Soviet and Nazi Defectors: Counter-Intelligence in WW2 and The Cold War

The object of this paper is to draw certain general conclusions about the subject of defection. For this purpose, the records available to us of Russian defectors have been studied. It is often dangerous to deduce generalities from the study of particular cases, but in our opinion common factors do emerge clearly from the stories of the defectors.

For the purpose of this paper a defector is assumed to be one who abandons the Russian service and who offers the information in his possession to a foreign power.

The cases of the following Russian defectors have been studied:

	Defected
Eugene PIK	1927
Grigori BESSEDOVSKI	1929
George AGABEKOV	1930
Walter KRIVITSKY	1937
Alexandre BARMIN	1937
Leon HELFAND	1940
Ismail AKHMEDOV	1942
Victor KRAVCHENKO	1944
Igor GOUZENKO	1945
Constantin VOLKOV	1945
Kiril ALEXEEV	1946
Michel KORIAKOFF	1946
YURCHENKO	1946
Mikhail DENISOV	1946
Vera TAKACS	1946
Andre JURACHOW	1947
Alesander KRAVCHENKO	1947
‘S’	1947
Vasili SHARANDAK	1947
Grigori TOKAEV	1947

It will be seen from the above list that the period of time covered is twenty years, 1927 to 1947. We must point out that we are unable to say definitely that all important cases of defectors have been studied by us. For example, in 1931 according to newspaper reports of the time, the defector BESSEDOVSKI had founded in Paris an ‘Association of Non- Returners’ or defectors’ club of which the membership was said to be about one hundred. We have no information about these men nor do we even know if they ever existed.

The summaries of information about all the defectors listed above, with the exception of JURACHOW and ‘S’, can be found in the Appendix to this paper.

It may at first appear that twenty cases in twenty years is a small number. In this connection it should be remembered that for many years the frontiers of Russia have been virtually sealed, and nobody has been allowed to leave the country until a careful investigation has been conducted into his political reliability. All the defectors studied were serving abroad at the time of their defection, Furthermore, within the USSR and Soviet citizens abroad, so rigid a watch is maintained upon each individual that the majority of those who are at all discontented with the regime are almost certain to be arrested or recalled to Russia before they have a chance of developing into even potential defectors.

II REASONS FOR DEFECTION

The examination of a defector’s reasons for his action is by no means a simple matter. It will usually reveal however an immediate cause such as his having been recalled to Russia from his post abroad shortly before he defected. Further scrutiny of his case shows in many instances a more deep-seated reason, often of long standing. These long-term reasons are in some instances caused by disillusionment with the increasing discrepancy between the Stalinist regime in Russia and the original conception of the USSR or by a realisation of the contrast between life at home and life in a democratic country. Such a disaffected state of mind may lead to the thought but not always to the action of defection, and if it should become known to the Soviet authorities it may be the cause of the recall to Russia which impels a man to take the decisive step. Not all defectors have latent feelings of disaffection, though nearly all, however strong their desire to break with the Soviet system, receive some outside stimulus before they defect.

It is often said in disparagement of defectors from the Russian Service and their motives that as they are already under sentence of recall fear is the true reason for their action. Should their recall be due to their having fallen under suspicion because of their dissident views or because of some breach of discipline, the best they could expect on their return to Russia would be disgrace or imprisonment; execution or exile to Siberia would be the more likely fate. We do not consider however that the existence of an immediate cause of defection should necessarily be regarded as a reflection upon the validity of the long-term reasons described below, a Russian who openly breaks with his Government not only exposes himself to mortal danger – TROTSKY, AGABEKOV, Ignace REISS, KRIVITSKY and probably VOLKOV paid with their lives – but may also suffer throughout his future life from misgivings as to whether in breaking with his Government he has not also been a traitor to his country. A Russian with a real love of Russia must feel that in defecting from his Government he renounces his country forever, and in order to do this the requirement of an outside stimulus to push him over the brink is understandable; also any defector who has left members of his family behind him in Russia must realise that his defection places them in danger.

BESSED0VSKY, KRIVITSKY, BARMIN, HELFAND, AKHMEDOV, GOUZENKO, ALEXEEV, KORIAKOV and TOKAEV are known to have been recalled to Russia immediately before they defected, making nine out of a total of twenty.

Our records of some of the others are not complete, and it may well be that the number of those recalled is even larger.

The very nature of the USSR as a totalitarian police state holding rigid ideological and economic tenets from which no divergence is tolerated is bound to foster dissatisfaction among those who must suffer from its implementation. From about 1923, the year of the second Soviet constitution, the ideological split between Stalin and Trotsky became increasingly marked until it culminated in 1929 with Trotsky’s banishment from the USSR. In 1937 with the great purge of the Red Army and the Intelligence Service directed against so-called Trotskyist elements it became clear that nobody whose views were suspect or whose abilities, real or imaginary, offered a threat to the Soviet system, would be spared. Thirty-five thousand Red Army officers were purged at this time. Walter KRIVITSKY and Ignace REISS who expected to be affected by the purge fled from the Soviet Intelligence Service as a result of this KRIVTTSKY to become a defector but REISS to meet his end at the hands of Soviet assassins in Switzerland. BARMIN who defected in the same year said that the recent Moscow trials had filled him with horror. HELFAND, who broke with the Soviet in 1940, said in the letter which he wrote to Molotov at the time that the old revolutionary pioneers to whom he claimed to belong had been liquidated in every sense of the word. The Russo-German pact of 1939 had further disillusioned him; he felt that the Stalinist Government no longer stood for the aims to which he had devoted his life. TOKAEV, the most recent defector, also expresses strong dissatisfaction with the regime. He defected just in time to avoid arrest.

TOKAEV further states that there are many people with his views in the USSR and that conspiratorial groups exist to some extent. Though we have not enough evidence to confirm this there are signs that a purge is in progress and sudden recalls of Russians from Germany are fairly frequent. If the Soviet Security efforts are not completely successful, therefore, we may hope to receive other defectors of this type and should expect some of them to be of considerable importance.

In addition to the purges and repressive measures described above, resulting in the complete lack of freedom of the individual, the economic difficulties of the USSR have necessitated harsh measures which have affected successive classes of the population and have kept the standard of living of the majority of the people exceptionally low. Such measures as the collectivisation of farms have caused misery and suffering for the entire peasant class. As a result, to avoid general discontent, Soviet propaganda has painted an entirely false picture of Western Democracy and the position of the worker. Both Victor KRAVCHENKO and GOUZENKO, who defected on their first visit to a foreign country, have emphasised their amazement on discovering the contrast between the Western Democracies as they are and the account given of them by Soviet propaganda and between the standard of living at home and abroad. GOUZENKO has expressed this attitude of mind admirably in his statement before the Royal Commission, which is given in full in the Appendix.

TOKAEV has also said that while in Berlin, where he got to know the British, American, French and other Western Europeans, he realised the utter falseness of Russian propaganda. This realisation seems to have seen the initial factor in shaking the faith in the Soviet system of those Russians who were paying their first visit to a foreign country.

AGABEKOV and TAKACS and DENISOV defected because the exigencies of Russian service interfered with the course of their love affairs. AGABEKOV had fallen in love with an English girl, and for her sake he abandoned his post and openly broke with the Soviet Government. TAKACS and DENISOV, both of whom worked for the Russian Intelligence Service, were refused permission to many, and finally when they were even forbidden to meet they decided to defect together. In addition, SIIARANDAK, who was not anxious to return to Russia as he was able to enjoy a much more comfortable life in Hungary, was confirmed in his desire to desert by the fact that he had fallen in love with a Hungarian girl whom he wished to many.

It is interesting to note that in not one of these cases have we any evidence that the defectors had been recalled to Moscow or otherwise threatened in any way.

Our information about KORIAKOV is scanty, but we have been told that he had been planning for some time to abandon his post owing to his religious convictions. He escaped from the Russian Embassy in Paris in 1946 after he had been recalled to the USSR.

III METHODS OF DEFECTION

After he has made up his mind to defect, the defector is faced with the very difficult problem of how best to carry out his intention. Seven of the defectors studied have chosen countries other than the one where they were employed for their action, as they presumably thought that they could thus reduce the risk. Only one minor character successfully carried out his intention of defecting to the British. Three others attempted to do so, but one was recalled to Moscow before negotiations were completed and the other two were handed over to the Americans. TOKAEV, who chose the Canadians, in fact found himself in British hands. Four defectors therefore chose the British, of whom only one was handled by us; we ‘know of no defections in British territory.’ The comparative unwillingness of defectors to approach the British may be explained by the fact, pointed out by SHARANDAK and TOKAEV, that there is a general impression among Russians, fostered by Soviet propaganda, that the British hand back defectors. This depression may have been confirmed by the Russian interpretation of the Yalta Agreement.

TOKAEV, who chose the Canadians in Berlin as the recipients of his defection, has given his reason for doing so as follows:- firstly, he is violently opposed to the Potsdam Agreement; secondly, he had heard that the British hand defectors back; thirdly, he was opposed to the ‘materialistic’ outlook of the Americans; fourthly, among the French there are ‘too many people like Thorez and Duclos’. He therefore chose the Canadians as being ideologically closest to the British and as not having been signatories of the Potsdam Agreement.

Of the remaining defectors, six defected in Paris, three in America, three in Germany, two m Austria, two in Czechoslovakia, one in Canada and one in China.

Having selected the recipient and the locality most suited to his purpose, a defector, in most cases already under surveillance, must first succeed in eluding watchers; secondly, he has the by no means easy task of persuading someone to accept and protect him. and of convincing then that his story is a true one. He is not often [sic] able to plan his action long enough in advance and must therefore trust to luck as to whether he will be well received.

As a rule a defector does not know whom he should best approach, which makes his task difficult. Five men defected in France, and were helped in their initial approaches to the French Government by the White Russian colony in Paris; ALEXEEV in America was also assisted in establishing himself by a White Russian organization; AKHMEDOV throw himself on the mercy of the Turks, Victor KRAVCHENKO and GOUZENKO both decided to approach the American and the Canadian Press respectively with their stories. They were not as successful as they had hoped they would be; KRAVCIIENKO had to tell the newspapers far more than he had intended to do before they would take any interest in him, and GOUZENKO had no success at all with the Canadian newspapers he approached.

VOLKOV approached the British Embassy in Istanbul with a sensational catalogue of information which he proposed to provide in return for protection and remuneration. He was however recalled to Moscow before a decision was made about him TAKACS and DENISOV offered themselves to a British representative in Prague who arranged for their handling by the Americans.

Since the end of the war the majority of defections, as would be expected, have taken place in the field. The defector’s task is a much easier one under such conditions. His problem consists not so much in finding anyone to accept him, but simply in reaching territory where he can make contact with Western Forces, and once he has reached such territory the risk of his being assassinated or arrested before he can carry out his intention is small.

GOUZENKO and Alexander KRAVCIIENKO share the distinction of being the only two defectors known to have made careful preparations to bring with them info mat ion and documents of value to offer to their protectors. During the last few weeks before his departure from the Russian Embassy in Ottawa, after he had made up his mind to defect, GOUZENKO selected a number of documents from the files which he took: with him when he left.

Alexander KRAVCHENKO deferred his defection for some months so that he might have an opportunity to obtain more information about Russian Intelligence Service activities to give to the Americans as a proof of good faith.

IV RECEPTION

From the defector’s point of view, it is clearly desirable that he should be received into protective custody as soon as he raises his approach, otherwise he runs the risk of being removed or liquidated in the interval which may elapse between his first contact with foreign representatives and the couplet eon of negotiations. Disadvantages to the recipients in accepting a defector at face value certainly exist, and in particular a British Liaison abroad, such as the Embassy at Istanbul approached by VOLKOV, rarely has the machinery necessary to cope with immediate acceptance and evacuation. In VOLKOV’s case the delay which was necessary before a decision could be reached proved too long and the opportunity was missed. Although the British representative in Prague was not able to handle the evacuation of TAKACS and DENISOV he could and did put then in touch with the Americans who, as their zone of Germany borders upon Czechoslovakia, were able to make the necessary arrangements,

J’ield conditions would seem to be the most satisfactory for the reception of defection. Facilities are usually available for evacuation if necessary, and the keeping of a defector under close control until his story has been checked and the avoidance of political repercussions through premature publicity are also far easier to arrange in the field.

In GOUZENKO’s case we have an interesting example of the reaction of the public to a defection. After the difficulties he encountered from the Press and Canadian Government Departments, he was forced when his situation became desperate to turn to ordinary Canadian citizens who were his neighbours. They accepted his story, gave him shelter from his pursuers and then sent for the police to whom he was at last able to give his information.

Reception arrangements must of necessity depend upon political expediency, the expectation of a worthwhile return in valuable information, and upon facilities available to the recipient; but it is clear that while delay in acceptance nay not necessarily be fatal, an expeditious decision is certainly desirable.

V REACTION OF THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES

The attempt made by the Soviet authorities to repair or counteract the harm which a defector may do is usually rapid and forceful. To this end, kidnapping and assassination were frequently used expedients in the early days, There the physical recovery of the defector dead or alive has proved impracticable, some form of defamation of character is the most common alternative. This may serve severa1 purposes – as an effort to retrieve the defector, as in the attempts made to use the accusations of stealing brought against GOUZENKO and ALEXEEV as a reason to demand that they be handed over to bade to the Soviet authorities, and as a means of discrediting him personally both in the eyes of his protectors and of the Russian people. The TAKACS and DENISOV case shows an interesting development of this discrediting technique in which an attempt was made by means of a planted document to persuade the British that they had simulated defection on the instruction of the Russian or Hungarian Intelligence Service.

TOKAEV was asked what measures the Russians would be likely to take to prevent defection. He said that the authorities would never allow the public to know that there were people who would be willing to cross the frontier, consequently nothing would be done to oppose it openly. As already explained, however, constant vigilance is maintained with a view to preventing the possibility of defection, and it is one of the tasks of the Russian Intelligence Service to keep an ever-open eye on such matters.

VI SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF DEFECTORS

It is hardly necessary to point out that the solution to a defector’s future can never be an easy one. He cannot feel that he is safe from the fear of assassination, and security precautions to avoid murder are hardly compatible with a normal working life. To avoid the dangers which threaten him he is forced to use such expedients as the adoption of a false name and a life of strict seclusion. He is also faced with the necessity of making a living for himself and his family; this is not an easy matter. Those responsible for his disposal must consider the fact that if he is not adequately protected the fate which may befall him will discourage those who might have followed his example. If he is left with no resources he presents a security risk.

VII INFORMATION PROVIDED BY DEFECTORS

Of the twenty defectors who form the subject of this paper, eleven can be said to have been reasonably fully exploited from our point of view. These are AGABEKOV, KRIVITSKY, AKKMEDOV, Victor KRAVCHENKO, GOUZENKO, ALEXEEV, DENISOV, TAKACS, Alexander KRAVCHENKO, ‘S’ and TOKAEV. Of the remaining nine, PIK was regarded as an unsatisfactory and dishonest informant; BES5EDOVSKY’s newspaper articles were of some use to us and it is not thought that he possessed much additional information of interest to an Intelligence Service.

BARMIN’s information was never seen by us. In view of the fact that he had been engaged in Intelligence work from 1919 this seems unfortunate. HELFAND was seen by British representatives at various times since his defection and has produced a good deal of valuable information about Russian Intelligence activities. Constantin VOLKOV was of course only able to offer a tempting catalogue; in the case of KORIAKOV and YURCHENKO we have seen no product.

In the eleven exploited cases we do not think that there can be any doubt that the dividend was a very valuable one. Even where it was more of historical than current interest it has been of the greatest assistance in giving us a picture of the development of the Russian Intelligence Service and the Soviet regime, AGABEKOV, KRIVITSKY, AKHMEDOV, GOUZENKO, DENISOV, TAKACS, Alexander KRAVCHENKO, SHARANDAK and ‘S’ were all in a position to know at first-hand about the particular sections of the Russian Intelligence Service in which they worked, and in several cases had a far wider knowledge. The more spectacular results of information provided by KRIVITSKY and GOUZENKO were the trial and sentence of a Foreign Office cypher clerk for espionage on behalf of the Russians and the breaking up of a Russian Intelligence Service network in Canada. Twenty persons, one of them a Canadian Member of Parliament and many holding positions in connection with Canadian administration and atomic research, were tried for supplying; information to a foreign power, and GOUZENKO’s evidence also led to the trial and conviction in this country of Dr Allan Nunn MAY.

AGABEKOV and AKHMEDOV provided information on Russian activities in the Middle East and Turkey and the latter has recently given information which even after six years this led to a spy ring which recently came into operation in the Western Hemisphere; DENISOV, TAKACS and SHARANDAK on Hungary, and Alexander KRAVCHENKO and ‘S’ on Germany. TOKAEV, as a high-ranking aircraft expert, is in a position to provide both technical information and accounts of the intentions and methods of the Politburo.

There are inherent dangers in the acceptance of information from defectors, particularly where the information cannot be checked and is not supported by documents. There is a great temptation for a defector both to over-state his own position and to embroider and colour his facts to suit himself, but not as many defectors as would be expected seen to have succumbed to this temptation. There is also a temptation for the subsequent users of the information to be too much impressed by it and to regard later material which may reach then from a different source as incorrect because it does not coincide with the defector’s story.

In spite of these and other drawbacks, there is no doubt that the defectors whose cases form the material for this study have provided information of enormous value to us. They have been, in fact, a major if not the chief source of our knowledge of the Russian Intelligence Service, and in the absence of other sources they are likely to be so for some time to come.

VIII THE FALSE DEFECTOR

Those responsible for handling defectors have generally, we think, adequately borne in mind the dangers of an agent being planted in this guise. It has been pointed out that the ‘arranged defection’ of a Russian official fortified with a quantity of true information and documents might be accompanied by a story of sympathisers still in the Diplomatic and Intelligence Services of the USSR. The country which gives such a defector shelter might be touted to use him not only as a short-term source of information but also as a long-term agent, and the latter case might provide a penetration opening for the Russian Intelligence Service. Also, a skilled Russian agent posing as a defector would be likely in the course of his interrogation to learn a good deal about the methods, targets and personalities of the Intelligence Service handling him, and the knowledge already in its possession.

We know of no proven case of the acceptance of a defector who later proved to be false and in the lack of any information about an operation of this nature it is not possible to say how it would be organised or to estimate the likelihood of its success. Recently there was a suspicion that an attempt was being made to introduce to us a false defector, but we have few details and cannot comment upon the story.

Clearly precautions should be taken in each case, including a careful check of the defector’s story against all other sources. It is felt that the risk of a false defector being undetected or, if undetected, of his do in; any serious donation can be made very small by proper handling. In our opinion the existence of such risks should not unduly influence us against receiving a defector since we stand to gain much more than we may lose with him.

IX TREATMENT OF DEFECTORS

It seems clear to us from all the cases we have studied that the quality of the information provided by a defector, and consequently the advantage to be gained from him, is to a large degree affected by the way in which he is handled. The Security Service, however, has had very few direct dealings with any of the defectors whose cases have been studied and has therefore practically no first-hand experience of handling them. Defectors are a vital source of information and as sources of information they present a unique psychological problem. Only if considerable attention is given to the psychological aspects of each case can a defector acquire that feeling of trust in his interrogator which is of such assistance in the future conduct of the operation.

It should be remembered that almost any man who has defected, whatever nay have been his reasons for doing so, has been through a period of intense and often prolonged nervous strain. There is bound to be a reaction after the defection has been successfully completed and for some time such a man is likely to be in an abnormal state of mind, Some defectors have abandoned the service of their country and come to us because of a genuine conviction that loyalty to the Stalinist Government is no longer compatible with the best interests of Russia and the world. With such men, every effort should be made to confirm in them the feeling that in giving us all the information in their possession they are actively attacking the Stalinist regime and furthering the interests of their countrymen. They are bound to suffer from doubt and recrimination as to whether they have acted rightly and should these doubts persist they may materially affect the amount of information which a defector may give. They may even lead to a complete revulsion of feeling and a desire to return to his masters, Furthermore, it would appear that in most cases, whatever may have been his real reasons for defecting, the subject will want in self-justification to convince his interrogators and incidentally himself that his true motive was selfless and ideological. In our opinion nothing should be done to prevent his taking this view; it is important that he should mint a in his self-respect, since we are largely dependent upon his goodwill and gratitude in obtaining information from him.

There has been a notable absence of cynicism amongst some of the most important Russian defectors and it is felt that cynical approaches should be avoided as they are distasteful and incomprehensible to those who are not of a cynical turn of mind. Many defectors have an exaggerated sense of their own importance; it is felt that allowances must be made for this in appropriate cases, and the defector should be treated, so far as possible, as a person of importance and integrity. Some care may have to be taken to make the defector-feel that he is meeting men of high status, but it is not suggested that action along these lines should mount to over-indulgence. Indeed, this would be disastrous since the relationship between the defector and his questioners should, at any rate on the surface, be one of mutual respect. A show of firmness when this is necessary can only do good.

Consideration must also be given to other matters. There is a marked contrast between the feverish activity which loads up to a defection and the comparative idleness which often follows it. It would seem inadvisable to leave a man too much alone and with too much time to think in the early stages after his defection. If he can be kept busily employed writing his story and talking to his interrogators he is less likely to indulge in dangerous recriminations and second thoughts. Besides, the feeling that he is doing useful work is exactly what is required to help him to justify his action to himself.

Steps should of course be taken to minimize the worries a defector may have about the safety of his family and himself, and the problem of his future.

The remarks above are intended to apply primarily to such defectors as have or can believe that they have a disinterested and respectable motive for their action. Men who throw themselves on our mercy only because they fear for their personal safety are unlikely to present such a complicated problem, since all they are likely to expect or receive from us is asylum and protection, and since if they threaten to prove intractable we can simply withdraw our protection without much loss to ourselves.

Our opinions on the handling of defectors are not intended to advocate in any way the least relaxation of security precautions to establish whether a defector is genuine, and efforts to ensure that even if he is not he can do little harm. A genuine defector will expect and appreciate that to protect ourselves we must go to considerable lengths to establish his reliability; but there is a difference between this and giving a man the impression that he is constantly regarded with suspicion. Sooner or later the investigations into his reliability should be presumed to have been completed and from his point of view he should cease to be treated as a suspect, This of course does not mean that those handling him will forget the possibility that he may have boon planted; it is plainly a question of a change of attitude in interrogating him. A risk always exists in the acceptance and exploitation of Russian defectors; the defector may be a brilliant plant, or he may at a much later date resume work for the Russians. This risk can be minimised by reasonable security precautions, but it cannot be eliminated. A too great insistence upon the risk may, by antagonising a genuine defector, destroy all the value which might have been gained from the operation.

X SUMMARY

In this paper we have illustrated by the stories of the defectors the points which we consider to be relevant to the subject of defection. They can be recapitulated briefly as follows

1. The repressive measures introduced in the USSR in the course of the past twenty years have affected successive classes of the Russian people and have given then cause for that dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime which engenders the desire to defect.

2. Defectors are almost unanimous in claiming that dissatisfaction with the regime was the main reason for their action. An additional impetus however is almost always present in the form of fear, love, or a desire for the western way of life.

3. The possible consequences to a man’s family should they be in Russia are a considerable deterrent to defection – and worry about the’ may affect his value after defection.

4. It is most important that, if he is to be accepted at all, a defector should be received with despatch and given immediate protection. Otherwise the opportunity of taking advantage of his offer may be missed, and his failure should it become known will be a deterrent to other potential defectors.

5. The reaction of the Soviet authorities to a defection is prompt and energetic. In the early days they resorted to kidnapping and assassination to recover the body before much harm could be //done, and also preferred criminal charges with requests for extradition. This latter expedient, which has become the most common in recent years, also served the purpose of an attempt to discredit the defector both in the eyes of his protectors and if necessary of his compatriots.

6. The solution of the defector’s future is bound to be a difficult problem. He fears assassination or kidnapping and is faced with the necessity of earning a living, Those responsible for his disposal must consider the fact that if he is not adequately protected the fate which nay befall him will discourage those who night have followed his example. If he is left with no resources he presents a security risk.

7. The information provided by defectors has been of a very high quality and of the greatest value to us. Though the danger of a penetration agent disguising himself as a defector must, of course, be borne in mind, adequate security precautions and careful checking of his story should prevent him from doing serious damage even should he remain undetected. Where there is reasonable expectation of advantage to ourselves, our decision as to the acceptance of a defector need not be unduly swayed by the fear of attempted penetration.

8. A great deal depends on the way in which a defector is treated. An attempt must be made to anticipate his fears and worries and to eliminate them when possible. Many difficulties such as those which have marred the late stages of past defections can be avoided if firmness and understanding are used from the start, and if an atmosphere of mutual respect can be established between the defector and those who are handling him.

Appendix II