENONA material as TECHNICIAN, and was also listed on one of the ‘Petrov papers’, designated G1, as ‘Denis’.
To cap it all, Clayton denied on oath that he had ever met any Soviet citizen. This, of course, was a travesty, but both the British and the Americans insisted that VENONA was too important to be jeopardised in an effort to imprison Clayton and his ring. Accordingly, unlike its Canadian equivalent which had resulted in twenty-one prosecutions based on Igor Gouzenko’s evidence, not a single charge was brought against a suspect in Australia. Doubtless the outcome would have been rather different if ASIO had been permitted to reveal what had been achieved by the British and American cryptographers over the past decade, but this was never an option, so the Royal Commission confined itself to the various documents that Petrov had removed from his embassy safe. These consisted of a short hand-written list of contacts, inherited from Ivan Pakhomov, that appeared to incriminate those named, and various other items, including a forty-page profile of leading Australian politicians and personalities containing some highly pejorative and controversial observations. Much to Rupert Lockwood’s embarrassment, he was identified as the principal author of the notorious ‘Document J’ and he reluctantly conceded that he had visited the embassy to help compile it, claiming that he had simply acted as a professional journalist, assisting a foreign correspondent who had sought his help on what would now be called ‘background’. Such behaviour, while reprehensible, amounted to neither espionage nor criminal conduct, and much the same was true of the others similarly tarnished.
Despite the disappointment of the Royal Commission, which markedly failed to have the same impact as its Canadian counterpart, set up after Gouzenko’s defection in September 1945, the Petrovs were nevertheless the most senior Soviet intelligence defectors to the West for two decades, and together they supplied a wealth of information to flesh out the bones already provided by VENONA. For instance, the Petrovs confirmed the composition of the rezidentura which, apart from himself and his wife, who had acted as his cipher clerk, included the second secretary, Filipp Kislytsin, who had arrived in 1952, having spent three years at the London rezidentura between 1945 and 1948; the TASS correspondent Viktor Antonov, and an attaché from Latvia, Janis Plaitkais, who had arrived early in 1953 and had concentrated on monitoring the very substantial local émigré community. In addition, the rezident could rely on a few co-opted workers in the embassy, and these included the press attaché since 1951, Georgi Kharkovetz, and the commercial secretary since 1952, Nikolai Kovaliev (who was also the embassy’s party secretary). MI5 was particularly keen to hear about Petrov’s friendship with Kislytsin who had confided to his colleague that while in Moscow he had supervised the last-minute escape from London in May 1951 of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, who had been resettled in the Soviet Union. His recollection that Burgess and Maclean had been recruited by the NKVD while still at university, would be a considerable shock. Perhaps worse was Kislytsin’s assertion that the two diplomats had fled the country because they had spotted MI5’s interest in them.
For the past thirty-five months the British public, media, government and intelligence agencies had puzzled over the disappearance of the two diplomats. The last confirmed sighting was of them, on Saturday, 26 May 1951, after they had disembarked from the SS Falaise, in St-Malo, attempting to catch a train to Paris. Only MI5 knew that probably both men had been long-term Soviet agents, perhaps since their university days, but the organisation also knew that it had been Maclean who had been under surveillance, and that Burgess had never been an espionage suspect. Yet, according to Petrov, they had been alerted in part by MI5 surveillance on Burgess. The Russian also knew that their escape had involved ‘an airlift over the Czech border to Prague’ before they reached Kuybyshev (modern day Samara), where they were now living.
The Petrovs also gave valuable information about their previous posting in Stockholm, and revealed that the assumption that Boris N. Yartsev, codenamed KIN in VENONA, had been the NKVD rezident was incorrect. In fact, he had been a subordinate of his wife, who was the real rezident, a detail that did not emerge from scrutiny of the VENONA texts.
While they may not have had quite the same impact as Gouzenko, the Petrovs did achieve considerable political notoriety because Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies was accused of having made capital out of the defection, and of having attempted to smear the Labour opposition with disloyalty. When Dr Evatt, formerly the minister for external affairs, but now the leader of the Opposition, appeared before the commission he denounced Petrov’s papers as forgeries and accused him of conspiring to undermine the Labour Party. Tactically, his approach was a mistake as the documents were entirely authentic, but he did unite the Australian left against what he claimed was a massive, politically motivated plot. Dr Evatt, of course, had never been indoctrinated into the original VENONA-based enquiry, and therefore never realised that the accusations against Milner, Hill, Throssel and Clayton even predated Petrov’s arrival in the country.
The defection of Petrov, and his wife Evdokia, who was also an intelligence officer, holding the rank of senior lieutenant, and who acted as her husband’s cipher clerk, took some three years to gestate, and remains an object lesson in how to develop and handle a potential candidate for defection. The beginning of the Petrov story is best told by Michael Thwaites, one of several remarkable Australian case officers who pulled off one the greatest coups of the Cold War. In November 1955, ASIO circulated Thwaites’s report:2
DEFECTION of Vladimir Mikhailovich PETROV @ PROLETARSKI, and Evdokia Alexeevna Petrova © KARTSEVA
Introduction:
1. The defection of V.M. Petrov and his wife was the culmination of a case conducted by the Australian Security Intelligence Organ- isation as part of its counter-espionage function. In the account which follows no attempt has been made to summarize the whole case. Only those elements which concern the Petrovs’ decision to defect, and the steps by which they arrived at that decision, have been included, together with some general conclusions on the subject of Russian defectors, Some of these conclusions are necessarily tentative at present, and may be modified by subse- quent disclosures. Nevertheless, the main outlines of the Petrovs’ defection are now fairly clear, and shed considerable light on the internal stresses in a Soviet station in foreign territory, and on the psychological and other factors involved in a defection from the Soviet Intelligence Service abroad.
2. The defection was in each case the free deliberate choice of the person concerned, and this was acknowledged by both Petrovs. On the other hand, it is certain that neither defection would have taken place without careful study, and in the latter stages, detailed planning and vigorous action by ASIO to anticipate difficulties and facilitate the final step. It must be acknowledged that the Soviet authorities for their part, could hardly have done more than they did to ensure the successful conclusion of the venture. Their part is one of the encouraging aspects of the story.
Arrival in Canberra:
3. V.M. Petrov and his wife arrived in Australia on 5th February, 1951, to join the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Canberra. He was then listed as ‘Clerk’, and he and his wife travelled on Special (non-Diplomatic) passports. However, on 4th April the Soviet Embassy described Petrov to the Department of External Affairs as ‘Third Secretary’; and that remained his official posting up to his defection to the Australian authorities on 3rd April, 1954. Mrs Petrov carried out the duties of Accountant and Chief Secretary at the Embassy until November 1953, when she was relieved by the wife of the new First Secretary, Vislykh.
Study of Soviet Representation:
4. At the time of the Petrovs’ arrival in Australia, AS1O. had just embarked on a programme of systematic study of the official Soviet representation designed to build up background informa- tion as a basis for, (a) penetration of the Embassy, (b) selection of likely Intelligence operatives, (c) assessment of potential defec- tors.
5. Background particulars and a photographic register of all Soviet Embassy personnel were compiled and revised at regular inter- vals; and the collated results were studied in conjunction with the known pattern of Soviet espionage and of Soviet Diplomatic estab- lishments in other countries. Studies supplied by [the] UK Security Service proved to be of the utmost value in this connection.
6. A particular effort was made to maintain surveillance of the inter- state travel of Soviet personnel selected for special attention, as it was considered that the larger cities of Sydney and Melbourne provided better opportunities for ‘clandestine contacts’ than did Canberra. Though exacting, this surveillance paid good dividends.
7. Surveillance in Canberra offered peculiar difficulties because of Canberra’s wide, deserted streets, semi-rural atmosphere, and widely-spaced houses. However, though surveillance there was of necessity limited and sporadic, it supplied indispensable evidence of persons in social contact with Russian officials.
8. (Clandestine contacts were in fact carried out by Petrov, and prob- ably other Russian officials in Canberra itself, and a letter-drop was selected by Petrov in a small railway bridge in the nearby countryside. The bigger cities of Sydney and Melbourne were, however, preferred for the purpose of secret contacts.)
9. From the end of 1951 technical aids began to supply a steady stream of information on Soviet Embassy personalities; and from August 1952, when the exploitation of this source was intensified, it became possible to draw up an increasingly accurate Order of Battle, and to select with some confidence the likely candidates for Intelligence functions among Soviet officials.
10. Petrov was soon selected as one of several Russians deserving spe- cial study because of – (a) his frequent visits to Sydney and Mel- bourne (often unaccompanied), (b) the fact that, though he was listed only as Third Secretary, he and his wife occupied a complete house of their own, (c) a report that on a previous tour of duty in Sweden he had had some kind of unspecified Intelligence duties, (d) his claim, as Third Secretary, to diplomatic immunity.
11. His overt functions were obviously such as could provide him with excellent cover for clandestine contacts as Consul he was the point of contact in the Embassy for Soviet and Satellite nationals in Australia; he was found to be active in the Soviet’s repatriation drive, and to visit numbers of migrants in this connection; he was a regular visitor to the pro-Soviet Russian Social Club in Sydney; as VOKS representative he was concerned with the distribution of Russian films, and had a natural link with pro-Soviet organi- sations such as Australia-Russia Societies; he was responsible for meeting the Diplomatic Couriers in Sydney, and seeing them off again; he was in charge of travel arrangements for members of the Embassy to and from Australia; and he was in frequent official touch with the UK Passport officer in Canberra and the protocol officer in the Department of External Affairs.
12. It was debated whether these functions of Petrov’s were so many and so open as to preclude secret Intelligence duties; but his free- dom of movement was considered to be an overwhelming argu- ment in favour of giving him special attention, A striking feature was the frequency with which he travelled alone on his visits to other cities, and there was some evidence of independence of Ambassadorial control.
13. As a result of this study, together with information from other sources, the Counter-Espionage Section of ASIO was satisfied, by mid-1953, that Petrov was in fact an officer of the MGB (Minis- try of State Security), later incorporated in the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs).
Role of Source DIABOLO in the Defection:
14. A key part in the cultivation of Petrov and in his ultimate defec- tion was played by DIABOLO. DIABOLO was a Russian-speaking source already working in the pro-Soviet Russian Social Club in Sydney. He was a Pole who arrived in Australia in 1947, ‘became a naturalized British subject in 1947, obtained a medical degree by means of a shortened post-war course, and went into practice in Sydney, his practice consisting to a large extent of migrants who were glad to avail themselves of his language qualifications.’
15. DIABOLO met Petrov in the Russian Social Club, to which Petrov was a regular visitor, and he was frequently in touch with him on his visits to Sydney. The exact nature of this early relationship is ‘by no means entirely clear as yet. According to DIABOLO, Petrov and another member of the Club encouraged his interest in NINA, a Russian girl who had recently arrived in Australia as a migrant, with whom DIABOLO soon became intimately associated. For a period of, months DIABOLO reported sensational statements and conspiratorial behaviour by NINA, who claimed that she was a member of a spy ring, produced an NKVD camera, ostentatiously photographed Sydney Harbour and Mascot aerodrome, and gen- erally played the part of the would-be Miata Hari.
16. DIABOLO reported her behaviour with apparent objectivity, but was found to have played up her story in or two small but possi- bly significant particulars. In general his attitude in reporting to his case officer was that NINA was mysterious and unreliable; but he expressed strong disbelief in her espionage story only when it was clear that his case officer disbelieved it.
17. At an early stage NINA visited Canberra in company with DIA- BOLO; she called at the Soviet Embassy, and was sent back to her hotel in an Embassy car. Questioned after Petrov’s defec- tion, NINA has denied any participation in real espionage and has admitted fabricating her espionage role, but claims that this was with the purely personal objective of interesting DIABOLO. Whether DIABOLO himself was a victim or a conscious partici- pant in the scheme has yet to be resolved.
18. However that may be, as early as May 1951 DIABOLO was briefed to devote himself instead to the cultivation of Petrov and any other members of the Embassy whom he might meet. He established himself as a regular dining and wining companion of Petrov’s in Sydney, and on various occasions visited him at his home in Canberra.
19. As early as November 1951 DIABOLO reported that he was sure that Petrov and his wife would not wish to go back to Russia when their term in Australia expired. If this represented more than wishful thinking on his part, it would seem to confirm Petrov’s assertion that he had thought about defection even when he was in Sweden. However, when questioned on the point, DIABOLO explained that he had formed this view by observation of Petrov’s behaviour in Australia, not from a direct statement by Petrov that he would like to stay; and his report was accordingly received with some caution.
20. Nevertheless, in April 1952 ASIO Headquarters advised State offices that Petrov (along with the TASS agent, Pakhomov) should ‘be studied as a possible subject for a planned defection operation’.
21. DIABOLO’s association with Petrov continued to be close and reg- ular. He reported in considerable detail on Petrov’s movements, overt activities, and relaxations, indicated Mrs. Petrov’s position as Ambassador’s Secretary and Accountant in the Embassy, and supplied some facts (later confirmed) about their domestic life and background.
22. In September 1952 DIABOLO reported was feared and respected by other members of the Embassy indicating that he was a high-ranking member of the MVD at the Embassy. However, he asserted that all the members of Soviet Embassy staffs are MVD and this, coupled with suspicions concerning the NINA episode, cast some doubt upon his reliability in assessing the importance of his contact.
23. (In fact it became clear when direct contact was established with Petrov that DIABOLO had no precise knowledge Petrov’s MGB-MD functions or of his undercover activities and contacts.)
24. Throughout 1952 and into 1953 the convivial association of DIA- BOLO and Petrov continued. DIABLO would meet Petrov on his arrival at Mascot aerodrome, Sydney; or Petrov would ring DIA- BOLO at his surgery using the codename of ‘Bill’. They dined and drank together, and attended various social gatherings, including meetings at the Russian Social Club, parties given by the Czech- oslovakian Consul-General, end gatherings of a pro-Soviet com- plexion enlivened by variations on the ‘peace’ theme.
25. DIABOLO reported that Petrov, besides partaking of his hospi- tality, regularly asked him to perform small commissions, such as obtaining blank official forms (Immigration forms, driving licences, etc.) and several times got him to make enquiries on his behalf about migrants who were Soviet or Satellite nationals. DIA- BOLO performed many such services for Petrov, as well as driv- ing him about Sydney in his car.
26. Early in 1953 a new and important trend appeared. DIABOLO began to report repeated evidence of open hostility on Petrov’s part towards his Embassy colleagues, On one visit Petrov eluded the Chauffeur who had apparently been sent to accompany him as a bodyguard, and swore at ‘the Embassy crowd’, implying that some of them were jealous of his being on good terms with Aus- tralians. According to DIABOLO, Petrov said he would not drink with this mob’; that they were ‘a lot of bastards’; that he had no friends at the Embassy; and that he was afraid his house might have been wired by his1 colleagues.
27. On 20th April 1953 DIABOLO reported that Petrov seemed sick, worried and depressed, and was having trouble with his eyes. Moreover he claimed that he and Petrov had had discussions on the question of Petrov going into partnership with him in a restau- rant business in Sydney.
28. (Mrs. Petrov has subsequently confirmed that Petrov hod DIAB- OLO under study for recruitment, and gave him the code name of GRIGORII in 1951; DIABOLO supplied Immigration forms and gave other help to Petrov, and Petrov had recommended the loan of £500 to DIABOLO to help him buy the restaurant, which could then be used for Illegal work).
29. On 3rd May 1953, a development occurred the importance of which for various reasons was not fully appreciated at the time. Petrov visited DIABOLO at his recently acquired flat and stayed the night there, instead of at an [sic] hotel, as had hitherto been his practice. From this time onwards he frequently stayed at DIA- BOLO’s flat on his visits to Sydney, and showed other signs of laxness and recklessness in regard to caution and security. (See below, Operational Comments, paragraph 140.)
30. Reports were now received that Petrov was due to in late May or early June. On 4th May he told DIABLO he was going to the USSR with his wife for a few months leave, and indicated that he thought it quite on the cards that he might not return.
31. On 19th May Petrov consulted FRANKMAN, an eye specialist, about his eyes, and went into Canberra hospital for treatment; but on 16th June he again stayed at DIABOLO’s flat in Sydney; and said that if the condition of his eyes was satisfactory for travel, he would leave for Russia by air early in July. He dismissed the busi- ness proposition, saying he was not certain he would be returning to Australia.
32. He was worried about his return to Russia, abused his colleagues and their intrigues, and described an incident at the Soviet National Day celebrations on 7th November of the previous year when he had refused to carry out the Ambassador’s order to remove a Duty Officer who had imbibed too freely. At an Embassy meeting next day the Ambassador had charged Petrov with diso- bedience and drunkenness.
33. Petrov said that he had had a row with the Ambassador over this and also over his wife, who had been charged with insubordi- nation: he suspected that this episode might be behind his recall to Moscow.
34. On the strength of these reported events, DIABOLO suggested various lines of action to get Petrov to defect. He suggested that a prominent Commonwealth official, with whom Petrov had nor- mal business contact, should be asked to approach Petrov with, offers of money and protection; ‘alternatively, that some Aus- tralian public figure should send Petrov a letter with an offer of political asylum.’ Neither of these proposals was taken up by ASIO since the first would involve the Commonwealth Govern- ment in the incitement of a Soviet diplomat to defect, while the other would provide documentary evidence of such an attempt by a prominent Australian if Petrov (as then seemed quite possible), reported the whole matter.
35. Something of a deadlock seemed to have been reached. On the one hand the reality of serious friction between Petrov and the Embassy authorities was not discounted; on the other hand the danger of relying on DIABOLO as an intermediary in defection loomed large in view of (a) his evident ignorance of the diplomatic pitfalls, (b) his personal eagerness and acknowledged mercenary interest in the matter, (c) doubts as to the reliability of his reports, in view of his opportunist character, and the earlier suspicions surrounding the NINA episode (in review, it is apparent that in all main points regarding the defection this suspicion was unjustified, and that his information was substantially accurate. This view was strongly maintained from this point by the officers who were in close per- sonal touch with him), (d) the feeling that, granted the truth of DIABOLO’s reports, his unscrupulous character, obvious to ASJO, would not have escaped Petrov’s notice, and this, together with the fact that he was so recently naturalized and of Polish origin, would create doubts in Petrov’s mind about his real standing and his official Australian connections, points on which a would-be but wavering defector would require the utmost assurance.
36. Two factors combined to break this deadlock, the announcement of Beria’s arrest on 10th July, 1953, and the enlistment of the assis- tance of FRANKMAN. Beria’s fall might have important repercus- sions which could be exploited, particularly at a time when Petrov was under sentence of recall to Moscow.
37. As ASIO were by this time satisfied that Petrov was an MGB officer, it was felt that the news of Beria’s fall might have impor- tant repercussions which could be exploited, particularly at a time when Petrov was under sentence of recall to Moscow.
38. FRANKMAN was the eye specialist to whom Petrov had been introduced by DIABOLO for the treatment of his eye complaint. It was felt that he could represent a useful new element in the situation. His characteristically Australian manner would be the reverse of conspiratorial, and would carry conviction; at the same time by dealing with him direct a useful cross-check would be obtained on DIABOLO s accuracy.
39. FRANKMAN was approached without DIABOLO’s knowledge. It was explained to him that ASIO had reason to believe that his patient, Petrov, wished to remain in Australia instead of returning to Russia, but that there were strong, reasons against any official sounding out of Petrov’s wishes: however, these objections did not apply to enquiries made by a private citizen, FRANKMAN agreed to help. At his own suggestion, he passed a message to Pet- rov, via DIABOLO, that he would like to examine his eyes again for professional interest in a rather unusual case; and an appoint- ment was made for 23rd July.
40. Meanwhile Petrov again stayed at DIABOLO’s flat, that he was not leaving for Russia immediately, the Ambassador (Lifanov) was leaving early in In this connection he expressed the hope that perhaps there were some good people in Russia who saw Lifanov’s actions in their true light; and said that he heard that the new Ambassador was a decent fellow.
41. Meanwhile Petrov again stayed at DIABLO’s flat and said he was not leaving for Russia immediately but that the Ambassa- dor (Lifanov) was leaving early in August. In this connection he expressed the hope that perhaps there were some good people in Russia who saw Lifanov’s actions in their true light; and said that he had heard that the new ambassador was a decent fellow.
42. The next evening from the flat Petrov rang his wife, who was on duty at the Embassy, and enquired how the meeting that evening had gone. He described to DIABOLO the procedure of criticism and counter-criticism, and said he despised the Soviet system of ‘putting each other in.’
43. Next morning DIABOLO took Petrov to FRANKMAN’s surgery. FRANKMAN indicated that he would be same time with Petrov, and that DIABOLO need not wait. When they were alone and there had been some preliminary talk, the following conversation took place:
FRANKMAN: Are you going back to Moscow?
Petrov: Yes.
FRANKMAN: I don’t know that I would want to go back, with all the changes taking place there – Beria.
Petrov: It is my duty.
FRANKMAN: Don’t you like this country?
Petrov: Yes, it is a fine country – plenty of food – plenty of everything.
FRANKMAN: Why don’t you stay here?
Petrov: It is my duty to go back.
FRANKMAN: If I was in your place I’d stay here.
Petrov: It is very hard to get a job like that.
FRANKMAN: Not if you know the right people – it is traditional that the Diplomatic Corps look after other members of the Diplomatic Corps who are in difficulties or in these circumstances – such as the Czech Consul who was here – I have friends who know about these things.
There was a long pause here, whilst FRANKMAN was busy treating Petrov – then Petrov said:
Petrov: That Czech – yes, he has a restaurant in … Street. (The Doctor could not recall the street name he mentioned.)
FRANKMAN: Oh, I am sure you could do better than that if helped by the right people.
Petrov did not comment and the matter was not pressed. An appointment was made in a fortnight’s time.
44. FRANKMAN described Petrov’s manner as quiet, guarded, slow and deliberate. He was quite sure Petrov perfectly understood the import of the conversation and he recorded his impression of three elements in Petrov’s reaction – (a) a sense of duty to the Soviet, (b) fear that he would not be able to establish himself in Australia, (c) wistfulness in country, etc.
45. DIABOLO subsequently reported that he had met Petrov after his visit to FRANKMAN, and Petrov had described the conversation. ‘The account given by DIABOLO was substantially accurate’; he added that Petrov warned him against FRANKMAN as being a ‘security’ man. The word ‘security’ was never used by FRANK- MAN: Whether it was introduced by Petrov or by DIABOLO is not clear. DIABOLO also reported that Petrov referred to a Czech consular defector viio had established himself comfortably in Syd- ney; and that Petrov was very vague about the interview but men- tioned that it would be interesting to ‘see how it develops’.
46. Petrov saw FRANKMAN a month later on 22nd August, at his surgery. On this occasion Petrov spoke glowingly of and at any attempt by FRANKMAN to steer the conversation towards the advantages of life in Australia, praised Russia even more emphat- ically. He mentioned that he would not be going back for a while, but that his chief was leaving soon. He was amicable but moved off briskly as soon as the medical examination was completed. FRANKMAN felt that he had completely dismissed any idea of staying.
47. The ASIO assessment was that, while the FRANKMAN approach was probably a ‘dead duck’, at least a clearly defined line of con- tact with official quarters had been established for Petrov if at any future time he should feel disposed to make use of it.
48. Petrov’s association with DIABOLO continued unbroken on his frequent official visits to Sydney, including drinking, dining, and staying overnight at DIABOLO’s flat; and there were further reports of friction between him and Ambassador Lifanov.
49. In late September DIABOLO reported that Petrov had said that he did not believe that the charges against Beria were true. DIABOLO believed that Petrov was still interested in staying in Australia.
50. On 3rd October 1953 the new Ambassador, Generalov, arrived to take over the Embassy in Canberra. (The significance of this in the defection story was not fully appreciated till later, but it would seem that Petrov nourished some hopes that with Lifanov’s replacement a more congenial regime might be inaugurated. The reverse proved to be the case.)
51. Early in November there was independent evidence that the new ambassador was taking a severely authoritative attitude to the Petrovs. DIABOLO confirmed this, and early in December reported as follows:
Petrov was impressed with the prosperity and rapid progress of migrants in Australia, and would like to stay but was a prey to fear. His wife had been recently sacked from her job as Accountant and Secretary. (It was independently confirmed that she had been replaced by the wife of the new First Secretary, Vislykh, and had handed over her duties); this caused Petrov great alarm; he was very upset, hostile to the new ambassador and Soviet officialdom, said he would rather work in the streets than live in fear of his life, and that he and his wife were considering suicide. DIABOLO said that Petrov never talked Communist ideology; he had a good deal of contempt for ‘peace’ and ‘front’ organisations; but had never expressed any attitude to the Australian Communist Party.
52. On 28th November DIABOLO reported that he had offered to assist Petrov with the purchase of a chicken farm near Sydney; that Petrov had admitted that he would like that sort of life, but had remained non-committal towards any definite proposal; DIABOLO believed that he was seriously considering the mat- ter. He further reported that Petrov had no close relatives in Rus- sia, as they were all dead; his wife had her family in Russia, but DIABOLO thought that Petrov’s main concern would be for his own safety.
53. On 1st December a conference was held to review the defection possibilities; and next day DIABOLO was briefed by Ron Rich- ards (Regional Director for New South Wales) who by this time was handling him personally. He was instructed to pursue the chicken-farm business purely as a private venture, and was given clear instructions as to his course of action if Petrov showed signs of coming to a decision. It was impressed upon him that ASIO could in no circumstances be a party to inciting Petrov to defect but that if Petrov decided he wished to put in direct touch with an ASIO officer and that DIABOLO was in no position to take the official measures indispensable to a diplomatic defection. (Up to this stage DIABOLO’s reported conversations with Petrov had dealt solely with the question of what Petrov might do in Aus- tralia. In the absence of feelers in regard and political asylum, doubts persisted intentions.)
54. From this point until Petrov’s defection Richards was in constant touch with the Director-General, reporting each development and discussing each stop in the case.
[Paragraph 54 missing in the original.]
55. Throughout December Petrov paid several visits to the flat, DIAB- OLO reported that he spoke well of Australia, as a country where one could do well, and said that his wife was very ill and might not live very long. (DIABOLO interpreted this as a pretext for uni- lateral action by Petrov).
56. On 16th December Petrov said he would like to defer any decision about his future until the New Year; the farm was a great oppor- tunity which might not occur again; he might take it without his wife. He said that his disappearance would be a terrible scandal, and spoke about his youth and the hard life he had endured.
57. On 16th December Petrov again called on FRANKMAN at his surgery, and asked for an examination of his eyes. Neither party raised the question of his staying in Australia. However, Petrov suggested to DIABOLO that it would be a good idea to invite FRANKMAN to lunch as soon as possible.
58. On 23rd December tentative arrangements were made on Pet- rov’s next visit, that DIABOLO would take him to FRANKMAN’s home, and leave them alone in order that FRANKMAN could confirm his ability to arrange official contacts and protection.
59. Early on the morning of 24th December Petrov was involved in a car accident on the road between Canberra and Cooma. He claimed that he was forced off the road by a lorry; his car over- turned and was completely burnt out.
60. A few days later DIABOLO met him by chance in Sydney; he was depressed over the accident, and said that as he had failed to renew the insurance on the car, the ambassador was insisting that he pay for its replacement. He complained of the callousness of his Embassy colleagues to the painful abrasions he received in the accident, and said he got a lot more sympathy from Australians. He told DIABOLO that he would stay in Australia even without his wife, but it was a very hard decision to make because of her. She would not agree to stay because of her family in Russia; but if she went back her head would be cut off in any case; the author- ities over there would-not ask any questions as to guilt or other- wise.
61. On 9th January Petrov was again in Sydney, DIABOLO took him out to visit the chicken farm, and he paid a deposit on it. Next day DIABOLO reported that Petrov, before returning to Canberra, had had a frank discussion with him about the official aspect of defection, and had asked DIABOLO touch with the local author- ities.
62. He had been in an overwrought state, and had opened up to DIA- BOLO about the abject poverty of life in Russia contrasted with the privileges enjoyed by Maenkov and the ruling clique who lived in luxury, just as the Czar did. But you try to go to Rus- sia and say something against them: they will cut your head off’. Three million Russians ran away: Beria was killed, after he him- self had killed legions. ‘Why shouldn’t Russians live and let live, open their frontiers, they can’t fool anybody anyway; foreign dip- lomats can see things for themselves. I will stay here. I will write a true story, I will fix those bastards. I will tell the whole truth’.
63. (There is no reason to doubt the description of Petrov’s outburst against the Soviet; he has repeatedly spoken in the same vein since his defection.)
64. DIABOLO promised Petrov to take steps to arrange the necessary official contacts; and was briefed at each step. From this point the business moved swiftly into a new phase. FRANKMAN invited Petrov and DIABOLO to his home for drinks on the evening of 15th January, Petrov did not keep this engagement, but explained later that he had been too busy with the Ambassador and the Commercial Attaché, who were in Sydney on that day.
65. But on the evening of 23rd January Petrov and DIABOLO vis- ited FRANKMAN at his home. From discussion of conditions in Australia and the world the conversation passed to ‘doing well’ in Australia and what Petrov could do if he were not a diplomat but a resident. Petrov explained that he had no special qualifica- tions and was only a ‘country man’; whereupon FRANKMAN suggested the possibility of a chicken farm. (This was in fact pure coincidence, and happened to be a hobby of FRANKMAN’s.) Petrov then made clear his need of financial help and personal protection; to which FRANKMAN replied, ‘That can be arranged, I think I know the right people to help in that regard’.
66. At this meeting Petrov showed obvious signs of strain and anxi- ety; but both FRANKMAN and DIABOLO were convinced that he had in fact made up his mind to stay.
67. DIABOLO reported that during this visit to Sydney Petrov had suggested that DIABOLO should visit Canberra and try to per- suade his wife of the advantages of staying in Australia, After a briefing by Richards, he went to Canberra and visited the Petrovs at their house on the morning of 31st January.
68. DIABOLO reported that Mrs. Petrov was obviously under great stress. He suggested her remaining in Australia. She said that the ambassador’s wife was not on speaking terms with her; but then launched into a tirade in which she declared that coexistence of different systems was impossible, that the ideas of Marx-Lenin- Stalin still held good for her; that she would go back to Russia even if it meant death; that it was no use trying to talk her into staying. She said that she cared little f or her father or brother, but much for her mother and sister. This was her general line when Petrov was present. At other times she ridiculed the unbecom- ing dress of Soviet women, and expressed her admiration for the Queen (who was then visiting Australia).
69. She said she would like to accept DIABOLO’s invitation for them ‘both to visit him in Sydney; and a plane seat was booked for a visit on the 24th February.’
70. In Petrov’s absence she asked DIABOLO if he were [sic] suggest- ing she should stay in Australia, expressed the Antonov’s (the Sydney TASS Agent and his wife, whom DIABOLO was in touch with), and asked for complete discretion in regard to their conver- sation. DIABOLO recorded his opinion that the Petrovs did not completely trust each other.
71. On the 2nd February the Australian press carried the story of Yuri Rastvorov’s disappearance in Japan; and DIABOLO was instructed to bring it to Petrov’s attention. He reported that Petrov had said that his wife had lost her job through being too outspo- ken; and that the Ambassador had accused her of using her hus- band as a mouthpiece at meetings in the Embassy.
72. DIABOLO felt that Petrov was playing a waiting game, and was hoping that his wife would make up her mind; he did not seem to be afraid that she would inform the Embassy authorities of his intentions; but he would not commit himself until the last moment. Petrov had recently repeated that his wife’s family were the main obstacle to her coming, that she assisted them, and they depended on this to keep them in reasonable material comfort, and she felt wholly responsible for their maintenance and well-being. Petrov agreed that if he stayed in Australia and she returned to Moscow her fate would be sealed, but she still needed to be convinced of that.
73. As instructed, DIABOLO told Petrov that FRANKMAN was pes- tering him for some clear indication of Petrov’s intentions. Petrov commented, ‘He is a keen customer’ but did not wish to discuss the matter.
74. On 19th February Petrov was again in Sydney; he told DIABOLO that he had been ordered back to Russia in two months, and he thought his wife had decided against staying. DIABOLO urged the necessity for practical steps and definite arrangements. That evening they both visited FRANKMAN’s home.
75. FRANKMAN reported that when reference had been made to his influential connections, Petrov took the initiative, showed his alarm (‘They could shoot me’), asked to see a high security official with credentials, and emphasized the need for absolute secrecy, especially if there was to be any delay.
76. FRANKMAN replied that he would be glad to introduce Petrov to a personal friend of his, Richards, ‘Head of the Security Depart- ment here’, whom he could vouch for. He made it clear that for international reasons no initiative could come from the Govern- ment, but said that the Government would certainly grant pro- tection. He then telephoned Richards, and an unofficial meeting was arranged for 10 a.m. the next morning at DIABOLO’s flat; Richards would bring credentials, and absolute discretion would be observed.
77. After some general talk on the enmities of Europe contrasted with the amiable relations of people of different origins in Australia, Petrov and DIABOLO left, DIABOLO commented that FRANK- MAN was a decent sort of fellow; to which Petrov replied, ‘Yes. He is not out to shoot men of my type’, and again expressed his disgust with the system of mutual denunciations.
78. Next morning (20th) DIABOLO, with Petrov at his elbow, rang Richards and said that Petrov would like to postpone the meeting until the 26th, Richards then got DIABOLO to make certain that Petrov understood his position Director of the Security Service in New South Wales, with authority to represent the Commonwealth Government. Asked whether he was serious, Petrov replied, ‘Yes, I am serious’, Petrov returned to Canberra that evening.
79. On the 26th Petrov rang DIABOLO from Canberra to say that he could not come that day; since Kovaliov (the Commercial Attaché) and Pliatkais, Petrov’s assistant in migrant work, were on their way to Sydney.
80. The next day, Saturday 27th February, DIABOLO rang me from his flat to say that he had Petrov with him, and that Petrov would like to see Richards.
81. Richards arrived at the flat at 6.50 p.m. Petrov was sober but acutely nervous and perspiring; he several times laughed loudly without reason. DIABOLO was present most of the time, but left the room while Richards had a short talk with Petrov alone. Rich- ards left at 8 p.m.
82. On arrival Richards introduced himself and showed his creden- tials and another document giving him authority to grant political asylum on behalf of the Commonwealth. Petrov examined these closely, accepted them and Richards, and gave his own position as Third Secretary and Consul of the Soviet Embassy. He said, ‘This is to be between the three of us’. He said he wished to stay in Australia; his wife was the main difficulty, and he would try to persuade her to stay, but in any case he would stay. He was shown a brief statement that he was voluntarily seeking political asylum in Australia; he said he would sign it when he made the actual break. He asked for assurance of physical protection, and material assistance to establish himself in Australia.
83. For his part, he said that he would, (a) tell all he knew about the work of the Soviet Government in Australia, (b) write a book ‘for the world to know the truth’. He would have further discussions, and would probably make the break about mid-March.
84. He discussed the steps that the Embassy would take after his dis- appearance. They included a request for the police to find him: he hoped they would not be able to. He also predicted that the Embassy would charge him with, 1) mental weakness, 2) suicide, 3) some offence against Soviet law.
85. He attacked the Embassy staff, and confirmed the reports received from DIABOLO that he and his wife had been adversely reported on by the Ambassadors.
86. When asked by Richards what he meant by his promise to toll ‘all’, he replied, ‘I know what you do, Mr. Richards. I know what you want. I can tell you all you want to know, and I will do so, but that is later’ (i.e. when he came), Richards terminated the interview on friendly but official terms.
87. Next day, DIABOLO confirmed that Petrov had accepted Rich- ards’ assurances was impressed by the offer of safety and assis- tance, and was confident that he could cope with his Embassy colleagues. But later he had said, ‘How do Ido I know that the Government will do what Mr Richards says they will do – then I would he in a mess’.
88. According to DIABOLO, Petrov suggested that he would need six months holiday and a sum of money, say £5,000, to give him time to tell all he knows and write a book; hut DIABOLO should not put up this requirement too bluntly. He repented that he knew what Mr Richards wanted, and would make a plan to ‘got together everything’: He could manage this during his nights on duty at the embassy.
89. On 19th March Richards again saw Petrov with DIABOLO at the latter’s flat. Petrov told Richards that he had definitely decided to stay in Australia; and discussed being made to his wife, possibly through some other woman of her acquaintance. (This proposal was put aside, as being altogether too dangerous, impracticable, and uncertain.)
90. A discussion on finance ensued, on which matter Richards had already sought the advice of the Director-General. As a visual aid and demonstration of the Commonwealth’s bona fides, Richards showed Petrov £5,000 in cash, a sight which, as described by DIA- BOLO, impressed all, ‘including myself’. ‘Petrov dismissed pro- posals for a trusteeship account, saying that he believed the prom- ises would be kept. It was then arranged that he should receive this sum of money after his defection, and should keep it in a safe of which he would have the key.’
91. There was a brief discussion of the information which Petrov could provide; and it was made plain to him that particular value would be attached to matters affecting the security of Australia and any help towards the detection of persons working against Australia.
92. As to the mechanics of his ‘disappearance’, Petrov rejected the idea of being picked up in Canberra, and proposed instead that he would come to Sydney with very little as if on a normal trip, and simply not return. He was anxious that after his disappearance no informa- tion should be given to the Press or the Soviet Embassy until after his wife’s departure for Russia, as he felt that would help her.
93. After Richards had left the flat he expressed pleasure at the finan- cial arrangements, and said ‘I don’t think they are going to put it over me’ (meaning the Australian authorities).
94. On the 20th and 21st March, further discussions took place between Petrov, DIABOLO and Richards. (DIABOLO reported that Petrov was badly needing reassurance about the moral basis of his pro- posed action.) Petrov proposed to come about 3rd April; he would be meeting new arrivals to join the Embassy staff, including his own successor, and he wanted to turn over his work to the new man and leave everything in order. He was still turning over the possibility of another approach to his wife, and even suggested a visit to their home in Canberra by Richards.
95. This suggestion was of course ruled out as foolhardy; but the pos- sibility was mentioned of an approach to her on board ship, while the chance remained of her dis-embarking at some Australian port. Practical details which interested Petrov were the picking up of his sporting gun and fishing rods, and arrangements for his Alsatian dog, Jack, to which he was devoted.
96. Meanwhile on the 20th Richards met Petrov at another flat with- out DlABOLO’s knowledge. Petrov was cool and decisive, watch- ful ‘but not uneasy, He now made clear that he considered DIAB- OLO his good friend in the matter of assisting his defection; ‘but stressed that, (a) in spite of DIABOLO’s emphasis on the finan- cial aspect, he, PETROV, was not primarily concerned to bargain about the money (‘I trust you to take care of me’)’, (b) DIABOLO did not know anything about his espionage work.
97. Petrov promised to give all the help he could in regard to cur- rent espionage including names of sources and reports: he would give these when he actually defected. He said that Generalov had demanded to know his contacts; but that he had refused to reveal them. Finally he voiced an apprehension which has evidently been real to both Petrovs at times – ‘My wife says we are like the Rosenbergs if we stay; I told her that was stupid’.
98. The next contact with Petrov took the form of three brief meetings between Richards and him in Richards’ car at various rendezvous in Canberra, At the first, on 30th March, Petrov was in a hurry, as he was on his way to a reception. He was satisfied that all was safe at the Embassy, and was so confident that he proposed to return to Canberra with the new arrivals from Moscow, and spend a week or so with them, getting valuable recent information before defecting.
99. The rendezvous next evening was for 8.30 p.m.; but Petrov did not turn up till 10.30 p.m. He said that a meeting at the Embassy which he had expected to be over in half an hour had lasted three hours. Generalov had criticized many of the staff, including Mrs Petrov. Following this Petrov had suggested that she should stay; but she was obdurate on account of her family. He felt that she was being stupid: he would stay in any case.
100. Richards again met Petrov the following evening. This time he was very nervous, and said that the previous evening, after he and his wife had left the Embassy, Generalov had carried out a raid on his safe and desk, where a document had been found which should not have been there. The Ambassador had severely reprimanded him, and had said a report would go to Moscow. The documents –which Petrov had secreted were quite safe; but in view of what had happened, he had decided to stay in Sydney on his next visit, and not return to Canberra: he thought there was a chance that his wife now might stay. He gave Richards his gun and a bag for conveyance to Sydney.
101. Petrov travelled to Sydney by next morning’s plane, carrying only a light handbag, Richards was a passenger on the same plane.
102. At 2.30 p.m. that day (2nd April) Richards met Petrov at Richards’ flat. At 4.30 p.m. Richards left Petrov in the flat and reported the situation to the Director-General. At 6.30 p.m. Richards returned to the flat, and Petrov signed the document requesting of his own free will political asylum in Australia, At 8 p.m. the Director- General arrived at the flat and had a short interview with Petrov. During this interview Petrov showed all the documents he had brought with him, and Soviet espionage in; for the first time gave detailed information about Australia. Petrov then went to stay the night at DIABOLO’s flat. Richards called there for a short time later in the evening.
103. On 3rd April Petrov met the new arrivals from Moscow, including his successor Kovalenok, escorted them to Mascot aerodrome, and saw them aboard the plane for Canberra. Then at 11.35 a.m. he followed Richards out of the passenger lounge of the aerodrome, and into Richards’ car, and drove off.
104. On the way to the safe house he asked to be taken to a private hotel where he had some business to complete with one of his Embassy colleagues. He transferred to a taxi some distance from this hotel, and arranged to be picked up again at an agreed time and place. He was late for this rendezvous, but arrived in due course. He explained that on his way he had felt thirsty, and had gone into a bar for a beer.
105. On arrival at the safe house, Petrov was given the promised sum of money, which he put away for him. He handed over the docu- ments to Richards, gave a brief explanation of their contents, and though very distraught and anxious for his own safety, began to give his own statement.
Defection of Mrs. Petrov:
106. Mrs. Petrov’s defection took place substantially as by her in con- siderable detail to the Royal Commission on Espionage, and reported in the Australian press.
107. From ASIO’s point of view the desirability of obtaining a dou- ble defection had never been in doubt, particularly in view of the important position which Mrs. Petrov clearly held in the Embassy in her own right, reinforced by the reports of her given by DIA- BOLO, and in the latter stages by Petrov himself. On the other hand there had been nothing like the close and continued contact which had been established in the case of Petrov himself; her own husband was dubious of her ultimate desire to defect; and there was the known factor of her family in Russia. In the circumstances it was decided that no initiative could be risked, and that the most that could be done was to foresee and prepare for every eventual- ity, What could not be foreseen was the degree of assistance to be provided by the Soviet authorities themselves.
108. Mrs. Petrov told the Royal Commission that her husband had ‘infiltrated’ the possibility of defection into her mind. Whatever the exact degree of their discussions on this point it seems clear that, (a) she knew that her husband was seriously considering defection, (b) she was by no means fully informed of his plans, and did not know when he left home on Friday, 2nd April, that he had arranged to following day, and not return.
109. On 6th April when Petrov was already several days overdue and nothing had been heard of him, Generalov called Mrs Petrov to his office and said that he feared Petrov would not now return, and had perhaps been kidnapped. He told her that he was asking the Australian authorities to investigate; that meanwhile she must take up residence in the Embassy building, in case an attempt should be made to kidnap her also.
110. From this point onwards the incredible ineptitude shown in the handling of this intelligent and high-spirited woman played an important, if not a decisive part, in her final decision, confined to one room. She was obviously under virtual arrest, was confined tone room in the Embassy building under continual supervision, was only provided with bed and food as a result of her own pro- tests, was allowed to see only one newspaper, The Canberra Times, and whenever she asked to listen to the wireless, was told that all the sets had ‘gone wrong’: this even proved to be the case, with the wireless in the official car which drove her to Sydney. She was studiously avoided by all Embassy staff except on official busi- ness; and the other Embassy wives showed malicious pleasure at her predicament, She was allowed a short visit to her house under escort to collect clothes and belongings, There she was outraged to find evidence of a hasty search and to see a large pile of her own and her husband’s clothes heaped indiscriminately in the middle of the room. She was several times interrogated by Generalov and Kovaliev (Commercial Attaché and Secretary of the Party in the Embassy) about her husband’s intentions and movements, but she insisted that she knew nothing beyond the fact that he was greatly distressed by the attacks and adverse reports against him.
111. Meanwhile (in her capacity as MVD cypher clerk) she handed over to Kovalenok all the documents, equipment, and funds of the MVD office: he checked these, accepted them, and signed for them on the 15th, After that she was not allowed into the cypher section.
112. Generalov and Kovaliev interviewed her again, and showed her a letter from her husband which had been received through External Affairs; in it he said he was well and asked her to meet him, Gen- eralov said the letter was obviously written under dictation. She had to write a reply under their supervision, on instruction from Moscow, in which she said that she was unwilling to see him as she was afraid of falling into a trap. She protested against this ref- erence to a trap, but finally gave way, Generalov also insisted that she alter the diminutive ‘Volodenka’ (her usual form of address to her husband) to the less affectionate ‘Volodya’. The stupidity and pettiness of the treatment she received irritated and provoked her greatly.
113. Three other developments caused her even more serious alarm, (a) she discussed with Kovalenok her situation when she returned to Moscow, and be reminded her that she herself must be aware of the provisions in the Soviet penal code for the punishment of relatives of enemies of the people which could mean penal servi- tude or even death for the wife a voluntary defector, (b) she asked Generalov to obtain for her a guarantee of immunity from Mos- cow. On the morning of her departure she again asked about this and he replied that it had not yet arrived. Prom this she inferred the worst, (c) finally, Generalov reminded her that the couriers who would escort her were armed, and if there were any attempts by the Australian authorities to force her to stay, they might use their weapons, (in Mrs. Petrov’s mind this aroused the apprehen- sion that there was a plot to do away with her on the journey, under pretext of an attempted escape).
114. On the 8-hours plane trip from Sydney to Darwin, all these epi- sodes added up in Mrs. Petrov’s mind to the consideration, ‘If they treat me like this in the Embassy here, what will they do when I get to Moscow?’ Nevertheless her feelings for her family in Moscow inclined her to take the risk.
115. She was to travel under escort of the two couriers, Jarkov and Karpinsky and Kislytsin, 2nd Secretary at the Canberra Embassy. By this time the Prime Minister’s announcement on the evening of 13th April that Petrov had sought asylum, and the subsequent publicity, had aroused great public interest and sympathy for Mrs Petrov, who was believed to be returning to Russia under duress. On the night of 19th April when the party were due to leave Syd- ney, a demonstration took place at Mascot aerodrome organised by anti-Soviet Russians and Czechs, Mrs. Petrov was assisted through the unruly crowd, losing a shoe in the process, and had to be helped aboard the plane. But she is insistent that at this point, though distressed and anxious, she had every intention of return- ing to Russia, and would not have responded to an offer of asylum had one been made.
116. (In fact, preparations had been made to grant Mrs. Petrov asylum at Sydney, Darwin and other points along the route if she asked for it, and Petrov was actually waiting in a room at Mascot aero- drome to interview her. But this was not thought likely and the demonstration ruled out the possibility.)
117. The Director-General of Security, Colonel Spry, was by this time in Canberra, in constant touch with the Commonwealth Govern- ment; he took personal charge of the operation throughout the night. Wireless communication was established with the Captain of the aircraft, who was asked specific 1 questions; after making enquiries he reported that Mrs Petrov was very much afraid of the couriers, who were armed, (bs; was anxious to know what had happened to her husband, and was interested in the question of staying in Australia.
118. Detailed instructions were then telephoned to Mr Leydin, the Assistant Administrator of the Northern Territory at Darwin. When the plane landed there, before dawn on 20th April, Mr Leydin approached Mrs. Petrov as soon as she disembarked, and asked her if she wished to remain in Australia. Another Commonwealth official engaged Kislitsyn in conversation, and at the same time a police guard interposed between the couriers and Mrs Petrov, and asked them if they were armed, (it had been ascertained that the carrying of firearms and ammunition in a pressurized aircraft was contrary to International Air Regulations and to the rules of the airline by which they werc travelling). One of the couriers made a move as if to draw a revolver; and both couriers were thereupon disarmed. (One courier offered resistance, the other did not.) Each was found to be carrying a loaded revolver. The weapons were handed to the Captain of the aircraft, for return to the couriers in due course; and the ammunition was sent back to the Soviet Embassy in Canberra. After this no restraint was placed upon the couriers’ movements, Kislytsin protested that diplomatic immu- nity had been violated; but was told that he was completely free to move about as he wished, and appeared satisfied. These events gave Leydin sufficient time with Mrs Petrov for him to inform her that her husband was safe and well, and that if she wished to seek asylum also he was in a position to grant it on behalf of the Com- monwealth Government. She would not decide, asked to speak her husband, and eventually rejoined her companions.
119. Then a telephone call was arranged from Petrov in Sydney to his wife in Darwin. Her escort stood by during the conversation. She was laconic, answered, ‘No, No’, and finally, ‘That is not my hus- band’. After a minute or two she put down the receiver and went back to sit with her companions in the passenger lounge, where six remained, apparently having rejected the offer. However, when the plane crew were already going on board, Leydin again asked if she would like to talk to him; and she said she would. In spite of her companions’ protests she went with him to the quar- antine office and spoke to him alone. She was acutely nervous, ‘but said that she would like to seek asylum.’ She admitted that she had heard her husband clearly, that he was well and cheerful, and wanted her to stay. She refused to sign any statement until she saw him.
120. She was then taken to Government House, Darwin, and thence flown back to join her husband at the safe house Sydney, where she signed the statement that she of her own free will requested political asylum in Australia.
121. There is little doubt that Mrs. Petrov was fully awake of the issues involved and the choice before her. The telephone conversa- tion with her husband was almost certainly the deciding factor because – (1) it satisfied her that he was alive and well. (She insists that she was never sure up to that point that he had not been kidnapped, or was not under committed suicide), (2) he appealed to her not as a husband but as a ‘man’, because even if she did go back to Russia she would now never see her family again.
Motives for Defection
A Material Inducements:
122. Both Petrovs acknowledge their appreciation of the material attractions of Western life. Petrov has described Sweden as a very good country and admits that the thought of defection crossed his mind as early as their term of service there (1943–47). He likes out- door life, and frequently went fishing and shooting in the country round Canberra; while in DIABOLO’s company he showed a dis- tinct taste for the more convivial pleasures of the city. His obser- vation of the rapid progress of migrants towards an established prosperity also impressed him with the material possibilities of life in Australia.
123. Mrs Petrov was distinguished among the Russian Embassy women in Canberra by her western aptitude for clothes and cos- metics (which was doubtless a factor in their enmity towards her). She is attractive and intelligent, speaks good English, has consid- erable social aplomb, well qualified to make her way in a West- ern society.
124. Since their defection they have both taken a keen interest in the question of providing for their future financial security.
125. On the other hand it is certain that material inducements alone, however great, would not have brought about either defection. Both Petrovs had achieved m their own right a successful career in the Soviet Service. From very humble origins both of them by their own efforts had attained the position of privilege and pres- tige that belongs to officers of the MVD; their combined salaries totalled approximately £8,000 (Australian) per annum. By Russian standards they were prosperous and privileged.
126. At the time of defection neither of the Petrovs were greatly con- cerned to bargain about actual sums of money; protection, with reasonable comfort and security, bulked larger in their minds than visions of vast wealth. At present Petrov shows most interest in the possibilities for fishing, shooting, and an outdoor life; while Mrs. Petrov shows an appreciation of the greater scope afforded in a Western country for dress, decoration, and house-furnishing.
127. As diplomats and as MVD officers, the Petrovs enjoyed a stand- ard of living that made them privileged persons in the Soviet, and which did not come sufficiently short of Western standards to pro- vide in itself a strong enough motive for defection.
128. Fear was without doubt the prime mover in both cases; without it neither defection would have occurred. For most of their three years term in Australia, the Petrovs were the subject of a campaign by successive Ambassadors, and the Party Secretary, Kovaliev, to isolate them in Canberra and destroy their credit in Moscow.
129. In the tangled skein of this intrigue against them, certain threads can be distinguished, including, (a) personal malice on the part of the Ambassadors and their wives, (b) a perennial campaign by Ambassadors against the credit of the enclave of independent authority represented by the MVD office, (c) repercussions of the struggle in Moscow between Party, Army and MVD, illustrated dramatically in the fall of Beria. As described by the Petrovs, this campaign included adverse reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee in Moscow, an effort to iso- late them socially, attacks upon them in the meetings of Party members in the Embassy, including the accusation that they were forming a ‘Beria group’, and a search of Petrov’s safe and desk, during which a document was found which, he was told, would be reported as an example of negligence.
130. Resentment at these attacks, and fear of what awaited him in Rus- sia, obsessed Petrov over a long and precipitated his defection when the opportunity was presented to him.
131. A similar fear, accentuated by her treatment after her husband’s disappearance, finally overcame Mrs. Petrov’s strong impulse to return to Russia out of devotion to her family. Every action by the Soviet authorities reinforced this fear and apprehension that noth- ing but the worst awaited them on their return to Moscow.
Ideological Factors:
Disillusionment with the Soviet:
132. It is doubtful whether either of the Petrovs was ever in the posi- tion of the fanatical ideologue or the dedicated revolutionary known in Western Communist Parties. Both are of peasant origin, familiar with the abject poverty which remains the lot of most of their fellow countrymen in city, town, or village. For both of them the Communist party and the MVD have represented a privileged elite, and a road to education, status, and advancement, wherein service of the State went hand in hand with service of their own material interests. Both of them, since their defection, have voiced criticisms of the Soviet which are evidently the fruit of experience and secret reflection rather than opinions hastily adopted to suit their new situation. Their stated desire to ‘tell the truth’ about the Soviet seems to represent something more than policy, and to reflect a genuine indignation and disillusion.
133. Petrov expresses himself as completely cynical about the Soviet system and Soviet professions, and inveighs against, (a) the ruin of village life by forcible collectivization (which he, as a young Communist official, helped to carry out), (b) the system of denun- ciation, (c) the injustice and brutality of the wholesale purges, (d) the growth of a privileged caste, whose luxurious life contrasts with the poverty of the masses, (e) the false propaganda about Soviet superiority, which deceives no-one, (f) the intolerance and suppression of all criticism.
134. Mrs Petrov’s criticisms are ‘not so unequivocal’ as her husband’s, but are frank and starching nevertheless. She has led a more sheltered life in the MVD, fold in Moscow, in which she enjoyed considerable personal and professional success. It is likely that, as a woman, her general criticisms would not have greatly influ- enced her course of action had she herself not been so directly and personally affected. She bitterly resented the campaign against them by the Ambassadors and the Party Secretary, and resisted the attempts to discipline and discredit her and her husband. Her public statements voice her indignation at the local Soviet author- ities and their behaviour, rather than any radical criticism of the Soviet system or of Moscow control.
135. However, an obvious motive for this distinction exists in her anx- iety for the fate of her family in Russia; and in private she too has spoken with frank dislike of the regimenting of opinion, the constant suspicion, the ruthless and inscrutable regime of terror under which all Soviet citizens live, and the grim poverty of the mosses, particularly widows and old people.
136. She appears to retain some sense of affection and loyalty to Russia as her country, but almost none to the tenets of Communist ideol- ogy. Like her husband, she depicts a system which has expended all its idealism and now relies in practice, though not in words, solely on calculated self-interest as a basis for service. A griev- ance which touched her particularly is the discrepancy between the theory and practice of the right of criticism. Though guaran- teed by the Soviet constitution to all Party members equally, and publicly proclaimed by Soviet leaders, this right proved a hollow privilege indeed in their controversy with the Embassy authori- ties in Canberra.
137. Resentment at the hypocrisy, insecurity, and ruthlessness of life under the Soviet system is apparently a real factor in the outlook of both Petrovs, and certainly weakened any feeling of loyalty which the machine which they may have had to the machine which they had served.
Appeal of Democratic Life:
138. Unlike Igor Gouzenko, the Petrovs have not so far taken any lofty line as to their motives for embracing democracy, They do not conceal the fact that the goading from behind, rather than the blandishments in front, governed their decision to defect to the West: namely, dread of the Soviet system as they had begun to experience it, rather than attraction to democracy for its own sake. However, this generalization requires qualification as follows:-
139. The Petrovs had had personal experience, in both Sweden and Australia, of life in a democratic Western country, Petrov in par- ticular, even before his defection, expressed his preference for the freedom of Western countries, and the more tolerant human atti- tudes which this made possible. This accords well with his own easy-going nature, and is believed to have weighed with him at least as much as strictly material considerations. Mrs Petrov, though much more restricted, had a few women friends outside the embassies in both Sweden and Australia. She had acquired a fairly clear idea of the much greater freedom enjoyed by women outside Russia, particularly in family and private life.
140. Both Petrovs were impressed by the firm but humane approach of the Commonwealth officers in relation to their defection: this con- trasted notably with the hectic and crude treatment which each of them received from their own superiors in the Embassy. At the first interview Richards succeeded in establishing Petrov’s confi- dence in his authority and competence: Mrs Petrov has described the favourable effect of Leydin’s calm but confident manner in his approach to her at Darwin.
141. Since their defection, both Petrovs have expressed their appreci- ation of the considerate treatment which they have received, and have also commented on the informality, mutual trust, delega- tion of responsibility end team spirit among the ASIO personnel with whom they have had to deal, contrasted with the timidity and mutual suspicion which pervade their own service, and all Soviet officialdom.
142. (The deep-seated suspicion of the Petrovs that they will be aban- doned by the Commonwealth once their usefulness has been exhausted, or that they will later be punished for their work against Australia, has not yet been wholly eradicated. It indicates the influence of anti-Western propaganda in the Soviet even upon persons who have had unusual contact with Western life, like the Petrovs, when added to their experience of the cynical opportun- ism practised by their own system.)
Operational Comments:
143. The Petrovs assert that Soviet Diplomats generally try to prolong their periods of service abroad, and that many would like to defect but are deterred by, (a) members of their family remaining in Rus- sia as hostages, (b) lack of contacts with the west. The Petrovs’ own story illustrates these points clearly enough.
144. The Petrovs are childless, and Petrov has no close relatives left in Russia. His defection was thus the ‘trigger’ to his wife’s defection since the Soviet penal code provides severe penalties for ‘enemies of the people’.
145. The value of intensive study of Soviet Embassy personnel appeared in three ways:
(a) It led to a correct general appreciation of Petrov’s func- tions, and hence of his value as a defector.
(b) It made possible the exploitation of contemporary events to advance the defection plan.
(c) It corroborated hostility and jealousy in the Embassy towards Petrov.
146. The length of DIABOLO’s intimate association with Petrov ena- bled a gradual establishment of Petrov’s familiarity with at least some aspects of Western life over a long period, and constituted a slow build-up to his ultimate decision.
147. Nevertheless, Petrov has named mid 1953 the time when his con- tacts with the West had reached a ‘good situation’. This was the time of FRANKMAN’s intervention. FRANKMAN’s entry into the scene evidently –
(a) Established for Petrov a trustworthy Australian link with Security (representing the Commonwealth).
(b) Introduced the Beria theme (which appeared later, a curi- ous sequence, when the Petrovs were accused of forming a ‘Beria group’ in the Embassy).
148. The very closeness of DIABOLO’s association with Petrov acted as a brake on ASIO as it was felt that the most likely explanation was that DIABOLO must be under cultivation by Petrov (as was indeed the case), and that the defection project might be a blind on Petrov’s part (which happily proved not to be the case).
149. In general, the capacity and efficiency of the Russians’ intelligence operations in Australia were over-estimated. Petrov, for example, seems to have been in no real danger from Russian surveillance while he moved about Sydney with such remarkable freedom, (it was not realized that he enjoyed this freedom as senior MVD representative; he himself has reported warning off his MVD col- league Plaityais from making enquiries about his movements).
150. The tactics adopted by the Soviet authorities after Petrov’s dis- appearance followed a stereotyped and expected pattern. They included, (a) suggestions of kidnapping; (b) the accusation that money had been stolen. (Petrov had already returned an air ticket and petty cash; while Mrs. Petrov had officially handed over, with- out queries being raised, her Embassy accounts to Mrs. Vislykh, and her MVD funds to Kovalenok). Preparations had been made to allow the Russians a closely-controlled interview with Petrov if they requested it. However, they did not do so, and refused his request to allow his wife to see him, clearly fearing that he would persuade her to defect as well.
151. Administrative arrangements made in advance included –
(a) Arrangements for the possible defection of either or both Petrovs in Canberra, Sydney or Darwin. i.e. provision of transport, necessary documents, and preparations to brief the necessary local officials.
(b) Briefing of the necessary Ministers and Heads of Depart- ments when the defection appeared imminent.
(c) Arrangements for safe houses and physical protection of the Petrovs.
152. Interrogation plans included –
(a) Detailed briefs on the basis of all that was known of the Petrovs before their defection.
(b) Arrangements to record intelligence supplied by them in a form suitable for possible legal action and the presenta- tion of evidence.
(c) A plan for preliminary questioning to ascertain
(i) Any other potential defectors.
(ii) Matters affecting the security of Australia or other countries which called for immediate action.
(iii) The substance of any documents supplied.
153. In conclusion, it seems certain that the defection of the Petrovs would not have occurred if there had not been –
(a) An unusual combination of circumstances assisting it.
(b) A vigorous effort to appreciate and take advantage of the opportunities as they occurred.
* * *
The Thwaites report remains the most comprehensive account of a Cold War defection yet declassified, illustrates the complexities of running two intermediaries, DIABOLO and FRANKMAN, against a candidate for defection. Incredibly, we learn that ASIO had very little idea of Petrov’s true role in the Soviet Embassy, nor ever guessed that his wife was also an intelligence officer.
What Thwaites omitted from his very readable narrative was the one other aspect of Petrov’s statement completed by him on the evening of his defection, and given to Ron Richards. This was Petrov’s biography and, perhaps most importantly, details of Soviet agents currently active and managed by the rezidentura. Now declassified, the document makes fascinating reading for several reasons. Firstly, although he was unaware of it, the document was validated by the VENONA material already in ASIO’s possession. This was the cryptographic material that had already identified Nosov and Antonov as members of the NKVD’s rezidentura. Petrov, of course, never learned about this very secret source. Secondly, some of the spies named by Petrov, such as Ric Throssel and Wally Clayton, had been compromised already by the VENONA messages, so Petrov’s testimony served to authenticate the conclusions reached by the VENONA counter-intelligence analysts. This single document would come to be recognised as one of the most significant of the Cold War, for another reason. Petrov, consciously or not, tarnished Leader of the Opposition Dr Evatt by revealing the penetration represented by O’Sullivan. Evatt’s misguided reaction had been to denounce the entire exercise as a political stunt created by Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies in the critical pre-election period, whereas this had not even been contemplated by ASIO. Evatt’s determination to denigrate Petrov, and indeed the ensuing Royal Commission, ensured the Labour Party would remain in opposition for a generation.
One other aspect to this initial Petrov statement, dated 3.00 pm on 3 April 1954, should be noted. His defection was only hours old, and he had not yet come to trust ASIO, so was mindful that the document he had signed might be used as evidence against him in a subsequent prosecution charging him with espionage. Understandably, Petrov exercised considerable circumspection at this early stage in his relationship with ASIO.
I was born in 1907 in a village called Larikha in the Tumen District, in Central Siberia, approximately 250 kilometers from the city of Omsk and 29 kilometers from Eshim.
My father was a peasant – he could not read or write. I was at school – a primary school – for 2 years in my village. I left school at nine years of age.
After I left school my father was killed by lightening, and I then went to work for my mother, and was helped by my younger brother – this would be about 1914.
I helped my mother until 1921. Following that, I went to work for the village blacksmith. In 1923 I joined the Komsomol – the Young Communist organization – this was whilst I was still working for the village blacksmith.
In 1921 our district had a famine and many people died.
The situation was so bad that we were eating potato plants with tree bark, and were making bread out of this.
The blacksmith was a communist – after the 1917 revolution – he was married twice – his second wife was the daughter of a chanter in the church. Because of this the blacksmith was expelled from the communist party. I worked for him until 1926. In 1926 I was sent by the Komsomol to the city of Perm to study in the Workers College. I studied mathematics – the Russian literature – and political and social studies. I failed in my first examinations. I made 76 mistakes in the dictation test – I also failed in mathematics. It was a competitive examination and because I failed I was not allowed to continue my studies. I tried to get work in Perm – I asked at the employment bureau – it was difficult to get a job at the time. I managed to get casual jobs on the docks which earned enough for me to buy bread to live. I then returned to my village by traveling [sic] via Sverdlovsk, by train and not paying the fare, as you say in Australia, ‘jumping the rattler’.
I was spoken to on the way by an NKVD guard and made to show my papers, which were in order – I was allowed to go on.
At Sverdlovsk I called at the office of the District Committee of the Communist Party asking for money to pay for my fare the rest of the way to the village. At that time I was a candidate member of the Communist Party – it is a probationary period before becoming a full member of the Party. The District Committee paid me 13 roubles with which I bought a railway ticket and I went back to my village.
I again went to work at the same blacksmith’s shop.
A few months later I was sent to Sverdlovsk by the Komsomol, to attend a special course for the training of pioneers.
The pioneers were the children selected to be trained as communists.
I had been reading Russian newspapers and literature in order to improve my knowledge of the Russian language and grammar.
I studied the special course for 9 months – this was in 1937.
I then returned to my village after which the Komsomols sent us to another village as a tutor for pioneer communists.
I was there a few months after which I attended a Soviet Party school in Linsl-Tagl in the Urals. It is an industrial area. I studied two years at this school and graduated. The school dealt with Trade Union activities. I then was sent to another industrial city which is now called Sorov, where I worked until 1929. I was the Party youth organizer of the factor – the factory Youth Committee paid my salary.
In October that year I was conscripted to the Red Navy. I served about 4 years in the Navy. I went to Moscow. There I had friends who had served with me in cipher section of the Navy who helped me obtain a position as a code clerk in the NKVD.
I served in a special section which dealt with sending and receiving telegrams to and from Soviet embassies and legations in foreign countries.
At that time there was no connection with the Australian Government.
I have been a member of the NKVD from that time until today.
My first post in the NKVD was assistant to the deputy chief of the operations office. It was the lowest rank in the office. In this rank I served until 1939. In 1938 I was detailed to Tintzin in China where a rebellion was in progress against the government and where Soviet troops were posted. I served there as a cipher clerk for a period of about 9 months. I then returned to Moscow and was transferred to the section which dealt with internal communications. This was a promotion – I became assistant to the Chief Cipher Clerk. This was in 1940. I was still there when Germany attacked the Soviet Union. I was appointed Chief of the Cipher Section of the NKVD. This was in June 1941.
In 1942 I was posted to Stockholm as code clerk in the Soviet Embassy there – my cipher duties included keeping under observation the conduct and associations of members of the Embassy. This was an NKVD function.
The Ambassador at first was Mrs Kolontai and later Mr Semenov (he is now in Berlin) and ten Mr Chenisev (he is now assistant to the General Secretary to the United Nations Organisation in the USA).
In 1947, I think it was in October, I returned to Moscow. I was posted as chief of the Cipher Section; my responsibilities included controlling the NKVD agents who submitted reports as to the political reliability of women on ships plying between the countries of Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
The ships plied on the river Danube.
The reports from the agents were submitted to NKVD representatives in those countries who in turn relayed the information to Mr Petrov. The messages were sent sometimes in code, sometimes clear, and by secret diplomatic mail. I considered the reports and arranged for the transfer of politically unreliable women. I made my reports to the head of the Department. Our recommendations were sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Part. In the Central Committee there is a special section which deals with these matters. It is called ‘The Special International Department’. It controls all Soviet citizens abroad. I stayed with this section until 2/1/1951 when I was posted to Australia. I arrived in Australia on 5/2/1951 in Sydney. My posting was as 3rd Secretary to the Embassy in Canberra. My responsibilities then were, as a member of the NKVD, to which the conduct of the Soviet Embassy personnel in Australia, and also to investigate cases of the activities of the anti-Soviet organizations in Australia.
A few days after my arrival in Australia I was appointed by Mr Lifanov, the ambassador, as Consul for Australia in the Soviet Embassy. I communicated directly with the NKVD office in Moscow and not through the Ambassador.
At that time there were two separate Ministries – now called the MVD, which was responsible for the internal security of the Soviet, and the other the NKVD which was responsible for control of concentration camps, border control and the conduct of Soviet officials abroad.
The separate functions were combined when Beria was made Minister for the MVD. I then became the officer of the MVD for Australia. When I arrived in Australia the other agents of the MVD was Mr Valentin Sadovnikov, who was First Secretary to the Embassy and Mr Ivan Mikhailovich Pakhonov who was the TASS agent in Australia.
Before I came here the NKVD agent in the Embassy was Mr Simon Makarov and his contact was Fedor Nosov, the TASS representative in Australia. Nosov was a secret agent of the NKVD – he obtained his information from one man – this man operated a group of agents in Australia, who reported information. I did not see any of this information but I know about it from Pakhomov. I have never seen Mr Nosov. I do not know this man he contacted but I know he was in close contact with Joan Ferguson of the Australian-Russia Society and Rex Chiplin of the Tribune. When Mr Nosov left to return to the Soviet he was replaced by Mr Pakhomov. Pakhomov was MVD agent and he reported to Sadovnikov –
who in turn reported his information direct to Moscow.
When Sadovnikov left to return to the Soviet Mr Pakhomov was appointed as temporary chief MVD agent in Australia. Sadovnikov left in about April 1951.
I worked independently of Pakhomov – we had different responsibilities Pakhomov’s responsibility as MVD agent was to establish contacts with officers of the Department of External Affairs with a view to obtaining and securing information regarding the policies of the Australian Government – including the plans for possible war by Australia against other countries including the Soviet.
Pakhomov was also responsible for maintaining contact with Press representatives in order to find out similar information.
He developed a contact with a representative of the Sydney Morning Herald who supplied him with information in the form of typed documents during a parliamentary session in Canberra about 5 or 6 months before he left. This document id the one I now show to the Australian Security Service. I’d not know [sic] where it was typed. Mr Pakhomov gave me the document – I have had it in my safe. The man’s name is Mr Frank O’Sullivan. The man is not a member of the Australian Communist Party but he is a sympathizer of the Party. He is not now a newspaper man – he is now an important man with the Australian Government. He is a responsible secretary to a member of the Opposition. He is the private secretary to Dr Evatt, the leader of the Opposition. I have met him twice – once in Canberra and once in Sydney. The Canberra meeting as about a year ago – the Sydney meeting was about 6 or 7 months ago. We had a meal together at the Adrin Restaurant. From my own knowledge he is a sympathizer towards the Soviet.
After Pakhomov returned to Moscow I received a cable from the MVD in Moscow to make contact with O’Sullivan. O’Sullivan is a young man, he intended to marry the wife of another newspaper correspondent in Canberra with whom he was living – I do not know her name but she attended a preview of Soviet films at the Capitol Theatre Canberra during 1952. I do not think she is attractive. I tried to make a contact with him but it was difficult in my position as 3rd Secretary.
The first introduction to me from Moscow was for Mr Antonov, the TASS agent, to make contact with O’Sullivan but he was unsuccessful. Then I received a cable to make the contact myself with O’Sullivan. Victor Mikhailovish Antonov, the present TASS agent is a cadre MVD officer in Australia.
Filip Vasilievich Kislytsin, the present 2nd Secretary of the embassy in Canberra is also a cadre MVD officer.
Between 1945 and 1948 there was a very serious situation in Australia in the Department of External Affairs. The Communist Party here had a group of External Affairs officers who were giving them information. Two members of the group were bringing out copies of official documents, which they gave to a Communist Party member. This Party man gave the documents to Mr Makarev at the Soviet Embassy. The documents described the Australian foreign policy and also contained a list of information about American and British foreign policy. I do not know the name of the Party man who at that time reported to Makarev, but his codename was ‘CLODE’ – (phonetically this is CLAUDE). One of CLODE’s group was Ric Throssel, an officer of the Department of External Affairs. Throssel had a code name ‘FERRO’. Throssel is the son of Katharine Suzannah Pritchard – the Australian writer. He has served abroad for External Affairs in the Soviet and also in South America. He is not active now – he is very still – I think he is afraid.
Moscow sent me a cable to me during 1953 – it was in June – instructing me that he was a very important man, and that I had to arrange personal contact with him for Mr Kislytsin. Kislytsin invited him to the 7th November reception in Canberra in 1953 – he attended but did not stay long – we also invited him to a film night at the Embassy, but he did not answer and did not attend. I do not know how many reports he made but Moscow regarded him as very important to them – I know his information was regarded as important.
In my opinion the Party contact of Ric Throssel was Rex Chiplin – but I am not sure of this.
Rex Chiplin has told me that he has a few friends in External Affairs – he said he [was] using the name of ‘Charlie’. About a month ago he told me, in Sydney, about this. About 2 months ago he gave to me a report on the Economic Conference held in Sydney – it was later published in all the newspapers.
About 2 months ago I received an MVD cable not to make any further contact with the Australian Communist Party, except official contact, because of the international situation. This instruction was sent to all countries. For example, I could continue to contact John Rodgers and Jean Ferguson on official matters connected with the Australian-Russian Society but I could not continue to make any secret contact with Party members to obtain information of a secret kind.
I don’t know if Chiplin has passed to the Soviet secret Government information. He does not know his code name is ‘Charlie’. All Embassy outside contacts have a code name.
I know a member of the Australian Communist Party – his name is Jack Hughes – whose responsibility is to investigate Security Service in Australia – he told us that he had a man working in the Post Office in Sydney who helped to ‘tap telephones’. He is the man who informs Hughes that a telephone is being tapped by the Security Service and to be on guard. I don’t know his name.
Hughes is a member of the Central Committee. Hughes also old ‘Charlie’, before Pakhomov left Australia, that a young woman who worked in the headquarters of the Security Service had fallen in love with a communist; they were intimate with each other and she informed him that Security Service were interested in the people at the Soviet Embassy – she mentioned two names – Mrs Petrov – my wife, and Mrs Koslova.
Later on Hughes told me himself, he said that the girl had left for a holiday in London after she had told the communist this information. Hughes told us this during 1953. I have met Hughes about 3 times. I know he reported to Sadovnikov the development of the peace movement in Australia. Hughes contacted Pakhomov in the Journalists Club, Sydney. I don’t know whether he contacts Mr Antonov.
I’m feeling very tired and I think I should rest. But there is a lot more information I have for the Australian Government. I have tonight with no documents from the embassy, which I will briefly describe tonight and explain them in detail later on.
(i) Document headed American Espionage in Australia.
This document was supplied by Mr Rupert Lockwood to Mr Antonov during 1953. Mr Lockwood visited the embassy with Mr Antonov – they arrived separately and stayed there three nights typing the report. He sued an Embassy typewriter but typed it himself. Lockwood has a codename ‘WARREN’. Moscow selects all the code names.
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are paragraphs of letters from MVD Moscow to me, describing my responsibilities in Australia. Some are in code, but I have brought the code with me. Each letter has a separate code.
8. A document describing two people in whom the embassy author- ities would be interested to develop them as spies in Australia – they are Australians. It is in the writing of Sadovnikov.
Sadovnikov has a codename ‘SAEED’. My code name is ‘MICHAEL’.
Kislytsin had code name ‘GLED’.
Antonov has code name ‘IGNAT’.
Jack Hughes had code name ‘BASK’
9. A document containing name for references in Sadovnikov’s writ- ing.
10. A document in Sadovnikov’s writing describing the views of a list of 36 people in Australia.
11. A document concerning Vintoss Vintsossvich.
Divischok – whose code name is PETCHEK. His wife is named Frantislika Volor. wife’s sister lives at 16 Holt St., Stanmore – she helped him get to Australia.
Divishok was born 2/22/1907 in Czechoslovakia – he was a good Soviet agent during the [Second World] war, and Moscow has instructed MVD here to contact him – set him up as a manager of an Australian restaurant – encourage his assimilation – so that he could become a good contact for spies. So far as I know, no contact has yet been made with him.
I have made this statement voluntarily and sincerely – it is the truth – I will say more in detail later.
I wish to ask the Australian Government for permission to remain in Australia permanently – I wish to become an Australian citizen as soon as possible – I ask for protection for myself and assistance to establish myself comfortably in this country.
I have no wish to return to the Soviet Union – I know that if [I] did so I would be killed – I know that Mr Lifanov and Mr Kovaliev have sent bad reports about me to Moscow and that Mr Generalov has confirmed these reports to Moscow. By confirmed I mean supported. The reports have been untrue but there is nothing I can do about them, and I would find it difficult to prove my innocence in Moscow – it would have been very dangerous for me to return to Moscow.
I like Australia and the Australian way of life – Lifanov and Generalov have behaved like Hitler towards me and also to my wife.
I no longer believe I the Communism of the Soviet leadership – I no longer believe in Communism since I have seen the Australian way of living.
My wife would like to stay in Australia but also is afraid for her family in Moscow and says that she must go back. There is a possibility that she might change her mind and stay here, but it is very difficult for her.
This statement has been read over to me in English and in Russian. I have read it for myself. It is the truth.
Petrov’s statement, formally witnessed by Ron Richards, named Hughes, Throssel, O’Sullivan and Chiplin as Soviet agents, thus confirming the identification of FERRO and CLAUDE who had both appeared in the VENONA traffic. The overlap with VENONA, mentioning Bernie, Throssel, Hill and Hughes, served to validate the VENONA identifications, and to authenticate Petrov.
Petrov, of course, never learned about VENONA, and great care was taken when encryption topics were discussed to avoid giving any clue of the source’s existence. Over the years, the couple lost their fear of prosecution and cooperated with their ASIO interrogator, John Elliott, and foreign visitors, such as GCHQ’s John Christie; both Petrovs had much to say about Soviet cipher systems and explained that the encipherment of a message usually took place after the clear text had been encoded. Specifically, Mrs Petrov was asked about ENORMOZ, the codeword for atomic weapons development, and in September 1954 the new MI5 D-G, Dick White, informed GCHQ about Mrs Petrov’s procedures and the rezidnetura’s interest in atomic matters:
Mrs. Petrov has given the following explanation of the codeword ENOKMAZ which occurs in the documents:-
ENORMAX – Code word used for the MVD interest in the matter of research and testing of the atom bomb in Australia, Thus, for instance, we received an instruction to collect information about the last test of the atom bomb in Australia, and also about the persons who were present at this test.
ASIO add the following comments:-
1. The codeword does not appear on the lists which were in Mr. Petrov’s possession but because of the very Top Secret nature of the word it was coded in a special code which Mr Petrov kept in her possession. This special code was very seldom used. One of the rules concerning it was that it could not be used in cables and when used the message could only go by hand of courier.
2. The special code book referred to was published about 1949 and was at the Embassy when Mrs. Petrov arrived in Australia.
3. The first time the code word ENORMAZ was used to Mrs. Pet- rov’s knowledge was about 15 days after the last atomic test when a signal was received by Petrov asking him to collect informa- tion about the last atomic test in Australia and the people who attended the test.
4. The special code book referred to above was destroyed under directions from Moscow last year after the arrest of Beria.
The Petrov interrogations were supervised by ASIO and MI5’s Russian expert George Leggett, with occasional visits by MI5 officers such as Pamela Stiebel, and research work in London undertaken by Ronnie Reed and his senior officer, Squadron Leader Peter de Wesselow, a distinguished wartime Pathfinder pilot.
From a counter-espionage perspective, the priority for ASIO and MI5 was to identify the individuals mentioned in Petrov’s papers, the material designated the ‘G Series’, which consisted of ten pages of lists of names, all in Sadovnikov’s handwriting, apart from G.4, which had been written by Petrov.
DOCUMENT G.1
1. ‘Denis’ [Dalziel]
2. ‘Stepan’ [Stanley]
3. ‘Tikhon’ – Tennequist [TENNEKUIST]
4. ‘Rafael’ – F [Ferguson, see G.3]
5. ‘Sister’ [SESTRA] – Burney, Francisca, bank
DOCUMENT G.2
K’s Contacts:
1. ‘Mastercraftsman’ [MASTER]
2. ‘Tourist’ [TURIST]
3. ‘Sister’ [SESTRA] – Francisca Burney
4. ‘Girl Friend’ [POIRUGA]
5. ‘Ben’ – Hughes
6. ‘Joe’ – bank (archives)
7. Academician, young girl, has finished the school of the bank and is going to work in the bank.
8. – sister of the wife of B
9. ‘Don Woods’ [UDS] – secretary to the adviser of Dr E. on Rtist [ARTIST] Enormous [ENORMOZ]
10. ‘Sailor [MORYak]’ McNamara [MCNAMARA] George
11. B. [Burton] – deputy director of the bank.
DOCUMENT G.3
1. WILBUR KRISTIANSON – ‘[Mastercraftsman] [MASTER]’, husband of Tourist’s sister.
2. HERBERT WILLIAM TATTERSELL – Artist [ARTIST].
DOCUMENT G.4
Mr C.R. TENANT ‘K’
50 BUNDARRA Rd
BELLVIEW HILL,
Sydney
Tel. FW 1267
Kristisen S.B. – ‘Crab’ [KRAB]
Rogers ‘Clever’ [LOVKIJ]
Kristisen H.M. ‘Eva’ [EVA]
Ferguson – Rafael
Koaki – ‘Friend’ [TRIYaTEL]
Turnbull K. – ‘Teodor’
GEORGE McNAMARA – Sailor [MORYaK]
DOCUMENT G.5
Letter No. 2 of 14/6/48
Herewith [or Communicate] additional materials and conclusions drawn therefrom in respect of the following persons:
1. Bruce Millis – progressive labourite, illegally aided the academy. Had the confidence of Chiffley Lived and had a commercial com- pany in the town of Katoomba.
2. Geoffrey Powell (GEOFFREY POWELL) – former doctor of phys- ics in Melbourne University, considered a leading scientist. Mem- ber of the academy since 1937. Carried out active work on an assignment of the academy. Went on a duty journey to the island.
3. Eric Burhop – former doctor of physics at Melbourne university. Considered a leading scientist. It was suggested that he change over to work in the club.
4. Dave Morris – born 1910, major, bachelor of science, illegal mem- ber of the academy. After graduation from the university studied on the island. During the second world war he worked as a techni- cal expert at Headquarters [GLAVShTAB] in Melbourne. Learned about tanks on the island. In 1948 he was sent to the island for work in the field of military research.
5. Kaiser (F. KAISER) – member of the academy, physicist, worked in the field of atomic energy. Went on a duty journey to the island.
DOCUMENT G.6
6. Don Woods [UDS] (Don Woods) – former secretary to the adviser of Dr. E om ENORMOZ Briggs.
DOCUMENT G.7
App to Letter No. 2 of 10.11.40
1. Joe – born 1921 works in the archives of the bank. Lives in the village [SELO]
2. Taylor – judge and representative of the Arbitration Commis- sion, labourite, until 1943 head of the club in the capital; during that period passed on to the academy a document permitting the uncovering of Mastercraftsman [MASTER] in one of the areas of the academy. President of the Legislation Commission of NSW. ‘K’ characterizes him as positive.
3. Legge, Jack – scientific chemist. Academician since 1936. In 1939 on an assignment from the academy he worked in a Trotskyite group. When the academy was illegal ‘K’ used Legge J’s house for issuing the paper ‘yt’. Carried out an assignment of the acad- emy when he went on a duty journey to the country of the skiers [LYZhNIKI]. L’s wife is at present doing scientific work in Mel- bourne. ‘K’ considers that N (L.) inspires confidence. A relative of L works in the political intelligence department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MID].
4. Hook, Jack – president of the Sydney trade union – Labour coun- cil, labourite, one of the leading members of the Labour Party. Col- laborates with the academy. Holds progressive views. ‘K’ consid- ers N to be a man who merits trust.
DOCUMENT G.8
5. Barras – doctor of economic sciences, an official worker of the club and an expert linguist, a swimmer. Engaged in throwing light upon runners, swimmers, etc. Among the members of the club he is regarded as left. Lives in the village [SELO].
6. Burney, Francisca – born 1923, Australian, worked as secretary- typist in the secretariat of the bank in the capital. Illegal academi- cian since 1943. ‘K’ was in personal contact with her and received interesting information from her.
7. Miller, Forbes – born 1912, native of Australia, deputy editor of ‘The Daily Telegraph’. Expressed a desire to keep ‘T’ systematically informed of materials being prepared for going to press. Like him- self, his wife is also well disposed towards us.
8. McInnes [MAKINES] – about 40 years old, journalist. Has wide contacts amongst employees of the press, in political and business circles. By conviction he is a left-inclined man.
9. Birtles, B. – about 48 years old, important journalist, has contacts amongst writers and artists. Has traveled [sic] in Europe, known the country of the swimmers well.
10. McLean [MAKLIN] – journalist, sympathetically disposed towards us, a very well-informed man. In the opinion of ‘T’ he will give information.
DOCUMENT G.9
11. Olsen, C. – promised to help ‘T’ in learning about the country and in acquiring information passing through the newspaper.
12. Simpson, Colin – positively disposed towards us.
13. Fraser – member of parliament, former correspondent, labourite, very close to Evatt. Likes drinking and in such a condition is very talkative. ‘A’ used him for obtaining information from Evatt.
14. Finnard – lawyer, graduate of Sydney university, interested in questions of Marxist philosophy. Stated his opinion of the labour- ites very clearly. To ‘A’ he prosed getting interesting information. Friendly with Withall, director of the Federal Chamber of Manu- facturers.
15. Calwell – minister of information, interested in our country. Expressed a desire to meet ‘A’.
16. Brook [sic] – alleged academician. Brother is an academician. Elected to parliament.
17. Falstein – about 40 years old, a Jew, former member of parliament, distinguished by left pronouncements, wanted very much to go to the Soviet Union.
18. McKell – former Prime Minister, was on good terms with SDO- NOV, first representative of the USSR in Australia. Asked ‘A’ to apply to him for help.
DOCUMENT G.10
19. Westcott – former employee of the communications branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MID], his work was secret. Very cautious. Was acquainted with ‘Lipskij’. Lives in Manooka circle, Canberra, Tel. B. 173 [sic].
20. Fitzharding – librarian of the national library, knows quite a lot and can give useful advice. Has access to the parliamentary library. Was acquainted with ‘Lip’.
21. Hibbard, L.U. – representative of the state of NSW [New South Wales] in the Federal Council, academician.
22. Gutvakh, Aleksandr Mikhailovich – born in Odessa in 1923. Went to the USA and then to Australia. Has relatives in the USSR, with whom he maintains correspondence.
In total there were forty-four suspects to be investigated, which placed an impossible burden on ASIO which found itself chasing leads as Petrov gave his public testimony before the Royal Commission. The fear in Canberra and London was that, having been alerted by the media, many suspects would disappear, and the SLO, Derek Hamblen, came under pressure from both MI5 and the FBI to at least gain access to the interrogation transcripts. Understandably, the impatient Allies had their own agendas, and were appalled by the ‘trickle’ of information being shared. Indeed, MI5’s de Wesselow complained to Hamblen that the newspapers were better informed than he was! Underlying this was the suspicion that ASIO was deliberately milking the situation, having been on the receiving end of fraternal abuse for so long. At the heart of the problem was MI5’s concern about Soviet illegals infiltrated into Australia as legitimate immigrants, and the embarrassment of Kislytsin’s disclosures about Burgess and Maclean, whereas ASIO had prioritised every individual named in front of the Royal Commission. Added to this volatile mix was Petrov’s own mercurial personality, and his apparent tendency to grandstand.
From MI5’s standpoint, Petrov’s appearance before the Royal Commission represented a daily threat to VENONA, as it was almost impossible to separate information that had originated from the earlier cryptographic source, and the defector himself, as James Robertson articulated:
To avoid confusion it is absolutely essential that information obtained from Petrov, on the one hand, and the information obtained from BRIDE [VENONA] on the other, should be kept as much as possible separate in all reports and letters.
Administratively, this discipline proved a nightmare because only a handful of indoctrinated officers knew about VENONA, yet there was a large group of staff handling Petrov leads, some of whom were inquisitive about cross-references to some other top secret source.
Predictably, the Royal Commission authenticated what became known as Petrov’s papers. and found the couple very credible witnesses. The commissioners also found that the only Australians willing to spy for the Soviets were communists, and that none should be prosecuted.
When the VENONA project came to an end in 1979, analysis of the Canberra traffic showed that a total of forty-seven codenames had been mentioned, of which about a dozen consisted of Australians who were assessed as ‘possibly involved in espionage’. In terms of contributing to the then current cryptanalytical programme, the Petrovs contributed little, except in relation to the Stockholm-Moscow channel where he was consulted about cables that he himself had drafted. Indeed, his codename, SEAMAN, appeared in the wartime Stockholm – Moscow traffic.
Initially the Petrovs were accommodated at an ASIO safe house in Palm Beach, Sydney, but they were moved to Sandringham in Victoria, and were given new identities, those of two Swedish immigrants, Sven and Maria Allynson in 1956. They stayed in St Kinda, Windsor for six months, and then bought a house Parkmore Road, in the Melbourne suburb of East Bentleigh, and started work. Petrov found a job as a processor at Ilford Films in Ferntree Gull Road in Waverley, while his wife worked for sixteen years as a typist for William Adams tractors. Petrov would become increasingly morose and descended into alcoholism. He suffered a stroke in 1974 and later moved into a nursing home in Brighton. He died of prostate cancer in the Royal Park Hospital, Waverley, in June 1991.
* * *
The unexpected bonus of Petrov’s defection was his wife’s last-moment decision to join him, after she spoke to him on the telephone during a refueling stop at Darwin while being escorted back to Moscow by a pair of burly Soviet couriers. Petrov deliberately had kept her in the dark about his plans because she had both parents, and a brother and sister, living in the Soviet Union, and she believed that if she was declared ‘an enemy of the people’, her family would probably perish too. The shock was ASIO’s discovery that she too was an intelligence professional, had participated in a cryptanalytical attack on a Japanese cipher machine during the Second World War, and had handled agents while at the Stockholm rezidentura between 1943 and 1947. As she would explain that her original assignment to Sweden had been as an ‘SK’ security officer, to monitor the activities of her colleagues in the Soviet Kolony expatriate community. Significantly, upon her return to Moscow she had been at the heart of the ‘Committee of Information’, a coordinating organisation created by Stalin in July 1947 to supervise all Soviet foreign intelligence operations. The KI would be closed down in 1951, and Petrova was the West’s first authoritative source of accurate information about this elusive body.
Known to her friends as Dusia, Mrs Petrov had enjoyed a fascinating career. Born in March 1914 in Ilpki, 120 miles south of Moscow, her family moved to Semipatatinsk in Siberia when she was five, and then went to live in Moscow where, through family connections, she was employed by the GRU as a cipher clerk, working on Japanese intercepts, until 1941 when she transferred to the NKVD and married Vladimir, her first husband Roman Kruvosh having disappeared in a purge, their daughter Irina having died of meningitis at the age of 3.
Early in the Second World War, Petrov worked in the NKVD’s cipher section in the Lubyanka, while Dusia’s department, recently accommodated in the Hotel Select, was transferred to Kuibychev. They would be reunited in Moscow in 1943 and posted to Stockholm, but in July 1942 were unable to sail from Archangel as planned. They returned to Moscow and eventually were flown to Tehran and then Cairo. Travelling with four other Soviet diplomats, they embarked on a troopship, the SS Llandaff Castle, bound for Durban, but the ship was torpedoed by the U-177 off Dar-es-Salaam in November 1942. They were rescued by a destroyer, HMS Catterick, and put ashore in Cape Town where, in March 1943, they completed their voyage to London. Finally, they flew from Aberdeen to Stockholm where they joined the rezidentura and remained there until October 1947.
Petrov’s appointment to Canberra under consular cover, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, had come about through the intervention of an NKVD friend, and did not take account of the fact that by 1947, the year his widowed mother died, he had no family left in the Soviet Union, both his brothers having been killed in the first months of the Second World War. His lack of relations made his decision to defect much easier, and the fear of what might have happened to her relatives haunted her until 1990 when her younger sister, Tamara, emigrated with her family to Australia. She revealed that their father, a former Moscow trolley-bus conductor turned NKVD agent, had been dismissed from his job.
Desia died in July 2002, still resentful that the book she had co- authored with Vladimir in 1956, Empire of Fear, had earned them next to nothing. She remained loyal to her husband, who was cordially disliked by most he met. He suffered from poor health and had a low income. He always regretted his defection. For the Petrovs, defection had not turned out to be the idyllic retirement to a chicken farm they had imagined, but the loss of two such senior officers would have a lasting impact on the NKVD, and on Australian domestic politics. It may also have emboldened Rastvorov.
During that same year of 1954 there had been one other NKVD deserter, Piotr Debiabin, who in February had presented himself to the United States Counterintelligence Corps in Vienna. He had been quietly exfiltrated to Linz, where he was interrogated. A former member of the NKVD’s Guard Directorate, responsible for the Kremlin’s security, Deriabin was kept under wraps by the CIA, with no public acknowledgment of the defection for a further five years. In December 1961 he played a crucial role in confirming the bona fides of one of his NKVD colleagues in Vienna who, unexpectedly, defected to the CIA in Helsinki.