At the time when Dönitz took over the affairs of the Reich on 1 May 1945, the foreign ‘possessions’ still in German hands were Denmark, Norway as far as Lyngenfjord, most of Rolland and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. A few small enclaves on the Channel coast, Biscay and in the Aegean had no further significance and were therefore left out of consideration. The discussion on the main areas addressed the following questions:
1. Do these territories have any military or political value in German hands that might be useful in the coming negotiations?
2. Should the German government and military leadership attempt to extend their freedom to manoeuvre and negotiate by using these foreign possessions and, if so, which ones?
3. What is the best way to hand over these territories at the surrender?
Since Dönitz did not want to resolve these questions without consulting the competent military and political men responsible for the territories, and also wanted to ensure that none of them would ‘revolt’ following the change of leader and continue the war on his own account, he wirelessed signals summoning the military and civilian commandants of each of the four territories. The talks were held on 3 and 4 May with each commandant separately in the presence of Dönitz, Schwerin, Wegener, Keitel and Jodl, and occasionally Himmler and Speer. In general, the following facts were established and decisions made:
1. The possessions still in German hands have no political value. None of the victors would be ready to make concessions for a territory which would have to be given up within a week or so anyway (except Himmler, who spoke of them being ‘in pawn’). Nevertheless, no stone could be left unturned in the quest to improve the German negotiating position.
2. Dönitz categorically rejected the idea of flying over Norway, Denmark or the Protectorate with the Government and OKW on a kind of ‘showing the flag’ exercise. This he considered unworthy and pointless because it meant extending the war uselessly, promised Germany no advantages and could bring the chosen territory additional misfortune.
3. He laid great value on these territories being spared any further fury of war and thought an attempt should be made to surrender them in the most advantageous way possible in the hope that it might gain some credit for Germany in the future. Any provocation of the native population was to be avoided, and power relinquished as smoothly as possible. As regards supply and other public functions, all possible aid and assistance was to be given. It was our duty to maintain order and keep the peace as long as the responsibility remained in our hands, and to avoid unforeseeable and disadvantageous consequences for both sides in the event of major disturbances being fomented.
Beside these general points of view covering all areas discussed, the talks touched on, and made decisions regarding, the following individual problems:
Bohemia and Moravia
(Reich Protector Frank: Generalleutnant von Natzmer, Chief of Staff, Army Group Centre, appointed his deputy by Schörner).
Politically, this region was almost lost. Bohemia was on the verge of revolution. The solution seemed to be to keep it subjected to a degree of German influence. We had no information as to what had been agreed by the Allies at Yalta with respect to the region. One had to assume that the intention was to liberate it. There were upper class Czech groups with who he, Frank, was in contact who saw great danger in such a development and would certainly prefer their country to be liberated by the Western Powers. One should therefore attempt to arrange a surrender to the Americans with the assistance of Czech politicians.
Neither Dönitz nor Schwerin thought much of this idea because it might aim to change the accord between the Allies and thus lead to tensions. It would not hurt to take soundings, however, which Frank was asked to handle. If successful, it might relieve Dönitz of the major headache he had regarding the existing German forces there. It was decided to declare Prague an open city, however, and so give the population peace of mind.
Subsequently we were unable to discover what steps if any Frank undertook: on the morning of 6 May we heard of the Prague Uprising and all further contact with the Reich Protectorate HQ was lost. From a military point of view the Protectorate was held by Army Group Centre, said to be intact, and which held a very strong natural defensive line in the Sudetenland, but could only hold on until its current provisions and supplies ran out. This was expected in about three weeks. Already on 1 May Dönitz was talking of abandoning the Sudetenland and moving the front westwards towards the American lines to avoid having the bulk of the Army Group fall into Russian hands at the surrender. He was dissuaded by OKW and Generalleutnant Natzmer on the grounds that the army would break up if the Sudetenland were abandoned. Experience showed that a withdrawal tended to be more orderly if the troops were forced back by the enemy that if they left an area at their own volition under no pressure. This was the correct decision but the collapse of the Army Group occurred anyway a few days later and valuable time was lost in which many more soldiers could have been saved from Russian captivity. Nevertheless, on 4 May Dönitz insisted that preparations for an immediate evacuation to the West must be taken in hand, and the order to move out was issued on 6 May. That morning, Lieutenant-Colonel W. [sic] of Montgomery’s Staff spoke with the Grossadmiral personally and recommended the immediate retreat of the Schörner front.
Holland
(Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart)
In this area certain agreements existed with the enemy that had helped improve the food situation for the populace. In line with general policy it was decided to offer a partial surrender. Seyss-Inquart doubted whether this would succeed because of the 1943 Casablanca Agreement. Dönitz ordered that hostilities should continue until any cease-fire came into effect, but there should be no scorched-earth measures or flooding.
At Montgomery’s insistence, which coincided with later German intentions, Holland was included in the partial capitulation that came into effect at 0800 hrs on 5 May. This meant there was nothing further for the territorial governor to do. Seyss-Inquart appeared reflective and clear-thinking, and made no attempt to escape his responsibilities. He was confined involuntarily to HQ for several days because the S-boat that brought him could not put out because of the weather, the only link between Flensburg and Holland being by sea.
Denmark
(Reich Plenipotentiary for Denmark Dr Best: Generaloberst Lindemann)
Despite a growing resistance movement, the political situation was still secure. The danger of insurrection was only feared from the intervention of foreigners. The refugee transports were heightening tension since they guaranteed that the war would continue on Danish soil to the last moment.
The military situation was favourable. The country was easy to hold and well supplied. The fighting strength and morale of the military units was unbroken. One of the common soldiers present, overjoyed at hearing the echo of his own oft-repeated opinions, declared: ‘I guarantee the men, and order generally in the country: no signs of landings – therefore come to North Schleswig, Herr Grossadmiral, and we shall close the bottleneck and make the last decent stand of the war.’ Schwerin stopped the overzealous soldier: ‘What for, Herr General?’ Denmark was included in the surrender to Montgomery and this relieved Dönitz of any further concerns in the area.
Norway
(Reich Commissioner Terboven: General der Artillerie Böhme)
The political situation here was favourable for the moment. The German collapse and the imminent end of the war were generally expected, and since everybody wanted to survive it with no further bloodshed there was little last-minute enthusiasm for an uprising. The region had been well supplied for some considerable time: the Commander-in-Chief was convinced that his troops were well able to defend Norway. These favourable factors, together with the inaccessible and easily defended terrain, invited a ‘heroic resistance’, and Dönitz was all the more anxious that there should be no pockets of resistance and that the transfer of power should proceed without a hitch.
In this respect Himmler admitted that he had put out feelers in Sweden for a capitulation. He thought it was both possible and right to offer the surrender of Norway to the Swedes so that their ‘brethren could arrive as liberators’. This political gesture promised that the German army in Norway could be interned in Sweden instead of being taken prisoner. Gruppenfiihrer Schellenberg, head of Overseas SD, was making the necessary contacts and had got the train on the rails. He would handle the negotiations himself.
Dönitz’s fears that Sweden might be pressured by the Russians to hand over these soldiers were dispelled by Schwerin. If Sweden accepted their surrender, which he doubted, they would only do so with British approval. Dönitz thereupon agreed to the approaches but did not provide Schellenberg with written authority to conclude a treaty. He wanted to reserve the right to decide for himself and not until he had received a telephoned report on the progress of the talks. The whole business seemed very vague to him and might invite a major political disaster. As it happened, Schellenberg’s mission achieved no practical results and was overtaken by events.
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For the sake of completeness I think I should present my personal impressions of the Reich governors of those countries. With the exception of Terboven, who followed the proceedings with a cold eye and only took part now and again, all of them seemed to have the fate of their own particular territory at heart. None had a guilty conscience, none was worried about being put on trial or exposed to the wrath of an oppressed people. All of them wanted to stay in their posts in order to personally oversee the German surrender and departure. None of them made an attempt to avoid his responsibility and save his own skin by fleeing. Even though Himmler took this way out, Frank or Dr Best would have needed it to have had excellent prospects for success to have followed him.
I cannot really allow myself to make a judgment on the activities of the Reich governors and the Wehrmacht commandants in the occupied territories. I have no way of measuring the extent of the guilt they incurred, if any. I would not wish to decide what measures were their own or Hitler’s, or which were forced upon them by the harsh necessities of war. Even if they had blood on their hands as a result of many acts or omissions, I have to respect their personal demeanour in the days of the collapse.