The practice of writing commentaries on the works of Plato and Aristotle had begun in an early period and was one of the main occupations of professional Platonists and Aristotelians in the two centuries leading up to the time of Plotinus. But handbooks and treatises on particular topics were also produced.1 More popular philosophical writing aimed at the general public was invariably in the form of essays or orations, such as those of Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre or Apuleius. Philosophical ideas were extensively employed by Philo of Alexandria in his works of biblical exegesis, while a specialist such as the medical writer Galen wrote treatises on particular philosophical topics which touched on medicine.2
PLOTINUS
Plotinus is something of an exception in so far as his published work is only in the form of treatises on particular philosophical problems even though the issues often begin with or closely involve philosophical texts, particularly of course Plato. His seminars too were based on the reading of a philosophical text, but this simply formed the basis of further enquiry and is to be clearly distinguished from the formal exposition of a continuous text, which came to be the general practice.
The Enneads of Plotinus are difficult to fit into any particular philosophical genre. According to Porphyry’s introduction to his edition of the Enneads Plotinus was very reluctant to commit any of his teaching to writing and Porphyry claims the credit for encouraging him to do so. His comments on Plotinus’ method of composition are revealing: he apparently wrote in a continuous manner without revising his work (Porphyry, Plot. 8). It also seems that the written treatises reflect closely the style of his teaching. Not that they are in any sense transcripts of the seminars which he conducted, but that they reflect the spirit of open discussion and relentless examination of theories, which were the mark of his teaching style. Porphyry relates, for example, how on one occasion when he himself raised questions about the relationship of soul to body Plotinus allowed the discussion to go on for three days despite the protestations of a member of the seminar who preferred to be given straightforward presentations by Plotinus himself.3 The briefest encounter with any treatise of the Enneads will provide examples of passages in which Plotinus appears to be debating with interlocutors who hold opinions different from his own or who present objections. These may sometimes be identifiable as the views of Stoics, Epicureans, Peripatetics or even of other Platonists. Sometimes Plotinus seems to be putting forward objections of his own to help clarify or progress the analysis. Although this often makes for difficult reading since it is sometimes not altogether clear which views Plotinus himself holds, it does present us with a lively philosophical discourse which is aporetic and exploratory. It may be this that Porphyry refers to when he says that Plotinus applied the “mind of Ammonius”, his teacher.
Another feature of his seminar style recorded by Porphyry is the reading of recent philosophical texts as starting points for a discussion or exposition of important themes.4 His discussion of time, for example, in the treatise on “Eternity and Time” commences with a review of the theories of earlier philosophers, particularly that of Aristotle (Enn. III.7[45].7–10). The basic assumption behind this practice is his conviction that there is a philosophia perennis which is to be found, of course, in Plato, but which needs expounding and elucidating, as he explains in Enn. V.1[10], where he says that “these statements of ours are not new … but were made long ago, not explicitly, and what we have said in this discussion has been an interpretation of them, relying on Plato’s own writings for evidence that that these views are ancient”. In fact, this entire treatise illustrates very clearly how Plotinus positions his own thought in the history of philosophy. After exploring and stating the nature of the three primal hypostases, the One, Intellect and Soul, he finds them expressed in Plato (Enn. V.1[10].8.1–2); but he affirms that the Presocratics (Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Heraclitus and Empedocles) also had some insight into them, as did Aristotle (Enn. V.1[10].8.15–19. For the Presocratics, see Stamatellos 2007). It remains his task to make more explicit and elucidate what Plato has already proposed. We should also acknowledge the use by Plotinus of Stoic ideas, and throughout the Enneads the evidence of a productive encounter with Aristotle (for an example of this, see A. Smith 2004).
Lastly, we should not ignore the practical nature of Plotinus’ teaching and writings. As for all ancient philosophers, philosophy is not a merely theoretical study, but has practical implications for the conduct of our lives. It is particularly important for Plotinus to express this since he is not presenting his students with ethical precepts but with what might to us seem abstruse metaphysical ideas, which are far removed from the conduct of our everyday lives. But for him the discovery of the primary principles of the universe is co-terminous with the discovery of our real selves; and spiritual progress can only be made when we rediscover and take ownership of our real inner self. Philosophical enquiry provides the way to do this (see Schniewind 2003). Many of the treatises are in fact structured around this principle of self-discovery. Enn. V.1[10], for example, begins with the encouragement to look within ourselves to discover what sort of entity we are. This discovery will then lead us to the primary principles themselves, which we can identify with those found in Plato and adumbrated in other philosophers. He then returns to the individual (Enn. V. 1[10].11–12), who has within him these principles; and he finally encourages us to turn inwards to rediscover them within ourselves and live by them. It is in exhortatory passages like this that Plotinus comes closest in style and spirit to Plato as opposed to the often more Aristotelian terseness of close analysis and exposition, which characterizes much of the Enneads. Enn. I.6[1], “On Beauty”, provides another example of a treatise which combines close analysis, in this case of the concept of beauty, and an exposition of the ascending levels of reality, which culminates in an appeal to turn within ourselves. A further dimension to this may be found in Enn. VI.9[9], where Plotinus attempts to delineate the nature of the One and our relationship to it. The One is beyond Being and Intellect; it cannot be spoken of or reached by our reasoning powers. But Plotinus still attempts to say what can be said of it, even if that will fall short of capturing its nature. His treatment oscillates constantly between reasoning about the One and invoking personal experience of it, an experience that transcends reason and intellect (for an analysis of this treatise, see A. Smith 1992). He appeals to his students to approach the One themselves to attain this personal experience, but at the same time not to abandon entirely the use of reasoning, since it is only by way of reasoning that we reach the point of transition to what is above reason. These passages illustrate both the way in which Plotinus constantly reviews a difficult topic, viewing it from different angles,5 and also his intense awareness that he is sometimes exploring the furthest reaches of metaphysics on the borderline between what is and is not accessible to reason, what is timeless (eternal) and what is in time.
Plotinus’ treatises are not a formal exposition of his philosophical system, although some of the treatises do contain most of the elements of his metaphysical world. Rather, they deal with major issues, which arise from an attempt to understand the writings of Plato and the tradition of Platonic interpretation. They often cover the same problems but from different angles, and where there appear to be contradictions, these can often be resolved by a consideration of the differing contexts within which they arise. The edition of his treatises which we possess, the Enneads, is a construct of Porphyry, who in editing the text was intent on giving it a certain pedagogical order, moving from ethical and this-worldly issues, to soul, intellect and finally the One. A further complication was his division of the work into six books of nine treatises (nine being for him of theological significance: three triads), which necessitated the splitting and repositioning of some of the treatises. To overcome this artificial arrangement it has become popular to print and read the treatises in their original chronological order of composition, which Porphyry thankfully has carefully recorded for us. This has the merit of restoring split works and highlighting the transitions from topic to topic, but throws little light on any possible development of Plotinus’ thought, as he did not begin writing until his maturity.
From the time of Porphyry onwards ever-increasing attention was paid both within the schools of the Neoplatonists and in their publications to the reading and careful commentary of Platonic texts. By the time of Iamblichus a carefully ordered programme of Platonic texts was in place. But the activity of the philosophers of the schools continued to require other forms of communication. By means of letters, exhortatory works, general introductions, compendia, polemical treatises and large-scale comprehensive works they engaged with the society in which they lived, with their fellow philosophers and with their students.
The letter as a means of communicating philosophical ideas was a long-established tradition before the Neoplatonists. We hear of letters of Pythagoras and of other Pythagoreans. And, of course, there are the surviving letters of Plato himself. Like those of the Pythagoreans, the letters of Plato are mostly later compositions (probably only Ep. II and VII are genuine and these are apologies rather than doctrinal expositions or hortatory epistles), but would have been accepted as genuine by the Neoplatonists. There is evidence, too, for letters of Aristotle, Theophrastus and other Peripatetics (e.g. Strato) as well as the fragmentary remains of important doctrinal letters of Epicurus. From a later period we hear of letters of Carneades (Diogenes Laertius 4.65) and of Apollonius of Tyana, and we have the curious collection of so-called letters of Socrates and the Socratics, composed probably in the first century BCE or CE. Nor should we forget the Roman tradition exemplified especially by Seneca.
In Neoplatonic circles the letter was used by philosophers in a variety of ways, from a straightforward means of communication as in the correspondence of Porphyry with his former teacher Longinus, which accompanied the manuscripts of Plotinus, to letters of a purely literary kind (Porphyry, Plot. 19). Porphyry’s Letter to Anebo falls into the latter category. This letter, addressed to the Egyptian priest Anebo, professes to raise a number of problems with him about the nature of Egyptian religion. There is little reason to suppose that Anebo is a real person and that the letter-form is anything more than a literary device to accommodate Porphyry’s enquiries. His Letter to Marcella, however, though it is not simply a private letter and was probably meant for a wider audience, does have the characteristics of a personal communication, of a husband to his wife, and is given a realistic setting, his necessary absence on a special mission (Porphyry, Marc. 4). The letters of Iamblichus, too, fall into this category and there is no reason to suppose that the addressees or the occasions for communicating with them are fictitious. In fact one of them, Sopater, even wrote his own philosophical letters, one of which, addressed to Himerius, has been preserved.
The philosophical content of these letters is characterized by its practical nature and by its simplified presentation of Neoplatonic ideas, simplified in the sense that there is avoidance of technical terminology and of more abstruse metaphysical concepts. Porphyry’s Letter to Marcella, for example, does not mention the One and presents a much simplified metaphysical foundation for its exhortation to raise the soul towards the divine. Such simplicity is exactly what is needed in what is a protreptic or exhortation to philosophical reflection. Moreover, there is no need in these first stages to go any further than Intellect. We will see that a similar restriction applies to his Sententiae, which also have little to say about the One. The letters of Iamblichus, too, are expressed in a popular and restricted philosophical palette. Their themes are also ones that are concerned with ethical conduct in this world. Topics touched on include justice, self-control, courage, wisdom, and virtue in general. Iamblichus deals with practical or civic virtue but concentrates rather more on a higher level of what we might think of as internal virtue and which he calls purificatory. Behind this we can detect the standard Neoplatonic grades of virtue which first appear in Plotinus (Enn. I.2[19]), are systematized by Porphyry (Sent. 32) and further refined by Iamblichus and Proclus (see Marinus, Procl. 3). Fate and providence also figure prominently. This is clearly a subject area of practical interest, although it is treated at a relatively high metaphysical level. Again, these are topics which called for Plotinus’ attention and which later prompted special treatises from Proclus,6 no doubt motivated by the practical needs of those trying to lead the philosophical life. But it is striking that more theoretical subjects, such as dialectic, are not neglected by Iamblichus. Thus, while these letters, some of which are addressed to figures identifiably involved in politics and administration, clearly avoid complex technical discussion they are not merely exhortatory but encourage their addressees to construct for themselves a securely based philosophical foundation for the challenge of living a good life.
These letters remind us that the Neoplatonists, just as much as other philosophers in the ancient world, were primarily concerned about what we might call the spiritual welfare of their followers, whether students within their schools or adherents seeking advice in the practical affairs of their private and public lives.
INTRODUCTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY
We have already mentioned the introductory nature of works such as the Letter to Marcella. The task of introducing students and others to the philosophic life was promoted by a variety of publications. On the technical side there are introductions to logic such as the Isagoge of Porphyry, which was intended to be read before attempting to tackle (with the aid of commentaries) the logical works of Aristotle. Iamblichus’ Protrepticus is intended to persuade people to turn to philosophy. And the various Lives of Pythagoras are also cast as introductions to the philosophical life, which must begin with ethical training even before the basic metaphysical groundwork is laid. It is important to understand that Platonists considered it essential to have a sound ethical formation and discipline before embarking on philosophical studies, which in turn strengthen that foundation to enable the soul to rise eventually beyond the realm of mundane ethical conduct. There has been a tendency to denigrate the Neoplatonists for their apparent neglect of ordinary human life in favour of the life of contemplation. It is true that they were not primarily interested in the technical discussion of ethics, but that is not to say that everyday ethics did not play an important role in their concept of the philosophical life. Their attention to this, however, was achieved more through example and precept than theoretical discussion, and in this they relied greatly on tradition by adopting ideas from Stoicism7 and from the Pythagorean tradition. The accounts of Pythagoras written by Porphyry and Iamblichus in fact serve as models of how to live one’s life. This is particularly the case with Iamblichus, whose work bears the title “On the Pythagorean Life” though it is cast in the form of a life of Pythagoras. It was intended to be followed by the reading of the Protrepticus, which contained readings from Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle; the course then continued with volumes on particular aspects of Pythagorean philosophy before the reading of the dialogues of Plato (and the treatises of Aristotle).
Porphyry’s work probably has something of the same aims as that of Iamblichus, but is differently conceived. It formed part of the first book of his four-book Philosophical History, extant only in fragments, which unfortunately makes it difficult to discern the intention and scope of the work as a whole. The History seems to have covered Greek philosophy from the beginning up to the time of Plato. Book II included Empedocles. Book III seems to be dedicated to Socrates and Book IV to Plato. Given the extensive treatment of Pythagoras which must have occupied a large part of Book I, it looks very much as if the work as a whole expressed a Platonic view of the history of philosophy with a strong emphasis on the connection between Plato himself and the Pythagorean tradition. Compared with Iamblichus, Porphyry’s treatment is far more academic. He generally cites his sources and, for example, gives different versions of the origin and early life of Pythagoras, whereas Iamblichus is more content with a straightforward narrative. But great attention is also paid to Pythagoras’ way of life: his ethical conduct, abstinence from eating flesh, his generally ascetic lifestyle, all of these supported by exemplary stories and instructive precepts. There is a stress on the community life, which he encouraged. And although Platonic schools such as those of Plotinus and Iamblichus do not seem to have been as organized and idealistic as Pythagoras’ community, they were nevertheless identifiable communities with a common purpose and an atmosphere of mutual support. The sort of ascetic life that Porphyry describes in his life of Plotinus could be seen as based on the Pythagorean model. And it is in this context that one must understand Porphyry’s de Abstinentia, a treatise written to encourage a member of the school not to give up on his vegetarian diet, which is just one of the means by which we can avoid the distractions caused by the body through overeating and heavy meat consumption, which slows down the body and impedes the operations of the soul.
But we should not forget that the Pythagorean contribution to Neoplatonism through the Neopythagorean revival was far more than just in the realm of ethics and lifestyle. According to Porphyry (Plot. 47), Pythagoras can teach us to rise beyond the body to the incorporeal world. Through the medium of mathematics, which are seen as symbols for the Forms, we can rise to the intelligible realm, and even to the One and the Indefinite Dyad. It is this same contribution of Pythagoreanism, which moves Iamblichus to compose a series of works on Pythagorean mathematics and metaphysics and to acknowledge the symbolic nature of Pythagorean precepts, which leads us to what is beyond normal human understanding (Plot. 23.103). And yet the main appeal of these “lives” of Pythagoras is to those who wish to make the necessary adjustments to the way they conduct their lives that will lead to the beginnings of the philosophical life. The admonitions are practical and concern not only human relations on an intimate scale (true friendship) but also within the fabric of the structure of society within the city. The detailed account of Pythagoras’ political engagement (Plot. 27) is another indication of the importance placed by these Platonists on everyday political realities and the contribution to them which the philosopher can make.
SUMMARIES
Another genre is that of what we might call formal summaries of philosophical thought, such as the Sententiae of Porphyry and Proclus’ Elements of Theology and Elements of Physics. There are indications of a considerable tradition in the production of such summaries, particularly among Platonists. Their use is primarily pedagogical. The Curiae Doxai of Epicurus provide an early example. The short sayings were evidently meant to be learnt by heart and absorbed into one’s lifestyle by constant repetition. The handbook of Arius Didymus is more like a work of reference, while Alcinous’ Handbook of Platonism and the Platonic Doctrines of Apuleius are examples of what must have been a widespread phenomenon of easily digested and condensed accounts of what had become a systematized formulation of Plato’s thought. When we turn to the Neoplatonic contributions that we have mentioned, we see that although they are each very different in scope they have in common an attempt to express basic philosophical concepts in a formal manner. They all lead the mind in a particular direction, from a starting point to a finish. In this sense they may be said to belong to the genre of “introductions”. The two works of Proclus are very formal in their construction and move the reader from basic to more complex propositions in an almost geometrically inspired logical sequence. The structure and purpose of Porphyry’s Sententiae is more difficult to discern. But it, too, as its full title, Philosophical axioms (sententiae) which lead to the Intelligibles, implies, is intended to lead the soul towards the intelligible world. The fact that it survives in an incomplete form and that some of its sections may have been reordered makes it difficult to assess its intent. But recent analysis of its contents helps us to make more sense of its aims (see D’Ancona 2005). The individual “sententiae” vary in length from a few lines to several pages, each of them consisting of a skilfully contrived mosaic of ideas from the Enneads of Plotinus, composed of long or short citations, summaries, verbal reminiscences and short phrases. It is also noticeable that the “sententiae” become longer as the work progresses, beginning with very short definitions and leading in the end to more expansive and striking passages.8 Porphyry would appear to have drawn largely on three key treatises from the Enneads: Enn. III.6[17], On Impassivity, Enn. V.3[49], On the Knowing Hypostases and Enn. VI.4–5[22–3], The Presence of Being Everywhere. The material presented serves very closely the theme of “leading” the reader “towards the intelligibles” which, as we have noted, is the intention expressed by the title of the work: we are first taught about the nature of the soul’s relationship to body, the fact that it is, in its innermost nature, not corrupted by body, that we can and must return to this aspect of ourselves which expresses itself at its highest level in our intellect. This return to our real self is a return to Intellect and the power of true Being. The ultimate principle, the One, is clearly mentioned (e.g. in Sent. 10 and 43 (p. 54.8 [Lamberz])), but plays no major role in the main argument which is clearly concerned with the ascent of the soul up to the level of Intellect. In this it corresponds very well with the sort of limited spiritual ascent that is expressed in other works of Porphyry, such as de Abstinentia and ad Marcellam, which advocate a return to Intellect without any reference to the One. This content suggests Porphyry’s concern to find a form of “salvation”, which is open and meaningful to more than the most elevated philosopher,9 and we should in no sense read into this that he had abandoned the doctrine of the transcendent One or its importance as the ultimate goal of the philosopher. Much of the material concerns the sharp distinction that is to be made between corporeal and incorporeal reality, and their relationship. Hence the substantial use of Enn. VI.4–5[22–3], a treatise in which Plotinus seems to lay aside for a moment all hierarchical distinctions of level in the intelligible world in order to concentrate on the examination of the way in which the incorporeal is present to and expresses itself in the realm of three-dimensional extension. We might recall here, too, Porphyry’s concern with the relationship of soul and body, an issue which he raised in Plotinus’ seminar.10 Although, in the Sententiae, Porphyry does not seem in essence to differ fundamentally from Plotinus, we may detect at times a hardening of position and lack of flexibility, due perhaps to the conciseness of the format he has chosen. But on at least one occasion he does follow a line of argument which seems to have been of only marginal interest to Plotinus and which may be a concession to more popular sentiment. In Sent. 29, he introduces the notion of the astral body, a sort of quasi-corporeal entity, to account for the concept of the soul being in Hades as a place, after its separation from its earthly body. Porphyry probably introduced this concept because it would have been familiar to readers in the context of the descent of the soul through the planetary spheres.
One of the longest sections is taken from Plotinus’ treatise on the virtues. It is fully in place here as it traces the ascent of the soul in its passage from its more embodied encounter with virtue to the level of intellect, which strictly is above virtue or rather is the level of the models of virtue. If we had a full text of the Sententiae, we might be able to claim with more certainty that this section is central to the plan of the work. As it is we must be content with saying that the section on the virtues plays a pivotal role in emphasizing the core purpose of the work as a means of leading the soul through philosophical reflection to disengage itself from the world and return to its true self in Intellect. Finally we may notice Porphyry’s choice in Sent. 40 of a long passage from Enn. VI.5[23] in which Plotinus addresses and exhorts his listener/reader directly in the second person. All of these elements contribute to the exhortatory nature of this work.
Brief mention should be made of Sallustius’ On the Gods and the Universe. This short work, which shows the influence of Iamblichus, is a handbook, for educated people who did not have the time to attend philosophy lectures (see chapters i and xiii). It aims to provide them with a correct understanding of the nature of the gods and their role in the universe and to lead them to union with the divine. The topics cover the different types of mythical representation of the gods, the hierarchy of reality, providence, fate, the nature of the human soul, virtue and the origin of evil. Particular attention is paid to the indestructibility of the universe, to sacrifice and the transmigration of souls. Without entering into the complexities of Neoplatonic metaphysics, Sallustius addresses in Platonic terms what he perceived to be the main intellectual issues facing educated pagans in the fourth century.11
Proclus’ Elements of Theology is quite different. Unlike the Sententiae and the work of Sallustius, which serve the practical purpose of aiding, in an immediately applicable and practical way, the relative novice in his ascent to the divine, the Elements of Theology aims to set out the basic metaphysical principles of Neoplatonism in a logical order of propositions, to each of which is assigned a demonstration. This a priori deductive system is inspired by the methods of Euclidean geometry. The resultant text is highly concise and technical, lacking in any kind of ornamentation or personal exhortation. Proclus’ concern is to set out the metaphysical structure of reality rather than the descent and return of the individual soul. “Theology” in this sense means what Aristotle would term “first philosophy”, the ultimate causes of things. It is the only systematic presentation of Neoplatonism that we possess and, although few, if any, of its basics precepts are not already contained in Plotinus’ Enneads, the precise arguments used in their support are sometimes not found in Plotinus. Almost inevitably in a work of such complexity, there are deficiencies and possible clashes with what Proclus says elsewhere, but that may be due to a wish to exclude unnecessary details12 or possibly because he continued to revise and adjust the work throughout his lifetime (the view of Steel 2010: 636). Propositions 1–112 present the basic principles that underlie Neoplatonic metaphysics: for example, the One and the Many, procession and reversion, time and eternity, while propositions 113–211 apply them to explicate the levels of reality from the One to Soul. Although the text is bare and lacks any reference to authorities, there are frequent hidden assumptions, drawn particularly of course from Plato, which render the arguments less cogent than they at first appear. Moreover, some of the arguments are circular. Nevertheless, this remains an important source of reference for understanding the most basic principles of Neoplatonic metaphysics which, when used together with his more expansive analyses in other works, can illuminate and provide a different perspective from Plotinus’ more aporetic approach to key issues.
The Elements represents one side of Proclus’ attempt to express what is central to Platonism; the other, and we might say more comprehensive, statement of Platonism is found in his grand project of a Platonic Theology. This work is monumental, voluminous, full of references to the most important authorities, Plato, the Chaldaean Oracles and the Orphics, not least appeals to a sense of personal religious experience, something which is completely absent, though not inconsistent with, the Elements of Theology. This work, like all of Proclus’ major compositions, except perhaps the Elements, does not survive in its complete form; but its surviving six books still comprise some 680 pages of text in the Budé edition. The intention of the project is to identify a distinctive Platonic theology in the dialogues of Plato and to integrate this with both traditional theology and the theology of the Chaldaean Oracles and the Orphics; in other words, to produce a grand synthesis of Hellenic theology based on Plato.
Proclus begins by making a clear distinction between natural theology or metaphysical theology and the sort of theology expressed through myth, symbol and divine inspiration, all of which may be found in Plato. In fact, he argues, his predecessors had failed to analyse Plato’s theology properly because they based their assessments on an uncritical compilation of every passage in which Plato mentions the gods. The correct procedure is to identify the metaphysical principles that underlie his theology, and the primary source for this is the Parmenides, which is to be understood not as an exercise in logic but as a metaphysical exposition of the structure of reality. The hypotheses of the Parmenides not only provide the basic structure of the Platonic world – the One, Intellect, Soul, body and matter – but detailed attributes of each order, most particularly of the transcendent orders, and may then be described as presenting theology “dialectically” (Proclus, Theol. Plat. I.4 [I.17.20]). Like Iamblichus before him, Proclus identifies divinity closely with unity, but although the One is the ultimate cause of unity, the unity which comes to be shared in by what we term gods is to be found at a lower level, intermediate between the utterly transcendent One which cannot be participated and Intellect. The key, Proclus argues, is to be found in his master Syrianus’ interpretation of the second hypothesis of the Parmenides. This hypothesis, which in general is to be interpreted as expressing the multitude in unity of the intelligible world, is to be interpreted as also expressing the unities or henads whose properties can be shared by what is below them; and these are the ultimate determiners of gods not only at the level of intellect but at lower levels too. Thus the whole hierarchy of gods, right down to the gods, daemons and heroes who dwell on the earth, finds its origin in the henads expressed in the second hypothesis of the Parmenides. Having established this principle it remains then to gather the common attributes of the gods to be gleaned from the other dialogues of Plato, mainly Laws, Republic, Phaedrus, Phaedo and Cratylus, and then to assign to the different levels of gods13 what is said in the various dialogues, whether by divine inspiration (Phaedrus), symbolically (Gorgias, Symposium, Protagoras) or through images (Timaeus, Politicus). Into this schema can then be inserted the authorities of the Chaldaean Oracles (divinely inspired), Orphic literature (symbolic) and Pythagoras (use of images).
It would be wrong to think that the idea of henads was devised simply as a means of explaining the presence of divinity throughout the universe and reconciling polytheism with the monism of the Neoplatonic system. The concept of henads also had a purely metaphysical function in Proclus’ system, for it could be argued that it provided a necessary intermediary to bridge the gap between Intellect and the One. The assertion of a completely transcendent One is probably one of Plotinus’ most striking philosophical innovations. It clearly troubled later generations. Porphyry seems to have grappled with the problem and Iamblichus found his solution in positing two Ones, a solution which Proclus rejected. But in rejecting it, he had to face the same problem. The divine henads provided one approach, which also had the advantage of helping to integrate religious and natural theology.
CONCLUSION
Both Plotinus and his successors claimed their title of Platonists largely because of the centrality of the Platonic corpus in their conduct of the philosophical life. The close examination of Platonic texts and the compilation of commentaries as aids in the interpretation of these texts were distinguishing features of Platonism from Porphyry to the end of the Neoplatonic schools. But, as we have seen, other forms of philosophical activity and other kinds of published work were of at least equal importance in promoting the worldview of these late Platonists. And not the least impact of this non-commentary tradition is the influence it had on the Arabic tradition where direct treatises on philosophical topics were of greater interest than the text of Plato himself.
NOTES
1. Thrasyllus wrote a prolegomena to reading Plato, Severus a treatise on the soul, Origen (the Platonist) wrote on daimones and a work entitled That the King Alone is Creator. The Aristotelian Alexander of Aphrodisias, in addition to his extensive commentaries, composed a number of treatises on special topics.
2. For example, The Errors of the Soul, The Faculties of the Soul Follow the Mixtures of the Body, On Demonstration, The Best Doctor is Also a Philosopher.
3. Porphyry, Plot. 8.13. In ch. 3, he tells us that Plotinus encouraged his students to ask questions and that this often led to a lack of order in the seminars.
4. In Porphyry, Plot. 14, Severus, Cronius, Numenius, Gaius and Atticus are mentioned, along with the Aristotelians Aspasius, Alexander and Adrastus. See Armstrong (1957) for a good example of Plotinus’ use of Alexander of Aphrodisias.
5. There is a similar approach in Enn. VI.4–5[22–3] where, in exploring the way in which incorporeal being relates to body, he presents us with a series of different viewpoints from which to approach the problem.
6. de Providentia et Fato et Eo Quod in Nobis; de Decem Dubitationibus Circa Providentiam; de Malorum Subsistentia.
7. As, for example, Simplicius’ commentary on Epictetus’ Enchiridion.
8. For example, Sent. 7 has two lines, Sent. 29 has 43, Sent. 40 (on intellect) has 78. Sent. 32 (on virtues) has 159 and could have been a centrepiece of the work as a whole.
9. As expressed, for example, in de Regressu Animae as reported by Augustine. Cf. Porphyry, frags 283–302 [Smith] and especially frag. 302 [Smith]. According to Augustine, Porphyry, though intent on discovering such a way to “salvation”, admitted that he had not yet found it.
10. Porphyry, Plot. 13.
11. Sallustius is probably to be identified with Sallustius, the friend of the emperor Julian to whom Julian dedicated his Oration 4 and 8. His treatise may then be seen in the context of Julian’s attempted pagan revival in 363.
12. See Dodds’ introduction to the edition, with translation and commentary (1963: xv–xviii). This edition is still the best introduction to Proclus’ metaphysics.
13. Intelligible, intellectual, hypercosmic, encosmic, divine souls, angels, daemons and heroes.