Appendix I

VERMEHREN INTERROGATION REPORT, MARCH 1944

While in Cairo, Vermehren was interrogated at length and over a period of two months by Security Intelligence Middle East, which cross-examined him on the structure, staff and agents managed by the Abwehr’s branch in Istanbul, known as KONO. Vermehren disclosed that he had acted as a recruiter, case officer and mission planner, supervising espionage operations across the region, working alongside the Abwehr chief in Turkey, Paul Leverkühn, codenamed ALADIN, who was based in Ankara, and his KONO colleagues in Istanbul, Walther Hinz, Gottfried Schenker-Angerer and Robert Ulshofer, who collected military intelligence for Eins Heer (I/H) and Kurt Zaehringer who concentrated on naval information for Eins Marine (I/M).

By the time this report was compiled, SIME had the benefit of three further Abwehr defectors, Willi Hamburger, and Karl and Stella von Kleczowsky.

Copy No:

MOST SECRET

S.I.M.E. Report No. 4

Name: ERMEHREN, Erich

Nationality: German

Date of Interrogation: 11 & 12 March 1944


SPECIAL POINTS

A ABWEHR’S CONNECTION WITH DRUG SMUGGLERS

1. Vermehren states that the Abwehr in Adana and Vermehren ran all the smuggler agents in which are included of course those who smuggle drugs from Turkey into Syria. He says that Abwehr – DI in Istanbul have asked several times for drugs to be sent to them in order that they might supply smuggler agents, but it was only in August 1943 that they received a small consignment weighing one kilo of a medicinal drug somewhat similar to morphia from a Parisian firm, the name of which he does not remember. This consignment of one kilo was worth about TL 750,000 on the black market. It was duly forwarded by I/M in Istanbul to their representatives in Adana and […] for distribution.

2. Vermehren states that by supplying smugglers with drugs Abwehr hoped to attract some people and induce them to carry out espionage missions for them in Syria in addition to their illicit traffic. He adds that it also gave Abwehr recruiting officials a good cover in that they could pose as drug merchants when dealing with prospective agents. Espionage could then be relegated to second place importance, and only later, when the agent had completed one or two tasks assume its primary role in the man’s clandestine journey into Syrian territory.

Vermehren does not think that any drug smuggling organization was used by the Germans to pay their resident agents in the Middle East.

3. TURKISH DRUG ADDICT

During his last stay in Germany in late 1943 Vermehren was told by his chief Major KUEBART that he would in all probability be put in charge of a very valuable Turkish source on his return in duty to Istanbul. This source, he was informed, was a Turkish drug addict who had been recruited in November 1943 by […] KUEBART’s personal assistant during his visit to Istanbul. […] had apparently known the Turk previously when he was in Turkey before the war. and on being contacted in November had agreed to act for the Germans if they kept him supplied with drugs. Vermehren says that he was not told the man’s name and did not get in touch with him in Istanbul but thinks that maybe he would have been instructed to do so had he not come over to the Allies when he did. The agent would have operated in Turkey.

C PERSONALITIES

Vermehren, on being presented with a list of sixty names (Middle Eastern nationals entering Turkey from any direction) and others, gave the following information.

(a) […] He has already divulged details of this man under refer- ence Report No. 1, para x)

(b) LAPIN [….…] This man made the proposal to KONO in 1942 that he would put his national organization in Syria at their dis- posal to supply them with military information from that quar- ter. He was given a large sum of money but his plan never came to anything, whereupon the Germans reduced their payments to him to a small retaining fee, which he still received to this day.

(c) Mohamed Riza GHAFFARI

Vermehren remembers seeing the above’s name on a list of Abwehr I/H agents, but states that he is no longer active. And that he knows no more about him.

(d) Parvin WAHASZAIDE

Vermehren considers that the above is probably a German agent, as he has heard the name of WAHASZAIDE mentioned by either HIZ or ULSHOEFER He says they were probably referring to PARVIN who arrived in Turkey from Baghdad in 1942, rather than SULIEMAN WAHASEZAIDE who arrived from Tehran in June 1943. He would have known about the latter’s recruitment by his colleagues but states that he has no knowledge of this effect. Vermehren has not heard PARVIS’ cover-name ‘SEITE’.

(e) Dr. Habib Dr HAHDMAZ

Vermehren knows this Indian’s name as he once read part of his translation into German of the Koran. Vermehren suggested that HAMBURGER should be asked about RAHMIA.

(f) Vermehren states that he does not know Mir Hohsen KOUS- SAWSAVIAN, a Persian who arrived in Istanbul in August 1943, representing the HERMAN GOERING-WERKE: Ahmed KHAN, proprietor of the Oriental restaurant in Berlin; Hamdi KHATTIG, an Iraqi employed in propaganda broadcasting under HAHRI, editor of the Persian programme, or Rashid QESART, Syrian in touch with the German Foreign Office and Ministry of Propaganda.

(g) Mansour and Hussein QASHGAI

Parvis WAHABAIE, during interrogation, had supplied information to the effect that SEILER, then German Consul- General in Istanbul, had given a banquet in honour of the two QASHGAI at the Consulate in January or February 1943, at which certainly Leverkühn and perhaps Vermehren had been present.

Vermehren remembers the occasion but states that he was not invited and that the banquet was a private affair of SEILER’s and not an official function. He confirms that Leverkühn was present.

(h) Graf MERAN

Vermehren does not know much about this individual beyond the fact that he is an SD man and at one time was a candidate for inclusion in a special punishment company, owing to his misdeeds. A certain von GEORG apparently spent two months in such a company, in which personnel carried out severe manual duties or handled dangerous high explosives.

Vermehren says that the Kleczkowskis will know much more than he about MERAN, as he was their personal friend.

(i) Organisation ‘ARMEN’

Vermehren has never heard of the above. He was shown a photograph of the report from a German agent in the Middle East written on fabric but stated that he had never come across anything like this during his stay in Turkey or elsewhere.

Vermehren did not recognize the names:

(i) VARICHIAN and

(ii) ARMAVIR

when these were put to him.

(j) ROSSETTI’s wife (Report No. 4, para 9a)

When [Clemens] Rossetti was moved by the Abwehr from southern Italy to Athens, his wife replaced him in the post he had vacated. Vermehren says that she then left Italy for Germany before the Allies had occupied that part of Italy in which she was operating.

(k) ZAMBONI

Vermehren has never heard of this man.

(l) MIRZA KHAN

He has heard of the above and states that he works for ZAEHRINGER Abwehr I/M and is either a Northern Persian or Southern Russian by nationality.

(m) Persian Agent to INDIA

Vermehren states that this agent of [Robert] HINZ (Abwehr I/H) was sent on an espionage mission either early or in the spring of 1943. He traveled [sic] from Turkey to the Indian border, but Vermehren does not know the exact route taken by the agent. At all events, he finally landed up in Southern Persia and approached the Persian (Baluchistan) frontier which he crossed on hearing that there was a large aerodrome nearby in Indian territory. He reached the aerodrome where he was arrested by the local security authorities, roughly handled, and imprisoned by them for two weeks. After which he was released and shipped back into Persia. The agent then made his way to Turkey where he delivered his report on the aerodrome and Persia to the Germans.

(n) KAVAS of the Egyptian Consulate in Istanbul

Vermehren had a contact with this man (see Report No. 4, para 7) and tried unsuccessfully to get hold of secret letters through him.

(o) The DANIELSONS

Vermehren says that he knew the two brothers socially, as his father had been their lawyer, but that as far as he knows they did not work for KONO.

(p) THIRK

ULSHOFER lived in a flat owned by Madame THIRK and Vermehren says that ULSHOFER may have been known to some people as Monsieur THIRK.

(q) HALDUN (Report No. 4, para 11)

The contract with HALDUN was made by one of ‘ALADIN’s’ men. KONO signaled to Berlin the terms of his offer and Vermehren heard that it had been turned down, although he did not see a signal from Berlin to that effect.

(r) Nicolas GALETI Sub-editor of ‘BRITANOVA

Vermehren does not recognize the above’s name and added that in all probability KONO had no connections with BRITANOVA. He excepted Abwehr III from this however, whose agents he does not know.

(s) Graf Von MOLTKE

Concerning the above, Vermehren states that he is a well-known international lawyer at present attached to the legal branch of the OKW. His two visits to Istanbul, in July and December 1943 were made in connection with the Danube shipping problem, which was causing the gravest concern to the OKW, the German Transport Ministry and Foreign Office. Von MOLTKE reviewed the situation and gave advice on the matter. Vermehren also says that he originated a scheme to seize ships formerly owned by countries under Axis control and now flying the British flag in neutral waters, to counteract the seizure of Axis shipping in Allied ports by the British.

On his first visit to Turkey in July Von MOLTKE stayed at Burgas with Dr WILLBRANDT, who is a German emigrant, a very reliable and capable type, very anti-Nazi and likely to return to Germany at the earliest opportunity to fight National Socialism.

On the second occasion in December, he stayed with Leverkühn who, according to Vermehren, esteemed him highly and called him a lever lawyer. and a very honest man with which latter remark Vermehren agrees.

Vermehren gathered from conversation with Von MOLTKE that he was anti-Nazi and thinks that he probably belongs to the anti-Nazi movement in Germany. He supported his opinion by saying that Dr WENGLER, the latter’s personal assistant is an ardent and outspoken anti-Nazi. WENGLER accompanied his chief to Turkey in July and paid a second visit alone later in the autumn.

(t) VON TROTT ZU SOLZ

Vermehren states that the above, whose Christian name is Adam, was a Rhodes Scholar and has lived some time in both China and America. He is strongly opposed to the Nazi Government, but politically ambitious and at the moment holds the appointment of personal assistant to head of the Indian Department of the German Foreign Office. This department is interested in information of a military and political nature obtained on India through diplomatic channels, e.g. through the Afghans. It is also concerned with propaganda to India.

During his visit to Turkey in June 1943, VON TROTT ZU SOLZ stayed with Leverkuehn [Leverkühn], with whom he had been working before the war, for part of the time. Leverkuehn [Leverkühn] wanted him to be attached to the German Embassy in Turkey as Secretary, dealing with American and Allied policy. The Foreign Office would not release him however and Gesandter [Erich] WINDELS, last German minister to Canada, was given this post. It was thought that WINDELS would have gained some knowledge of USA policy while holding his appointment in Canada.

Vermehren states that ‘ADAM’ is anti-Nazi and very probably connected with an anti-Nazi movement in Germany. It is also probable that this movement includes amongst its members, General [Franz] HALDER, who Vermehren considers to be a most valuable man for post-war Germany. Vermehren says that no-one knows where HALDER is at the moment. Vermehren gives ‘ADAM’ the highest recommendation, adding that he will not do the same as he has done and come to the Allies, as he considers himself too valuable to the opposition in Germany itself.

‘ADAM’ has an elder brother and a younger brother names JOACHIM. Vermehren knows them both and has a high opinion of them. The eldest, before the war, worked as a workman in a Berlin suburb to study working class conditions and feeling. During the war he became a Welfare Officer (before Vermehren’s time) but was eventually transferred to the Russian front on account of his anti-Nazi views. Vermehren last heard of him in Germany where he was recovering from a wound received in battle. He has been converted to Roman Catholicism

Vermehren states that JOACHIM, the youngest brother, is now in Holland as a lieutenant in command of a company of Free Indians, He has also been converted to Roman Catholicism. Vermehren says that ‘ADAM’ is well on the way to embrace the same faith.

All the VON TROTT ZU SOLZ brothers are in touch with an anti-Nazi German author named ERNST JUNGER.

NB. In regard to the above information concerning VON MOLTKE, and the VON TROTT ZU SOLZ brothers in sub paras (n) and (t), it is Vermehren’s wish that it should be handled with the utmost discretion in order to avoid harm coming to those whom he mentions at the hands of the Nazis.

(u) MRALAREN OYSU (Report No. 1, para 12i)

Vermehren states that the above had not been told of his proposed employment as courier between Baghdad and Istanbul in the spy-ring organized for Iraq and Iran by him (Report No. 1, para 12h and i). He said he knew of OYSU’s willingness to work, as he had already consented to smuggle things through to Syrian and Iraq for the several people.

Vermehren does not think that OYSU was involved in the reported smuggling and espionage organizations in which a ‘MAHMOUD’ in Istanbul sent letters to Mohamed FARAH and his associate HAGOP GULBENKIAN in Aleppo. Vermehren does not know these two last-named individuals. But has something to say on the subject of ‘MAHMOUD’ in Istanbul.

(v) Mahmoud Al ANGERER

HASSAM SIRRY (see Report No. 2, para 3c; Report No. 3, paras 2, 3b, 12, 19c(ii)) told Vermehren that he had heard from his friend YALINTIRK (Report No. 3, para 2) that an ABUBAKR in Istanbul had been receiving letters written in the style of a mother addressing her son and apparently concerning life on a farm in Syria. The contents of the letters were suspicious in that they contained many figures, disguised for example in this manner: ‘Our sow has had so many piglets and our hen has laid so many eggs in the past week.’ Vermehren thinks that the ABUBAKKR in question may be Mahmoud Al BUBAKR, and he may also be identical with the MAHMOUD in para 3.

(w) SABRI KIPEL

Vermehren says that he had the above on his list as a prospective agent but had never actually contacted him. He hoped that HASSAN SYRRY would be able to investigate the possibilities of using this man.

Vermehren states that KIPEL has not worked for KONO.

4. Vermehren volunteered the following names and produced the following information on them:

(a) ALI SHINAS

The above is one of HINZ’s agents. Vermehren knows nothing at all about him.

(b) ABDUL KERIM

This man is either HINZ’s or ULSHOFER’s agent. Vermehren does not know anything else concerning him.

(c) MARSHANI

The above is a Circassian living in Istanbul employed by Abwehr I/H for a long time, at least since 1942, as a recruiting agent. Vermehren states that he was an unsuccessful one, however and is an irresponsible type who, by failing to keep an appointment would ruin the prospects of recruiting a good agent. MARSHANI is a paper or cotton merchant by trade.

Vermehren states that he trained this man for an espionage mission to Egypt and the preparations for his journey were almost complete when Vermehren came over to the Allies. MARSHANI was to report on military matters in secret writing and would have been given matches. He was also instructed to recruit resident German agents and amongst Circassians in Cairo and Alexandria.

(d) SICHERHEITSDIENST AGENTS

5. Vermehren states that AHMED SAABRY (REPORT No. 2, para 4a) was a paid SD agent,

6. The remainder of the Germanophile clique (reference Report No. 2, paras 3–5). That is, ABUBAKR, HASSAN SIRRY, HASSAN AL FENDRE and Prince MANSOUR DAOUD before he went over to the Italians, were all Abwehr agents but nevertheless interested in FAST of the SD who could possibly provide them with a political future. Vermehren says that Prince DOUAD of the above clique was a paid Abwehr I/H agent although he too knew FAST.

E GERMAN W/T AGENTS

Vermehren was asked whether a German W/T agent before being sent on a mission to the Middle East was given a ‘pep talk’ by hid instructor saying that he would soon be a link in a large German W/T network supplying information to the Germans from all quarters of that territory.

Vermehren replied that although he did not know from personal experience what happened, he imagined that the agent would be given an underrated rather than exaggerated version of the extent of German W/T activities in the Middle East.

F KONO’S RELATIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF COUNTRIES OTHER THAN TURKEY

7. Vermehren states that he knows of no contacts between KONO and: The Hungarians; the Romanians; the Spaniards; the French.

8. With regard to the Italians, he says that HINZ exchanged military information with Lt. ANDORA. He had no Italian contacts himself and knows of none with Abwehr other than those he has already given (Report No. 4, para 8).

9. Vermehren states that Leverkuehn [Leverkühn] encouraged political interaction with the Japanese Press Attaché AOKI, mainly about America.

10. As far as the Russians are concerned, HAMBURGER told Vermehren of a White Russian agent. Vermehren cannot remember his name but thins he was a special envoy of General WRANGEL. He knows where he lives because HAMBURGER drew him the following plan:

11.

(a) Regarding the Afghans, Vermehren says he asked Leverkuehn [Leverkühn] if he could approach the Afghan Minister in Ankara. Leverkuehn [Leverkühn] replied that he was already looked after by the SD.

(b) The elder HAMATA has a cordial contact with his Afghan Minister.

(c) Vermehren says that a few days before he left Tur- key, ULSHOFER went to Ankara to try and recruit Afghan agents.

12. The only contact with Iraqis known to Vermehren is SCHENKE- ANGERER with the Iraqi Consulate (see Report No. 3, para 16b(ii))

G GERMAN PENETRATION OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

13. Vermehren states that he has already given all the information he could about German penetration of the British organizations in Turkey to another officer. He was therefore questioned no further on this matter.

E GERMAN PENETRATION OF THE AMERICAN O.N.I.

14. YOLLAND, Elmer (?) American Report No. 1, para 12e)

The above is about 33 years of age and was originally teacher at the American College in Istanbul, but attached to the ONI and the American Consulate General as a political commentator. He was a friend of LEHMANN, former head of ONI and became a great friend of Georg STREITER, correspondent of the Berliner Borsenzeitung, who took over the editing of the paper Boyoglu after the Italian collapse. He was an SD man.

15. Vermehren described Yolland as very queer, an egoist, well- informed and ‘brainy’. He had been in Germany before the [Second World] war and was an idealist who wanted to end the war and start an era of the common man. To this end he began in April 1943 to visit STREITER’s house almost every night to give him information about American opinion, what the American Consulate and Colony in Istanbul were thinking and what German propaganda would suit the American public. He also gave information about Anglo-American quarrels in the Middle East and asked for German books and press material in return. Vermehren often saw him at Streiter’s house and listened to him sometimes for hours at a time discussing how he could get visas to visit Hungary, where his family were. His father had been a professor for 15 years. Once only did he give military information; He told Vermehren one night that that morning a very high British intelligence officer had visited the ONI and asked for maps of Sofia, Budapest, Vienna and Stuttgart, apparently for bombing purposes,

16. In August 1943 the ONI staff was out down, [Harold] LEHRMANN was sent home and Yolland lost his job there. STREITER then asked KONO to take him over and KONO began to pay him TL 200.a month. Vermehren received his information for three weeks; then HOEBKE, KONO’s driver, who spoke excellent English and had little to do, saw Yolland daily. Yolland’s information was all passed to WINDELS (the last German Minister to Canada) who had come to Istanbul to start an Embassy Information Department. KONO reported that this information was getting less but might improve and should be kept going, as WINDELS liked it.

Vermehren believes that Yolland was paid latterly by the German Embassy and no longer by KONO.

Sometime in or after August 1943 HAMBURGER told Vermehren that Yolland had been discovered by the Americans to be working for the Germans, but the Americans, though they were ashamed of his treachery and tried to ‘cut’ him, still employed him. HAMBURGER would know more of what the Americans thought of Yolland.

Yolland knew DIZLINGER of the SD. But Vermehren does not know whether he gave DIZINGER information.

17. ALADIN had his own man in the ONI but not very highly placed. Neither this agent nor ALADIN had much respect for the ONI.

I THE FADL CASE (Report No. 1, para 12g; Report No. 2, paras 11g & r)

18. The following is a summary of information in the above case obtained from Vermehren by Captain [Desmond] Doran of SIME on 4th March 1944.

Once SHAHAB made his original approach to the German Embassy in Istanbul in 1940 or 1941 requesting to be sent to Germany for propaganda work. The offer was turned down by the German Foreign Office, who arranged that he should be put in touch with the SD.

In the summer of 1942, the Abwehr in Istanbul borrowed SHAHAB for sending to Egypt to put into operation a W/T set controlled by Father DEMETRIUS.

On SHAHAB’s arrival in Cairo however, he was unable to obtain the W/T set. As a result of information s0upplied to him by the SD, he contacted MOHSEN FADL an SD. agent and AZIZ FADL, and arranged for the operation of a W/T link.

MOHSEN FADL had been recruited and despatched to Egypt by Graf Meran of the SD.

After SHABAS had returned to Turkey Prince MANSOUR DAOUD’s mother-in-law was sent to Egypt with instructions and secret ink for the FADLs.

In November 1942 HASSAIN SIRRY was sent with money, a code, instructions in secret writing and perhaps white-headed matches for the FADLs. He was to deliver these through Prince MANSOUR’s mother-ln-law who was still in Egypt.

In February 1843 MAHMOUD MAHI SIRRY was dispatched to Egypt to deliver a secret ink letter and EP 500 to be paid in installments on receipt of instructions from Turkey depending on the efficiency of their work to the FADLs. SIRRY was also to carry out an espionage mission of his own, supplying military and shipping information from Alexandria.

19. H1LMI BEY

After being informed during Captain Doran’s interrogation that a certain HILMI had at one time contacted the FADLs in Egypt, Vermehren now expresses the opinion that the HILMI who works as Vice Consul in the Egyptian Consulate at Istanbul is probably identical with this man. He says however that he never sent HILMI BEY to Egypt and that, if the FADLs were indeed approached in this manner, it must in all likelihood have been the SD who had given HILMI his instructions He also considered it probable that AHMET SALABRY recommended this man as an agent to the SD. Some indication of HILMI’s activities for the SD were given by the fact that he told the Abwehr after he had contacted them in Paris that he had a message from Egypt for them but had destroyed it. Vermehren adds that HILMMI BEY is a specialist in money transactions on the black market. Vermehren was asked whether he agreed with the assumption that it was HILMI BEY who had informed FAST of the SD of HILMI’s arrest by the British in 1943, after which FAST gave the news to him. (see Report No. 3, para 15b. Vermehren admitted that HILMI possibly had heard through the diplomatic courier and had been FAST’s source, but pointed out that if this assumption was adopted it would mean that the SD had possessed a sure channel through whom they could also arrange to pay their resident agents in Egypt or elsewhere. Vermehren imparted however, that the SD experienced the same difficulties as the Abwehr in remunerating such agents. Indicated that the odds were that HILMI had been FAST’s source or not.

20. MANSOUR FADL

Vermehren states that the above was an agent of the SD when he arrived in Egypt in 1941. MANSOUR FADL. He does not think he was a paid agent however, owing to the difficulties in establishing communications between a resident agent in the Middle East and the Abwehr or SD in Turkey. Vermehren added that as [Erwin] Rommel was expected to occupy Egypt at that time, many agents would have to be rewarded by the Germans in the political field.

It appears that the Paris names were given to Prince GAMAS by the SD in Turkey for use in an emergency when no other suitable bodies could be found by the Abwehr.

21. COF IN CAIRO (see Report No. 1, para 12)

Vermehren says that this man’s […]. The Abwehr had devised a plan whereby […] was to travel to Egypt in October or November 1942, contact the FADLs and give them a photograph of […] who was also known to […] would then have got in touch with the last named and instructed him to pay 31,000 to the person. I assume destroyed the photograph before entering Syria or else the Abwehr gave up the plan and nothing ever came of it.

22. OTHER MEN TO HAVE BEEN CONTACTED BY PRINCE SHAHAB (Report No. 1, para 12)

Vermehren previously referred to another Egyptian who was to be contacted by SHAHAB in addition to Father DEMETRIOUS. Vermehren was asked for more details but could only say that an elderly Egyptian aristocrat, prominent politically, who was to have supplied the information which would have been communicated to the Germans by some of DEMETRIOUS’s W/T sets. When SHAHAB arrived, he found that this man had been arrested and interned with the priest.

23. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Vermehren has probably given most of the important information in his possession but his capacity to recollect odd facts which may be important is not yet exhausted. He should therefore remain available for the submission of further names and queries which may occur in investigating German intelligence activities against the Middle East.

SIME

J.F.E Stephenson, Captain

19 March 1944

H.F.M. Eadie, Captain