Aristotelian commentary tradition
NATURE AND BACKGROUND OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY
It is fundamental to our understanding of commentary as a genre that they respond to another text, often called the ‘base text’. Ancient commentaries have sometimes been characterized as “secondary texts”, but the label is likely to cause some misconceptions about how we should understand the nature of commentary (Sluiter 2000). It is preferable to read “secondary” as “using another text as its starting point” rather than as “unimportant”, “subservient” or “unoriginal”.1 In what follows I hope to show that the commentary in late antiquity defies such facile descriptions. Philosophical commentary required certain conditions for it to develop and thrive. And instead of being a philological activity, like most modern commentaries tend to be (producing a set of disparate notes to a text), philosophers would comment within a specific ideological setting and almost always to serve a higher purpose (understanding and truth); in other words, they were created in response to the school founder’s writings (a “canon”) and were didactic in purpose. Given the peculiar nature of the works it will be helpful to spend some time clarifying the background of philosophical exegesis, especially among the Peripatetics. After that I turn to the main part of the analysis, in which I clarify the methodology and evolution of the commentaries on Aristotle.
While the earliest formal commentaries were probably written in the first century BCE, several important stages of exegetical evolution preceded it, and contributed important technical elements to the exegetical strategies. It will be worthwhile to look at these briefly. For a long time literacy was the privilege of very few in a predominantly oral world. But that did not mean lack of sophistication (see Richardson 1975, 1992, 1993; Havelock [1966] 1982; Ong 1982; Thomas 1992). Allegorical and cosmological interpretations from the sixth and fifth century BCE already distinguished between literal and non-literal reading, when they attempted to uncover the (supposed) deeper meaning of Hesiod’s didactic poetry or Homer’s epics or lyric poetry (e.g. hermēneus “interpreter”, Ion 530c). The philosophers also engaged with these texts, now also available in written versions. Their focus was on explaining the world distinct from Homer. They began to evaluate language and syntax, and conceptual analysis (e.g. Protagoras invented names for parts of speech, frag. 80a [DK] = Diogenes Laertius 9.53–4). Moving away from the religious reading of the universe in which gods determined everything, natural philosophers started questioning certainties, considering alternatives and inventing new forms of discourse, which would drive philosophical analysis of the world (Most 1999). Heraclitus (frag. 101 = Diogenes Laertius 9.1) first drew a sharp contrast between information (polymathia, a quantitative notion) and the right interpretation of the world (noos, “understanding”, a qualitative notion). Within 250 years of its introduction writing became the vehicle of elaborate explanatory accounts, even if it came initially in the traditional guise of poetry (Parmenides, Empedocles and Xenophanes use Homeric hexameter).
THE RISE OF THE RUNNING COMMENTARY: 100 BCE–200 CE
It is in the fifth and fourth century BCE that clear evidence for a second-order discourse in philosophical circles is found. The Sophists, Plato and Aristotle are the main contributors to this new frontier. Verbal cunning and more systematic analyses, assisted by written notes, would raise awareness of the process of thought and argumentation, leading to an increase in semantic stability and differentiation combined with a greater self-conscious perspective. Terms for types of exegetical writings began to draw distinctions between comments (hypomnēmata) and preparatory notes (hypomnēmatika) (Dorandi 1991). In the relatively short period of one hundred years, this trend helped crystallize certain well-worn techniques among rhetoricians and emerging philosophical argument into what was to become philosophical commentary.2 It had become a methodical evaluative scrutiny of existing philosophical views with the purpose of pushing forward the search for the truth. Formalization was the next logical step.
The first ancient philosophical commentary (taken in a formal sense) does not appear before the first century BCE. It is commonly thought to arise in the first century BCE/CE, but there exists in fact little agreement on this issue. Should we agree with Dillon who has placed it “in the generation of Eudorus [first century BCE] that the tradition of formal commentary on both Plato and Aristotle seems to begin” (Dillon 1996a: 437, emphasis added)? He also considered the third century BCE, thinking of “Crantor who wrote ‘the first formal commentary’ as a Platonist on a work of Plato”.3 Still other views are more implicit: in his magnificent overview of the Aristotelian tradition, Moraux simply starts his chapter “Die Ältesten Kommentatoren” with Andronicus (first century BCE) (Moraux 1973). J. Barnes refers to Theophrastus’ and Eudemus’ works as “interpretations or exegeses of Aristotle, in a loose sense”, but qualifies this by stating: “there is no reason to believe that they wrote commentaries on his writings” (J. Barnes et al. 1991: 5, emphasis added). This must be correct given what we know about their work (philosophical and complementary rather than purely exegetical), and the characteristics of later exegetical writings bear this out. Elsewhere J. Barnes is close to Dillon: “philosophical commentaries go back at least to the third century BCE; and there were probably Aristotelian commentaries by the first century BCE”.4
The discussion often suffers from incomplete evidence and a lack of clarity in definition (e.g. scholars speak of commentary next to formal commentary), while the emergent nature of the genre is usually ignored. The seeds of the commentary tradition were already sown in the pre-Platonic literary tradition.5 Plato himself clearly exploited an existing practice of clarifying text in the discussion of a poem of Simonides in his Protagoras 339a–348c. This is a prime example of incipient commentary, as it incorporates features found in the Homerists and Sophists. The core elements seem to be already well known: Socrates claims to know the author’s intention (boulēsis), uses grammatical arguments to prove points, and proposes different ways of illustrating the hidden meaning of the poem (347a). The episode also includes two prototypes of hermeneutical principles concerning the importance of authorial consistency (341e1–2, later labelled “clarifying Homer from Homer”)6 and the notion of an overall purpose of the poem rather than just interpret words or phrases. Even if we allow for an element of parody in Plato’s representation of these practices, it had to contain certain realistic features to be plausible and credible for his audience.7
It is fair to say that a new dynamic arose with the Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus (first century BCE?). While the early instances of exegesis were either compositional (by bards who reinterpreted existing stories into a new format), polemical (such as the reactive accounts in natural philosphy by the Presocratics) or selective (partial comments on one work such as Crantor’s on Plato’s Timaeus), the Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus was the first visible case of an elucidation of a Platonic work by a “convert” keen on defending the Platonic position (a case of apologetics). What we have here is a supporter of Plato writing a “running commentary”, who in fact applies a variety of outlooks, some of which he may no longer be fully aware of.8 In other words, the work presents a continuation of the Platonic style of exegesis present, in statu nascendi, in the Protagoras, itself composed of established practices and innovative moves. Yet in spite of its syncretistic perspective, the intention of this commentary is to offer a genuine Platonic interpretation, regardless of whether we judge it successful. By now the central text has gained so much authority that it can no longer be challenged (at least not openly). It is here that we see the philosophical canon establish itself and the importance of an “agreed” written version of the founder’s views.9
RUNNING COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE: 200 BCE–550 CE
Platonist commentaries on Aristotle’s works began with Porphyry (c.300 CE).10 As a student of Plotinus (c.210–275 CE), he had been involved in the exegetical activities of Plotinus’ classes, in which Plato, Aristotle and other works were discussed. But Plotinus famously also included the exegetical comments of Alexander of Aphrodisias (c.200 CE) in his own explications (Porphyry, Plot. 14). Alexander was regarded as the commentator on Aristotle, setting the standard for the line-by-line running commentary for centuries to come. Plotinus’ approach thus started a tradition of an inclusive attitude towards previous commentaries on Plato and Aristotle. The late Platonists (Neoplatonists) thus took on board Peripatetic (Andronicus, Eudorus) and Middle Platonist precedents (e.g. Anon., in Tht.) as well as the first clear examples of the running commentary by the Aristotelians Aspasius and Alexander of Aphrodisias.11
With Plotinus as the founder of a new exegetical style producing a new philosophy, Platonism would be the dominant school of thought for the next four hundred years. Starting with Plotinus, a new curriculum was designed and then developed further by his pupil and biographer Porphyry, marking a new stage in the history of Greek philosophy. More importantly, an educational context became the ideal environment to nurture exegetical activities of “canonized” texts: curiously Aristotle became the introduction to Plato, and commentary on both authors the preferred mode of philosophical education. This approach to the two scholarchs of related, but still different, philosophical persuasion was based on the idea that their views could be brought into harmony. As Sorabji puts it, “Not for the only time in the history of philosophy … a perfectly crazy position (harmony) proved philosophically fruitful” which would lead to new ideas; the result was “an amalgam different from either of the two original philosophies” (Sorabji 1990: 5). Gerson’s explanation for this perspective is persuasive: “Platonists, for the most part, did not regard Aristotle as an anti-Platonist.”12
In the Platonic commentaries many of the emerging reflexes and topical themes we saw above (e.g. analysis of words and concepts, creative exegesis, making explicit connections with other texts) remain part of the approach. The idea of “tradition”, of placing oneself in a line of interpreters, bestows both authority and continuity upon one’s activity. But within the teaching context a more formalized methodology had been established, and the complexity of levels of commentary with it: we should think of a complex texture or fabric rather than just accumulated layers (like Russian dolls). In other words, they are complex documents to be read with considerable care and knowledge of the ideological frame of mind with which they were written.13
By distinguishing a fixed set of standard questions for opening the discussion of a text, the late Greek commentators established a structure for teacher–student interaction and a lucid and sensible philological approach to difficult texts.14 These so-called preliminary questions deal with important issues such as (a) authenticity, (b) place in the corpus, (c) utility and (d) purpose – the basis for detailed page-by-page, sometimes line-by-line, commentary (Mansfeld 1994: 10–11). Clearly this required a scholarly environment and the habitual use of books. It also reflects the focus on a body of writings regarded as a fixed set of texts representing an authoritative body of knowledge used in teaching; that is, a canon. Concerns about a canon started in the first century BCE, and once established, a fixed set of texts would stimulate the writing of commentary.
Closer to the last stage of the most elaborate commentary, we find Syrianus, the Athenian teacher of Proclus (d. 475 CE), who determined much of the commentary style in the fifth and sixth century CE (D’Ancona 2002: 208–11). He adopted Alexander’s method of providing a lēmma (literally a “snatch” of text) for commenting, and this format becomes the norm, in spite of several other forms of presentation. For instance, lecture notes (“from the master’s voice”, apo phōnēs, e.g. Proclus’ Timaeus commentary is based on a record of Syrianus’ teaching), discussion divided into theōria and lexis (Olympiodorus), or interpretive paraphrase (Themistius).15 Interestingly, as in earlier periods, the text commented upon is said to use intentional “unclarity”: while in the past Orpheus and the poets were said to provide messages in riddles, Aristotle is now said to use intentional unclarity so as to fend off the uninitiated (Ammonius, in Cat. 7.10–11 [Busse]). Such self-legitimization of the commentator’s task will inevitably lead to expansive supplementation as the main tool for clarification (Sluiter 2000). No wonder that the written commentaries soon grew longer and longer.
Proclus (c. 412–85 CE) also contributed several new strategies for exegesis.16 He was “chosen by Syrianus as ‘the heir capable of inheriting his vast learning’” (Dodds 1963: xxiii, quoting from Marinus, Procl. 12). He set out the principles of late Platonism in two major works, using mathematics as a structuring device in the one. Such an elaborate scheme of a highly intellectual nature may seem unpromising for the common man, but it was not unprecedented. Plato had set an example with his Timaeus, synthesizing much of the preceding tradition in natural philosophy. Proclus was far more systematic, with the ambition to embrace the sum of Platonist thought on the universe and with a clear spiritual objective in mind: to offer a convincing and comprehensive form of salvation. This shows in more than just his strictly philosophical works. The hymns that he wrote (traditionally seen as “mere” expressions of religious fervour) can in fact be considered as philosophically meaningful contributions (Saffrey 1992; van den Berg 2001). The influence of Proclus is acknowledged by Simplicius in his Physics commentary: “those after Proclus up until our time almost all follow Proclus not only on this point, but on all other issues” (in Ph. 795.11–13 [Diels]).17
Proclus’ contributions to the commentary format concern especially the use of a demarcation of passages to be read (praxeis) and a clear division between general exegesis (theōria) and specific exegesis (lexis).18 His commentary on the Timaeus is a monumental work, which has absorbed much of the foregoing tradition.19 But he was operating in an increasingly hostile environment, in which Christianity, now the official religion of empire, began to encroach on pagan territory and create formal and informal practices which would marginalize the pagan ideas and rituals. Once he went into exile for one year due to tensions in Athens and spent time in Lydia studying religious customs there (Marinus, Procl. 15). His staunch defence of paganism brought on risks when he expressed “direct criticism” of Christian doctrine.20
Our last important witness for the methodology of Aristotelian commentaries is the sixth-century Platonist Simplicius (c.480–540 CE). In writing his long commentaries on Aristotle Simplicius is following these examples, while philosophically still following the tradition established by Plotinus. In his works he manages to review and incorporate most Platonist commentaries written up to his day. Simplicius respectfully refers to Proclus as “the philosopher from Lycia and the teacher of my teachers” (in Ph. 611.11–12, cf. 795.4–5). He mentions Proclus mostly for the methodical refutation of objections and attacks to Plato’s thought by Aristotle and others. He probably used a work by Proclus “who wrote a book, solving the objections” (biblion … tas enstaseis dialyōn, in DC 640.24–5).
Simplicius’ works serve our purpose well, because they provide exceptionally good evidence for understanding the late Platonist commentary style.21 His commentaries are a source for exegetical and didactic practices, and also inform us about Greek philosophy from the Presocratics to his own day. They also form an important moment in the transition from late antiquity to the Middle Ages. But most importantly, they show us a distinctive stage of the interpretation of Aristotle and Plato.
Simplicius is important because from our modern perspective his scholarly method is quite reliable: he is unusually self-conscious of his approach and thoughtful in his assessment of text, manuscripts and an astounding range of sources (see Chase 2003: 8; Baltussen 2008). He also uses quotation far more often than most other commentators. He gives further evidence for the animosity between Platonists and Christian intellectuals. Since Iamblichus (third century CE) a greater emphasis on religion had resurfaced. It could range from strong ritualistic approaches, such as Proclus’ theurgy, to more theological concerns about theodicy and the creation of the world (Simplicius, Philoponus). The lively school context in which Platonism is held with a strong conviction, as a way of life, thus resembled a religious initiation. Not surprisingly, there are significant parallels with Christian exegetical strategies, which is at least in part a sign of their common Greek stock (Mansfeld 1994). But the rivalry between Christian and pagan positions is even more significant, as both parties strove to win the hearts and minds of men by arguing in books about books, with authoritative texts at the core. But as the official state religion, Christianity would threaten the pagan schools supported by worldly authority and ultimately cause the closing of Plato’s Academy in Athens in 529 CE by Emperor Justinian.
Among the many references to his commentator predecessors Alexander of Aphrodisias (c.200 CE) is by far the most-quoted source in Simplicius.22 Simplicius calls him the “most knowledgeable of Aristotle’s exegetes”.23 Alexander’s surviving works show him as a patient and meticulous thinker and commentator, firmly making use of the Aristotelian tradition, without agreeing with everything Aristotle wrote.24 Simplicius represents the more recent Platonist outlook in which Aristotelianism and Platonism were brought closer together on important issues, with occasional Stoic ideas thrown in. Simplicius’ use of his sources plays an important role in this and already illustrates well his skill and innovation in clarifying Aristotle. The weaving of many different voices into the fabric of his commentaries may be compared with the writing of a symphony – an image Simplicius would have liked, since one of his aims is to show there exists agreement (Greek: symphōnia) between Plato and Aristotle. He will variously use paraphrase and quotation; about these two modes he expresses specific views (and here he is not typical of the Neoplatonic school): first, how to use them, and second, what role they can fulfil.
In his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories Simplicius acknowledges debts to earlier exegetes. Using a topos of modesty, he claims that he merely wants to copy and expound Iamblichus’ commentary.25 He gives a clear idea of his intentions and aims as a commentator (in Cat. 7.23–32 [Kalbfleisch], trans. Chase):
The worthy exegete of Aristotle’s writings must not fall wholly short of the latter’s greatness of intellect (megalonoia). He must also have experience of everything the Philosopher has written, and must be a connoisseur (epistēmōn) of Aristotle’s stylistic habits. His judgement must be impartial (adekaston), so that he may neither, out of misplaced zeal, seek to prove something well said to be unsatisfactory, nor, if some point should require attention, should he obstinately persist in trying to demonstrate that [Aristotle] is always and everywhere infallible, as if he had enrolled himself in the Philosopher’s school. [The good exegete] must, I believe, not convict the philosophers of discordance by looking only at the letter (lexis) of what [Aristotle] says against Plato; but he must look towards the spirit (nous), and track down (anichneuein) the harmony which reigns between them on the majority of points.
This description of the natural talents of an exegete (with similarities to those found in the Anon. in Tht., e.g. col. IX.25–X.12 [Bastianini & Sedley]) are still sound today: he advocates impartiality, a broad familiarity with the works and their style, and, remarkably, a capacity to distinguish between the letter and the spirit of the text.26 But virtue and hard work are also relevant, as well as an interest in learning by “frequent … in-depth examination of Aristotelian concepts” (ibid.).
The high frequency of references to Alexander in Simplicius’ commentaries is statistically significant.27 His works play a major role in Simplicius’ elucidations, and a few different types can be distinguished. Alexander certainly provides a helpful exegesis of Aristotle and often entails agreement. Simplicius is clearly looking for enlightenment from his predecessor-colleague for understanding Aristotle’s arguments better. Even if we grant that some rhetoric may be involved, often the consultation of an authority is genuine and will lead to further discussion of possibilities and textual details. For instance, at in Ph. 434.36 the position of Aristotle is propped up by Alexander’s comments, which are brought in without qualifier: “Now he [Aristotle] wishes to provide clear examples of things reciprocally changed in initiating change and at the same time, as Alexander says, to separate off the divine body from being reciprocally changed and affected.” Such brief interjections (“as Alexander says”) are frequent and often signal agreement – giving an example of the argument from authority. Moreover, Alexander will serve to back up Simplicius’ argument. Based on agreement, this move resembles an argument from authority, in that Alexander’s view is invoked for confirmation and/or is placed in opposition to that of “others”.28 A correct understanding of a text is the basis for offering clarifications. In addition, the polemic against Philoponus about the eternity of the world is a well-worn part of exegesis (Hoffmann 1987). Here the strategy is to declare the opponent an inferior exegete: he has misunderstood a passage (a comment made possible on the basis of Alexander’s interpretation). Two things stand out: (a) the emphasis is on text and its polysemy; (b) he now uses a secondary text, making this polemic a tertiary phenomenon where previous interpretations become part of the overall discourse of how to understand Aristotle.
Two further points can be made regarding the influence of Alexander. Alexander is often mentioned in connection with a variant in the manuscript tradition, an important link to the scholarly discussions of different lines of transmission. Finally, many references represent direct quotations. Even when Alexander’s view is criticized and/or rejected, he is quoted anyway. In a considerable number of cases Simplicius will give quotations where disagreement with Alexander is expressed.29 Although many Alexandrians quote ancient sources when they disagree, Simplicius deviated from this habit by quoting both categories; that is, if he agreed or disagreed. This puts him slightly above the usual suspicion of presenting a distorted narrative, which might have induced him to keep references to views he disagrees with very brief. Such a procedure would allow a critic to suppress evidence and present only as much material as is needed for a convincing refutation of the opponent.30 It seems plausible to put this down to respect for Alexander’s views.
In sum, Alexander is seen as both an authoritative interpreter and source for ammunition against others. Thus an Aristotelian commentator is given pride of place at the heart of Platonist commentaries. That he is also criticized shows how Simplicius has a mind of his own, despite his heavy reliance on others. Yet most of the time he seems to keep up the pretence of merely passing on the wisdom and insight from his predecessors (again, the “topos of modesty”: Sluiter 2000: 200). The abundant sources and his scholarly method may well indicate that his works did not originate in the classroom, even if they may have been intended for such use. The later Alexandrian commentary tradition (Elias, David, Stephanus) tried to consolidate by writing prolegomena to the study of Plato and Aristotle, and their work is reflected in later compendia (Sorabji 1990: 20).
The late antique commentary was a form of philosophical activity: it arose out of the teacher–student interaction during the reading of a preferred body of texts, which became a canonized corpus. Platonist exegesis of Aristotle’s works was intended to prepare the minds of students for the more important ideas of Plato. This inversion of the historical relation was justified with traditional and doctrinal arguments: after the moral training (reading Epictetus’ Handbook) the “smaller mysteries” of Aristotle’s works would lead from a better understanding of words and concepts (Categories, On Interpretation) and the physical world (Physics, On the Heavens) to the metaphysical understanding of Plato’s philosophy.
With the rise of commentary in the first century BCE, among both Platonists (Anon., Lucius, Nicostratus) and Peripatetics (Eudorus, Boethus, Xenarchus), philosophical progress would be determined by these factors: a self-conscious embedding within a recognized tradition (philosophy) viewed as a cooperative undertaking with the purpose of finding the truth while exploring the meaning of many views on the truth. Commenting on others is thereby subordinated to the quest for knowledge and understanding, and the conveying of truths once established would entail teaching by way of commentary. Every period would have their “own” Plato or Aristotle, and commentary was part of that process of renewal. The label “Neoplatonism” fails to take that into account, operating with a flawed notion of purity of the tradition. In the Platonic tradition it is a deliberate continuation and passing on of an “established” philosophical truth, yet it also involves creative interpretation.
The ancient philosophical commentary, in its formal and fully mature form, is thus not so much a deliberate choice of “genre” as a natural by-product of this ongoing dialogue between pupils and colleagues, past and present. This also explains the sheer size of the works, with their multifarious chorus of voices in multi-layered documents of unprecedented length. The commentaries often have an overarching aim, ideologically framed by an institutionalized learning process, which lacks the irksome features of modern commentary such as fragmentation, parallelomania and the reference-book function (Gibson 2002). Thus they could stand on their own feet as valuable and valued contributions to science and philosophy.31
NOTES
1. From the perspective of interpretation “which takes control and … remakes its object in the very act of its subservience” McCarty (2002: 363) has declared the commentary “primary”.
2. For the former, see Nehamas (1990); for the latter, Mansfeld (1986).
3. Ibid.: 43, emphasis added. An even earlier commentary of the third century BCE is on a poetic text with religious and cosmological content (Betegh 2004).
4. J. Barnes (1992: 270); see also Falcon (2012). Historical and literary writings at the time are also of interest: “commentary on the Royal Diary of Alexander”, c.335 BCE (Hammond 1987); “the first attested commentary on a text, Aristophanes’s Plutus, [was] by Eratosthenes’s pupil Euphormius” c. third/second century BCE (Wilson 1969: 370, ignoring the Derveni papyrus, “published” in 1967); “the first commentary on a prose author: Aristarchus’s commentary on Herodotus”, second century BCE (Wilson 1969: 371).
5. For a fuller discussion, see Baltussen (2004 [with further literature], 2007).
6. The seminal paper on the Homerum ex Homero principle is Schäublin (1977). Recent observations on the topic can be found in Mansfeld (1994), Sluiter (2000), Baltussen (2004).
7. I give a more elaborate argument for this in Baltussen (2004). Cf. Yunis (2003), Kahn (2003).
8. Elements in the exegesis show him to be a product of his time: his syncretism is clear in Stoic and Peripatetic notions merging with the Platonist perspective (Bastianini & Sedley 1995; Sedley 1997).
9. The earliest successors (Speusippus, Xenocrates) are still in the midst of establishing what the canonical Platonic view is. It is indicative of the importance and influence of Plato’s system that his corpus is one of two to survive complete. This also holds for the other: that of Plotinus.
10. Karamanolis (2004, 2006).
11. The philosopher-doctor Galen (129–216/19 CE) added further dimensions to commentary and some of his work was known to Simplicius, but there is no room here to describe his contribution.
12. Gerson (2005b: 270). He also rightly emphasizes that “to be in harmony … must be sharply distinguished from the view, held by no one in antiquity, that the philosophy of Aristotle was identical with the philosophy of Plato” (ibid.: 271).
13. Sorabji (1990: 15): “Evidently, the theological motive of the Neoplatonic curriculum and the pressure to harmonize Plato with Aristotle creates dangers, if the commentaries are read as straightforward guides to Aristotle, without due allowance being made.”
14. These have been well studied recently: see I. Hadot (1987; 2002: 167–76), Mansfeld (1994), Blumenthal (1996a), J. Barnes (1992, 1999).
15. Most commentaries in theōria and lexis are lemmatic, but not all of them are apo phonēs, i.e. notes taken at a lecture. I owe this point to the anonymous reader.
16. This section is based on Baltussen (2008: ch. 5).
17. Cf. I. Hadot (2001: xlvii ff.), Dodds (1963), J. Barnes (1992).
18. Lambertz (1987: 1–2), who distinguishes between lecture notes (Vorlesungsnachschriften) and commentary proper (von den Exegeten selbst redigierten Kommentare, which Proclus himself calls hypomnēmata); cf. Dillon (1973: 54), Festugière (1963), Lamberz (1987).
19. See most recently Cleary (2006: 147): “it is clear that Proclus is conscious of standing at the end of a long tradition of interpreting Plato’s Timaeus that goes right back to the Academy, and obviously this tradition dominates his whole interpretation of the dialogue”. Now translated by Tarrant & Baltzly (2007–2013).
20. Dodds (1923: xxviii n. 4) adds examples from Damascius, Isid. 48.11ff., 92.26ff. and Simplicius, in DC 370.29. Cf. Watts (2004, 2006).
21. As was most recently pointed out by Chase (2003: 8). But this has been a growing consensus for some years now: cf. I. Hadot (1987); Tarán (1987: 246–7) who mentions two of the four points; de Haas (2001); Baltussen (2002).
22. It is not easy to provide a number: a search on the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (version E, © University of Irvine California) for “Alexand(r)-” offers around 700 instances, only giving explicit occurrences of the name (and all its cases).
23. My translation; see Simplicius, in Ph. 80.15–16 and 707.33–4.
24. On certain issues he diverged from Aristotelian orthodoxy, such as the immortality of the soul: see Moraux (1942), Sharples (1987).
25. J. Barnes (1992). Cf. below, note 30.
26. This distinction was the basis for most ancient strategies of allegorical reading (pagan or Christian; Chase’s use of the Pauline formulation of the dichotomy [“letter” and “spirit”, 2003: 23] is slightly misleading). There was also the philological and rhetorical tradition (status de scripto et sententia).
27. Above, note 22.
28. For example, Simplicius, in Ph. 521.10, τῶν παλαίων “thinkers of old” in opposition to the νεώτεροι “moderns, upstarts”, a contrast already popular in Galen (c.129–216/19 CE).
29. There is a notable parallel in later commentators of the early Renaissance, where reference to Alexander is dictated mostly on account of disagreement (Fazzo 1999: 48).
30. Simplicius has been imputed with such an approach regarding Alexander on the basis of recently found marginalia of a Paris manuscript, and in this case that verdict seems justified (Rashed 1997). That assessment should not be generalized, since at least according to modern standards the quoting of dismissed views has merit. These important fragments are from Alexander’s lost commentary on Aristotle’s Physics.
31. In this essay I have drawn on a number of my earlier works on the topic published between 2002 and 2010, but much has been revised, added or rearranged in order to make it fit the current volume’s purpose.