From Alexander of Aphrodisias to Plotinus
PORPHYRY ON PLOTINUS’ USE OF HIS SOURCES
In his Life of Plotinus Porphyry lists the authors who were read in the school of Plotinus and includes “Alexander” among the Peripatetics who were studied (Plot. 14.13).1 Most scholars identify this figure as Alexander of Aphrodisias, although there are other candidates.2 This chapter will, in any case, offer internal evidence for Plotinus’ specific engagement with the text of Alexander. Earlier, in the beginning of the same chapter, Porphyry cautions us as to Plotinus’ use of such texts:
In writing he is concise and full of thought. He puts things shortly and abounds more in ideas than in words; he generally expresses himself in a tone of rapt inspiration, and states what he himself really feels about the matter and not what has been handed down by tradition. His writings, however, are full of concealed Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines.
(Plot. 1. 14.1–5)3
Clearly, Porphyry would convince us that Plotinus absorbs his erudition into his own broad philosophical vision. Concerning Longinus, Plotinus observes: “Longinus is a scholar (philologos) but certainly not a philosopher (philosophos)” (Plot. 14.19–20). As his story of Plotinus’ criticism of Longinus reveals, Porphyry clearly sees Plotinus as more the philosopher than the philologist. This preference for philosophy over philology on the part of Plotinus accords well with his original, creative and philosophical attitude towards his sources. Scholars have expressed a range of opinion that varies from great optimism to extreme scepticism in seeking the sources of Plotinus in Alexander (see Schroeder 1984: 240–42; Sharples 1987: 1220–23).
A CRUX IN ALEXANDER DE ANIMA 88.26–89.6
On a minimal interpretation of the notoriously difficult chapter, de Anima 3.5., Aristotle sees in play in his noetic doctrine the categories of potency and act that are at work in his ontology.4 The Active Intellect (or Productive Intellect) acts as the efficient cause for potential intelligibles to become actual intelligibles, even as light is the efficient cause for colours to change from being potential colours to being actual colours. Some are convinced that Aristotle may have had in mind the analogy of the sun and the Good in Republic 508a4–509b10 where, even as the sun is the cause of both being and being visible to the visible objects in the sensible world, so is the Good the cause both for being and for being intelligible in the intelligible realm.5 We shall be asking whether Alexander and Plotinus interpret de Anima 3.5. with reference to the Platonic analogy.
We shall, later in this chapter, be examining the influence on Plotinus of Alexander’s understanding of the Aristotelian Active Intellect and the analogy of light. We shall begin our study of Alexander’s reception of the Active Intellect together with the analogy of light in Aristotle with the presentation of an important crux of interpretation. It is important to keep in mind that Alexander, in exploring the role of the Active Intellect in causation, concentrates on the Active Intellect, not as intellect, but as intelligible.
At de Anima 88.26–89.6 Alexander states a general principle:
For in all things that which is especially (malista) and eminently (kyriōs) what it is is the cause for other things of being such as they are. For that which is especially visible, such as light, is the cause for other things of their being visible and that which is especially and primarily good is the cause for other good things of their being good. For other things are judged good by their contribution (synteleiai) to this. Indeed that which is especially and by its own nature intelligible is, it is reasonable to maintain, the cause of intellection of other [intelligibles]. Such an entity would be the Active Intellect.6
Merlan remarks:
The causal relation is of the type “whatever is eminently some kind of being imparts this kind of being to everything which is less eminently the same kind of being”…. It is obvious that Alexander presents a very particular type of causation. It is as close to what is causality in Neoplatonism as possible.
(1969: 38–9)
Moraux (1942: 90–92) argues that this principle of causation is well expressed by the medieval maxim: Propter quod alia, id maximum tale (“that on account of which other things possess a certain quality itself holds that quality supereminently”). This maxim he misconstrues to mean that that which holds a quality supereminently is the cause of that quality in something else. As A. C. Lloyd (1976: 150) properly observes: “Alexander was not at that point trying to prove the existence of something supremely intelligible.” Thus Alexander is not reasoning from the existence of, for example, good things to the necessary existence of a supreme good. Rather he is assuming the existence of that principle (e.g. a supreme good) and stating that all other goodness is to be derived from it. The statement is not a conclusion, but a premiss, of argument. Moraux, in misinterpreting the maxim, correctly interprets the passage at hand (Schroeder 1981: 222). The doctrine expressed by the formula that that which holds a quality supereminently is the cause of that quality in other things is, in any case, to be found in Aristotle and hence need not be regarded as Platonic.7
It is significant that in the case of goodness Alexander adds the rider: “Other things are judged good by their contribution (synteleia) to this.” This addition is significant because it represents a departure from the apparent monism of causation in the passage. The effect contributes to its causation. Donini sees Alexander here as applying a contribution of good things to the Good that is not accorded to a contribution by visible things to visibility or intelligibles to intelligibility. He thinks that Alexander shrinks from the Platonism of positing a supreme Good from which all goods are derived by participation. He sees such contribution as modifying the principle that that which is eminently what it is is the cause of that quality in something else. Alexander is distancing himself from Middle Platonism (Donini 1974: 46–8). If we may rescue Alexander from the charge of special pleading, that is, that he is advancing the argument concerning contribution on the part of good things to goodness simply in order to dissociate himself as an Aristotelian from Platonism, we should do so.
To understand the contribution on the part of good things to the Good it is germane first to enquire why anyone would wish to see Platonic (let alone Middle Platonic or Neoplatonic) overtones in this passage. Let us for the moment confine ourselves to the passage’s account of goodness (de An. 89.2–4) (Merlan [1969: 38–9] focuses upon the instances of visibility and intelligibility). We are aware that Aristotle criticized the Good of Plato’s Republic on the grounds that “good”, since it is predicable in different senses in different categories, cannot serve as a genus in which other goods participate. Therefore the Good cannot function as the formal cause of goodness.8
Bergeron and Dufour properly, in their commentary on Alexander’s de Anima, argue that, while the Good may not be the formal cause of goodness, it is the final cause.9 If this is the case, we need discover no Platonism in the present passage. To put it another way, Aristotle is not rejecting the Idea of the Good (he equates the Good with the God of Metaphysics 12),10 but is identifying the Good as the final cause.11 While Bergeron and Dufour elsewhere consistently translate synteleia as “contribution”, and the verb syntelein as “contribute”, they in this instance elect to translate the noun as “association”, as in a community organized around a common goal (de An. 89.4) (Bergeron & Dufour 2008: 349–50). Even in this case, there is surely “contribution” of some kind: the members of the community must contribute something to their common good. As I remark in my review of their commentary:
Alexander argues that, whereas the lower phases of the soul exist for the sake of survival, the disposition (hexis) of intellection contributes (suntelei) not to survival, but to well-being (81.15–16). Thus the hexis of intellection is judged good by its contribution to goodness. Also, by stating that language contributes to the best social life for man, Alexander is claiming that in this way it is being evaluated for its contribution to goodness (49.23–5; cf. 93.17–20 for a similar use of synergein and contribution to goodness). What is more, it would seem that contribution is an important theme in Alexander’s psychology generally. Alexander states (75.24–6) that each lower stage of soul contributes (syntelein) and has as its end the higher state that develops from it.
(Schroeder 2010: 85)
Bergeron and Dufour (2008: 350) contend that their translation of synteleia as “association” is supported by Aristotle, Metaphysics 1075a11–22. There Aristotle asks whether the good exists as something self-sufficient, or whether it is immanent in the order of the universe, or both. It is both, as in the instance of an army: the good is present both in the order of the army and in the general, but especially in the general (as source of order). All things “are ordered together (syntetaktai) toward one thing” (Metaph. 1075a18–19). It is of interest that Pseudo-Alexander glosses syntetaktai with the verb suntelein, not in the sense of “association”, but of “contribution” towards the completion of the cosmos on the part of components that are not equal in dignity (in Metaph. 715.8–9).12 From this discussion we may see that the appropriate translation of synteleia at Alexander, de Anima 89.4 is not “association”, but “contribution”.
Aristotle’s example of the general and the army would well illustrate Alexander’s concept of contribution. The general is eminently good (at victory). The soldiers are also good in a lesser degree. Yet they make their own contribution towards victory. In the psychological hierarchy of Alexander, each phase contributes to the good of the higher phase. The notion of contribution also sits well with the idea that the supreme good is not the formal, but the final, cause of goodness. The soldier (or the lower phase in the hierarchy of soul) aspires to and contributes towards the finis or goal of goodness. Alexander’s use of synteleia may owe a debt to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics I.4.1096b29 where Aristotle, maintaining that “good” is not a univocal term, yet seeks a commonality of meaning whereby things are good by contributing to the good as one end.13 Thus Alexander’s use of synteleia in the sense of “contribution” is compatible with the view that the Good is final cause.
Yet Aristotle shows himself to be a Platonist.14 While he rejects the Good as formal cause, he does recognize the same transcendent and metaphysical principle as final cause. Thus he applies to the Good his own classification of causes: clearly the Good is neither a material nor an efficient cause. Since it is not the formal cause, it remains for it to be the final cause as indeed it is. Thus Aristotle accepts the Platonic Good as adapted to his own philosophy. As was noted above, scholars have seen the analogy of the Active Intellect to light in Aristotle, de An. 3.5 as drawing its inspiration from the analogy of the sun to the Good in Republic 508a4–509b10.15 Alexander in following Aristotle on the Good as final cause is, like Aristotle, a faithful Platonist. However, there is nothing in this passage that would invite us to see anything that is (in the words of Merlan) “as close to what is causality in Neoplatonism as possible”.16
ALEXANDER ON THE PHYSICS OF ILLUMINATION
Aristotle defines light as the act of the diaphanous qua diaphanous. The diaphanous is that which is, like air, water or transparent solids, visible, not in itself, but through the colour of something else. Colour, which is by nature visible, sets in motion that which is diaphanous in act. Aristotle speaks also of another visible object which, he says, shall remain nameless, but is clearly phosphorescence (de An. 2.7.418a27–8; 419a2–6). Light is not a body and is not an emanation from a body, either fire or another luminous body, but is the presence (parousia) of fire or something like fire in the diaphanous (de An. 2.7.418a26–418b17).
As we have seen, Alexander, in drawing the analogy of the Active Intellect to light in Aristotle, de An. 3.5, says that light, which is eminently visible, is the cause of visibility for other things (89.1–2). To understand the analogy of light, it is surely worthwhile to explore what Alexander says, not about light as the term of an analogy, but about natural light itself in the process of illumination. In pages 42–4 Alexander explores the physics of light. Alexander here, in the treatment of the physics of light, as in his analogy of light, says that light, which is supremely visible, is the cause for other things of their being visible (44.13–15). (There are some objects, such as the divine body, fire and phosphorescent objects, that are by nature luminous.17 We shall define “illumination”, for the purposes of the present discussion, as a process in which a source of light illumines an object that is not itself a source of light.)18
The sensible objects that belong to sight are colours and objects that can be seen in the dark (e.g. phosphorescent objects). The latter are not properly colours because they do not fit the definition of colours as that which may move the diaphanous in act. We translate the word diaphanes as “diaphanous” or “transparent”. Examples of diaphanous objects are air, water and such solids as do not contain their own colour, but when moved by colours can serve as a medium through which vision may perceive colours. These become diaphanous objects when they are illumined (42.4–11).
Alexander then considers the question of how colour comes to be in light and light comes to be in the diaphanous (42.19–43.4). He begins with a negative statement: light is not an emanation. This denial doubtless springs from the conviction that light is incorporeal, as he explains at 43.11. (Both in his view that light is not an emanation and that it is incorporeal he follows Aristotle, de An. 2.7.418b13–17.) However, in addition to the denial of corporeality, Alexander is thereby rejecting the hypothesis that light is the effect uniquely of its source. He also denies that light is the form, the diaphanous the matter, of illumination, so that the diaphanous as matter would receive the light as its form. Similarly, colour is not the form that is received by the diaphanous in act as the matter that would receive that form (42.18–22).
Alexander then offers a proof that light is neither an emanation nor a formal cause. He says that “when those things are withdrawn” that cause colour and light to be in the diaphanous, then colour and light also disappear. We may suppose the reasoning to be: if light is an emanation, then we might expect something luminous to remain after withdrawal of the source of illumination (as something remains heated if fire is withdrawn). If light is the form of the diaphanous, then that form would abide after its causes were removed. Let us examine more closely the phrase “when those things are withdrawn”.19 What is included in “those things”? Alexander specifies that if that which illumines20 is not present, then light disappears from the diaphanous and if those things that induce colour21 are withdrawn, then colour retires from the diaphanous. He later says that light comes about in the diaphanous by the presence (parousia) of fire or the divine body.22 This presence he interprets in terms of relation (schesis):23 for, he argues, light comes about through the relation between the source of illumination and the illumined object. For light is incorporeal, and for this reason the generation of light is atemporal (43.8–11). It would seem reasonable to conclude that “those things” include both the source of illumination and the source of colour.
Having rejected the hypotheses concerning emanation and formal cause, Alexander says that light comes about in the diaphanous because there is a certain change (tis … kinesis) from both.24 By “both” he means both the source of light and the source of colour.25 Alexander proceeds to specify that the change in question is in accordance with presence construed as relation (as we have seen, relation between the source of illumination and the illumined object [the diaphanous]).
Alexander offers an example: it is on the same model that things are seen in mirrors. The mirror would qualify as exemplifying the definition that the diaphanous solid is without its own colour (42.7–8). The mirror (qua reflecting surface, not qua its material substrate) borrows colours from other things. When someone stands before the mirror, that person is the source of light and colour. The mirror is the diaphanous object that receives light and colour. A sort of change arises from the presence of the sources of light and colour. As we have seen, the presence of the source is construed in terms of relation. This means, of course, that the source of light is a necessary, but not a sufficient cause of illumination because illumination proceeds from the presence of the source in accordance with the relation between the source and the illumined object.
Illumination then produces a “kind of change” (tis … kinesis) in the illumined objects. The only kind of change that we can imagine here would be qualitative change (since it cannot be a change of size or place).26 Yet Alexander, as we have seen, qualifies “change” here as “a kind of change”. The qualifying tis (“kind of”) indicates that he cannot be content simply with qualitative change.
The reason for this discontent is revealed from a study of texts beyond Alexander’s de Anima, the in de Sensu and the “How according to Aristotle sight comes about”. In Alexander, in de Sensu (132.2–6),27 we read:
For air and the diaphanous are not illumined through change (kinesis), but all at once the diaphanous and the illumined come about from that which is potentially diaphanous and illumined, passing from a state of not having to a condition of having, not through receiving and being affected (kineisthai). For it is by relation (schesis) and presence of the source of light toward that which is by nature to be illumined that light is brought about.
Alexander further contrasts the illumination brought about by this relation with the causation of sound and scent both of which require a transition (diadosis) and change (kinesis) taking place in time (132.14–15). The kinesis that is excluded here is an alteration that takes place over time through a medium (sc. air). When Alexander at de Anima 43.1–2 speaks of illumination as tis kinesis the function of the indefinite pronoun is to exclude communication through a medium over a length of time. We should recall that Aristotle says of light at de An. 2.7.418b14–17 that it is “neither fire nor corporeal at all, nor an emanation from any body (for it would in that case be a kind of body), but the presence of fire or something of that nature in the transparent”. Alexander remarks at de Anima 42.20–21 that light is not an emanation from a source of light. The incorporeal nature of light forbids that light be transmitted through a corporeal medium. Alexander in the de Anima 43.10–11 says: “For it is in relation to the source which is capable of illumining and those things that are capable of being illumined that light is. For light is not a body” (cf. Schroeder & Todd 2008: 665). Illumination then produces a kind of change (tis kinesis) in the illumined objects. Since light is incorporeal, change cannot be transmitted either through space or in time, but must take place all at once.
There is another text which Accattino and Donini (1996: 181–2) think, because of its affinities with the in de Sensu, may reflect the thought of Alexander: the treatise in the de Anima Mantissa entitled “How according to Aristotles sight comes about” (143.4–18) also denies that illumination and visibility require an alteration (alloiōsis) defined as a change that comes about in time and involves a transition. Illumination rather comes about by the presence (parousia) of the luminous source and its relation (schesis) with the illumined object. The relationship is compared to that of two objects that are externally, but not internally, related (being on the left of or being on the right of). We have seen that in the in de Sensu sight and sound involve a communication over distance and in time. The in de Sensu excludes light from such communication. Doubtless the intent of this treatise is also to exclude such communication (Accattino & Donini 1996: 181–2). Sharples (2004: 127) is of the view that the relationship described by the imagery of being on the left or on the right would signify a “Cambridge change”; that is, a change in which the externally related objects (the source of light and the illumined object) would remain unaffected.
Significantly, in the passage which we discussed above in which Alexander considers the presence of light in terms of relation (de An. 42.19–43.11), Alexander uses the image of mirrors. If the source of light and colour (in this case reflection) is removed, there is no illumination (reflection). Now the word katoptron can refer not just to a mirror as artefact, but to any reflective surface (Schroeder 1980: 55 n. 58). The mirror or reflective surface is not altered qua bronze, silver, water, and so on, but qua reflective surface. So when Alexander speaks of how the illumined object is not affected by the illumination, he does not mean that there is no effect. Rather, the reflective surface is changed in the sense that when the object before the mirror stands in a relation with the reflective surface, that surface reflects the source of the reflection. This same pattern of relation will apply to instances of illumination other than reflection. We also need not think that illumination is the relation between the source and the illumined object (see further Schroeder & Todd 2008: 666). Rather, that relationship is the condition of illumination taking place.
We are now in a position to see why Alexander refers to the change that takes place as “a kind of change” (tis … kinesis, de An. 43.1–3). To speak, for example, of qualitative change would entail a contradiction of the denial that illumination involves kinesis in the in de Sensu. This denial applies to the corporeal substrate of illumination. Yet the surface of the substrate allows illumination to take place without any change to the substrate itself. The pronoun tis is introduced in order to show that some kind of change is taking place, namely in the case of mirrors, what is being reflected, for example, now one person, then another (considered as sources of reflection in colour and illumination).28
Alexander also says that when something can in act (kat’ energeian) appear through (diaphainisthai) what is diaphanous, then the diaphanous is eminently what it is and achieves its perfection (teleiotes) and native form from light as far as it is diaphanous (43.5–8). This statement implies that the diaphanous is not just eminently visible when it is illumined, but confers visibility on things that are seen through it. Thus light, when it comes to be in the diaphanous, confers illumination on everything in its field that is capable of being illumined. As we have seen, the diaphanous cannot be a medium in the sense in which air is a medium through which sound or scent are communicated over a distance and through an interval of time. Light is incorporeal and exists as pure activity (energeia).
We have seen that Alexander gives as examples of the diaphanous transparent things, air, water and solids that do not have their own colour. Later he extends the definition of the diaphanous to things that have their own colour. Every body that is receptive of colour shares more or less in the quality we call “diaphanous” (44.20–21, cf. 45.5–19). With this extension of the term, “diaphanous” would seem to mean not simply “transparent”, but “capable of being illumined or of appearing in the diaphanous medium”
Furthermore, there are two kinds of the diaphanous. The first is indefinite, and light is the act of the indefinite diaphanous qua diaphanous (44.13–15). The second is definite and its limit is colour. There are, in the case of objects that have a definite diaphanous character, two limits, one qua physical object, the surface, and another limit qua coloured, which is colour (45.20–46.1; cf. Aristotle, Sens. 3.439a28–33). Alexander also establishes a hierarchy among diaphanous objects. The source of light (e.g. fire) is white and white is the colour of light at its purest. That white becomes mingled with other colours in the diaphanous medium. In objects with their own colour, the presence of earth can impede the purity and luminosity of colour (45.5–19). So in the diaphanous there are hierarchical distinctions based on purity. We may ask whether the expansion of the definition of “diaphanous” leaves it lacking in meaning.
Generally there seem to be a number of contradictions in Alexander’s account of the physics of light. We shall see that Plotinus sees these contradictions as arising from Alexander’s failure to think through properly the consequences of the incorporeal character of light. If light is incorporeal and not transmitted through air or some other diaphanous medium, then why is there need for a diaphanous medium at all? And why compound the problem by expanding the definition of “diaphanous” to that which is capable of appearing through a diaphanous medium? Alexander interprets the presence (parousia) of the source of illumination in terms of the relationship (schesis) between the source of illumination and the illumined object. According to my interpretation (which resists the notion of “Cambridge change”), the word “relation” (schesis) does describe a spatial relation between the source of light and the illumined object: if I am correct in this, why should location be so important for the generation of an entity that is incorporeal and timeless? (Plotinus, as we shall see, regards light as the act of a luminous body qua luminous [i.e. not qua corporeal] directed externally.)
PLOTINUS ON THE PHYSICS OF ILLUMINATION
Plotinus says (Enn. IV.5[29].6.27–3129): “But, just as life, being an activity (energeia), is activity of the soul (psychēs … energeia), and if something, body for instance, is there, it is affected, but life also exists if this something is not there, what would prevent this being so also in the case of light, if it is a kind of activity?” In the case of life, that is an activity of the soul, life abides whether the body lives or dies (cf. Enn. IV.5[29].7.55–60). So the illumined object is immaterial to the existence of light. If the object is illumined, then it is illumined, but light remains an activity that is independent of the object being illumined. The context is provided by a discussion of whether air is necessary to the existence of light. Since light is essentially an activity, it does not require air as a medium (Enn. IV.5[29].6.1–17). We may note that Plotinus’ position is opposite to that of Alexander, who uses air as an example of the diaphanous, and that for Alexander, light is the act of the diaphanous qua diaphanous. Clearly for Plotinus the diaphanous, while it may be illumined, is not essential to the existence of light. This is his argument:
But the activity within the luminous body, which is like its life, is greater and is a kind of source and origin of its [outward] activity; that which is outside the limits of the body, an image of that within, is a second activity which is not separated from the first. For each thing that exists has an activity which is a likeness of itself, so that while it exists that likeness exists, and while it stays in its place the likeness goes far out.
(Enn. IV.5[29].7.13–19)
Thus the emanation of a second activity from the primal activity of its source is an expression of a more general principle.30
Despite his principal disagreement with Alexander, Plotinus expresses his view on light in language that is reminiscent of what we have already encountered in Alexander:
The light from bodies, therefore, is the external activity of a luminous body; but the light in bodies of this kind, bodies, that is, which are primarily and originally of this kind, is altogether substance, corresponding to the form of the primarily luminous body. When a body of this kind together with its matter enters into a mixture, it gives colour; but the activity by itself does not give colour, but only, so to speak, tints the surface, since it belongs to something else and is, one might say, dependent on it, and what separates itself from this something else and is, one might say, dependent on it, and what separates itself from this something else separates itself from its activity. But one must consider light as altogether incorporeal, even if it belongs to a body. Therefore “it has gone away”31 or “it is present”32 are not used of it in their proper sense, but in a different way, and its real existence is as an activity. For the image in a mirror must also be called an activity: That which is reflected in it acts on what is capable of being affected without flowing into it; but if the object reflected is there, the reflection too appears in the mirror and it exists as an image of a coloured surface shaped in a particular way; and if the object goes away, the mirror-surface (to diaphanes) no longer has what it had before, when the object seen in it offered itself to it for its activity.
(Enn. IV.5[29].7.33–49)
We can see that Plotinus and Alexander agree that light is incorporeal (even if it is derived from a body). Yet Alexander defines light as the perfection of the diaphanous qua diaphanous. This is not the case for Plotinus, for whom light is the procession of light as a secondary act derived from the primary act of the luminous body. Alexander denies that light is an emanation or efflux from fire or the divine body. In this he is, as we have seen, avoiding the implication that light is corporeal. For Plotinus light does flow from its source, but in such a way that corporeality is avoided (even if the luminous body from which it proceeds is corporeal). Light as secondary activity flows from the primary activity of the source. For Alexander, illumination is caused by the presence (parousia) of the source of light in accordance with the relation (schesis) of the source of light and the object of illumination. Whereas Alexander then, in seeking to avoid the corporeal character of light, denies that it is an emanation from a source of light, Plotinus, while also denying that light is bodily, affirms that light is an emanation from a luminous source.
The words “when a body of this kind enters into a mixture …” (Enn. IV.5[29].7.37–8) are rather opaque. Plotinus is distinguishing between (a) the internal activity of the luminous body; (b) the secondary activity of light that proceeds from the luminous body; and (c) the product of the secondary activity. What, we may ask, enters into a mixture with what? At Enn. IV.5[29].7.49–62 Plotinus says that life flows from the upper soul. He then entertains the question of whether the life in the body (distinct from these activities of soul) is not the product of the activity of life, rather than that activity itself? Similarly, the light that is mixed with bodies is a product distinct from the light that flows from the luminous source. The products of illumination may disappear but not the activities that make them. Now the light that is the first and internal act of the luminous body is the essence of the luminous body qua luminous body. Yet the body is, apart from being a luminous body, a body with matter that can be “mixed up with” other bodies in the sense that it causes them to be illumined. As such it gives colour. By this Plotinus must mean that the light itself is without colour, but the body qua body (not qua luminous body) conveys colour. Thus a red rose placed in front of a mirror conveys the light from the source that illumines it into the mirror. But the colour red it possesses qua body, and this colour appears per accidens in the mirror. So Plotinus is uncomfortable with “gives colour”. It rather tints the surface of the illumined object. The secondary light that proceeds from the illumined body is in no way affected. The tint on the surface of the illumined body is absent from33 the secondary act of illumination. Thus Plotinus does not accord to colour the importance attached to it in Alexander, for whom it is that which renders light visible (see § “Alexander on the physics of illumination” above). He also avoids the apparently contradictory notion that colours can be transparent by the fact of appearing through a diaphanous medium.
In the case of reflection, Plotinus begins by saying that the image of the figure that causes the appearance in the mirror is an activity which proceeds from its cause without (corporeal) emanation. Yet because light is incorporeal, the words “it has gone away” (apelelythe, Enn. IV.5[29].7.42; cf. Alexander, de An. 43.22–3: apelthontōn; synaperchetai; apelthoi) and “it is present” (parestin, Enn. IV.5[29].7.42; cf. Alexander, de An. 43.1: pareie) are not appropriate. The presence of the source is not, as in Alexander, defined in terms of its relation with the object to be illumined. When the figure that causes the appearance in the mirror is removed, the image does not appear. Yet the secondary activities of light and reflection continue and the light is not cut off from its source. When Plotinus says that the image of the figure that causes the image is an activity, what he means is that that figure is projecting an image whether there is a mirror there to receive it or not. This idea expresses the more general notion of emanation that everything that exists projects an external activity that is an image of itself. Yet the tincture of colour on the surface of the mirror is cut off from that activity, however much it is dependent upon it. It is a product of that activity. Similarly, the light that proceeds from the luminous body qua luminous is projected whether or not it illumines a body as object of illumination.
The presence of the source in Plotinus is not defined in terms of its relation to the illumined object. The presence of the source is defined in terms of the secondary activity of illumination that proceeds from itself as primary activity. If something is thereby illumined, then it is illumined. Thus when a person (as source of light and colour) steps away from the mirror, the image in the mirror disappears. This does not mean that the image no longer exists. On the general principle stated above, everything that exists projects such an image of itself. Like Alexander, Plotinus speaks of what happens when the source of light, colour or reflection “goes away”. Yet the only relevance of the presence or absence of the mirror is to whether that image appears. Similarly for illumination in general, presence (or absence) do not interfere with illumination as such, only whether this or that object is illumined. Alexander’s account of illumination has two elements: (a) the definition of light; and (b) an account of the genesis of light. For Plotinus these two elements coincide. For Alexander, with reference to the second element, the object of illumination is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for illumination. In this sense, the object of illumination makes its own contribution to illumination.34 For him the source of light is both the necessary and sufficient condition for illumination. In other words, Plotinus entertains a monistic, and Alexander a dualistic, theory of illumination.
THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLECT IN ALEXANDER
In the de Anima Alexander presents an account of the ontogenetic evolution of the human intellect which culminates in the abstraction of intelligible forms from their material substrate. These forms exist in the act of their being thought by the human intellect. On the other hand, he sets forth the view that the Active Intellect (equated with the Aristotelian God of Metaphysics 12), being the supreme intellectual object, is the cause of the existence of the intelligibles. We may seek to reconcile these two apparently contradictory accounts.
The first phase of intellect in Alexander is the potential intellect (dynamei nous) otherwise known as the material intellect (hylikos nous). The description of the first phase as potential intellect would seem to contradict the notion that it is capable of abstracting form from its material substrate, conserving concepts, and knowing. Donini argues, with respect not to the intellect, but to the soul generally, that by dynamis Alexander means not potentiality, but power to do and action in what Aristotle describes as first entelechy (an example of which is knowledge we have when asleep as opposed to the knowledge we actually use when awake) (de An. 2.1.412a–b1) (see Donini 1970; Alexander, de An. 9.15–27; 15.29–16.10; 24.18–25.2). I have applied Donini’s reasoning to the rational soul, showing that by potential intellect Alexander understands not a passive faculty, but a first entelechy. The function (energeia) of reason proceeds as a second from a first entelechy. That Alexander refers to the first phase of intellect as material intellect would also suggest an unwanted passivity. However, the potential intellect is material in the sense that it receives the hexis or fixed disposition of intellection (Schroeder 1982; Alexander, de An. 81.22–82.3). In the case of the irrational soul the terms dynamis and hexis are used interchangeably (Schroeder 1982; Alexander, de An. 26.30–32). In the human being they are separated. All human beings progress to the grasp of the universal and knowledge through synthesis of similar perceptions (koinos nous) (Schroeder 1982; Alexander, de An. 82.26–8; 82.5–15). In the human being, the second stage of intellectual evolution, the hexis or fixed disposition of intellection, is enjoyed by the sage alone.35 The hexis in turn is, in its relation with the third phase, or active intellect, a first entelechy analogous to the person who knows something as contrasted with the second entelechy (the active intellect), analogous to the person who uses that knowledge.36
At de Anima 89.17–18 Alexander boldly equates the Active Intellect of Aristotle, de An. 3.5 with the God of Aristotle, Metaphysics 12 who is “thought of thought” (1074b34–5).37 Alexander argues that the Active Intellect is cause for all the intelligibles:
If there were not something that is intelligible by nature, nothing intelligible would come to be, as has already been remarked. In all cases in which one principle is primarily something and another secondarily, that which is secondarily derives its being from that which is primarily. What is more, if such an Intellect should be the First Cause, which is cause and principle of being for all the others, it would be productive (poietikos) in the sense that it is the cause of being for all the intelligibles.
(Alexander, de An. 89.6–11)
Alexander establishes two classes of intelligible object: transcendent and immanent. The immanent forms are potential intelligible objects and become intelligible objects when the human mind abstracts them from their material substrate. The transcendent form or forms are free of a material substrate and are addressed by the Active Intellect equated with the Aristotelian God (87.24–88.3).38 The phrase “all the intelligibles” includes both immanent and transcendent form.39
We have, then, two accounts of the genesis of immanent intelligible forms. In the first the potential intellect (regarded as first entelechy) abstracts potentially intelligible forms from their material substrate and renders them both existent and intelligible in act. Merlan insists that the immanent intelligibles “exist only in the act of intelligence that abstracts them from their matrix” (Merlan 1967: 118; Alexander, de An. 87.24–88.3). He also observes, “In other words, they exist qua intelligible only in and through the act of intelligizing them” (Merlan 1967: 118; Alexander, de An. 90.2–9; 19–21). In the latter, the cause of intelligibility is that which is supremely intelligible which causes intelligibility in other things by being itself eminently intelligible. So it is that that which is supremely intelligible is by that fact the cause of intelligibility for other things. We may ask how these two accounts are to be reconciled (on which see Sharples 1987: 1207–8).
We shall recall that Alexander says (89.2–4) that that which is eminently good is the cause of goodness for other things. That eminently good principle is not the formal, but the final cause of goodness. Alexander adds that other things are judged good by their contribution (synteleia) to goodness. We saw that the notion of contribution makes great sense in that synteleia describes generally the contribution made by a lower level of the soul to a higher level (75.24–6). The potential intellect is also a phase of the human soul. That phase has its function prepared by sensation as it abstracts forms from matter, compares and conserves them, and knows them. The Active Intellect, engaged in thinking the transcendent forms, is the final cause of the intelligibility and being of the immanent intelligibles. It is so by being eminently intelligible. Yet the ontogenetic evolution of the human soul contributes, phase upon phase, to the intelligibility and existence of the immanent forms. We have seen that the hexis of intellection contributes to goodness by promoting not just survival, but well-being (81.15–16). If we understand intelligibility and the growth of intellect as goods, then we may see how the evolution of intellect contributes to a good end, namely intelligibility. Thus in the cases both of goodness and of intelligibility the principle that that which is eminently p is the cause of p in other things is not compromised by the notion of contribution on the part of other things.
We may return to the case of light. The source of light is inherently both luminous and visible. Yet it also causes luminosity and visibility in an object of illumination when the conditions of presence of the source and relationship between the source and the object of illumination are realized. The illumined object makes its own contribution to illumination in the sense that it is a sine qua non of illumination (of course, this contribution does not follow the pattern of final causation observable in the genesis of goodness and intelligibility). In the analogy of the Active Intellect to light, even as the source of light is inherently luminous and visible, the Active Intellect (equated with God) is inherently intelligible. The conditions of presence and dependence necessary for intellectual illumination are met when the human intellect abstracts forms from matter and, by its progress, brings these forms into the appropriate relationship with the Active Intellect. That omega point of noetic illumination takes place within the human soul.40 We know that light makes colours visible. To colours may correspond the potential intelligibles which, when illumined (in the sense of rendered intelligible), become actually intelligible. The act of intellectual illumination that takes place when the Active Intellect cooperates with the human intellect to render actual the immanent intelligibles manifests efficient causation (in addition to the final causation that we have already discussed). Nyvlt argues that Alexander, in thus presenting efficient as well as final causation, differs from Aristotle, for whom his God operates alone by final causation, and prepares the way for Plotinus for whom the upward path of the soul is final causation, while emanation from the One is efficient causation (Nyvlt 2012: xi, 2, 5, 6, 8, 206, 226, 235, 237–40).
We have seen that intelligibility and goodness are produced by final causation. Yet illumination does not involve final causation. Rather, intellectual illumination intervenes at the end of the progress of the mind towards its final goal to actualize the potential intelligibility of the second order of intelligibles as the human mind abstracts these from matter. Intellectual illumination is a form of efficient causation contextualized by an overall pattern of final causation.
THE ANALOGY OF THE ACTIVE INTELLECT TO LIGHT IN PLOTINUS
Rist is persuaded that Alexander’s identification of the Active Intellect with God would have been attractive for Plotinus.41 In Aristotle, de Anima 3.5.430a12 the Active Intellect functions tōi poiein panta.42 Plotinus may interpret these words to mean “by making (creating) everything”. Such an interpretation may be at work in Enn. VI.8[39].19.16–19: “But he, being principle of substance, did not make (epoiēse) substance for himself but when he had made it left it outside of himself, because he has no need of being, he who made it.” The One, in its production of Intellect, would then function as Active Intellect (Rist 1966b: 90). Since Intellect is the first principle to emanate from the One and everything else goes on to emanate from Intellect, the One “makes everything”.
Plotinus applies the analogy of the sun to the production of Intellect from the One and describes the One as “by its own light bestowing intelligibility on the things that are and on Intellect” (Enn. VI.7[38].16.30–31). The hypostasis of Intellect proceeds from the One as “a radiation from it while it remains unchanged, like the bright light of the sun which, so to speak, runs around it, springing from it continually while it remains unchanged” (Enn. V.1[10].6.28–30). Plotinus goes on to state the principle that everything that exists produces an image of itself as archetype of its existence (Enn. V.1[10].6.30–34). It is in the following chapter that Plotinus states his monistic view of the genesis of natural light. There is then symmetry between the emanation of natural light from its source and the analogy of light in which the Intellect emanates from the One as light from its origin. The One, in producing Intellect, plays a role which is comparable to that of the Active Intellect in Alexander which is the ultimate cause of intellection. Yet the discussion is removed from the sublunary sphere altogether as the one hypostasis begets another as light is generated from the sun. It is significant for the Platonism of Plotinus that, where Alexander engages in an analogy of the Active Intellect to light, Plotinus’ analogy refers to the sun (Plato, R. 6.508a4–509b10). Where Plotinus unites the definition of light and the account of its genesis, Alexander divides them. Plotinus differs also from Alexander in making the source of light its unique cause. For Plotinus, then, the One is the unique cause of everything. By emanation it acts as efficient cause in producing Intellect. It in turn acts as final cause in serving as the goal of our return or conversion to itself.43
We have examined above how Alexander (de An. 88.26–89.6) states the principle that that which is eminently p is the cause of p in other things. It is clear that such a principle does not inform Plotinus’ analogy of the Active Intellect to light. Indeed, the One is not, in its own nature, intelligible (noeton), but is “intelligible for another”,44 that is, the hypostasis of Intellect (Enn. V.6[24].2.10). Generally, the problem in Plotinus is how the One produces that which it does not have (cf. Enn. V.3[49].15.35–6, 7.15.18–20; VI.7[38].17.1–6). Thus Merlan is surely incorrect in the view we examined above that we are in Alexander as close to causality in Neoplatonism as possible (Merlan 1969: 38–9).
There is a suggestion that the role of the One as source of Intellect would be repeated mimetically at lower levels. Thus Plotinus speaks of the intellection of the human soul as a “state (hexis) of the soul, which is one of the things which derive from Intellect” (Enn. I.1[53].8.1–2).45 Here we have Alexander’s word hexis but described not in terms of ontogenetic evolution, but as gained from Intellect which is superior to the soul. Plotinus describes the chain of reality extending from the One to the sensible world as: “like a long life stretched out at length; each part is different from that which comes next in order, but the whole is continuous with itself, but with one part differentiated from another, and the earlier does not perish in the later” (Enn. V.2[11].2.26–9).
Blumenthal comments: “These words are interesting. They contrast with Aristotle’s view that the lower faculties are always present if the higher ones are, and exemplify the different approaches of the two philosophers: Plotinus in discussing any part of this world tends to look down on it from above” (1972: 26 n. 19). We have seen that Aristotle argues against the Platonic Good as the formal cause of goodness by observing that “good” is predicable in different senses in different categories. “Life” is also not predicable in a generic sense as it bears different meanings at different stages of the soul’s development. For Aristotle, focal meaning occupies an intermediate position between synonymy (demanded by generic predication) and equivocation. A p-series of terms predicated by focal meaning demands a pattern of cognitive priority. Thus “healthy” may refer to the maintenance, creation or symptom of health. “Medical” could describe the medical art, the practitioner, his function, his instrument, and so on.46
Plotinus agrees with Aristotle (EN 1.4.1095a18–20; cf. EE 2.10.1219b1–2) that we may equate living well (to eu zen) with well-being (eudaimonia). Where Aristotle’s context is ethical (to live well), Plotinus begins his enquiry in a biological context (to live well). If a creature has the good appropriate to its grade of life, it may be said to live well. Aristotle denies that well-being may be situated lower than humanity because lower stages of life are incapable of contemplation (EN 10.8.1178b20–32). Ultimately Plotinus agrees with this idea. The senses of “good” and “life” are predicated homonymously (in the sense appropriate to pros hen predication) of the various grades of life in the scala naturae. Contemplation, at the summit of this hierarchy, is the truly good life (Enn. I.4[46].1–3). (Plotinus argues [Enn. VI.2[43].17] that the Good is not a genus, but is predicated by focal meaning of different entities within the hierarchy of being).
Plotinus then predicates the words “life” and “good” in a descending p-series which extends from the Good through Intellect and Soul to the sensible world by focal meaning. In this way he meets Aristotle’s critique of the Platonic Good by a use of Aristotelian argument.47 He is, in effect, agreeing with Aristotle that the Good is not the formal cause of goodness because it is predicated in different senses in different categories. The same difference of perspective may be seen as existing between Alexander and Plotinus, with Plotinus looking at Alexander’s world from above.
CONCLUSIONS
The fundamental difference between Plotinus and Alexander is that, where Alexander is a dualist, Plotinus is a monist. The distinction is manifested in their different accounts of the physics of light. It is also at work in their respective epistemologies. It is clearly apparent in Plotinus’ attack on the physics of illumination in Alexander. For Alexander, the presence of the source of light and the relation between the source and the illumined body are both necessary (though each is not in itself sufficient) conditions for the genesis of illumination. In Plotinus the source of light is the sole cause for illumination. It is less clear in the Plotinian response to Alexander’s epistemology. In the dualistic account of Alexander the Active Intellect is, in its cooperation with the human intellect, the efficient cause for the abstraction of form from matter, and the Active Intellect is the final cause of that evolution of the human mind that progresses to that moment. If Alexander is a source for Plotinian epistemology, Plotinus has traced a labyrinthine path from Alexander’s position to his own, which is quite different. In the monistic version of Plotinus, the One (corresponding to the Active Intellect in Alexander) is the efficient cause of Intellect. It is also the final cause of the return of Intellect (and ultimately of our return) to the One. Alexander also differs from Plotinus in that the intelligibility of his highest principle may be predicated (in a lesser degree) of intelligible forms in the sublunary world. For Plotinus his highest principle, while it is the cause of intelligibility, is not in itself intelligible: thus Plotinus accepts a greater degree of transcendence and incommensurability.
NOTES
1. The text of the Life of Plotinus is to be found in volume 1 of Henry & Schwyzer (1964–82), Plotinus: line references are to this text.
2. Becchi (1983: 90) identifies “Alexander” here with Alexander of Aegae who was one of the teachers of Nero and composed commentaries on the Categories and de Caelo of Aristotle. I might suggest another candidate. We have now an inscription for a statue dedicated by Alexander of Aphrodisias to his father Alexander, also a philosopher, from the rich site of Aphrodisias in Caria. On the assumption that Alexander’s father was also a Peripatetic, perhaps the “Alexander” in Porphyry is not the familiar commentator, but his father; for the epigraphic evidence see Chaniotis (2004).
3. Trans. Armstrong. Porphyry’s Life is included in Armstrong’s translation, Plotinus, vol. 1. Translations of Porphyry, Life of Plotinus and Plotinus are taken from Armstrong.
4. References to Alexander, de Anima are to the Bruns edition.
5. Cf. Hicks (1907: 501); Sprague (1972); Moraux accuses Alexander for his lack of Aristotelian orthodoxy in his use of the Platonic analogy: Moraux (1942: 92 n. 2) and Donini (1974: 43 & n. 100).
6. Translations of Alexander are mine.
7. Cf. Metaph.993b24–6; APo 1.2.72a29–30 and Accattino & Donini (1996: 288). For a thorough review cf. Sharples (1987: 1207–8).
8. NE 1.4.1096a17–1097a14 and EE 1.8.1217b1–1218b27.
9. Bergeron & Dufour (2008: 350–51) and especially Aristotle, Metaph.1075a11–15; cf. Accattino & Donini (1996 : 291–2), especially their treatment of EE 1.1218b7–27.
10. Metaph. 1072a26–b1, b10–11, b18–19 & b30–4; 1074b25–6, b33–5 & 1075a8–10; 1075a11–15 & a37, and Bergeron & Dufour (2008: 350–51); cf. Gerson (2005b: 260–61).
11. Metaph.1075a11–35; Bergeron & Dufour (2008: 350–51); cf. Aristotle, Metaph. 983a31–2; 984b11–14; Gadamer (1978: 101; 1986: 174).
12. However, there is no reason to believe that the Ps.-Alexander consulted Alexander’s commentary on Metaphysics 12: see Sharples (2002: 5 and n. 22).
13. πρὸς ἕν ἅπαντα συντελεῖv; cf. Gadamer (1978: 89–90; 1986: 151–2) for the relationship between this passage and the analogy of attribution in Metaphysics 3.2.
14. Much controversy surrounds the question of Aristotle’s Platonism. For bibliography on the question of whether Aristotle is, or is not, a Platonist, see Gerson (2005b: 12–15). Gerson himself affirms the Neoplatonic view that there is a harmony between the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.
15. Cf. note 5 above.
16. Merlan (1969: 38–9). Of course, other schools may share with Platonism the ethical axiom that everything strives for the good. Platonism requires a transcendent or superordinate Good with respect to which all good things are ordered and this principle is adopted by Plato, Aristotle and Alexander. Such a transcendent principle could not be operative in Stoicism because the Stoics reject the Platonic Theory of Forms and refuse to hypostatize universals, cf. Sedley (1985); for a useful treatment of the Stoics on the subject of the good (in its relation to nature), cf. M. Frede (1999).
17. Alexander, de Anima 46.1–6; in de Sensu 45.26–46.3; the treatise “How according to Aristotle sight comes about”, Mantissa 143.35–144.23; Accattino (1992: 58–9).
18. Accattino (1992: 59) (cf. Accattino & Donini 1996: 183) objects to my notion of illumination as a joint effect of the source of light and the illumined object (Schroeder 1981) that it would not explain the luminosity of the source of light itself or of objects that are themselves luminous. However, I am speaking not simply of light, but of illumination in the sense defined above.
19. ἀπελθόντων γοῦν τῶν ταῦτα ἐμποιούντων (de An. 42.22).
20. τὸ φωτίζον (de An. 43.1).
21. τὰ χρώννυντα (de An. 42.23).
22. Cf. Aristotle, de An. 2.7.418b16: πυρὸς ἢ τοιοῦτου τινὸς παρουσία.
23. I wrote (Schroeder 1981: 217–18 n. 11): “παρουσία is interpreted in terms of σχέσις, not vice versa. If παρουσία describes only the presence of source to the product, then σχέσις will be redundant.” I should perhaps have written “to the object of illumination” rather than “to the product”. Accattino (1992: 56 n. 50) interprets me to mean that παρουσία is the more particular, σχέσις the more general term. Accattino prefers to construe relation as the more general and presence as the more particular term. He refers to Alexander, in de Sensu 134.11–19, where relation is exemplified by the father and son (a more general term) while presence is represented by spatial location (a more particular term). I am not sure what Accattino is getting at here. I did not intend to differentiate between the two terms as general and specific so much as to say that relation is epexegetic of presence. Accattino proceeds to argue that, if presence were the more general term, Alexander would not have written at de An. 42.2–3 κατὰ παρουσίαν καὶ ποιάν σχέσιν He adds that the καὶ would have explanatory sense. Quite so: the one phrase explains the content of the other. Bergeron & Dufour (2008: 179) agree with me.
24. ἀπ’ ἀμφοτέρων (de An. 43.2).
25. I earlier construed “both” to mean “both from sources of colour and light and coloured or illumined objects” (Schroeder 1981: 217). Accattino (1992: 57) prefers the proximate referents. Cf. Accattino & Donini (1996: 182–3). To concede this point is not to disturb my larger argument, cf. Schroeder & Todd (2008: 664).
26. Aristotle, de An. 2.8.419b10–11 speaks of colour as τὸ κινητικῷ εἶναι τοῦ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς; cf. Aristotle, Ph. 8.7.260a26–8 for kinesis as change either of size, quality or place.
27. For Aristotle’s denial that light involves kinēsis cf. Sens. 6.446a28–30.
28. Accattino (1992: 53–5) (cf. Accattino & Donini 1996: 180–81) observes that Aristotle at de Anima 2.7.418a31; 419a10–11 and 13–14 states that colour moves the diaphanous in act (at de An. 418a31: πᾶν δὲ χρῶμα κινητικὸν ἐστι τοῦ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς). Alexander feels he has to use κίνησις out of piety towards Aristotle. The addition of the qualifying τις to κίνησις at Alexander, de An. 43.1–2 is intended to alleviate the embarrassment of using a word that, as we have seen, he condemns elsewhere. My interpretation preserves Alexander from this kind of misplaced loyalty.
29. Reference is to the Henry & Schwyzer editio minor. All line references are to this edition.
30. On this doctrine of the double act see Rutten (1956); A. Smith (1974: 6–13); Schroeder (1986, esp. 192–3; 1992: 32–3); Narbonne (1994: 61–79); F. Ferrari 2002; Emilsson (2007: 22–68).
31. Τὸ “ἀπελήλυθε” (Enn. IV.5[29].7.42); cf. Alexander, de An. 42.22–3: ἀπελθόντων … συναπέρχεται … ἀπέλθοι.
32. Τὸ “πάρεστιν” (Enn. IV.5[29].7.42); cf. Alexander, de An. 43.1: παρείη.
33. ἄπεστιν.
34. Although that contribution cannot follow the pattern of final causation observed with respect to the role of contribution in the genesis of goodness and intelligibility.
35. Schroeder (1982); Alexander, de An. 82.6–11; the hexis is also described as epiktetos (“acquired”) (de An. 82.1).
36. Cf. de An. 85.25–86.6. For the derivation of these three phases of intellection from Aristotle, de Anima cf. Bergeron & Dufour (2008: 341).
37. Papadis (1991a; 1991b: 348–65) calls this identification into question. For my reasons for rejecting his arguments, see Schroeder (1997a: 114 n. 31).
38. Cf. de An. 87.24–88.3; 89.13–15; 90.2–11; 90.20–21 and Merlan (1969: 16–17). For an account of the alternation between plural intelligible forms and a single intelligible form, cf. Sharples (1987: 1209–11). Sharples points out that the discussion of plural intelligible forms at 87.24–88.16 precedes the introduction of the Active Intellect, so that we need not think that Alexander sees plural intelligible forms as the proper objects of the Active Intellect. What is more, “the discussion of pure forms at 87.24–88.16 precedes any mention of the active intellect, and seems intended to introduce the notion of pure form in a general way, preliminary to the argument at 88.17 ff. that the active intellect is a pure form” (1211). See Accattino & Donini (1996: 283–4); Bergeron & Dufour (2008: 344–5). Merlan (1967: 120) sees in the thinking of the transcendent intelligible in Alexander the source of Plotinus’ doctrine that the intelligibles are not outside the hypostasis of Intellect (the subject of Enn. V[32].5).
39. Bergeron & Dufour (2008: 351–3) pace Accattino & Donini (1996: 292).
40. Nyvlt (2012: 202–5) expresses agreement with my interpretation of the genesis of intelligibility and the way in which it follows the analogy of illumination in Alexander. Bazán (1973: 478–85) argues that the Active Intellect furnishes the light by which the human intellect performs the abstraction of form from matter. Moraux (1978: 300–301) argues contra that the hexis of intellection must exist before it can conceive of the Active Intellect. Sharples (1987: 1208 n. 108) agrees with Moraux but falsely attributes Bazán’s view to me (Schroeder 1981, 1984). I am arguing that the illumination of the immanent forms takes place after their abstraction.
41. This section shall prescind from discussing the influence of the de Intellectu on Plotinus because I am convinced both that Alexander of Aphrodisias is not the author of that work and that Plotinus influences the de Intellectu. Cf. Schroeder (1982, 1997a); Schroeder & Todd (1990: 6–22; 2008).
42. Rist (1966a: 10; 1971 reprint: 508) interprets these words to mean making things of one kind things of another.
43. On the subject of emanation and conversion see Schroeder (1986; 1992: 24–65).
44. νοητὸν ἑτέρῳ.
45. In context, Plotinus is asking how we are related to Intellect and then clarifies that he is not speaking of “the state of the soul which is one of the things which derive from Intellect, but Intellect itself”. Nevertheless, he implies that there is such a state of the soul, etc.
46. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. 1003a33–b4; 1061a1–5; cf. A. C. Lloyd (1962: 67; 1990: 76–8).
47. See Schroeder (1997b) where this question is discussed in close philological argument.