OLEG LYALIN
Our intelligence gathering activities in England suffered a blow from which they never recovered, and the Lyalin defection sent shockwaves through the Lubyanka.
Oleg Kalugin, Spymaster1
Based in the Soviet trade delegation, Oleg Lyalin was a member of the KGB’s London rezidentura who was persuaded in April 1971 to defect while conducting an illicit affair with his 30-year-old blonde secretary, Irina Templyakova, and to cooperate with a joint MI5-SIS team of case officers. It would be five months before he formally applied for political asylum, at the end of August 1971, as described in his MI5 file, codenamed GOLDFINCH, which opened with a summary:
1. Oleg Adolfovich LYALIN was born on 24 June 1938 at Staropol. His father was an agricultural engineer who suffered expulsion from the Party in 1937, fought with the partisans during World War II and thereafter until his death in 1952 worked in the Chief Planning Department of the City Council of Pyatigorsk.
2. In 1952 LYALIN entered the Higher Marine call in Odessa. He graduated from the school as an officer of the Merchant Fleet in 1959. In 1957, however, he had been recruited as a KGB informant working against western seamen and smugglers in Odessa. In 1958/59 the KGB after trying him on it in an exercise, offered him a job in the illegal net. He was sent to 101 School of the KGB. He passed his 2-year course in 18 months and was then lodged in a private flat for further training.
3. Owing to the breakdown of his first marriage, the plan to place him in illegal work was cancelled and he spent the next 4 years in the KGB. KIAIPEDA, on security work against foreign seamen.
4. In February 1967 LYALIN was sent on a 6 month course at the Department V school near Moscow, where he studied partisan warfare, radio communications, explosives and parachuting. After 18 months of further training and briefing Lyalin was posted to London in April 1969.
5. LYALIN is a captain in the KGB and a Party member since 1960. His motives are personal – dissatisfaction with his career and the desire to marry the wife of one of his colleagues who defected with him.3
In the days that followed the defection, the MI5 Security Liaison Officer in Washington DC, Barry Russell-Jones, held frequent meetings with Ed Miller, the director of the FBI’s domestic intelligence division, and plenty of transatlantic correspondence was generated by John T. Minnish, the FBI legal attaché at the U.S. embassy in London.
Lyalin’s initial plan, when he first encountered his MI5 handlers, had been to persuade the British authorities to declare him persona non grata so he could return to Moscow and divorce his wife, but his arrest on the night of 31 August 1971 for drink driving forced MI5’s hand. Another factor was a letter written to Lyalin that had been misdirected to the London rezident, which indiscreetly disclosed that he had indicated to his wife in Moscow that he was unhappy in London and with the KGB. These unanticipated events combined to frustrate Lyalin’s original plan, which MI5 told the FBI, was ‘to return to the USSR where he would continue to operate as an agent in place’. However, the case officers who handled Lyalin thought him unstable and considered the idea of running him in Moscow as impractical.
Lyalin’s torrid love life was an added complication. While he was having an affair with his secretary, Irina Teplakova, the wife of a colleague, a Soviet delegate to the International Wheat Council described as an ‘operational KGB worker’, (an occasional co-optee) he was also involved with a married Englishwoman.
Lyalin’s value lay partly in his KGB career experience, which had included a lengthy period as an illegal support officer in the first chief directorate’s Directorate S (known to insiders as ‘Line N’) and then his transfer to department V, an even more secret branch of the KGB, which had become notorious when Nikolai Khokhlov had revealed in 1954 that he had been trained as an assassin by the FCD’s ninth section. Following Khokhlov’s detailed revelations when he defected, the KGB disbanded the ninth section and created a new unit, the thirteenth department (‘Line F’), to replace it until it too became notorious when Bogdan Stashinsky defected and described the thirteenth department. Accordingly, in 1969, department V had quietly come into existence, and Lyalin was in an excellent position to identify its key personalities and detail its principal function, to prepare contingency plans for a network of specially trained illegals who would act a saboteur when called upon to do so, perhaps in times of political crisis or even armed conflict. Among the schemes listed by Lyalin was a plan to contaminate the NATO submarine base at Faslane and blame the United States Navy for the contamination, with the objective of undermining the alliance and influencing public opinion in Scotland. It was, stated the FBI Director’s assistant Alex Rosen,
a highly sophisticated and fully developed plan for effective sabotage in England; had personnel in place prepared to carry it out; and had plans for further personnel to parachute into England in time of emergency.3
One of the many KGB colleagues exposed by Lyalin was Nikolai A. Kuznetsov, named as head of Department V in the United States. The FBI quickly established his credentials, having already identified him as a KGB officer who had tried to recruit a chemist who was already under the FBI’s control:
Until October/November 1969, the head of Dept. V in the USA was Nikolay Alekseyevitch KUZNETSOV who was in the UN in New York. This was his second posting in the US. On the first, he recruited a technician connected with electronics and computers for which he received a very high decoration. He was not liked in headquarters because he was always emphasising his superior position and the fact that he had been decorated. During this second posting in the US, he produced no practical results and after encountering some ‘difficulties’ was obliged to return unexpectedly to Russia in October or November 1969 leaving all his possessions behind. LYALIN believes he is now teaching [XXXXXXXXXXXX] believed by LYALIN [XXXXXXXXXXXX].4
The NYFO file on Kuznetsov, born 15 October 1921, showed that he had entered the United States on 17 February 1953 as an interpreter attached to the UN secretariat’s translation unit. He left fifteen months later, on 13 May 1954, but returned accompanied by his wife Stepanida on 3 December 1954 and stayed for three years, departing on 11 July 1957. His third posting to the United States began on 23 December 1966, as first secretary in the Soviet mission, but he left for Montreal on 15 November 1967. He then returned on Christmas Day 1967 and stayed until 17 September 1968. When he returned home a week after a minor road accident.
Of principal interest to the FBI was what Lyalin had to say about department V’s plans for the United States, and the identities of any American citizens recruited by the KGB. This was the issue addressed by a heavily redacted memorandum from Miller dated 14 September 1971:
[XXXX] also advised that Lyalin furnished information about one [XXXXXXXXXXXXXX] Bremen, Germany, and Latvia. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] the U.S. Navy [XXXXXXXXXX] between Germany and Vietnam. He also mentioned a major in the U.S. Army recruited by the Soviets two years ago in Norway who is currently in West Germany. [XXX] has advised that this information has been made available to the Army and the Navy and investigation is now underway to identify these individuals.
Lyalin also named [XXXXXXXXXXXXX] American currently in London who was being assessed by [XXXXXXXXX] of the KGB. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXX] San Francisco people who sent him abroad to avoid the draft. The Chief Resident of the KGB was skeptical about [XXXXX] interest in [XXXXX] and as a result [XXXXX] interest in him has lapsed. We are instructing San Francisco to identify [XXXX] since Bufiles are negative.
Lyalin also mentioned on [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] of the U.S. Embassy in London who has been in contact with [XXXXXX] [XXXXXXXXXXX] has advised that both State Department and [XXX] are aware of [XXXX] contacts with the Russians and such contacts are not for intelligence purposes.
Lyalin also mentioned one [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] Shell Oil Corporation in London and furnished information to the KGB which he obtained from Shell. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] Boston Office has been instructed to identify and develop background information about the activities of this couple in order that consideration may be given to interviewing them.
[XXXXX] is extremely anxious to obtain whatever information is possible which would assist them in determining whether Lyalin is a bona-fide defector and he requested that any information developed be furnished to [XXXXX] through him. He stated the same request was made of [XXXXXXXXXXX] will channel information through him to [XXXX] in London.
ACTION: This matter is being followed closely in order that we can develop complete information concerning any Americans involved.5
Naturally, the FBI’s first concern was the immediate impact on American national security, and what Lyalin could reveal about department V’s plans in the United States. As it happened, the FBI was at that time running at least one asset inside the KGB rezidentura in New York headed by Vikenti Sobole, and the mole, designated IRONCLAD, quickly alerted his FBI handlers to the drama unfolding in London:
Source learned that on Monday, 6 September a communication was received by the NY KGB residency from Moscow, concerning a Soviet defection in London, England of a KGB officer assigned to ‘V Department’ (Sabotage, assassination, etc.) of the London KGB residency. The defector was identified as one LYALIN, first name not recalled by the source. According to the source, the communication indicated the defection occurred during the preceding weekend (4 September 1971) and apparently was [XXXXXXXXXXXX]
Background furnished regarding LYALIN indicated he (LYALIN) had been employed in the London residency since 1969Prior to that time, he had served in the ‘S’ Directorate (Illegal Support) during the period of 1960–69. Source learned that the communication further indicated that LYALIN defected with the wife of an operational KGB worker assigned to the London Residency, identity of whom was not discussed.
According to the source, the above information was not publicized generally within the KGB Residency but facts relative to the defection were made known to the various Branch ‘Chiefs’. Thereafter, KGB officers within each branch were questioned concerning the possibility of LYALIN’s knowledge of their affiliation. According to the source, the basis for this questioning was not disclosed to the KGB officers.
Further, source learned through [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXX] knew of LYALIN and were possibly known to him (LYALIN): [XXXXXXXXXX] source also learned that some other KGB officers within the NY Residency were also mentioned as possibly being known to LYALIN, but these individuals were not identified.
Source also learned that [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] is known to LYALIN.
In addition, sources learned through [XXXXXX] that LYALIN can identify some details concerning [XXXXXXXX] operations in London.
According to the source [XXXXXXXXXX] cannot be sure whether LYALIN is in a position to identify him. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXX] who served in London with LYALIN may have mentioned [XXX] as having been [XXXXXX] in the London Residency. [XXXXX] feels that LYALIN undoubtedly knew his [XXXXXX] successor in London as [XXXXXXX].
Source learned that, concerning the reaction of KGB Headquarters regarding the defection. The NY Residency’s opinion is that all KGB personnel assigned to the London Residency will be replaced. Concerning those KGB officers assigned to the NY Residency who might be known to LYALIN, source indicated that the prevalent opinion in the NY Residency is that no immediate action is necessary regarding possible replacement of these officers since the possibility exists that LYALIN might not recall specific names and identities.
Concerning the result of the defection upon current illegal service by the London Residency, source indicated KGB Headquarters will continue the analysis of LYALIN’s operational activities while assigned to London will also review the files to which he (LYALIN) had access and, thereafter, formulate the necessary actions regarding the illegal agents known to LYALIN.
Source indicated that the NY KGB Residency was not informed concerning the motivation for LYALIN’s defection. Source stated that LYALIN’s official cover position while assigned to the London Residency is unknown to the source. Source indicated that LYALIN was a ‘rank and file’ worker who occupied no supervisory position within the London residency.
Source added that, based on a conversation with [XXXXXXXXXXXXXX] source learned that LYALIN entered the KGB in 1960 He was graduated in 1962 from the KGB Intelligence institute 101 and, thereafter, pursued specialized courses relative to ‘Line S’ techniques for approximately two or three years. In 1969, for reasons unknown to the source, LYALIN was transferred from the ‘S’ Directorate to Department ‘V’6.
Although heavily redacted, this report strongly suggests that the source was a senior member of the KGB rezidentura whose comments might have made it easy for one of his colleagues to identify him. Accordingly, the report advised that
In the light of this situation, it is again noted that if disseminated further, every precaution is urged to present the above information in such a manner as to fully protect [XXXXXXX]. Contacts with the source regarding this matter are continuing.7
The FBI also expressed concern about tasking the source to seek information or to engage in behavior that might compromise him. Nevertheless, in early 1971 the special agent in charge of the New York Field Office informed his director, J. Edgar Hoover, about ‘a tentative schedule of meetings with this source for briefing and debriefing’ the 902nd Military Intelligence Group, then the United States Army’s principal counter-intelligence organisation, formerly known as the Counterintelligence Corps. The 902nd had a reputation for running highly aggressive operations against the Soviets, usually in the form of ‘dangles’ deliberately deployed to tempt a suspected Soviet talent spotter or recruiter, or via an established double agent, likely a soldier who has been cultivated under the 902nd’s supervision.
The precise nature of the relationship between the FBI and the source inside the Soviet Mission to the United Nations is far from clear, but it would appear that the 902nd MI Group was in the final stages of a plan, codenamed IRONCLAD, intended to embarrass the KGB, blow an agent operating on the west coast, and expose the expose the source inside the rezidentura who, presumably, FBI knew to be a double agent acting under the KGB’s control.
As the Bureau pointed out, however, in the light of the recent defection in England of an Officer of the 15th Department, OLEG A. LYALIN, this meeting could very well be aborted by the Soviets. In line with this thinking, the NYO wishes to point out that if the meeting is consummated and if the subject does make an appearance, it could be the last opportunity for a long time to take advantage of a situation that could discredit the subject, cause the KGB considerable embarrassment and disrupt the efforts of the 13th Department for an extended period of time.
The NYO agrees with the Bureau that a defection approach to the subject is impractical and unfeasible. Also, the knowledge we might gain, if their operation is allowed to continue, from the handling by the Soviets of the source, in the west coast area seem minimal to the amount of damage we might cause by exposing, not only the subject, but other KGB Officers worldwide, who have handled this source.
The Bureau is requested to make reference to NY TT 9/10/71, captioned ‘IRONCLAD IS-R’ wherein an informant had had advised that the recent defector OLEG LYALIN had spent approximately nine years in the Illegal Support Directorate before being transferred to the 13th Department, Sabotage and Assassination Group. The NYO has noticed that the submitted communications under separate captions, of information received from [MI5] concerning operations in which LYALIN was privy. The NYO would like the Bureau to consider the feasibility of submitting all information received concerning these departments to a NY control file (captioned OLEG A LYALIN) being opened by this office for receipt of same. In this way the NYO can more properly evaluate this information and can more intelligently submit questions concerning these two Departments in which we have primary interest.8
The implication of this plea from the NYFO to Hoover is that Lyalin’s defection in London had unwittingly interfered with a well-founded counter-intelligence operation conducted against a department V officer based in the New York rezidentura who thought he was managing an asset in California. The NYFO had already assessed their contact as unsuitable for defection and was worried that the KGB would call off the entire ‘operational game’ in anticipation of Lyalin’s compromising the source in New York who was definitely known to him. According to the FBI’s informant, ‘the subject was among those KGB officers in NY who knew this defector (Oleg A. Lyalin) or were known to him.’ The NYFO explained on 24 September that two days earlier Lyalin’s colleague had unexpectedly fled the country:
This departure was obviously in haste as the subject and his wife had taken a new residence in which they stayed for only about a week. He had also indicated to friends that he would remain in the US until the conclusion of the General assembly at the UN. This subject’s departure would therefore seem to be linked with the defection of OLEG LYALIN.9
While the debate continued between the NYFO and headquarters in Washington DC over how to handle the situation, the FBI continued to receive information from IRONCLAD. Four days later, on 28 September, Hoover was informed that
Source has determined that the defection of Oleg Lyslin in London, England, has had some effect upon the KGB NY Residency in that regard, source has determined the [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] have both alluded to the Lyalin defection and in non-specific terms indicated that perhaps KGB should consider the possibility of establishing a special ‘service’ within the Residency which would analyze the activities, behaviour patterns, weaknesses, etc. of the Soviet personnel with the objective of preventing a similar defection. Source added that [XXXXX] implied that the receipt of a telegram from Headquarters addressed solely to [XXXXXX] outlined this possibility.
Source determined from [XXXX] that he [XXXX] had come to the conclusion that if such a step were taken by Moscow, the special ‘service’ which would be established within the NY Residency, would probably be composed of personnel assigned to the two Main Directorates, Moscow.
In this regard source feels that [XXXXX] comments might be a prelude to the establishment of more stringent security measures within the Residency
Source feels that the only personnel whom source can trust and [XXXXXXXX]
[XXX] source determined that [XXXXXX] of the NY Residency, had indicated that [XXXX] was not known to OLEG LYALIN, nor did LYALIN know of [XXXX] KGB affiliation.10
A few days later IRONCLAD was back in touch with his FBI handlers to report that a senior KGB officer, who had been expected in mid- September on an inspection your, had failed ‘to leave the USSR as scheduled’. As reported to Washington, ‘source feels that the recent defection in London, England, of KGB officer Oleg Lyalin might have some influence on’ the unexpected change in plan.
In another report, IRONCLAD disclosed that the rezidentura had been ordered to suspend all operational meetings with its agents:
The seriousness with which the KGB has viewed the developments in London on the basis of LYALIN’s defection is emphasized by the fact that KGB Headquarters has advised [XXXXX] to prohibit intelligence meetings between KGB officers and their most important American agents. This directive was issued by [XXXX] on Thursday, 23 September 1971 and, as a result, only the most insignificant meetings have taken place since that date. There is no indication as to how long this prohibition will be In effect.11
The fact that Lyalin had spent some nine years in the KGB’s illegals directorate was of great significance to Western intelligence agencies, which knew little about the activities or staff of what was arguably the First Chief Directorate’s most secretive branch. Although MI5 and the FBI had some experience of two illegal rezidents, Willie Fischer (alias Rudolf Abel) and Konon Molody (alias Gordon Lonsdale), who had been imprisoned in the United States and England respectively, neither had cooperated with their captors. Both men had been thoroughly professional and their silence had been rewarded with their eventual early release in spy-exchanges. Both Soviet officers had won the respect of their interrogators but had whetted an appetite for information about illegal networks that, by their very nature, were potentially vulnerable because of their lack of protection under the Vienna Convention, which protected their counterparts operating under official cover.
The Washington Field Office’s interest in the illegals phenomenon prompted the drafting of a questionnaire, which was to be passed to MI5 for GOLDFINCH to answer, and its composition offers an insight into the FBI’s understanding of Directorate S’s modus operandi. Indeed, FBI headquarters considered ‘the questions as set up by the WFO are too revealing’.
DEFINITION OF ILLEGAL
Define what the KGB terms an illegal.
TRAINING SCHOOL FOR ILLEGAL AGENTS
I identify and describe individuals who were in training school with you as both students and teachers.
Describe training in selection of drops, meeting places, secret writing techniques, anti-surveillance procedures, communication methods, etc.
PROCEDURES / ORGANISATION
Are third-country nationals used by Soviets in illegal networks in target countries? Are business concerns in target country ever used as part of illegal network?
Where are illegal agents placed in the United States? What are principal targets in the United States? Has the number of Illegal Support officers serving abroad increased or decreased in recent years?
Has the Center taken over the day-to-day direction of illegals so that the duties of Illegal Support officers abroad have been minimized?
How long would an illegal agent reside in [the] target country before he becomes operational? Does this procedure vary with different target countries? How many illegal agents does one Illegal Support officer handle?
Can an illegal agent and his wife enter [the] target country with children?
Do Illegal Support officers and their assigned illegal agents have personal meetings in target country?
What South American countries are utilized to send agents into the United States?
Are Americans recruited in the United States for use as agents in other countries? On [a] large scale?
RETURN TO SOVIET UNION OF ILLEGAL AGENTS
How long would an illegal agent remain out of [a] target country on such a trip?
Is there any pre-set time schedule for illegals to return to USSR for briefing, i.e. 2, 3, etc. years?
How long would an illegal agent remain in [a] target country before returning to the Soviet Union for vacation? For permanent recall? For briefing?
ESCAPE / RECALL FROM TARET COUNTRY
What type of escape training and documentation is given to illegals to leave target country if they believe they are compromised?
In the event that KGB recalled illegal agents from target country in belief their cover had been blown, but it was later concluded that this was not true, would KGB send these same illegals back to that country?
Is Swiss bank utilized in funding of illegal agents in the United States?
What is the usual method in funding for illegal agents in target county?
COMMUNICATIONS
Method of communication between center and illegal agent in target country?
Method of communication between support officer and illegal agent?
Are commercial radios adaptable for target country used by Illegal Support officer to communicate with illegal agents in target country?
What makes radio does Center recommend for the use of its illegal agents in target country?
In illegal training school, here is it recommended that illegal agents hide radio schedules, secret writing equipment, etc. when they have set up residence in target country?
Does an Illegal Support officer monitor at one of the legal establishments the same radio transmissions that the illegal agent (whom he operates) receives?
USE OF CP MEMBERS IN ILLEGAL APPARATUS
What is [the] current policy re involvement of CP members in target countries in illegal apparatus, support or recruitment?
USE OF POST OFFICE AND SAFE DEPOSIT BOXES
Are safe deposit boxes used by illegal agents in [a] target country?
Are Post Office boxes used by illegal agents in [a] target country?
SAGOTAGE/DISRUPTION UNITS
In the event of crisis preceding outbreak of conventional war, what action do you think illegal groups took in the United States during the Cuban crisis in 1962?
Are any sabotage units now operational in the United States?
If so, describe organization, equipment, number of agents, procedures, targets.
Are any disruptive units used at this time by Soviets in the United States?
If so, describe organization, procedures, number of agents, targets.
As drafted, the WFO questionnaire was embarrassingly naïve and unrevealed an astonishing ignorance of standard Directorate S procedures dealing with the management of its illegal networks. Some of the items listed betrayed a very basic lack of knowledge that certainly would have surprised MI5 and doubtless Lyalin himself.
On 16 September, Lyalin’s interviews with MI5 analysts yielded a detailed biography, which was circulated to Allied liaison services. It served not only to advertise GOLDFINCH’s credentials, but to celebrate the fact that the British had succeeded in running a penetration of the KGB without Soviet interference, Considering that this had not happened since 1947, this represented quite a milestone.
Oleg Adolfovich LYALIN
A RELATIONS
1. Father
Adolf. Born 2878. Died 239.1952 of a heart attack.
Chief engineer of the CALSSYROV (ph) (electrical and engineering equipment for agricultural purposes).
1937: Expelled from Party – reason not known.
During [the Second World] war joined partisan movement, received decorations. Discharged on grounds of health, returned home in 1944 and allowed to join [the] Party again.
1944 until death: Chief of Planning Department of City Council of PIATIKOPSK.
2. Mother
Born 1905 or 2906. Teacher. Graduate of Higher
Political School. Party member. Pro-Stalin.
1950s: Separated from husband and went to live in village of MACAVOYS near ARTOL where she was director of a school.
After husband’s death in 1952 returned to PIATORSKY and obtained [a] position as a geography teacher.
1954: Accused of collaborating with Germans during the [Second World] war.
1956: Cleared of collaboration charge but was in ill health (only 1 lung) and could not work so retired to TSISIS in Latvia. Visited Czechoslovakia (1964) as Representative of Teachers’ Union of Latvia. In receipt of a pension. Refuses to speak to LYALIN because she hates the KGB. As a result of her experience with it when accused of collaborating. LYALIN gets news of her through her sister.
3. Brother
[XXXXX] KHANOKOTSK [XXXXXXXXXXXX].
Graduate of Moscow Aviation Institute [XXXXXX] Institute [XXXXXXXXX] of Radar [XXXXXXXX] Institute, [XXXXX] for the Army on aeroplanes. [XXXXXX] (probably KGB). Lives in Kiev.
4. Stepbrother (Deceased)
Alexander child of father’s first marriage.
Joined the Airforce. Killed on 2 May1945.
[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX].
5. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX].
6. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX].
7. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] Klaypodo.
8. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX].
9. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX].
10. [XXXXXXX]rgi Ivanovich SISTRNKO born 11.10.15.
Identified CO [XXXXXXX] Soviet Russia [XXXXXXXX].
11. O.A. LYALIN
(1) LYALIN was born 29.6.28 at STAVOPOL but he was not reg- istered until 28.8.1938 and the latter date is therefore his offi- cial birthday. During the war years he lived with his mother in German-occupied PIATGORSK In 1950 when his parents separated he remained with his father PIATIGORSK. After his father’s death there was very little money and he was obliged to leave school and find work. He continued to attend school in the evenings.
(2) LYALIN entered the Higher Marine School, KAVOTSK (ph) street, Odessa in 1954 and remained there until 1959. He entered by means of a competitive examination consisting of mathe- matics, physics, history, literature, and an oral examination in French English or German (LYALIN chose English) Students lived in the School and uniform and leaks were provided free. There were two seasons per year, Spring and Winter, but every year from September to November students were at sea gain- ing practical experience. LYALIN studied electrical marine engi- neering, astronomy, physics, and economy of sea transportation. At the end of the course there were two exams: (1) the State exam and (2) Universal Diploma which is a thesis on one particular subject the student chooses out of five or six set by the Board of Exams. To obtain (1) and (2) is equivalent to a University degree.
(3) In 1957, while still a student, LYALIN was a crew member of a four-masted schooner ‘TOVARICH’ (a confiscated German ship) making a goodwill tout of Western ports which included a two week visit to Portsmouth, as guests of the Portsmouth Marine School and several Mediterranean ports. In 1958 he vis- ited Kuwait and Suez aboard a tanker. When he left the school in 1959 he served aboard a cargo ship visiting local (i.e. Baltic) ports as third and later second officer until July 1960.
(4) At some time prior to 1959 whilst still a student at the Higher Marine School he was co-opted by the KGB to work against Western seaman and smugglers, (Transportation Department, later 5th Sector Odessa KGB). There was nothing formal about this recruitment. A friend who was already a co-opted worker took him along to the Personnel department of the School where it was arranged. His main qualification for the job was his com- mand of English.
(5) In 1958/59 the KGB sent him on a training exercise to KISEGEV with false documents in the name of OLEF ALEXANDROVICH KISHEEV. His task was to find four named people and collect information about them. Oh his return he was offered a job in the illegal net.
(6) It was the Odessa KGB (for whom he was working as a co-optee) who recommended him for a place in the 101 School. He went for an interview and was accepted. Students lived in at the School. He commenced a two year course at the School in August 1960. This course consisted of Chemistry, Photography, English and ‘Tailing’. There was one lecture at the beginning of the course on the structure and purpose of the KGB. Thereafter also six months and one year course at the School LYALIN took his examinations before the end of the course and graduated in October 1961 and was sent to live in a private flat for a few months. There he read the English newspapers and wrote a paper on how to avoid the call-up in the USA. After his graduation it was decided not to use him in the illegal net. He believes this was because of the divorce from his first wife which was pending.
(7) On 29 April 1962 he was posted to Klaypoda where he was in Sub-Division X dealing with foreign seamen. Hs rank was ‘1 small star’; by the time he left Klaypoda he had ‘4 small stars’. He was in the same sub-division for the whole of his stay in Klaypoda. The numbering of the sub-divisions changed while he was there and his became sub-division II.
(8) In February 1957 he was sent to Moscow to attend a six month course starting 1 March 1957 at the V Department school at Calitziner. The school is still called the Calitziner but is now situated in the premises which used to be occupied by the 101 School on the road to BAASIKA 26 kilometers from Moscow. Training at this school consisted of lectures on:
(a) Partisan warfare including organizing a partisan army from a small group, and how to maintain security and prevent penetration by the local secret services or army intelligence. These [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] Poland and Czechoslovakia.
(b) Radio communications. Two army types of radio were shown, one weighed 24 kilograms and the other 35. They had very good tuning capacities. LYALIN describes a method of using failm to obtain high speed. Coding, decoding and how to use a ‘grid’ were also taught. LYALIN stated that because of my marine education I know what a radio is and I know how to use it so I was not even attending the lessons’ i.e. at the Training Centre.
(c) Explosives. Basic principles and precautions only were taught ‘because everybody understand that as soon as you leave the School you will forget about it but it won’t take you that long to renew it again.’
(d) A practical exercise in which the students were divided into groups of six and given a direction. The target would be a factory, rocket base, power station or something similar. The group would have to locate and identify the target, give a full description including plans, details of security measures, and how entry might be effected and an assessment of its value as a target.
(e) The same groups of six were given a ‘theoretical task’. Each were given two books and a good map of a different place and using only this they had to prepare a plan of where they would land, what equipment would be needed, how many people, etc. Then they were given a place to find and describe fully including how to penetrate it and lastly they blew up a bridge. The last tasks are divided amongst the groups who were supposed to be in radio communication (In fact they had no radio and used telephones). When all the tasks were finished the members reported back to the chief of the group (LYALIN was the chief of his group).
(f) Parachute training. Three rubles per jump were paid as an incentive.
When the course was finished LYALIN returned to Klay Poda.
(9) On 2 May 1968 LYALIN was sent to Moscow and instructed to prepare himself for a mission to Czechoslovakia posing as an American tourist of German origin. This mission did not materi- alize as the situation in Czechoslovakia was brought under con- trol and LYALIN returned to Klaypoda in mid-August 1968.
(10) In November 1968 LYALIN was sent to Moscow for training prior to his UK posting. This included visits to most depart- ments at KGB Headquarters although he admits that he man- aged to avoid some of these. He also received some instruction from the Foreign Trade organization for his cover position. He arrived in the UK on 11 February 1969.
(11) LYALIN speaks good English, some German and a little Span- ish and French. He has visited Bulgaria, Turkey, France, Italy, Gibraltar, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, East and West Germany. His service in the UK was hid only foreign posting.
(12) LYALIN’s KHB rank is 4-star captain. He has been a party mem- ber since 1950. and was the Young Communist League leader in his group at the Higher Marine School.
(13) He has used the following aliases:
The purpose of assembling this potted biography was intended partly to alert liaison services to areas of potential interest to them, but mainly to keep a record of the defector’s claimed curriculum vitae so any subsequent discrepancies might be detected. The interrogation technique had proved useful when in 1964 Yuri Nosenko had been caught out in various contradictions in his KGB career, which to him acknowledging that, for example, he had inflated his rank and exaggerated his status and access to files, motive by a desire to make himself more valuable to his American hosts:
Until October/November 1969 the head of Department V in the USA was Nikolay Alekseyevich KUZNETSOV who was in the UN in New York. This was his second posting to the U.S. On the first he recruited a technician connected with electronics and computers for which he received a very high decoration. He was not like in headquarters because he was always emphasizing his superior position and the fact that he had been decorated. During his second posting in the United States he produced no practical results ad after encountering some ‘difficulties’ was obliged to return unexpectedly to Russia in October or November 1969, leaving all his possessions behind. LYALIN believes he is now teaching. The current head of Department V in the U.S. is believed by LYALIN to be [XXXXXXXX] under UN cover in New York.
There are currently two young Department V officers in Washington: They had previously been [a] subordinate to KUZNETSOV. [XXXXXXXXX] prior to going to the U.S. later this year. he will serve under UN cover in New York.
There is a Department V officer in Colombia: he went there in late 1969/early 1970. LYALIN does not know if there is a Department VF representative in Canada. In November 1968 there was someone training to be a member of the Consular staff for Canada. This man might therefore be in Canada.
The 13th Department (now known as Department V) agents in the U.S. about whom LYALIN learned from [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] U.K. who up to 1969/70 was in the North and South American subdivision of Department V Headquarters.
[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX], an Armenian, now an American citizen living in the U.S. He left Armenia many years ago but still has relatives in Russia. He writes to his relatives not to officials and he uses an ancient Armenian language which is difficult to translate as it is not spoken today.
[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX].
Note: All three agents mentioned above are American citizens with American passports.
They used their own identities. All three were current cases in 1969/70. [XXXX] was not directly involved in them but heard about them as a result of sharing a room.
1. [XXXXX] has a contact in London who has communist sym- pathies. The contact shares a flat with a young American. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] they advised him to travel to Europe to avoid the draft. Recently [XXXXX] has been holidaying in Morocco. In the U.K. he does occasional jobs to make a living. In places where he works he tries to cause trouble. Inciting strikes, etc. Initially [XXXX] was cultivating his contact with a view to finding out as much as possible about [XXXX], and he met [XXXX] twice. The Resident was [XXXXXX] interest in [XXXX] but he con- tinues to pay attention to the [XXXXXXXXX] was unable to say if there is a homosexual aspect to this case.
2. When [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] was in Norway two years ago [sic] he recruited a major in the U.S. Army. The major was connected with building and reconstruction techniques. He was subsequently posted to West Germany where he continued to be met by someone else. It appears that [XXXX] was on friendly terms with a bookshop owner and he found the American’s name on a mailing list for books. He asked the bookshop owner about the major, contrived a meeting in the shop and subsequently recruited him. LYALIN was unable to supply any further informa- tion about this major for the [XXXXXXXXXX].
3. In 1964, the First chief Directorate KGB received a document issued by the ‘American Security Service’ for its officers on ‘What kind of behaviours must be shown towards Russian refugees and refugees originated from the U.S. or from the U.S. zone of Ger- many. It was distributed to all places where there were Russians who traveled abroad, rig seaports. LYALIN saw a partial transla- tion of it when it reached KLAYPEDA in 1965. The main points that he recalled were:
4. (a) How to criticize the Russian way of life.
(b) What you may tell a Russian.
(c) How to treat a Russian refugee or escapee.
5. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] between BREMENAVEN, RIGA, VENTSILS and KLAYPEDA, has been a KGB agent since 1963 working to one of LYALIN’s for- mer colleagues in KLAYPEDA. [XXXX] has a relative, probably a cousin, whose husband is in the U.S. Nayv working on military transports between HANGENHAFEN [sic] and Vietnam. [XXX] met this American in Germany and obtained from him infor- mation about security measures on board ship, cargoes, loading techniques and timetables of his transport which his controller considered very useful. LYALIN could not recall which port the transport sailed but he thought that it could have been a small place in North Germany.
6. When [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] Counter-intelligence section in the KGB residency in London, was in the USA (1963–69) he had an agent offering him information about special classified cars. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXX].
7. In July 1971 an urgent report was received by the KGB Resi- dency in London instructing all Pollical Section officers to con- centrate on obtaining information on Sino-American relations. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXX] informed LYALIN that he [XXXXXX] Lon- don, a JE[XXXXXXXXX] from whom he [XXX] to seek informa- tion. This American official had apparently been offered the post of Second man in Singapore but he refused. He told [XXXX] that he was either going to be an ambassador in a very big country or somewhere e else but that he was not going to be a secretary somewhere especially in a place like Singapore.
8. [XXXXXX] has a non-Soviet contact, possibly an American, who returned to London from Geneva on 22nd July 1971. [XXXX] is particularly interested in this person because [XXXX] works in the U.S. embassy, London. [XXXX] has not yet met the girl in the U.S. embassy.
9. [XXXXX] was until Nov/Dec 1970 [XXXX] was in touch with [XXXXXXXX] who was in London from [XXXXXXX] by chance in a café [XXXXXXX] and he passed him technical reports ‘to help him’. Before [XXXX] was handed over to LYALIN with instructions to complete his recruitment and bring him under proper control. LYALIN accomplished this in the first two months. [XXXX] pro- vided a large volume of confidential reports from SHELL about the oil industry, e.g. research, developments, production, profits, plans, quarterly progress reports on the Stanley Research Centre, etc. The material was normally collected from him on Friday and returned to him on Saturday so that he could replace it on Mon- day. [XXXX] motive was mercenary and LYALIN paid him £40 for one year. He signed receipts in the name of [XXXXX] information which from an industrial point of view was considered very good was primarily of interest to the Scientific and Technical Section who were prepared to pay £200 for a complete set of Stanley Research Centre reports. In the second half of 1970 [XXXX] was introduced to [XXXX] of the [XXXX] Technical Section but he did not care for [XXXX] and he left for the U.S. at the end of 1970, with- out telling [XXXX]. LYALIN does not now know of any attempts to re-establish contact with [XXXX] in the U.S. In LYALIN’s view it would probably be necessary to see from [XXXX] employment whether there would be any advantage in recontacting him and if so who, e.g. [XXXX] LYALIN himself would be available to make the contact. LUALIN had received a request from Moscow for [XX] current address. He had intended to establish the address from another of his agents who is in touch with [XXXX].
10. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX] whilst in the UK she appears to have been [XXXXXX] Jesuit Missions at 12 Park Street. New Park Lane, W1 (Tel. No. 493 7811 [XXXXXXXX] went to Boston to live with the wife’s parents, but the last that LYALIN heard was that they were looking for a flat.13
In addition, Lyalin mentioned a pair of KGB illegals, a husband and wife team, who had arrived in London in mid-1969. He also compromised three of the agents he had run in London, who were promptly arrested. They were a Malaysian clerk, Sirioj Abdoolcader, Kyriacos Costi and Constantinos Martianon.
Abdoolcader, who had been recruited in March 1967 by Vladislas Savin, a fellow ‘Line F’ officer, was employed by the Greater London Council in the vehicle registration department and had access to details of cars used by MI5 in covert surveillance operations. He had been instructed by Lyalin, to whom he was introduced in 1969, to cultivate Marie Richardson, then a Ministry of Defence secretary working for the deputy director of the Royal Navy’s Support and Transport Staff. She had been the subject of an approach while on a cruise to Leningrad in 1969, an incident that she had reported upon her return. Aged 33, Abdoolcader had failed in his pursuit of Richardson, but he nevertheless was regarded as a valuable source by the KGB. He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.
The other two other KGB agents, Constantinos Martianon and Kyriacos Costi, were Greek Cypriot tailors, brothers-in-law who had been members of the Young Communist League. When questioned they had admitted having been recruited in 1961 during a visit to a Soviet trade exhibition. Aged 27, Costi was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment and Martianon to four.
Lyalin agreed to trade information in return for eventual resettlement in the north of England, and he soon supplied a complete order of battle for the KGB in London. He also revealed his own mission, reconnoitered while posing as a textiles buyer across the Midlands, to select targets for attack by special forces in the event of war, including the Fylingdales early warning radar installation in Yorkshire, V-bomber bases, and the London tube, scheduled for flooding by the River Thames after strategically placed bombs detonated. Chillingly, the defector also described a plan to infiltrate agents disguised as official messengers into Whitehall’s system of underground tunnels to distribute poison gas capsules. He also identified other members of the London rezidenturas who were expelled in Operation FOOT. Codenamed GOLDFINCH, Lyalin’s debriefing covered five volumes and was circulated widely among Western intelligence agencies. In Ottawa it was copied by a KGB mole inside the RCMP Security Service, Gilles Brunet, and passed to his KGB handlers.
Lyalin’s recruitment was accomplished by Tony Brooks of SIS and Harry Wharton of MI5, supervised by Christopher Herbert, as part of a joint effort to acquire a source inside the rezidentura, a highly ambitious goal that could never have been contemplated while there was a suspicion that MI5 had been penetrated. Brooks was a legendary figure, codenamed ALPHONSE who had won a DSO and an MC while organising the PIMENTO resistance network in Toulouse for Special Operations Executive in France during the Second World War. In the early days of the Cold War, he had been posted to Sofia, Belgrade and Cyprus. Wharton was bluff, no-nonsense Yorkshireman, while Herbert had enjoyed an MI5 career that had included a posting to Trinidad as the security liaison officer for the Caribbean. This trio represented the sharp end of a dream team that had been tasked to assemble the complete order of battle of the KGB and GRU rezidenturas, and then employ whatever methods they though appropriate to find, cultivate and recruit someone on the inside. It must have seemed a tall order, as such a coup had not been pulled off since 1927.
Lyalin’s eventual defection was unplanned, having been prompted by his arrest on drink driving charges by a Metropolitan Police traffic patrol. The detained Lyalin arranged for his handlers to be contacted, and MI5 despatched a team, equipped with the antidotes to various poisons, to extract him from the police station and supervise his asylum. Lyalin and his girlfriend were resettled, and he died in February 1995. While living in England with a new identity Lyalin was the target of a sustained effort by the KGB to trace him, and John Symonds was approached to use his police contacts to establish his whereabouts.
Operation FOOT, initiated and accelerated by Lyalin’s defection was the expulsion conducted in September 1971 to expel Soviet intelligence personnel from London, and intended to establish some equivalence in the imbalance that had developed between British diplomatic representation in Moscow and the reciprocal arrangements in London. This had been an objective of MI5 for years, but objections from Downing Street and the Foreign Office had kept the issue off the agenda, until the permanent undersecretary, Sir Denis Greenhill, lent it his support, confident that a joint MI5-SIS operation had acquired a reliable source inside the KGB’s London rezidentura. His information was considered at a meeting held at the Foreign Office by Greenhill on 25 March 1971 attended by Burke Trend, the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Sir Stewart Crawford, Sir Martin Furnival Jones of MI5, Sir John Rennie from SIS, and the permanent undersecretaries at the Home Office, Ministry of Defence, and the Department of Trade and Industry. The initiative for removing about 100 Soviets came from Furnival Jones who complained that
in the last 15 years there had been evidence of penetration of the FCO, the Ministry of Defence, the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Labour Party, Transport House and the Board of Trade. It was difficult to say exactly how much damage was being done. But it was equally difficult to believe that the Russians maintained such a large establishment for no profit. At least 30 or 40 Soviet intelligence officers in this country were actually running secret agents in government or industry.14
Following Furnival Jones’s presentation, Rennie added that ‘the Russians attached high priority to acquiring scientific and technical secrets, and to commercial information with military overtones.’ Advocating a mass expulsion, Rennie confirmed that
our Allies in western Europe, far from viewing our action badly, would probably welcome it. It was clear that the French were concerned about the numbers of Russians in their country, they might emulate our action. This would make it difficult for the Russians to switch their trade15.
Having examined a table displaying the numbers of Soviet personnel engaged on diplomatic duties in Western Europe, the United States and Japan, which indicated that there were more posted to Britain than anywhere else, the meeting closed with agreement to draft minutes on the subject.
Once the foreign secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, had been convinced of the necessity to restrict the size of the Soviet Embassy in London, and get rid of the disproportionately large KGB and GRU rezidenturas that were draining MI5’s limited resources, his task was to persuade Prime Minister Edward Heath. On 30 July, he received a memorandum from the home secretary, Reginald Maudling, and the foreign secretary, in which they pressed the case for action:
Soviet intelligence officers operate under cover of the various Soviet establishments in this country. Apart from the Soviet Embassy (189) there are the Soviet Trade Delegation (121) contract inspectors (73), and other organizations such as TASS, Aeroflot and the Moscow Narodny Bank (134). The total is higher than the Soviet establishment in any other country of Western Europe.16
This MI5 assessment would later be disputed by the FBI’s mole in the New York rezidentura codenamed IRONCLAD. At the end of September 1971, the asset advised his handler that
the KGB had 50 intelligence officers and the GRU had 35 officers assigned to this residency. Of the 50 KGB officers in the London Residency, 15 were assigned to the Scientific and Technical Branch of that Residency.17
Having reluctantly accepted the need for action, but uncertain over the appropriate timing, Heath agreed to have the matter raised privately with the Soviets, who were anticipated, correctly, to be unresponsive. On 4 August, Sir Alec wrote to his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, drawing his attention to the problem and illustrating it with a complaint about an application for a visa from a man named B.G. Glushchenko, together with the statement that he had been nominated to the post of First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in London.
This man was in Britain from 1964 to 1968. At that time he was described as the representative of Aviaexport at the Soviet Trade delegation, Mr Glushchenko’s activities however had little to do with the sale of aircraft. He came to our notice on various occasions; for example, he offered a large sum of money to a British businessman if he would obtain details of certain British military equipment.19
Gromyko failed to reply, so it was decided that the announcement would be made on Saturday, 24 September, when the Commons would not be sitting, but at the end of August all the plans were thrown into confusion because Lyalin was arrested on Tottenham Court Road and charged with drunk driving. Fearing he would be sent back to Moscow as soon as his rezident learned of his offense, Lyalin used his emergency contact number, and MI5 spirited him out of the police station. However, the news of Lyalin’s defection leaked, and was published in the Evening News on Friday, 24 September, so Operation FOOT was advanced by twenty-four hours, and handled by Greenhill, as Sir Alec left for New York. Ninety Soviet diplomats were declared persona non grata, and a further fifteen who happened to be out of the country, among them Yuri Voronin, the KGB rezident, were refused permission to return. Information from subsequent defectors confirmed that foot succeeded in severely disrupting Soviet intelligence operations, and it was used as a model for FAMISH, a similar exercise conducted subsequently in the United States.
In early October 1971 a GRU officer, Anatole Chebotarev, a member of the Soviet Trade Mission in Belgium, and reportedly a friend of Lyalin’s, defected from the GRU rezidentura in Brussels and was thought to have been quickly spirited to London because his car had been found abandoned at the Channel ferry port of Zeebrugge. A few months later he turned up at the Soviet embassy in Washington DC, seeking repatriation. He was promptly flown back to Moscow under escort where he was convicted of desertion by a military tribunal. He only served a short sentence, and later was pardoned and appointed a French teacher at a school in Ryazin. Although Chebotarev’s defection has been linked by the media to Lyalin, there was no such connection. Quite simply, Chebotarev had been stopped by the traffic police while en route to meet an agent, and then had been questioned by the Sureté d’Etat. When offered the opportunity to apply for political asylum, he had done so spontaneously, and been handed over to the CIA.
Lyalin’s defection inflicted immense damage on the KGB and wreaked havoc in the third department, which had spent years building up the London rezidentura, only to have the entire edifice torn down. Additionally, Lyalin compromised all his colleagues operating under diplomatic cover and effectively terminated the careers of dozens of contemporaries. In these circumstances it was not entirely surprising for MI5 to hear from John Symonds, a former Scotland Yard detective convicted of corruption, that he had been approached by the KGB to use his police contacts to identify one of the Special Branch officers assigned to Lyalin’s protection.
Symonds had fled England in April 1972 when two of his CID colleagues, Bernard Robson and Gordon Harris, had been imprisoned for corruption. Symonds had been scheduled to appear as their co- defendant, but his counsel had argued skillfully for a separate trial, but their conviction had persuaded Symonds that he too would be rewarded with a long sentence, so he drove to Morocco where, while trying to find work as a mercenary, he had been cultivated by a Soviet diplomat, doubtless a member of the Agadir rezidentura, who was anxious to find Lyalin. Symonds later claimed that he had reported the incident to the authorities in London, without disclosing his whereabouts. In any event, the episode showed that the KGB was in an unforgiving mood as far as Lyalin was concerned. As General Klaugin ruefully recalled in his memoirs, ‘the upshot of the Lyalin affair was that dozens of KGB officers were fired or demoted, department V was shut down.’