THE ONE AS THE BASIS FOR BEING AND THOUGHT
It is by the One that all beings are being, both those which are primarily being and those which are in any sense said to be amongst beings. For what could anything be if it was not one? For if things are deprived of the One which is predicated of them, they are not those things.
(Enn. VI.9[9].1.1–4)1
Plotinus’ programmatic treatise On the Good or the One begins with these words. It summarizes the basis of his “philosophy of the One” (Enn. VI.9[9].3.14), as he essentially characterizes his own thought in the shortest possible way. Let us analyse this claim in more detail.
First, unity is the most essential condition for the Being and the conceivableness of all things. This insight cannot be reasonably disputed. Whatever we think of as existing, we already think of it as a unity. In fact, we can only think of such things which are a unity in some way: what is not one in any way does not exist with regard to thought. Parmenides had already formulated this idea and Plato had made it the basis of his philosophy. He had pointed to the etymology of the Greek word for nothing (ouden) as “that which is not one” (oude hen, R. 478b; cf. Prm. 166c), which is adopted by Plotinus (Enn. V.2[11].1.1). What is not one is nothing. Therefore everything which is, is necessarily one and in such a manner that it only is, for the very reason that it is one.
That something is, is based on the fact that it is one: therefore unity is the reason for Being, the existence of all things, but not only that. Secondly, what something is it also owes to its character as a unity, since if it were not one, it would no longer be that which in each case it is. Whatever something is, it is also that only because, and in so far as, it is a unity. It always contains its essence as a unified essence. Without a unitary character, it would be undefined and what is completely undefined is neither something, nor does it exist at all, nor can it be thought. Unity is therefore the basis of Being, not only in the sense of existence, but at the same time also in the sense of being what it is, the essence or the definition of every defined entity. That is valid for all conceivable classifications. Unity is consequently also the reason for the “thinkability” of all classifications and of conceivable entities by means of their being defined. So, third, unity turns out to be not only the ontological basis for existence and essence, but also the epistemological basis for our understanding of existence and essence.
Since unity is the basis for everything that is at all conceivable, therefore even its apparent opposite, the Many, in so far as it can be conceived of, is itself contingent upon the One: “For if it has not become a unity, even when it is composed of many, one can in no way say of it that it is” (Enn. V.3[49].15.12–14). In fact, we always of necessity think the Many as a unity, that is to say as a united multiplicity and that means as a united whole, which is formed from many elementary unities, so that the conception of the Many presupposes unity in a double sense, that is, the unity of the totality of a multiplicity, just as much as the unity of each one of its individual components. At the conclusion of his Parmenides, Plato illustrated that a radically disunited multiplicity cannot be conceived of, that it is absolutely nothing and therefore is not many (Prm. 165e–166c). Therefore nothing can oppose the One, because even multiplicity is only conceivable as a unity and therefore always presupposes the One. As a basis for the conceivability and definition of everything, including multiplicity, the One is without opposition or beyond it. As that which is detached from any opposite, it is the Absolute (apolyton, Enn. VI.8[39].20.6).
No one can dispute that everything which can be conceived of, can only be conceived of as a unity, because everything which is conceivable must be defined and definition is only possible as a unity. However, this insight can be interpreted in different ways. That unity, therefore, because it is the necessary condition for all thought, is the basis for Being, that is, for the existence and essence of all entities as Plotinus hypothesizes, only follows if one presupposes that the structure of Being fundamentally corresponds to the structure of our thought. This unity of thought and Being was first expressed by Parmenides (frag. 3). Plato had also referred to it with the sentence “that which entirely ‘is’ is entirely knowable, and that which in no way ‘is’ is in every way unknowable” (R. 477a [Shorey]). This differs from an Aristotelian approach in that the ground for being as well as knowability indeed transcends being and knowability, as we will see below. However, it is precisely here that an objection might be suggested. One could perhaps argue, just like Kant, that unity is the highest principle of our reasoning faculty, by means of which we order reality according to unitary points of view, because we could not grasp them otherwise (CpR B §16). However, it does not necessarily follow from this requirement of unity on the part of our thought that reality by itself, independent of our thought, must be a unity and must be ordered according to a unitary perspective. For Kant, the final basis for unity of our thought-forms is the unity of the thinking Self, the unity of subjectivity; self-consciousness first places the unitary perspective in its thought, through which it apprehends and orders the diversity of the world, as it is present in perception. Therefore, it produces itself the unitary nature of its classifications and of the thoughts formulated through them via subjective synthesis – according to Kant. Unity for him, then, is only a subjective principle, not the basis of Being.
Interestingly, Plotinus also poses the question whether Thought2 itself first spawns unity, without which nothing can be thought: when Thought transmits that which is obtained by perception to us, “even though it is a multitude, it does not permit it to be a multitude, so that it somehow even here makes unity apparent, either by imparting unity itself, which multiplicity does not have, or by recognising unity lying in order by means of its acute vision and uniting the reality of the many to this unity” (Enn. VI.6[34].13.19–23, trans. O’Brien).
He, then, clearly formulates the alternatives: to interpret our thought’s requirement for unity either subjectively, as a consolidation of Thought itself, or realistically and ontologically, as the perception of the unitary character of Being itself, which reveals itself in its orderliness. In the second case, it is Thought which again extracts the unitary nature of the order, so that Plotinus at no point disputes the impossibility of transcending subjectivity or the contribution of Thought itself to our presupposition of unity.
Which alternative should be chosen? Plotinus provides a quasi-transcendental analysis of the conditions for the possibility of our thought. This ensures the ontological significance of our conceptual anticipation of unity and simultaneously means that our fundamental classifications of Thought are stable in reality. Plotinus’ argumentation runs as follows: if we can only think, in so far as we already presuppose unity, where both that which is thought and the intellective act (noēsis) encompassing it must possess a unitary character, then that which is presupposed by each intellective act from its very beginning cannot itself be the product of an intellective act which presupposes it. An intellective act originally positing unity would not be unitary before this position and would therefore be nothing, and thus not be a thought either. The One presupposed by every intellective act as a condition for taking place does therefore not rest upon the subjective positioning of Thought itself, but rather necessarily precedes all subjective unifying actions of Thought:
If, then, it is not possible to think anything without the One how is it possible for that not to exist without which it is not possible to think or speak? For it is impossible to say that it does not exist of something, without which one cannot think or say anything at all. But that which is needed everywhere for the coming of existence of every act (noēsis) and content of thinking (logos) must be there before (prohyparchein) content and the act of thinking: for this is how it can be brought to contribute to their coming into existence.
(Enn. VI.6[34].13.43–9)
Our thought’s requirement for unity itself proves that the One is the necessary condition for all our thinking and hypothesizing; with its abolition thinking itself would be suspended. The One is not a product of our thought, not posited by it, since every intellective act is itself only possible if the One has been presupposed. The One is therefore more primordial than Thought and is its principle; on account of its need for unity, Thought finds in itself the necessity of always requiring its principle. The logical priority of the One before the implementation of Thought, which from its very beginning requires unity, ensures for Plotinus the ontological validity of our intellective anticipation of unity. Since the One is also always presupposed before everything which conceivably contains Being, the ontological priority of the One before Being is by this means simultaneously revealed, which proves that the One is the principle of Being: “But if it is needed for the existence of each and every substance – for there is nothing which is not one – it must exist before substance and initially generate Being” (Enn. VI.6[34].13.50–51; cf. Halfwassen 2004: 59–97; Gabriel 2009: 184–310).
Plotinus’ argumentation demonstrates that the One as the principle of Thought precedes and makes possible every implementation of subjective thinking and in this way it itself cannot be what is posited by our thought. However, does it also demonstrate that reality itself is based on unity and is structured as a unity? Here the sceptical argument is suggested that Plotinus does not demonstrate the unity of Thought and Being, as it is so understood, but rather always presupposes it. However, a scepticism which questions the affinity of the fundamental structure of our thought with the fundamental structure of Being enmeshes itself in self-contradiction. If the anticipation of unity which first makes thinking possible and therefore precedes it should not be sufficient to ensure the ultimate unity of reality, then one must concede the possibility that reality by itself, independently of our thought, might also consist of a disunited multiplicity of disconnected individual things. However, it is precisely this assumption which claims already unitary classifications of thought, such as actuality, multiplicity or individual things, as stable reality. By doing so, it already presupposes the stability of reality attained by our classifications of thought; that is, the anticipations of reality which make it possible. Therefore it presupposes the argument which it wants to dispute. However, a presupposition which is presupposed even when attempting to deny it cannot be disputed. Therefore the One is not only the basis of Thought, but also, owing to our thought having a foundation in reality, it is necessarily the basis for Being.
As the basis for Being and Thought, the One precedes both. This absolute priority of the One also shows itself in the fact that while we can think all entities and even Being itself only as a unity, we must on no account always think the One as connected to Being. We can of course conceive of non-Being. So, for example, we can think of Non-Being as different from Being, Becoming as the intermediary between Being and Nothing and even of Nothing itself as the complete lack of Being; and by this means we think of Non-Being, Becoming and Nothing, in each case, as a unitary constitution. In contrast, we cannot think of anything, without simultaneously thinking of it as a unity. The One is therefore prior to Being, just as it is prior to Thought. The One is the Absolute and is not contingent upon Being or Thought and it is presupposed in and before all Being, just as in and before all Thought, and does not allow itself to be thought away.
The absolute nature of our presupposition of unity has a series of metaphysically significant implications, which form the structural principles of Neoplatonic philosophy:
(a) Unity enables the differentiation of Being and Non-Being. Admittedly, we think of “Being” and “Non-Being” to an equal extent as unitary constitutions, but in thinking of Non-Being, we do not conceive of any positive content, no “what” or “something” of its own, but rather simply the negation of Being. Every positive content, every “what” or “something” which can be attributed to Being, must have a positive, unitary character: “so that it is being when it is one in some way” (Enn. VI.6[34].1.20). Being, for Plotinus, primarily signifies determination, that something is made into something and not merely actual existence. So content implies determination. In contrast, Non-Being is indeterminate, which is non-being on account of its lack of determination. As the basis of all determination, the One is the principle of Being, which endows it with all its determination and by this very means makes it a being and preserves it in Being: “For all that is not one is kept in being by the One and is what it is by this One” (Enn. V.3[49].15.11–12).
(b) Furthermore, unity is the measure which makes the differentiation of various grades of Being possible. If the unity of something is the basis of its Being, then every “something” is also a being to the extent that it is one. A higher degree of unity at the same time signifies a higher degree of Being; the more unified something is, the more “being” it is (mallon on, Enn. VI.9[9].1.26–8). For example, the Soul, the principle of unity of the organism in which it lives, is not only more unified, but on this account participates more in Being, than the bodily organism which it renders into a unity. In contrast to the organism, which is generated when the Soul endows it with unity, and passes away when it loses its unity, the Soul always exists and is imperishable (cf. Enn. IV.7[2]). Only the henological approach of his philosophy allows Plotinus (as it already allowed Plato) to posit the graduation of Being; that is, the differentiation between different grades and levels of Being. Unity as the basis of Being generates the “ontological comparative” and in this way also forms the foundation of the Theory of Ideas, in conformity with the unitary nature of something participating more in Being than its individual realization. Since the unitary classification “justice” or the unitary classification “courage” possess a higher degree of unity than the many different cases of just or courageous behaviour, as Ideas they also possess a higher, more substantial or “more being” Being than these. It is only unity which makes the multiplicity of its instantiations into what they are.
(c) If multiplicity is the concept opposed to the One, then the relationship of unity to multiplicity forms the foundation of our thinking and all its classifications, including the foundation of Being; it is also prior to the opposition between Being and Non-Being. Plato saw the ultimate and most original principles in the One and the Many. However, since multiplicity is only possible and conceivable as a unity, it always presupposes the One; conversely the One does not presuppose the Many. The relationship of unity to multiplicity is therefore fundamentally asymmetrical and from this fundamental asymmetry, Plotinus obtains the motif of ascent and the notion of the transcendence of the absolute One, which determines his entire philosophy.
THE ASCENT TO THE ABSOLUTE
The relationship of unity to multiplicity determines the ontological structure that is foundational for all entities, irrespective of whether they are intelligible and eternal or manifestly appearing and changeable. All Being is only because and in so far as it is a unity. However, because of that, it is simultaneously Being and One, and if it is twofold, then it is a multiplicity (Plato, Prm. 142b–144e). However, that multiplicity is itself only possible as a united multiplicity, the unity-endowing One is therefore always presupposed, therefore the One and Many do not have equal priority and power as principles of Being, but rather the One as the basis of all multiplicity is the sole absolute principle, the origin of everything (archē pantōn, Enn. VI.9[9].5.24). Plotinus arrives by this means at his monistic interpretation of Plato’s theory of principles with all its bipolarity of unity and multiplicity which determines Being (cf. Enn. V.1[10].5.6–19).
As the basis for all multiplicity, the One necessarily transcends all multiplicity. This thought is central for Plotinus. If the One is the reason for all multiplicity, then it cannot be present in multiplicity as the One, as itself, and merge into this presence. While it sustains, by means of its presence, the Many in Being, it cannot, however, merge in this presence with the Many, but rather it remains by itself above it as a unity beyond multiplicity. Otherwise, on account of its immanence in the Many, it would itself be a multiplicity; it would be divided into multiplicity and would therefore no longer be the One or the origin of unity, which holds multiplicity together as a unity and by this means makes it possible:
For, from what has been said, it is not correct to divide the One up into the many, but rather to bring back the divided many to the One, and that One has not come to these many, but these because they are scattered have given us the impression that also that has been taken apart, as if one were to divide what controls and holds together into parts equal to what is controlled.
(Enn. VI.4[22].7.3–9)
The question of how the One can be the basis of multiplicity, without in this process nullifying itself as One, had already occupied Plato. It comprises the basic problem of the Theory of Ideas: how can an Idea be the basis for the multiplicity of its many instantiations and still remain a unity itself (Prm. 131b–e; cf. Phlb. 15b)? Plotinus answers this fundamental question of Platonism exactly as Plato had previously answered it: “But there is a need for the One, from which the many derives, to exist before the Many” (Enn. V.3[49].12.9–10). The basis cannot, then, itself have the character of the thing which it serves as a basis for. As the origin of multiplicity, the One itself is no longer a multiplicity, but rather it is the basis for multiplicity, precisely because it as a unity itself remains itself beyond multiplicity. The basis, then, remains always transcendent in relation to the thing which it is a basis for and it is a basis for it precisely by means of its transcendence:
And this is no wonder. Or yes, it is a wonder how the multiplicity of life came from what is not multiplicity and the multiplicity would not have existed, if what was not multiplicity had not existed before the multiplicity. For the origin is not divided up into the All, for if it were divided up it would destroy the All too; and the All could not any more come into being if the origin did not remain by itself different from it.
(Enn. III.8[30].10.14–19)
Plato was the first to state the transcendence of the basis in relation to what it is a basis for, by means of which it is foremost the basis (Smp. 211b; R. 509b; Test. Plat. 50, 52; cf. also Phdr. 245d; Ti. 37d, 42e), and his nephew, Speusippus, had formulated it in all its essentials: “The origin is never of the same kind as that which it is the origin of” (frag. 72; cf. also Test. Plat. 55b).
From the transcendence of the One over the Many, by means of which it is the basis for the Many, there originates throughout all of Plotinus’ philosophy a movement of ascent. It is understood as a henological reduction; that is, as a return movement (anagoge) of multiplicity in each of its shapes to the unity upon which it was based at any time, in the process of which multiplicity is transcended to the One (cf. Halfwassen 1992: 57–61):
Therefore, too, we go back everywhere to one. And in each and every thing there is some one, to which you will trace it back, and this in every case to the one before it, which is not simply one, until we come to the simply One (haplos hen); but this cannot be traced back to something else. But if we take the one of the plant – this is its abiding origin – and of the one of the animal and the one of the soul and the one of the universe, we are asking in each case what is the most powerful and really valuable in it.
(Enn. III.[30].8.10.20–26)
The henological reduction is therefore comprehended in three stages: (1) from the individual phenomena to the Ideas; (2) from the world as the unity of all phenomena to the unity of all Ideas (the One-Being); (3) from the unity of Ideas (the One-Being) to the absolute One, which is absolutely devoid of multiplicity, and therefore no further reduction is possible. This movement of ascent, its stages and its methods follow Plato’s Theory of Principles:
1. From the manifest multiplicity of individual things, the first step leads to the respective Idea from which they derive their unity, for example, from many plants to the Idea of the plant, the “One of the plant”. For Plato already the most general and most fundamental classification of the Ideas was that they were the basis of unity for the multiplicity of their instantiations (R. 476a, 479a, 507b, 596a; Prm. 131b–c, 132a–d, 133b, 135b–d; Phlb. 15a–b); Aristotle defines the Ideas in the same terms as Plato as a “one over the many” (hen epi pollōn), because as a unity it transcends the multiplicity of its instantiations (Met. 990b7–13, 1079a3–9; APo. 77a5). Therefore when Thought in a multiplicity recognizes the unity of a shared classification, an Idea must always be set above this multiplicity as the transcendent basis of unity in multiplicity (see also On the Ideas, frag. 3).
2. However, unity in multiplicity is not only the basic condition of every individual entity. Since this condition is common to all entities, it already merges all particular entities into a unity, which is once again a unity in multiplicity; that is to say, the unity of the world or the universe (pan), of the entirety of the world. The unity of the entire world equally presupposes a transcendent basis of unity as a unity in multiplicity, which merges all individual things into the unity of the world’s totality. This basis for the unity of the entire world is no longer a particular Idea, but rather the totality of the Ideas, which encompasses all individual Ideas, the cosmos of the Ideas, which Plato called the “One-Being” (hen on) in the Parmenides; it is the totality of all Ideas, just as the world is the totality of all instantiations (Ti. 30c–31b; cf. 92c). As the unity of all Ideas, the One-Being transcends all individual Ideas, which it contains in itself as its moments.
3. The character as a unity in multiplicity, which requires the reversion to a transcendent basis of unity, defines not only individual instantiations and the world as a totality, but also the Ideas and the One-Being as a totality. Admittedly, every Idea is a unity, but it is not an absolutely simple unity, which is completely devoid of multiplicity and which cannot be further analysed, but rather every Idea contains as a definable essence a multitude of moments of its own nature, which are indicated in its definition. For example, the Idea of Man contains in itself the Ideas of “Life”, “Reason” and “Community” which are essential to man’s nature. As the unity of the multiplicity of the moments of its nature every Idea is a number (cf. Enn. VI.6[34]). In this sense every Idea is also a “unity from many” (hen ek pollōn): that is, the unity of the entire totality of its moments, as Plato defines them in the Parmenides (157c–e). That is most especially true for the One-Being as the totality of all Ideas. Admittedly as the all-encompassing unity of the totality of Being, it enjoys a higher degree of unity than any particular Idea. However, it contains all given Ideas within itself as its moments and, just like every other Idea, it is thereby a unity, which contains multiplicity in itself. As a unity with immanent multiplicity or as a “One-Many” (hen polla, Plato, Prm. 144e5; often cited by Plotinus, e.g. Enn. V.1[10].8.26), the One-Being thereby also presupposes a transcendent basis for its own unity. As the totality of the Ideas, however, the One-Being is no longer a unity alongside other unities, but rather the unity of the absolute totality, outside of which there exists nothing, the total unity (hen panta, Enn. III.6[26].6.23; V.3[49].15.23). The basis of its unity is by this means the absolute or simple One, the One itself, which as pure unity is absolutely devoid of multiplicity and for which therefore a further basis is neither required nor possible. The simple One is by this means the Absolute, by which the ascent to the ultimate Principle ends; it is the aim of the ascending movement towards a point of origin, beyond which it is not possible to proceed further.
Furthermore, it is important in principle that this ascent is understood as a movement of abstraction (aphairesis), so that it does not lead to a deflation of thought, but rather continuously to a higher plenitude of essence from one level to the next. The abstraction is to be understood as a liberation from multiplicity and from the finitude and changeability of the many things, which is contingent upon multiplicity. It is the revelation of the unity which serves as the basis for multiplicity, but which is hidden by it. The reversion to the One is to be understood, then, as a successive removal of all multiplicity, and at the same time it attains, to the extent to which multiplicity is removed, to a continuously higher, more intense and more concentrated plenitude; the plenitude increases with simplicity. Therefore, since the One is the basis of Being, all plenitude, which is obscured by multiplicity, is found in unity. For example, while the Idea of the plant is recognized by means of looking beyond all individual plants and their particular properties, it is not an empty product of abstraction like our general concept “plant”, but rather it is that by means of which all individual plants are plants at all, by participating in it; that is in its unitary nature. Accordingly, the One-Being is also not the emptiest and most general concept which we can form, but rather the very embodiment of the plenitude of Being (Halfwassen 2004: 68–79).
Certainly, when it is necessary to go beyond this epitome of the plenitude of Being to the absolute One, which contains no multiplicity and therefore also no positively conceivable content, then there arises the paradox that the Absolute, which is the basis for everything, can only be thought of as nothingness (Enn. III.8[30].10.26–35). Plotinus does not conceal this paradox in any way. It preserves in itself the highest notion of Platonism: the pure transcendence of the Absolute and its interpretation by means of a strict negative dialectic or negative theology. One can speak of “negative theology” here to the extent that “theology” in the ancient sense, since Aristotle, signified a theory of principles. “Negative theology” means the exclusion of the Absolute as the definitive principle and point of origin by denying all positive attributes. It is thereby not implied that the transcendent Absolute, the One itself, can be conceived of as God and even less so as a personal God of any kind; it is rather that the One itself is “more than God” (Enn. VI.9[9].6.12–13). The very conception of God is included in that which a strict negative theology transcends. “What one says of God is insufficient for me: that which is beyond divinity is my life and my light”, says Angelus Silesius in terms of Neoplatonic negative theology (in The Cherubinic Pilgrim: Angelus Silesius 1986: I.15). It was in exactly this sense that Ps-Dionysius Areopagite, a student of Proclus, coined the term “negative theology” (apophatike theologia) around the year 500.
ABSOLUTE TRANSCENDENCE AND NEGATIVE THEOLOGY
Negative theology is the attempt to think of the Absolute as absolute transcendence. Its starting point is the notion that the Absolute must be conceived of as a pure unity. However, if pure unity is to be consistently conceived of, then it strictly denies all classification, because any classification which can be conceived of at all would lead it into multiplicity. As that which is detached from all multiplicity and all determination, the One is itself pure transcendence, absolutely beyond everything (epekeina pantōn, Enn. V.1[10].6.13; V.3[49].13.2; V.4[7].2.39–40). Plotinus stresses this repeatedly. Particularly illuminating is his first detailed explanation of the absolute transcendence of the One in the early Enn. V.4[7]:
For there must be something simple before all things, and this must be other than all the things which come after it, existing by itself, not mixed with the things which derive from it, and all the same able to be present in a different way to the other things, being really one and not a different being and then one; for it is false even to say of it that it is one and there is “no concept or knowledge” [Plato, Prm. 142a] of it; it is indeed also said to be “beyond Being” [Plato, R. 509b]. For if it is not to be simple, outside all coincidence and composition, and the true and absolute One, it could not be a first principle (archē); and it is the most self-sufficient (autarkestaton hapantōn), because it is simple and the first of all.
(Enn. V.4[7].1.5–13)
The Absolute is the absolutely simple (pantē haploun, Enn. V.3[49].11.27). Consequently, everything which is not absolutely simple, that is every unity, which in some way still contains multiplicity in it, presupposes the absolutely simple as its origin, and is dependent upon it, because every unity which is limited by multiplicity is only a unity at all by means of the absolutely pure unity. The pure unity, which, as an absolute simplicity, strictly excludes any form of multiplicity from itself, is the purer nature of the Absolute. Absolute simplicity signifies the removal of every multiplicity, including any conceptual multiplicity and by this means the exclusion of any ontological structure, whatever its nature, which always implies a conceptual composition. Moreover, by this means, it equally signifies the removal of any determination, since determination, on the one hand, implies something to which it comes and of which it is a determination and, on the other hand, it is by this conceptually distinguishable from that “something” of which it is a classification or essence. Every determined “something” allows itself to be separated into the thing determined and the determination, and in this way already demonstrates a composition, an ontological structure as the relationship of a multiplicity of at least conceptually distinguishable moments. For that reason, the absolute unity of the One itself excludes every determination and every structure from itself. Therefore any possibility of relation of the Absolute to itself or to others is excluded, since any relationship to itself or to others presupposes at the very least a conceptual differentiation of relata. Since every determination places the thing determined in relationship to itself or to others, the absolutely simple is also absolutely without determination; that is, it is also not only undeterminable for us, but rather it is by and for itself beyond all determination. Pure simplicity itself is therefore also not the determination of the Absolute; rather it is correctly understood as the absolute negation of all determination. Absolute simplicity which is understood in this manner is the pure concept of the Absolute, which can only be thought of negatively. However, the pure transcendence of the Absolute is contained in this absolute simplicity, correctly understood as the negation of all determination. By means of its pure simplicity the Absolute is completely removed from everything, so it is “beyond everything” (epekeina pantōn, Enn. V.1[10].6.13), and by this means it is also “before everything” (pro panton, Enn. V.4[7].1.5), “above everything” (hyper panta, Enn. V.5[32].13.33) and “different from everything” (panton heteron, Enn. V.4[7].1.6). The point of Plotinus’ negative theology is to express this.3
Even referring to the Absolute as “the One” is improper and metaphorical, because the Absolute is not a unity in the sense that things which are in Being have a positive character of unity, which determines a single thing, itself conceptually distinguished from unity. Pure unity in contrast means the negation of all determination and all Being; it means that the One is not even conceivable as a unity in affirmative concepts. Plotinus stresses this emphatically: “This marvel of the One, which is not existent, so that ‘one’ may not here also have to be predicated of something else, which in truth has no fitting name but if we must give it a name, ‘one’ would be an appropriate ordering way of speaking of it, not in the sense of something else and then one” (Enn. VI.9[9].5.30–33).
The term “the One” should instruct us to transcend all multiplicity and all determination in thought: in reality it targets the “Super-One”; in order to conceive of this, Thought must transcend itself and its own unitary thought (Enn. VI.9[9].6.1–15). The Absolute is the One, not in any positively determined sense of unity, but rather only in the negative sense, that it is beyond all multiplicity (Enn. V.5[32].6.24–34). Therefore, the name of the One, which is most suitable to the negative content of the Absolute, leads to the insight that the Absolute is in reality unspeakable (arrheton, Enn. V.3[49].13.1; cf. Plato, Ep. VII.341c). There is no denotation which is suitable to the One; one can say nothing concerning it at all, because the twofold structure of predication, which always says something about something, is fundamentally inappropriate to the pure unity of the Absolute. We can say nothing about what the Absolute is, but rather what it is not (Enn. V.3[49].14.6–8; VI.8[39].8.4–8), because the Absolute is not a “what” or a “something” (ti), but rather it is before everything which is a “what” (Enn. V.3[49].12.51–2; pro tou ti). We therefore have neither knowledge nor insight of the Absolute (Enn. V.3[49].14.2–3; VI.9[9].4.1–2), for all knowledge (episteme, gnosis) is directed at the “what” or the essence of a thing, and intellection (noesis) – the highest form of knowledge – intuitively encompasses this essence in a simple gaze of Intellect. Plato for this reason denied the Absolute any determination, Being and a unitary character, alongside knowability, sayability and the ability to be designated (Prm. 142a).
Plato summarizes the absolute transcendence of the Absolute in the formula that it “transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power” (epekeina tes ousias presbeia kai dynamei hyperechontos, R. 509b; cf. also Test. Plat. 50). After Plato, the absolute transcendence of the One was most strongly stressed by his nephew and first successor as head of the Academy, Speusippus: it is beyond Being and also beyond the Good and the Beautiful (frag. 72 [Isnardi Parente]). In this way, it is also “beyond Intellect” (epekeina nou), as Aristotle formulated it, following Plato and Speusippus (On Prayer, frag. 1; cf. Plato, R. 508e–509a; Speusippus, frag. 89 [Isnardi Parente]). Transcendence above being, “beyond Being” is, however, the most precise and at the same time the most all-encompassing expression for the pure transcendence of the Absolute, because “Being” is not simply a classification alongside other classifications, which must be excluded from the Absolute; rather it forms a foundation for all other classifications and represents the epitome of all determination. Furthermore, “Being” (ousia) in a concise sense does not simply signify that something is and exists, but rather it refers to the plenitude of essence, in which something completely is what it actually is; the final and actual fruition of Being is therefore no particular essence, but rather the One-Being as the absolute epitome of the entire plenitude of Being. In this sense, Being is the totality of all determination, which lacks nothing – no conceivable classification and no conceivable degree of Being (Enn. III.6[26].6) (see Halfwassen 2002: 504–11). However, the plenitude of Being, the epitome of all determination, is not the Absolute; the One-Being is not the First Principle, but rather the Second, after the One itself. Therefore, the transcendence of the One above Being signifies its transcendence over the totality. “Its product is already all things. But if this product is all things, that Principle is beyond all things: therefore ‘beyond being’” (Enn. V.4[7].2.39–40). Because of the significance of this transcendence of Being as transcendence above the totality, Plotinus repeatedly cites the Platonic phrase “epekeina tēs ousias” (on at least thirty-one occasions, which makes it by far the most repeated citation in Plotinus’ oeuvre).
That Being is not only the foundation, but rather also the epitome of all determination is connected to its classification as an eidos, which was developed by Plato and which his most important students, Speusippus, Xenocrates and Aristotle, developed further in different directions (see Krämer 1973). Eidos – which literally means “aspect, appearance, shape, form” – refers to the constitution of Being. What does not possess constitution of nature is therefore not Being. As the origin of all constitution, the One itself cannot be anything constituted and therefore does not possess any character of Being at all. Exactly by means of its transcendence over all constitution of Being, it allows constitution and by this means Being as the totality of all constitution:
Since the substance (ousia) … is form (eidos) … and not the form of some one thing, but of everything, so that no other form is left outside it, the One must be without form (aneidon). But if it is without form it is not a substance, for a substance must be some one particular thing, something, that is, defined and limited, but it is impossible to apprehend the One as a particular thing: for then it would not be the principle, but only the particular thing which you said it was. But if all things are in that which is generated [from the One], which of the things in it are you going to say that the One is? Since it is none of them, it can only be said to be beyond them. But these things are beings (ta onta) and being (to on): so that it is “beyond being” (epekeina ontos). This phrase “beyond being” does not mean that it is a particular thing – for it makes no positive statement (thesis) about it – and it “does not give it a name” [Plato, Prm. 142a] but all it implies is that it is “not this” But if this is what the phrase does, it in no way comprehends the One.
(Enn. V.5[32].6.1–14)
Plotinus here makes it clear what absolute transcendence actually means: it does not signify that Being as one component, and the One as its ulterior origin as the other, together make up the whole, but rather it means that “which is detached from every totality and transcends it”, as Proclus later formulates it (in Prm. 1107.32–3). The Absolute does not allow itself to be assembled with Being in a totality which encompasses both of these, Being and the Absolute, but rather it always transcends any such horizon of totality (Huber 1955: 58–60). Being is already the totality of that which can be thought of as determined. The transcendence of the Absolute above Being is therefore not a determination of what the Absolute is or is not, but rather it is the rejection of all determination. Transcendence, therefore, does not contain any positing; that is, it is no longer a positive observation of something, but rather the rejection of all meaning. However, it performs the rejection of all conceivable meaning in such a way that it at the same time supplies the direction in which this rejection is to be understood. That is, the Absolute is in no way lacking that which is negated from it, but rather is superior to it. Transcendence is therefore the assertion of something which exceeds everything that permits itself to be thought of and that permits assertions to be made of it; it is therefore not a “something” any longer. It is an assertion that even retracts itself as an assertion in order by this means to point to what transcends every positive assertion, to what in truth is absolutely unsayable (Enn. V.3[49].13.1–6). The semantic form of the assertion about transcendence and its character as illustrative of what goes beyond everything therefore surpass mere negation. The special feature of the assertion concerning transcendence remains in the fact that its absolute semantic excess and its absolute conceptual negativity are mutually dependent: the rejection of everything targets what surpasses everything and which is beyond everything and exactly that does not allow itself to be expressed in any other way except through the negation of all that which it surpasses. The Absolute is nothing in exactly this sense: “It is certainly none of the things of which it is origin; it is of such a kind, though nothing can be predicated of it, not being (on), not substance (ousia), not Life, as to be above all of these things” (Enn. III.8[30].10.28–31).
The Absolute is “nothing from the All, rather before All” (Enn. III.8[30].9.53–4) so that it must not be said of it that “it neither is the ‘it is’ (to estin)” (Enn. VI.7[38].38.1), “it is not (ouk esti)” (Enn. VI.7[38].38.11), “we take even the ‘is’ away from it” (Enn. VI.8[39].8.14), therefore “it also does not exist (oude hypestē)”, but rather it is “before all existence (pro hypostaseōs)” (Enn. VI.8[39].10.35–6) and “beyond Being” (hyperontōs)” (Enn. VI.8[39].14.42). “And if you can take hold of it after taking away Being (to einai), you will greatly marvel” (Enn. III.8[30].10.31–2). This transcendence of Being, however, can only be implemented to the extent that Thought can also transcend itself along with Being. The goal of transcending Thought is then ultimately ekstasis, the stepping out of Thought out of itself (Enn. VI.9[9].11.23).
PLOTINUS’ MYSTICISM: EKSTASIS AS THE SELF RISING ABOVE THOUGHT
Plotinus’ mysticism of ekstasis emerges from the absolute transcendence of the One. This connection is important. One completely misunderstands Plotinus, if one assumes that his philosophy is a subsequent attempt to understand a mystical experience of unity. His mysticism would then stand at the beginning of the theory. What can be referred to as Plotinus’ mysticism is rather the reverse: the consequence of his theory of the Absolute as pure transcendence, as it was developed. Plotinus himself stresses this repeatedly (Enn. VI.9[9].4).
Even the term “mysticism” is utterly ambiguous and can cause misunderstanding. It is derived from the verb “myein”, which means to close one’s eyes, just like during initiation into the mysteries. If one applies the expression “mysticism” to Plotinus, one must first steer clear of any association with irrationality and obscurantist emotional experience. For Plotinus it has nothing to do with being in a state of trance or Dionysian experiences. Plotinus only speaks of “myein” once (Enn. I.6[1].8.25) and by this means the complete turning away of consciousness from every relation to the sensible world, by which means consciousness is entirely concentrated upon itself. The goal of this collection and concentration on what is internal is the unclouded clarity and brightness of Intellect. This is not an emotional experience, but rather purely intellectual; emotions – even of a Dionysiacecstatic sort – are a connection with the external world, which should be discarded by consciousness. The concentration of consciousness upon itself is furthermore not unification with the Absolute, but only the first, if crucial, step towards it.
Through this “mystical” self-contemplation of what is internal to us, “another vision” is activated in us, a purely intellectual form of seeing, which, according to Plotinus, is accessible to every person, but only a few are aware of it (Enn. I.6[1].8.25–7). A non-discursive, and therefore not linguistically composed, form of thinking and recognizing is meant by this, which perceives the thing recognized in a simple glance of the Intellect with a single blow, that is, an intuitive display of the whole at once, which at the same time is of absolute and indisputable evidence, and in its implementation the thinking or contemplating consciousness does not stand opposite what is contemplated as a “subject” which is differentiated from its “object”, but rather fuses with it and becomes a unity. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friederich Hölderlin and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling later spoke of “intellectual contemplation”, because in it what is perceived is present at once as a totality, just like with vision; not sensibly, but rather purely intellectually. Plotinus speaks of a “gazing” (thea) or “contemplation” (theōria), but mostly of “intellection” (noēsis); this term was used by Plato and Aristotle, in order to distinguish intuitive from discursive recognition. This intuition, the highest form of recognition, is the manner in which the absolute Intellect can recognize and think itself as the very plenitude of Being. Who actualizes it is therefore one with the absolute Intellect, the basis of our soul and our thinking consciousness, into which consciousness reverts, when it concentrates perfectly upon itself. The act of intellectual contemplation is therefore the transformation of consciousness into the Intellect as our true or actual Self: our “becoming Intellect” (noōthēnai, Enn. VI.7[38].35.4; VI.8[39].5.35) (see Beierwaltes 2001: 97–114). It is the highest ascent of our self-consciousness and at the same time the most perfect removal of boundaries, so that it can no longer distinguish itself from other things as something fixed, which it itself is not. For that which it contemplates and that with which in its contemplation it becomes a unity, is not an individual thing, but rather the plenitude of Being, which is the contemplating Intellect itself:
Often I have woken up out of the body to myself and have entered into myself, going out from all other things; I have seen a beauty wonderfully great and felt assurance that then most of all I belonged to the better part; I have actually lived the best life and come to identity with the divine and set firm in it. I have come to that supreme actuality (energeia ekeinē), setting myself above all else in the realm of Intellect. Then after that rest (stasis) in the divine, when I have come down from Intellect to discursive reasoning (logismos), I am puzzled how I ever came down.
(Enn. IV.8[6].1.1–9)4
Intellectual contemplation is a genuine philosophical form of mystical experience. It is an experience of all-encompassing unity, in which the Self knows its identity with the All-Unity of Intellect. It does not have any irrational connotations, since its structure and its necessity can be argumentatively demonstrated, even when it no longer understands itself argumentatively and deductively, but rather as a stepping out from discursivity and by this means also from the temporality and the sayability of our usual consciousness and conscious thought. It is the basis of our self-consciousness, since only through it can the Self truly and immediately know itself as a unity (cf. Enn. V.3[49].3–5); in this respect Plotinus agrees with German Idealism after Kant. The experience of unity from intellectual contemplation, the awakening to oneself, is a “standing still in the divine” (Enn. IV.8[6].1.7), that is to say in the absolute Intellect, because it is no longer a movement of searching, but rather an eternal discovery of the plenitude of Being and the eternal knowledge within it, since it has stepped out of time. For Plotinus, however, it is not an experience of the Absolute. Plotinus requires of the thinking and seeing of the Absolute that it also surpasses even the noetic contemplation of Intellect, the fulfilment of the search of Thought for Being. Just like thought, in order to obtain its fulfilment in Intellect, it must step outside of its relationship to the external world, which is transmitted via the sensible, so it must also go beyond Intellect, in order to reach the Absolute in its pure transcendence, so it must transcend everything which is conceivable: “but just as he who wishes to see in intelligible nature (noete physis) will contemplate what is beyond the perceptible if he has no mental image of the perceptible, so he who wishes to contemplate what is beyond the intelligible will contemplate it when he has let all the intelligible go” (Enn. V.5[32].6.17–20).
The absolute transcendence of the One demands from Thought the detachment of everything which is thinkable, as is accomplished by negative theology. However, this contains a fundamental paradox. How can one abolish all thinkability from Thought, without thereby at the same time abolishing Thought itself? And when the abolition of thinkability can be understood only as the self-abolition of thought, then how is a self-abolition possible which is not a self-annihilation or self-destruction of reason? Plotinus’ theory of ekstasis arises from this very paradox and is his response to it. As pure transcendence, the Absolute withdraws and becomes unreachable for Thought. Thought reaches absolute transcendence only by means of leaving itself, through transcending itself, in which Thought – outpacing itself – perfects itself and is not destroyed, to the extent that it is no longer Thought, but rather surpasses Thought as “Super-Thought” (hypernoesis, Enn. VI.8[39].16.32). “Ekstasis” refers to this self-transcendence of Thought. Plotinus’ ekstasis is, then, the consequence of the pure transcendence of the Absolute.
Plotinus repeatedly stresses that the absolute transcendence of the One is not only transcendence of Being, but rather it is at the same time also transcendence of Intellect and transcendence of knowledge: “Then since it is beyond Being (epekeina ousias), it is also beyond all activity (epekeina energeias) and beyond Intellect and Thought (epekeina nou kai noēseōs)” (Enn. I.7[54].1.19–20, trans. O’Brien). From this it equally follows that the One itself “does not think” (Enn. V.6[24].2.2); for this reason “it does not perceive itself” (Enn. III.9[13].9.12–13), “it does not recognise or think itself” (Enn. VI.9[9].6.46), “it does not know itself” (Enn. V.6[24].6.31), but rather “it is also raised above self-consciousness (synaisthesis) and every intellective act” (Enn. V.6[24].5.4–5). From the transcendence of the One above Intellect, and consequently above every form of Thought, of recognition and of consciousness, arises the problem of how we can then reach the Absolute, the goal of the entire ascent. Certainly, from Thought’s requirement for unity we can ultimately postulate an absolute basis for pure unity beyond all Thought and all Being. However, such a conclusion concerning the origin of all unity is still not an attainment of the Absolute, but rather only what points beyond Thought itself. This pointing beyond Thought itself is still not a fulfilment of the search for the Absolute. The Absolute appears in its pure transcendence to be unattainable, “For again, since knowledge of other things comes to us from intellect, and we are able to know intellect by intellect, by what sort of sudden and simple intuition (epibolē athroa) could one grasp this which transcends the nature of Intellect?” (Enn. III.8[30].9.19–22). Plotinus’ answer runs as follows:
The perplexity arises especially because our awareness of that One is not by way of reasoned knowledge (episteme) or of intellectual perception (noēsis), as with other intelligible things, but by way of a presence (parousia) superior to knowledge. The soul … must therefore run up above knowledge and in no way depart from being one, but one must depart from knowledge and things known and from every other, even beautiful, object of vision.
(Enn. VI.9[9].4.1–10)
Thought constitutes itself through its anticipation of unity. The vision of the One itself is the fulfilment of the anticipation of unity, which first makes all Thought and knowledge possible. This fulfilment is only possible to the extent that one transcends every form of unity, which continuously characterizes knowledge, even in its highest form as intellectual contemplation. At the same time it is determined through its intentionality: it is always directed towards what it wishes to thematically perceive. This intentionality of Thought is first made possible through its anticipation of unity, which therefore precedes its intentionality; at the same time it endows Thought with the structure of a unity in divisive-ness, which is fundamental for our entire objective consciousness. Therefore, in order to perceive something thematically, we must think of what has been perceived as the unity of something determined; as what is determined, however, is not simply one, rather it is at the same time differentiated from the Thought perceiving it and from all other determined things. The thematic perception of something is always the perception of something that is differentiated from the perceiver himself within a horizon of determinations, in which the perceived is first constituted as one determinate thing, through being delimited from other determinate things appearing in the same horizon.5 I grasp something always as “this and not that”; therefore I grasp it at the same time as being determined but also as different from myself. The intentionality of thought for this reason leads to the self-division of Intellect into thinking and thought, knowledge and known, subject and object. This division, however, is not absolute. Therefore I can only grasp something when it stands in my horizon and so forms a unity with me.
The thematic perception of something always signifies two things: the differentiation and division of perceiver and thing perceived, as well as the collective comprehension of both in a unity, the unity of a collective horizon. This horizon of unity makes all thematic perception possible, but it makes it possible to the extent that as a mere horizontal unity it contains distinctions in it – in particular the distinction between thing perceived and perceiver. The unitary horizon itself is by this means co-present in all thematic perception, but never thematically as such. Only in noēsis proper, that is, intellectual contemplation, Thought encompasses this whole structure, the object, its horizon and the knowing Self. However, first, it does so in a non-objective or non-objectifying way and, second, the whole structure remains a unity of differentiated elements.
Pure unity beyond all differentiation and beyond all multiplicity is in no way thematically knowable; that is, it can never become the explicit theme of any epistemic thought, because it always transcends the unitary form of knowledge, the unity with differentiation in itself, which also constitutes noesis. It itself therefore does not know about itself, it does not know or think itself, because this would already be a division of unity in itself and therefore a removal of the absolute or pure unity of the One itself (Enn. VI.9[9].6.42–52; VI.7[38].38–9). However, according to Plotinus that does not mean that it is unattainable for us. As the absolute basis of all unity, which first allows every unity in differentiation, the One rather is ever-present to us (Enn. VI.9[9].8.33–45); however, in a presence which is higher and prior to all knowledge. Prior to knowledge is Thought’s anticipation of unity, which first allows all knowledge and consciousness; in this original anticipation of unity the One in us is actual. In order to notice the operative presence of the One in us, we must therefore take back the intentionality of our consciousness, in which the unity of Intellect becomes divided, to the original anticipation of unity, which makes all Thought possible, without itself being saturated Thought or the thematic perception of anything. This original unity in our thought, which precedes all self-differentiation, “the First of Intellect” (Enn. VI.9[9].3.27), is that in us in which and through which the Absolute is present for us; Proclus refers to it as “the One in us” (to en hemin hen, in Prm. 1072.8) (see Beierwaltes 1979: 367–82).
We notice the presence of the Absolute, when we turn back to undifferentiated unity, which is the basis of our thought, so that we in no way step outside of unity, as already occurs, when we attempt to thematize it as a unity: “But when the soul wants to see by itself, seeing it only by being with it and being one by being one with it, it does not think it yet has what it seeks, because it is not different from what is being thought” (Enn. VI.9[9].3.10–13). The experience of unity with the Absolute is then not a conscious act, in which the Absolute would be thematically conscious of us, but, as the retraction of the Intentionality constituting all thematic consciousness into the unity antecedent to all differentiation, it remains prior to consciousness. As the most intensive experience of unity, however, it is not unconscious and not less, but rather more than all consciousness: Plotinus refers to it as “something like being awake (hoion egregoris) when the wakener was not someone else, a wakefulness and a thought transcending thought (hypernoesis) … his waking transcends substance and intellect and intellectual life” (Enn. VI.8[39].16.31–4).
The self-perception of the unity of Thought in intellectual contemplation includes the knowledge that it is the anticipation of the undifferentiated pure unity, the anticipation of the absolute One, which first makes possible Thought as a unity: “But he who has learnt to know himself will know from whence he comes” (Enn. VI.9[9].7.33), “for in turning to itself it turns to its principle” (Enn. VI.9[9].2.35–6). In order to experience the presence of the One, the premise is the withdrawal of the intentionality of Thought and Vision into that most original unity in Thought, which first makes all Thought possible. This, however, is itself no longer Thought, but the basis for it. The Intellect, which withdraws to its own original and simple unity, is no longer self-conscious Intellect, but rather only a pure, pre-and supra-conscious implementation of unity: “ignoring all things (as it did formerly in self-perception but then in the realm of Forms) and even ignoring itself, it comes to be in the contemplation of that One” (Enn. VI.9[9].7.18–21).
Plotinus also speaks of a “loving Intellect” (nous erōn), which he distinguishes from the “thinking” or “rational” Intellect (nous emphronos, Enn. VI.7[38].35). Love, eros, is a longing for unity, which is prior to all attaining thematic consciousness of something; it is the longing for undifferentiated unity, since it reaches fruition as a fusion with the beloved in an indistinguishable unity, which obliterates all differentiation. At the same time, love as the free transcendence over itself is the traction towards transcendence, which leads to self-transcendence. The “loving Intellect” is the Intellect which transcends all otherness and therefore all intentionality of Thought, which removes itself to the undifferentiated simple unity which is the basis for all Thought. The Intellect which reverts to its original unity is no longer Intellect, but rather only simple, pure unity. Since pure unity excludes every otherness from itself or from others, it is no longer distinguished from the Absolute when therefore there is no otherness, the things which are not other are present to each other: “That One, therefore, since it has no otherness is always present, and we are present to it when we have no otherness; and the One does not desire us, so as to be around us, but we desire it, so that we are around it. And we are always around it, but do not always look to it” (Enn. VI.9[9].8.32–5).
This glance at the Absolute, whose presence first renders us possible, on account of which it is inalienable from us, is not an intentional seeing but rather an undifferentiated union with the Absolute which extinguishes the distinction between both, “for it was not really seen but united to him” (Enn. VI.9[9].11.5–6).
But perhaps one should not say “will see” but “was seen”, if one must speak of these two, the seer and the seen, and not both as one – a bold statement. So then the seer does not see and does not distinguish and does not imagine two, but it is as if he had become someone else and he is not himself and does not count as his own there (in absolute transcendence), but has come to belong to that (the Absolute) and so is one, having joined centre to centre.
(Enn. VI.9[9].10.12–17)
Therefore, the union is also inexpressible (dysphraston, Enn. VI.9[9].10.19), because language in its differentiated structure fundamentally fails to match the experience of undifferentiated, absolute unity. Therefore everything which can be said about it is a dark inkling and mere hints about what is really unsayable (Enn. VI.9[9].11.27).
The union with the Absolute is at the same time the most exalted experience of transcendence: it reaches “by transcending everything (tō hyperbanti panta) absolute transcendence” (Enn. VI.9[9].11.35). This includes the transcendence of the Self “and he himself was not there … but he was as if carried away or possessed by a god (enthousiasmos) in a quiet solitude and a state of calm (eremos)” (Enn. VI.9[9].11.11–13). The union is therefore no longer a vision, but rather a stepping out of oneself (ekstasis), a radically simplifying transformation (haplōsis) to absolute simplicity and a total dedication of oneself (epidosis hautou) to absolute transcendence (Enn. VI.9[9].11.23). This transcendence of the self, however, is not a rejection of the self, but rather the surpassing fulfilment of the search for Self: transcending the Soul comes “not at something else, but to itself, and in this way since it is not in something else, it will not be in nothing but in itself, but when it is in itself alone and not in being, it is in that, for one becomes not substance but beyond substance” (Enn. VI.9[9].11.38–42).
The most original, undifferentiatedly simple unity in the foundation of our thought, in which the Absolute beyond Being is present, is as such not Being, but rather transcendence above Being. It is the basis of our Self, for which reason its transcendence above Being is not the extinction of selfhood, but rather its fulfilment. The Self, which transcended all determination of Thought and therefore also Being, steps out of itself, because as an undifferentiated pure unity, it is no longer the Self, but rather nothing as a pure unity and for this very reason it is one with the One itself. In this experience of absolute transcendence, what transcends reaches its goal as an “escape in solitude to the solitary” (Enn. VI.9[9].11.51), as is expressed by the famous concluding formula with which Plotinus’ programmatic treatise On the Good or the One ends. Having started from the One as the ground of existence and essence – the Good from which Being springs – we have now arrived at the One as the ultimate goal of Thought – the Good as the end to which Thought finally returns.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The editors are most grateful to Carl O’Brien for translating this essay from German, with the assistance of Thomas Arnold and Tolga Ratzsch.
NOTES
1. Unless otherwise noted, translations of the Enneads are by Armstrong (1966–88), occasionally modified.
2. “Thought” is capitalized here and throughout the article for the following reasons. The everyday term “thought” (a) is wide enough regarding the kind of activity subsumed under it (over and against the more narrow “intellect”), and (b) implies activity rather than being a faculty or property (unlike “mind” or – again – “intellect”). However, usually as we employ the term “thought” we still conceive of it as an activity of someone (a person) or something, i.e. some active entity behind the activity of thought itself, some subject. In capitalizing the term we keep the conceptual width and the dimension of activity, but want to draw attention to the fact that we are dealing with “pure” thought in Plotinus.
3. Plotinus also appeals to Plato, namely to the negative dialectic of the first hypothesis of his Prm. 137c–142a; see Halfwassen (1992: 298–405), Dodds (1928), Horn (1995b).
4. On this passage, see also Aubry (Chapter 20) below.
5. Applying the notion of horizon in this context is no illegitimate usage of modern terminology; cf. Hinske (1974).