Over the past decade, social democratic parties across western Europe have been in ignominious retreat. The centre left’s electoral decline has been unprecedented. Even where social democrats have attained governmental power, often in coalition with other parties, their experience has been unhappy, followed rapidly by defeat. As a result, many commentators insist that social democracy has lost its vitality, and is destined to wane as a political force and an ideological tradition in Europe. This book considers the factors behind social democracy’s decline over the past decade, giving particular attention to the rise of populist counter-movements across the European Union. It then looks ahead at the future of centre-left politics in Europe with an eye towards potential strategies for stemming the left’s demise.
The central argument is that for all the difficulties facing social democracy, pessimism can be overstated: despite the apparent demise of centre-left politics, a new progressive era is within reach underpinned by renewed government activism and a new collectivism that goes beyond the traditional state; the new politics of left reform has the potential to fashion a more egalitarian capitalism and a fairer, more inclusive society. This age of progressive reform will be rooted in new electoral coalitions, new governing strategies, and new political narratives.
It is always tempting to search for social trends that might presage a dramatic shift in the centre of gravity towards the left. However, structural change does not have any pre-determined effect on the fortunes of parties: in the early 20th century, the growth of the working class was supposed to ensure the rise of socialism eclipsing Europe’s Conservative and Christian democratic parties. In the aftermath of the second world war, it was feared that the structural decline of the working class and the growth of affluence and mass prosperity would destroy social democracy. But electoral majorities are there to be forged from the raw material of social change; this depends on the skill with which parties develop new ideas and create a language that can appeal to the board majority. The 2008 crisis was heralded as a ‘social democratic moment’ in the industrialised countries, but the opportunity was squandered as too many centre-left politicians believed that a crisis of the capitalist system would lead inevitably to a rise in support for the left. They failed to cultivate a new generation of progressive ideas and policy programmes akin to the advance of Keynesianism in the 1930s. It is to this vital task that social democrats must now turn.
In Britain, politics on the left has never been more insular or parochial. Within the Labour party, the problems afflicting UK social democracy have been viewed through an almost entirely British lens. Under the present Labour leadership, the belief in ‘socialism in one country’ has returned with a vengeance. The UK’s decision on 23 June to ‘leave’ the EU is in danger of reinforcing a turn away from the Labour party’s historic commitment to internationalism and pro-Europeanism. Yet whether or not Britain remains an EU member, the road to electoral and political recovery for the Labour party will only be found by actively learning from the experience of social democratic parties in other countries across Europe.
The electoral landscape
Today, social democratic parties and governments are undeniably operating against a backdrop of political uncertainty and electoral volatility: this relates not only to one of the most severe financial crises in the west’s history. Capitalism is undergoing major structural alterations: the rate of technological innovation and the decline of industrial-era mass production imply that advanced economies are on the brink of a ‘fourth’ disruptive industrial revolution, which is undermining existing political and economic institutions. Moreover, fiscal pressures unleashed by the financial crisis are placing unprecedented strain on the public finances, welfare systems and future shape of the state. Crisis ‘aftershocks’ are accentuating the impact of long-term demographic trends, from an ageing society to declining fertility rates (Sage et al, 2015). The global context is being further reshaped by the rising power of the emerging economies and the relative decline of the west.
The energy and sense of historical purpose that gave birth to social democracy in the late 19th century have faded. Across the industrialised world, the pendulum has swung against the centre left to the surprise of many commentators. The 2008 crisis was predicted to herald a dramatic shift in social democracy’s favour, leading to a ‘centre-left moment’. The political discourse of advanced capitalist countries has become more concerned with inequality; the disorder wreaked by international finance; the consequences of inadequate regulation in financial markets; and the fragile moral foundations of global capitalism. The great recession has been accompanied by renewed concerns about the impact of technological change and automation on the labour market and the future of employment. Identifying effective remedies for ‘capitalist crises’ is territory that should naturally aid social democratic parties, as economies struggle to cope with one of the deepest and most painful recessions in 80 years.
Counterintuitively, however, the crisis appears to have benefited the moderate centre right and the populist far right, both of which have adeptly exploited the politics of austerity. The moderate right does this by redefining centre-left parties as profligate and economically incompetent. Those moderate parties are themselves being challenged, however, by the rise of populist parties even further to the right, particularly in northern Europe, that deftly exploit voters’ anxieties and insecurities about the increasingly globalised society they inhabit. In last year’s Danish elections, for example, it was the rightwing People’s party rather than the Conservative moderates that drove former prime minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt’s left coalition from power. In Austria, the presidential candidate of the hard right Freedom Party was in touching distance of victory.
The shattering of confidence in global capitalism and the return of state intervention to the centre of political debate has done little to revive support for the left. The 2014 European parliamentary elections could hardly have been worse for the centre left and sent a clear warning signal, resulting in its lowest representation since 1979. In Germany, the SPD has recorded its worst results since the 1890s, despite a very modest improvement in the last federal elections. In Spain, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ party (Psoe) has done poorly. The Irish Labour party’s vote halved from 14 to 7 per cent. In the Netherlands, the Labour party (PvDA) polled less than 10 per cent. In France, where the left had returned to government, the omens are far from auspicious for next year’s presidential elections.
In 2010 and 2015 at the national level, British Labour suffered among its worst defeats since 1918. In Sweden, the ‘heartland’ of European social democracy, the centre left lost two consecutive parliamentary elections for the first time in over a century, before scraping back to power. Italy provides the only robust evidence for European centre-left optimism. Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s Democratic party obtained more than 40 per cent of the vote in the 2014 elections. However, Italian politics are notoriously volatile while Renzi suffered a recent setback in regional elections, placing the left a long way from building a viable political coalition. The prospect of a centre-left renaissance across Europe is more distant than ever, while the historical achievements of postwar social democracy – universal welfare, high-quality public services, the social investment state – are vulnerable as never before. In electoral terms, social democracy is on the back foot.
Of course, incumbent centre-right parties have fared poorly too. There is arguably a reaction against establishment parties across Europe, as politicians struggle to overcome the long-term legacy of the financial crisis: lower growth, declining living standards, rising inequality and acute fiscal pressures. European centre-left parties’ electoral underperformance can be explained by weak and unpopular leadership; lack of a credible alternative, especially on economic management; and the cost of internal divisions in unstable coalition governments. It is not just that social democrats are losing elections, however. In the face of growing economic turmoil and escalating government debt, many now question whether social democracy is even capable of a revival. The centre-left, it is argued, lacks a persuasive electoral and ideological programme and has no credible governing strategy. It is far from impossible that we might be witnessing the slow, painful death of social democracy.
The structural causes of decline
These problems are compounded by structural shifts that are eating away at social democratic parties’ support base, as economic and social change reshapes the centre left’s electoral coalition. And as the structural environment changes, social democratic ideas that were largely accepted in most western European countries in the aftermath of the second world war become increasingly open to challenge. The welfare state’s universalism and commitment to addressing unmet material needs has shifted to a focus on enforcing the rules of contribution and responsibility. The perceived legitimacy of centre-left beliefs and values is apparently eroding. It is clear that major social and economic trends are continuing to transform politics.
Two broader historical shifts have challenged social democrats since the end of the cold war. The first is globalisation, characterised not only by worldwide market integration but also by deregulation and liberalisation, which significantly embolden capital at the expense of labour and the state. The second is the structural weakening of democratic politics in comparison to markets and other economic forces, which raises serious questions for a movement such as social democracy, whose existence depends on articulating ‘the primacy of politics’ in achieving social progress.
Both the liberalisation of global economic activity and the weakening of representative democracy have a crucial impact on centre-left parties. Globalisation has revolutionised economics and politics, with major consequences for traditional institutions but while the global economy has created unprecedented gains in economic growth and living standards, the benefits have not been evenly distributed. Moreover, globalisation no longer seems capable of generating an improved standard of living for those outside the economic and political elite. As a result, there is a strong political backlash against the global economy, expressed most visibly in hostility to liberal migration regimes and to European integration. Cosmopolitanism is now challenged by rising levels of xenophobia, motivated by new insecurities about national identity and belonging. Meanwhile, the institutions of global capitalism are increasingly distrusted following the financial crisis. This was the backdrop to the UK’s decision to ‘leave’ the EU in June 2016.
In the meantime, just as globalisation and liberalisation place new strains on the social and economic fabric of western states, political institutions appear less capable of dealing with these adversities. A ‘24-hour media’ cycle and the scrutiny of social media have made politics more transparent, but also more vulnerable to attack. The public mistrust of politicians and political institutions has weakened their legitimacy, as evidenced in lower turnouts at national elections. Voters demand quick results, even though achieving political change is as arduous as ever: the German sociologist, Max Weber, famously described the exercise of democratic politics as “the strong and slow boring of hard boards”. Moreover, confidence in EU institutions has never been weaker. As governments confront increasingly global challenges, they lack transnational mechanisms that can deal with interdependence while ensuring democratic legitimacy and consent (Gamble, 2010).
The decline of social democratic politics, combined with the rise of globalisation and the weakening of representative democracy, have long-term implications for the future of social democracy throughout Europe, as well as for Europe’s political left.
The current weakness of the social democratic idea
What, then, are the structural weaknesses that underlie the performance of social democratic parties? Shortly before the millennium, the late sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf famously wrote of the “end of the social democratic century”. For him, the third way and other ‘revisionist’ projects were largely fruitless efforts by the left to remain relevant in a transformed political landscape. Darendorf’s view resonates with those who believe that social democracy’s mission had already been accomplished, given that today’s centre-left programmes form part of any ‘mainstream’ political menu. Hence, there is no longer anything specific or challenging about social democracy; the programmes of centre-left parties offer no impending threat to the status quo, nor do they promise to protect working-class interests against the forces of international capitalism.
A less benign reading might conclude that social democracy has been fighting a losing battle since the process of globalisation hastened by the end of the cold war. The period after the second world war saw the emergence of a model of nation state social democracy in which national solidarity trumped international class consciousness. It was a period defined by the aim of improving the material conditions of the working class within fixed national boundaries, primarily through the use of redistribution and social security (Berman, 2006). But with greater global and European integration following the cold war, spurred on by the rise of international economic competition as well as migration, a ‘defensive’ mindset increasingly dominated thinking on the left. Centre-left parties became conservative, determined merely to defend the gains of the postwar period.
On top of this, the new wave of globalisation and market capitalism weakened collectivist institutions, promoting an increasingly individualistic society while eroding class identity and solidarity. In effect, the end of the cold war marked the demise of any ambitious social democratic vision, even if it enabled the centre left to separate itself from the excesses of state socialism. As the significance of class faded, social cleavages formed around migration and identity, spawned new populist movements on the left and right.
Migration, integration and identity
Social and demographic change poses major questions about the future sustainability and structure of the European welfare state; concerns have mounted over migration’s social impact across the EU, despite the economic and cultural benefits that migrants bring to member states. The success of the far right and its anti-immigration agenda in the 2014 European parliamentary elections, as well as in the recent Brexit campaign, is testament to social democracy’s decline.
The widening gap between rich and poor within the EU has ensured migration becomes a major political issue. Rising levels of unemployment in the aftermath of the great recession inevitably influenced attitudes toward European immigration. As the economic crisis recedes, the ‘new’ Europe is experiencing important and, in some instances, troubling political developments and social tensions. The EU’s expansion to the east combined with southern Europe’s economic stagnation has emboldened new political forces that threaten the mainstream political system.
This was on display in recent elections, as countries across Europe witnessed the rise to prominence of so-called populist parties. Though some parties came from the left, such as Syriza and Podemos, others are harder to classify, like Italy’s Five Star Movement. Nonetheless, the vast majority of electoral gains made by populists came from the right. In three major western European countries in the European elections – Denmark, the UK and France – rightwing populists topped the poll.
Many of these parties, including those on the left, derive their support from those citizens who are deeply alienated from the EU. This disaffection is a product of the EU’s apparent lack of democratic accountability, encouragement of the uncontrolled free movement of labour, and the imposition of austerity. Indeed, austerity has driven support for both the populist left and right; in the south, voters have leaned toward parties determined to scale back austerity, while many in the north feel they have already paid the price for southern ‘profligacy’.
With the notable exception of Greece and Spain, however, the left in the EU has failed to capitalise on the crisis as the right has done. The performance of green parties exemplifies this trend. The only country where green parties have been successful was in Portugal, where the Democratic Unitarian Coalition and the Earth party won a combined share of the vote of nearly 20 per cent. This fits with the broader pattern of the growth of the radical left in Europe’s south. The wider picture of green performance in Europe is one of stagnation. Most countries have seen no change in the number of green members of parliament.
More importantly, the rise of radical and populist parties is fracturing support for traditional social democratic parties. The growth of the populists is challenging the hegemony that centre-left parties have enjoyed in Europe since the second world war. Although there are more ‘right-leaning’ governments in Europe than ‘left-leaning’ ones, centrist political parties are increasingly forced to work together in coalition governments. Only two EU states currently have one-party centre-left majorities: Malta and Slovakia. Though once considered temporary and the by-product of electoral arithmetic, coalitions that span the two wings of the centre are increasingly seen as the norm. In the future, they might be fundamental to holding back the populist tide, but the danger is that establishment parties become vulnerable to populist forces who exploit the unpopularity that inevitably follows incumbency.
The European political landscape has transformed dramatically since the financial crisis. In northern countries, many social democratic voters – disillusioned with the EU, immigration and fiscal bailouts for the south – have shifted their support to parties of the populist right. Mistrust in political institutions and dissatisfaction with democracy have hardened these divisions. Southern Europeans are now far more sceptical than those in the north toward both the EU and their national governments, cultivating support for anti-establishment movements like Podemos and Syriza. This is accompanied by a shift in the ideological character of politics in the north and south: where the gravity of political debate in the north has often moved rightwards, in the south it has shifted left, making it harder for social democratic parties to survive in an electoral environment where the centre is declining at the expense of the extremes (Sage et al, 2015).
What next for European social democracy?
Europe’s social democrats are facing an increasingly pessimistic future in the face of repeated electoral defeats; but they should not lose hope. After all, the world still needs the values and programmes that centre-left parties espouse. So what should the priorities be for reviving social democracy? Intellectually, there are two major challenges ahead relating to the politics of economic competence, and the politics of identity. In the 1990s, third way centre-left governments undermined themselves by becoming too close to market liberalism. In the wake of the Berlin Wall’s collapse, they came to the inevitable conclusion that western capitalism had triumphed: to gain office, social democratic parties had to run a market economy at least as efficiently as the right. But the result was ideological capitulation. Many of the policy regimes and institutions developed in the immediate aftermath of the second world war were swiftly abandoned.
This was not wholly misguided. Left parties did need to demonstrate they could manage the capitalist economy effectively by coming to terms with markets. Moreover, in a globalised economy, prescriptions arising from an earlier application of Keynesian theory had to be revised. We have learned that public spending on the demand side is not all that matters and governments have to attend to supply-side reforms; moreover, the state has to be aware of the impact of fiscal policies on innovation and growth (Aghion, 2014). The problem was that by the time the financial crisis struck in 2008–9, the centre-left appeared complicit in the policy decisions that led to the crash. In particular, social democrats had largely given up effective regulation and supervision of the financial sector, alongside any wider objective of strategic intervention to rebalance the economy. The left today needs to rethink its economic approach in order to create a fairer, more resilient and sustainable capitalism, while rejecting the claim that governments have no business intervening in markets. This willingness to intervene is all the more necessary given the ‘existential’ threat posed by climate change: the 2015 Paris agreement was an important step forward, but with global growth of three per cent per annum following two centuries of rapid industrialisation, new ways must be found to deal with the potentially devastating impact of environmental pressures.1
The second task relates to the politics of identity. Across western Europe, social democratic parties have been damaged by the insinuation that they are no longer committed to defending national interests and borders. The centre left needs to demonstrate that there is no contradiction between a commitment to national interests – to patriotism and pride in the nation state – alongside the need for a stronger Europe. Only by working together can EU countries address common security and economic challenges while also defending their national interests. At the same time, national electorates will only accept the case for international cooperation if they feel confident in their own national identity. The overwhelmingly liberal, cosmopolitan values that prevail among the progressive left have to be balanced by the recognition that national solidarity and shared values matter to our citizens. They should start by being prepared to revisit fundamental principles such as ‘freedom of movement’ in Europe in order to address voters’ concerns about political and economic dislocation; this theme is considered further in the concluding chapter.
But social democracy needs more than ideas if it is to flourish in the future; it needs political organisation. Centre-left politics must continue to be anchored in citizen mobilisation rather than ignoring the politics of protest and dissent. Social democratic parties have always drawn strength from practical activism and bottom-up campaigning. Left parties must remain insurgents even when they are in government, refusing to become part of the status quo and continuing to offer solutions to new social challenges and injustices. They must govern responsibly without abandoning the quest for solidarity and equality, embracing a participatory democracy that empowers citizen decision-making. They must continue to recognise ‘the primacy of politics’ in a changing society: social democracy has a duty to continue to reform political institutions. This is vitally important in western Europe, where representative democracy has been in decline in recent decades.
Social democracy in Europe is not destined to retreat in the years ahead. The electoral setbacks it has suffered since the 1990s have been serious, and the long-term deterioration in social democratic parties’ vote share is sobering. The structural obstacles to social democratic reform, such as redistribution and efforts to strengthen welfare states, remain formidable where public attitudes have become harsher and more punitive in recent decades. To overcome these challenges, centre-left parties must make their case more skillfully, framing an appeal relevant to the broad majority of citizens: both those who embrace economic change, and those who increasingly fear openess. Social democrats can draw on a wealth of arguments in remaking centre-left politics, articulating the case for fairness and equality through the vision of an inclusive social and economic future. Making the plight of society’s least privileged resonate with the relatively well-off has always been vital for centre-left politics. It is even more so today, given the ‘new hard times’ that Europe is living through.
Note
1. http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2016/07/13/the-coming-crisis-we-do-not-have-much-time/.