Which voters are the left losing?
This chapter examines how the long-term erosion of support for social democratic parties among voters can be explained. The prevailing view among political scientists is that having repositioned themselves in the centre ground as ‘catch-all’ parties after the second world war, social democrats have alienated their traditional working-class supporters, just as they have gained a new, but precarious, base of middle-class support. New Labour in the UK is an exemplar of the shift, but the German SPD and the Swedish Social Democratic party are both held to have moved in a similar modernising ‘neoliberal’ direction.
There is support for the claim that becoming ‘catch-all’ parties with moderated policy positions does have adverse electoral consequences for social democrats. It appears that in most countries, working-class voters have defected from centre-left parties towards the radical left and more often, the populist right; whereas social democratic parties were once part of the process of ‘democratic class struggle’ and decommodification through the development of the welfare state, they no longer perform that historical role.1 This argument nonetheless underplays the structural impact of class de-alignment alongside disenchantment with established political movements on the decline in support for the left. Such a perspective implies that if only centre-left parties embraced statist social democracy, all would be well. The focus on the ‘traditional working class’ ignores structural change and misunderstands how economic insecurity has spread to new occupational groups in society. Middle-class support for social democracy has grown among the ‘salaried middle strata’ and the ‘educated and intellectual professions’.2 The primary reason why social democratic parties appear to be losing elections, however, is that the support base of social democracy has fragmented over the last three decades.
Fragmentation as ‘the new normal’
Centre-left parties are confronting a political dilemma that is far from new: their coalition of support is fracturing as the secular decline of the manual working class has forced them to seek middle-class votes which do not solidify into enduring electoral coalitions. This is a political environment characterised by a breakdown in ‘hereditary voting patterns’ and the erosion of stable political affiliations (Moschonas, 2008). In the main, electorates are more fragmented and volatile than in the ‘golden age’ of postwar social democracy. Social democratic parties are operating in a world of ‘relative classlessness’ characterised by ‘a diverse and fluid electorate in which socially structured partisanship is weak, while the potential for volatility is high and increasing’ (Padgett, 2003: 47). Moreover, unprecedented numbers of voters no longer participate in the political system. John Callaghan (2009) emphasises that social democracy has been increasingly under pressure, as the case for the traditional activist state has been undermined. From the right, neoliberalism has emphasised the negation of the state in favour of the market; from the left, the culture of ‘left libertarianism’ has further challenged statism and collectivism (Callaghan, 2009). The goal of centre-left parties is to forge enduring political coalitions in a more segmented and fractured political environment. The emphasis, as ever, is on reconciling seemingly divergent, if not contradictory strategic interests.
Much previous analysis has adopted the more traditional lens of analysing social democracy’s electoral coalition in terms of voter groups centred on a broad notion of social class. Yet across western societies, the relationship between class identity and partisan affiliation has substantially broken down: culture is increasingly seen to trump economics. An alternative framework involves understanding voter groups in terms of cultural ‘types’ rather than occupational categories. This is more sophisticated than the dualism which is frequently posited in the literature between ‘communitarian’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ voters (Callaghan, 2009). In Callaghan’s schema, for example:
• Traditionalist voters emphasise material solidarity, traditional forms of collectivism, the preservation of postwar welfare states, alongside the importance of class-based social movements such as the trade unions. They are often resistant to developments in the European Union, for example greater freedom of movement and labour mobility.
• Modernist voters place a high premium on individual achievement and aspiration alongside material economic growth and improvements in living standards. They are broadly sympathetic to the ‘consumerist’ agenda of politics putting an emphasis on material prosperity. They are wary of growing government spending and any rise in the overall tax burden.
• Post-materialist voters prioritise quality of life, emphasising ecological concerns, the climate change transition, and environmental sustainability as key political imperatives. They are often relatively ‘cash rich’ but ‘time poor’, valuing greater freedom from paid work.
• Hedonistic ‘post-modernist’ voters are libertarian ‘pleasure-seekers’ who stress the importance of freedom and civil liberties. They are generally ‘anti-statist’ and particularly drawn towards the potential of new technology as well as markets. They are enemies of paternalism and want greater autonomy to govern their own lives (Callaghan, 2009:47).
What is apparent from Callaghan’s approach is the difficulty of constructing a political coalition across these social groups given the apparently sharp divergence in social and political attitudes and interests. Nick Lowles and Anthony Painter (2011) have similarly developed this sociological typology analysing the ‘new tribes of identity politics’ drawing largely on empirical data from the UK:
• Their first group are confident multiculturals predominantly drawn from the professional and managerial occupational classes. They have a tendency to support centre-left and green parties, and are generally positive about diversity, cosmopolitanism, and mass immigration, believing that western societies do well from globalisation.
• Second, mainstream liberals who have similar values to multiculturals and are also well-educated. They may be more sceptical about immigration but still regard it as a ‘net benefit’ to their country.
• Third, identity ambivalents do not have this degree of confidence in the future, and are generally less optimistic about their country’s potential. They tend to be ambivalent about immigration given its impact on public services and social housing on which they are often dependent. This group often includes black and minority ethnic voters.
• Fourth, culturally integrationist voters are in the main older and more prosperous, tending to support centre-right Conservative parties. According to Lowles and Painter, this group’s concern about immigration relates to national identity and integration, rather than pressure on living standards and public services.
• Fifth, latent hostiles are less well-educated, and fearful of the impact of immigration and globalisation on their economic prospects and way of life. They want political parties to defend national identity and the distinctive values of their societies.
• The final group exhibit active enmity: they display open hostility to immigrants and are generally intolerant of religious and ethnic differences. These voters are the most disengaged from the formal political system and are often prepared to support far-right parties.
According to Lowles and Painter’s data, around 25 per cent of the sampled population are essentially cosmopolitan liberals (‘confident multiculturals’ and ‘mainstream liberals’). Approximately 50 per cent are broadly ambivalent, some because of economics, others because of cultural factors (‘identity ambivalents’ and ‘culturally integrationists’). A further 25 per cent are actively hostile to immigration and multiculturalism (‘latent hostiles’ and the ‘active enmity’ group). Lowles and Painter map their identity categories onto social class too, but find the relationship is rarely determinate. For instance, a small proportion of ‘confident multiculturals’ are drawn from the lowest socioeconomic class; the highest socioeconomic group is strongly represented within the ‘cultural integrationist’ category. This finding demonstrates the inadequacy of the ‘cosmopolitan/communitarian’ dichotomy in understanding the prospects for social democratic politics. A significant challenge for social democracy is the tendency for a high proportion of centre-left support to come from ‘identity ambivalents’, despite the generally multiculturalist orientation of centre-left parties in western Europe. This explains the volatility that often characterises the performance of social democratic parties.
The ‘traditional working class’ which is still seen as the natural ‘heartland’ of European social democratic parties is declining relative to the size of the population. One recent study of social class argued that ‘new social formations appear to be emerging out of the tendrils of the traditional working class’. According to the thinktank Demos: ‘As the pre-war cohort shrinks as a proportion of the population, therefore, we can expect the balance of opinion in the population as a whole to move in a more liberal direction’. Today’s ‘working class’ is actually comprised of a diversity of suburban voters, graduates, young people, service workers, and so on (The Economist, ‘The new working class’, 16th June 2014). The ‘new working class’ is better-educated and more diverse, but also increasingly aware of economic insecurity which is spreading to those in traditionally middle-class occupations where there are few links to the labour and trade union movement.
This point is emphasised by Anne Wren (2013) who notes that there has been a major shift in the type of workers exposed to international competition. Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s ‘blue-collar’ workers in less skilled occupations were particularly vulnerable to global competitive pressures, today middle-class professionals find themselves under growing threat. The ICT revolution has meant that high-skilled employment in service sectors such as finance, the law, media and business has become more internationally traded, increasing middle-class exposure to global competition and heightening job insecurity (Wren, 2013). This is attenuated by the impact of new technologies and automation across the labour force; European social democratic parties have to respond to ‘the international rise of the new working class’. Wren (2013) concludes that highly skilled workers in sectors that are more exposed to global competition may be less sympathetic to spending on redistribution and the welfare state, and are less likely to support centre-left parties. There are progressively fewer middle-class professionals in ‘sheltered’ public sector occupations prepared to support welfare spending than was the case in the ‘golden age’ of the post-1945 welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 2009).
Cultural identity and generational change
The traditional white working class that has remained, at least symbolically, important to social democratic parties has been in secular decline. The new frontiers of politics are perceived to be about younger generational cohorts: more tolerant, cosmopolitan, outward-looking, and accepting of globalisation, but also more self-reliant and less willing to tolerate poor quality public services.
Progressive politics stands at a crossroads. On the one hand, the strategic opportunities for social democracy in Europe and the industrialised countries appear propitious. Structural trends in our societies are accentuating inequality, polarisation, social division and insecurity; in the aftermath of the financial crisis, many on the left believe ‘the state is back’. On the other hand, weaker lifechances, lack of opportunity and burgeoning insecurity are not only afflicting the traditionally excluded groups. This ‘disease’ is spreading to the broader middle-class suffering from declining real wages and incomes; these groups are increasingly anxious about the future of employment in the light of global outsourcing, the spread of new technology, and the rise of automation; they are struggling to reconcile the pressures of ‘earning’ and ‘caring’ in family life, both for the very young and the very old; and they fear their children’s life opportunities will be weaker than those of their parents in the face of rapidly rising asset prices (especially housing), the increasing cost of higher education, and fears about future employment in the light of global competitive challenges. Moreover, the ‘new middle class’ is as sceptical of ‘big’ government as it is of global market forces. As such, social democrats need to fashion an inclusive, broad-based strategy that appeals both to those already in the middle class, and those who aspire to get there.
The new insecure: today’s middle class and those left behind
Every industrialised country will have marked variations in its class structure. Nonetheless, the dominant trend in the last two decades has been towards the development of a ‘5–75–20’ society in the developed economies:
• Roughly five per cent enjoy ‘runaway’ rewards at the top, as asset prices and returns to wealth soar, a group largely comprised of professionals working in finance and those who have inherited wealth (Bell & Machin, 2014). They are increasingly footloose and globally connected. This group are often criticised for their efforts to evade tax, but they already contribute a growing share of tax revenues.
• The 75 per cent in the middle are either in work or have a retirement income but are relatively insecure; they are anxious about the future. They are not only ‘blue-collar’ industrial workers threatened by outsourcing, but middle-class professionals who fear their jobs will be next as the emerging ‘Mint’ economies move quickly up the economic value-chain (Wren, 2013).
• The 20 per cent at the ‘bottom’ of society are marginalised from the labour market and excluded from most of life’s opportunities (Taylor-Gooby, 2013). This group are often dependent on state benefits throughout their lives; their children are at significant risk of poverty.
The issue for social democracy is that historically it has been most concerned with the state of the wealthy and the very poor. The centre left wants to ensure that the rich pay their fair share of tax and that the capitalists behave responsibly. And quite understandably, social democrats want to improve the life chances of the poorest in society. The current focus on inequality since 2008 has accentuated this intellectual orientation even further. Yet it is among the ‘anxious middle’ that elections are won and lost. As recent studies by Mike Savage and Fiona Devine (2015) demonstrate, relatively few people can be straightforwardly categorised as ‘middle-class’ or ‘working-class’; this is a major challenge to the traditional mindset of social democratic parties.
Key trends: automation, the ‘unfinished’ gender revolution, and the ageing society
The inequality, polarisation and growing insecurity which characterises the new class structure of the industrialised countries is being exacerbated by structural forces alongside economic and social change. Part of this is evidently to do with new economic forces: technology and automation; globalisation and trade liberalisation; and taxation policies in particular. The starting point is that more than 75 per cent of employment in the OECD countries is now in services (Wren, 2013) and job growth is predominantly occurring in service-orientated sectors (both high- and middle-skill levels).
However, it is the shift in the nature of the service-driven economy which is significant. The analysis of the impact of ‘automation’ where relatively highly skilled, ‘human-capital rich’ jobs once performed by people are now performed by machines is increasingly in vogue (Frey & Osbourne, 2013). Technological change not only threatens the position of lower-skilled workers, but those in ‘white-collar’ and professional occupations. The tendency is for labour productivity gains to increasingly benefit an ever-smaller group at the top, leading to a further squeeze on nominal wages (Irvin, 2014). Moreover, an increasing share of GDP is flowing to capital at the expense of labour as technology replaces human workers. Nonetheless, technological change alone cannot be blamed for rising inequality and adverse economic outcomes.
The increasing volume of trade in the global economy as product, capital and labour markets are more liberalised puts further downward pressure on the wages and incomes of the middle. In many countries (although not the Nordic states), the structures of collective pay bargaining that have traditionally protected middle-class jobs and living standards are being eroded; neither is the public sector a ‘safe haven’; the impact of austerity means that insecurity is spreading to the public sector professions (Wren, 2013). As the emerging market economies move up the productivity value-chain, so the competitive threat to workers in the industrialised states grows more acute.
As a result, wage inequalities are accelerating as there is a secular decline in the relative economic position of middle-class households. According to George Irvin (2014) median household incomes in Germany, for example, between 2000 and 2010 have consistently lagged behind GDP growth; in Japan, median incomes have fallen by an average of one per cent a year since 1995; in the UK, median income growth since the mid-2000s has declined to zero. This change in the distribution of growth away from the middle is apparently a structural shift rather than a temporary cyclical trend.
As the impact of these developments has worsened in many industrialised states, taxation systems appear to be becoming less redistributive and progressive. It is sometimes forgotten that postwar taxation and welfare state regimes in northern Europe were widely supported by middle-class groups, not only the poor, recognising that collective social provision and progressivity in the tax base protected their relative position in the distribution of earnings and rewards. Too often, these institutions and systems have been gradually eroded by the growing pressures towards restructuring, targeting and the residualisation of the welfare state: the middle class is losing its stake in social security. Yet the middle ‘75 per cent’ are the new ‘cling on’ middle class who need collectivised social security to be assured of dignity and income adequacy, especially in retirement (Bell & Machin, 2014).
Nevertheless, there are wider structural trends beyond economic forces that are reshaping the income distribution: one set of social trends relates to what Gosta Esping-Andersen (2009) has termed the ‘unfinished’ gender revolution in western societies. While the balance of caring and earning roles is being renegotiated between women and men, women continue to face major pay penalties and inequalities in labour market outcomes. Moreover, families are under pressure as the increase in working hours coincides with rising care costs, both for childcare and elderly care. Apart from impacting negatively on family life, the risk is that women particularly are either forced out of employment, or compelled to accept jobs way below their labour market potential, which undermines economic growth and productivity. The ‘new’ social risks include intergenerational imbalances and gender-related inequalities.
Another set of structural changes in the industrialised countries alludes to the ageing society and demographic change. This is putting growing pressure on welfare systems while potentially weakening long-term growth, as larger numbers of older workers drop out of the labour market. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently warned that the impact of demography on the public finances would be considerably greater than the financial crisis: in the EU, the cost of pensions is expected to rise from 10.2 to 12.6 per cent of GDP by 2060; healthcare will increase from 6.7 to 8.2 per cent. Maintaining an active workforce relative to the retired population is necessary in the long term to pay for state services, which is likely to refocus debate about the importance of migration in continental Europe. Europe’s high rate of unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, has weakened the long-term viability of welfare states, acting as a drag on growth.
No return to ‘defensive’ social democracy
In the midst of these structural changes, there are undoubtedly opportunities for social democracy to rebuild its political base. What the centre left cannot do, however, is return to what the late Tony Judt termed a doctrine of ‘defensive’ social democracy. The traditional welfare states of the postwar era cannot be recreated in a world of greater complexity and social change: today’s younger generation is a ‘networked generation’ who identify their interests with flat, non-hierarchical structures, rather than the vertical institutions of the 1945 settlement (Mulgan, 2005). A knee-jerk shift to what Philippe Aghion calls ‘bazar Keynesianism’ is untenable given the fiscal pressures on the state, and the lack of confidence in conventional Keynesian prescriptions.
Moreover, social democracy will neither find salvation in crude distributional politics, nor the flirtation with political populism. The politics of handing out ‘sweeteners’ to deserving electoral groups is implausible in an age of acute fiscal constraint, while elevating short-term political tactics above long-term policy is unlikely to produce sustained governing success. Bending to populist attacks on globalisation and the European Union begets the fundamental truth that it has never been possible to create ‘social democracy in one country’: today’s world is more internationalised and interconnected than ever before. The greatest challenge for social democrats, however, remains the battle to sustain political coalitions in favour of collectivised social security and public provision in a world where structural change may be eroding the cross-class coalition in support of welfare states. This chapter has addressed which voters the left is losing; the chapter that follows will seek to explain precisely why social democratic parties across Europe appear to be performing so badly.
Notes
1. G. Moschonas, ‘Electoral Dynamics and Social Democratic Identity: Socialism and its changing constituencies in France, Great Britain, Sweden and Denmark’.
2. G. Moschonas, ‘Electoral Dynamics and Social Democratic Identity’.