Chapter 11

Conclusions

Depending on their sources or political viewpoint, until quite recently Soviet (Russian) and most Western historians have consistently ignored, overlooked, or understated the Stavka’s strategic intentions as it planned the Red Army’s offensive operations during the fall of 1942 and the winter of 1942–1943 and the full scope and scale of the operations the Red Army conducted during these periods. This is particularly the case in regard to the offensive operations conducted along the western (Moscow-Smolensk), central (Kursk-Orel-Briansk), and northwestern (Leningrad and Staraia Russa) axes.

For example, the official Soviet six-volume History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941–1945 [Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941–1945] published in 1961 remains totally silent about the Red Army’s offensive operations along the western axis during the period of its counteroffensive at Stalingrad, in particular, Operation Mars.³⁶⁰ Its sequel, the official Soviet eight-volume History of the Second World War 1939–1945 [Istoriia Vtoroi Mirovoi voiny 1939–1945 ] published in 1976, dismisses the offensive operations the Red Army launched against the Demiansk and Rzhev-Viaz’ma salients in November and December 1942 (Operation Mars) as mere diversionary operations:

While planning and organizing the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, the Stavka envisioned tying the forces of the enemy down with active operations of forces along the western and northwestern axes and in the North Caucasus. It thought that, as soon as the enemy found himself in a difficult situation at Stalingrad and in the North Caucasus, the High Command of the Wehrmacht would try to transfer part of its forces from other regions, in particular, from the Rzhev and Viaz’ma regions, to help its southern grouping. For this reason, it had to begin the offensive operation “Mars.” Its [the Stavka ’s] aim was not only to tie down the forces of the enemy and inflict a defeat on them in the region of the Rzhev-Viaz’ma salient but, additionally, also to attract enemy reserves to this axis. The counterstroke by the forces of the Trans-Caucasus Front in the Mozdok region during the Stalingrad offensive operation was assigned the very same role.³⁶¹

More recent Russian accounts of Operation Mars, while providing a bit more detail about the offensive, continue to claim this offensive was part of an elaborate Soviet deception plan designed to draw German attentions and forces away from the Stalingrad region. However, other Soviet studies published internally for Soviet Army use or commercially about Red Army deception operations during wartime make little or no mention of Operation Mars.

Soviet accounts of the offensives the Stavka organized along the western and northwestern axes during February and March 1943 have been more candid as evidenced by its 1961 history of the war:

During the winter offensive of the Red Army, intense fighting raged in

both the central and northwestern sectors of the Soviet-German front.

At the end of January, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command worked out a plan for a series of operations associated with a single strategic concept. Five fronts were to participate in them: the Northwestern, Kalinin, Western, Briansk and Central. The concept of the Stavka was to destroy the 2nd German Tank [Panzer] Army in the Orel region with the forces of the Briansk and left wing of the Western Fronts and then, with the arrival of the armies of the Central Front, to develop the offensive through Briansk toward Smolensk to reach the rear of the enemy’s Rzhev-Viaz’ma grouping and, in cooperation with the Kalinin and Western Fronts, encircle and destroy the main forces of Army Group “Center.” At the same time, the Northwestern Front was assigned the mission to smash the enemy in the Demiansk region and support the arrival of a strong mobile group in the rear of German forces operating against the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts. Simultaneous implementation of these operations should have deprived the Hitlerite command of freedom to maneuver his reserves and prevent it from transferring forces to more threatened front sectors.³⁶²

This history then allocates three pages to describe the course and outcome of the operations along these critical axes.

The official history of World War II published in 1976 paid even less attention to these operations. It stated categorically that the vast panoply of strategic operations the Stavka planned and the Red Army conducted during February and March 1943 along the western, central, and northwestern axes were clearly subordinate to and in the interests of the major operations in southern Russia:

The operations of Soviet forces along the western and northwestern axis, conducted in the beginning of 1943, were closely associated with the strategic offensive in the south. Although they did not achieve their assigned aims, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to reinforce his groupings on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front at the expense of Army Groups “Center” and “North.” This made it considerably easier for the Soviet Army to not only successfully carry out the operations at Stalingrad, on the upper Don River, and along the Khar’kov and Donbas axes but also to repel attempted enemy counteroffensives. The liquidation of the bridgeheads in the Rzhev and Demiansk regions practically removed the threat of an offensive of the enemy along the Moscow axis. Prerequisites were created for the development of operations along the Pskov, Vitebsk, and Smolensk axes.³⁶³

The first substantial post-Soviet treatment of the war, the four volume Great Patriotic War 1941–1945, which was published in 1998, seven years after the fall of the Soviet Union, represented a genuine and constructive effort to cover these forgotten battles in greater detail, although still insisting they were secondary in nature. An example is this history’s treatment of Operation Mars within the context of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad:

The strategic plan for the actions of the armed forces along the southern wing of the Soviet-German front began to be formulated in the Stavka of the Soviet Supreme High Command in mid-September, and the winter campaign of 1942/43 as a whole – in November and December ….

Such a plan, however, did not take shape immediately but was formulated gradually. The overall decision was determined only at the end of September and beginning of October, but it was not then formulated in any sort of unified document. Furthermore, in the beginning the General Staff and Stavka VGK did not even contemplate further perspectives. The question was only about immediate missions. Therefore, the main attention was paid chiefly to concentrating on the main operation – in the Stalingrad region – and the secondary — at Mozdok (in the northern Caucasus). In addition, it was intended to de-blockade Leningrad (Operation “Iskra”) and to liquidate the Rzhev-Viaz’ma salient (Operation “Mars”). The directive about the preparation of these operations was issued in October. The concept of an attack on Rostov (operation “Saturn”) also ripened in its most general form but was not worked out in detail. The concepts of the subsequent operations appeared during the course of the developing battles, as favorable conditions were created for them ….

[The Stavka ] intended to deliver its main attack along the Stalingrad and Rostov axes. Having gone over to the counteroffensive here, the Stavka VGK expected to encircle and destroy the main grouping of Army Group “B,” thereafter cut off the routes of withdrawal of Army Group “A” from the northern Caucasus into the Donbas, and, subsequently, not only liquidate the most dangerous enemy penetration in the south but also deprive him of the main shock groups of his forces. Subsequently, [the Stavka ] planned, while broadening the front of the strategic offensive to the north, to crush successively the forces of the enemy along the middle and upper Don [River], develop the offensive along the Khar’kov and Kursk axes and into the Donbas, and penetrate the Leningrad blockade in the north. Along the remainder of the front, the intention was to conduct local, but no less important offensive operations in the Demiansk, Velikie Luki, Rzhev, and Viaz’ma regions with the objective to tie down the forces of the enemy, liquidate the threat to Moscow, and inflict a defeat on the forces of Army Groups “Center” and “North.”

The first and most important operation of the winter campaign – the strategic counteroffensive of Soviet forces at Stalingrad – was planned to begin the first ten days of November. The subsequent operations were intended to begin later, based on the concrete situation that existed as operations “Uranus” and “Saturn” developed. Overall, [the Stavka ] intended to employ 11 of the 12 [existing] fronts in active operations during the winter campaign. Their operations would unfold in a 1,500–1,600-kilometer-wide sector to a depth of from 200–600 kilometers. The scale of the operations and the fronts’ missions were determined accordingly ….

Along the western axis, the Kalinin and Western Fronts were ordered to conduct the offensive operation “Mars” with the objective of the destruction of the enemy’s 9th [Army] and 3rd Tank Army in the Rzhev, Sychevka, and Olenino region and to capture Velikie Luki and Novosokol’niki with part of their forces. Along the central axis, the Briansk and Voronezh Fronts were assigned the mission to defend the positions they occupied and prepare to go over to the offensives along their axes “as soon as favorable conditions have been created.”³⁶⁴

A striking improvement over its predecessors, this account is not only the first officially sanctioned work to mention more than just the name Operation Mars, but it also provides a brief, albeit only partially accurate, description of the operation nestled deep within a more lengthy description of the fighting in the Velikie Luki region:

At the same time [the fall of 1942], the Soviet command intended to conduct a large-scale operation, under the code name Operation “Mars,” to liquidate the Rzhev-Viaz’ma salient with the main forces of the Western and Kalinin Fronts. In the Western Front, four armies were enlisted in it, which were supposed to deliver blows toward Rzhev and Sychevka. Four armies from the Kalinin Front were also to participate in the operation with the mission of conducting attacks toward Belyi and Olenino and subsequently to develop the offensive to Smolensk. Deployed on the right wing of this front , the 3rd and 4th Shock Armies were initially not employed in active operations. They were at hand to protect the main grouping against possible enemy attack from the northwest for which they were to occupy a defense along the 50 kilometer front from Kholm to Nelidovo. However, the plan was altered because intelligence detected the approach of enemy reserves from the Smolensk and Vitebsk regions. The decision was made to conduct a preventative attack along the Velikie Luki axis with the forces of the 3rd Shock Army, reinforced by units freed up from the 43rd Army.

Thus, in a word, both sides began preparing for active offensive oper ations in the Velikie Luki region. The only question was which side would be the first to attack and achieve decisive results along this axis. Soviet forces were the first to attack and did so on 24–25 November. But, unfortunately, [the offensive] was not developed in most of the sectors. We achieved success only in the Belyi region. The Kalinin Front’s 41st Army, under the command of General G. F. Tarasov, penetrated the enemy defense southwest of Rzhev with its shock group consisting of General S. I. Povetkin’s 6th Siberian Rifle Corps and General Solomatin’s 1st Mech anized Corps and reached the approaches to the city of Belyi.

However, the situation for the Soviet forces changed abruptly by the beginning of December. This was because Field Marshal G. Kluge, the commander of Army Group “Center,” transferred there four panzer divisions, which conducted a powerful counterattack against the 41st Army’s weakly protected flank. As a result, it [the 41st Army] was first halted and then encircled. Its formations and units fought in a “sack” for eight days. By order of the Stavka , the encircled grouping under the command of General M. D. Solomatin broke through to the main forces on the night of 16 December. However, all of the formations suffered heavy losses, lost almost all of their heavy equipment, and lost their combat capability. Attempts to revive the offensive were unsuccessful. The penetration of the Western Front’s 20th Army to the Rzhev-Sychevka railroad did not help. As a result, the offensive along that axis was halted. At the same time, the most important events were developing on the right flank and in the center of the Kalinin Front’s operational formation [in the Velikie Luki region].³⁶⁵

Far more candid than previous accounts, the new history’s description of what actually took place in Operation Mars is still only a pale reflection of what actually occurred. Although it acknowledges the gruesome fate of one army that participated in the offensive (the 41st Army), it fails to even mention the contributions and fates of five other armies that took part in the operation. Nor does it mention the Western Front’s major offensive in the Sychevka sector or the heavy fighting conducted by the front’s 20th Army during the November phase of the operation. Finally, it blatantly conceals the role Marshal Zhukov played in planning and coordinating the offensive and also says nothing about the role of other commanders, such as Konev and Katukov, who also played significant roles in the failed operation.

On the other hand, this new Russian history of the war pays far more attention to the Stavka’s ambitious strategic offensive in February-March 1943 along the western, central, and northwestern axes than previous Soviet accounts:

In February 1943 forces along the western and central axes were associated with the general strategic offensive of Soviet forces, begun in the southern, southwestern, and northwestern sectors of the Soviet-German front. While preparing it, the Supreme High Command assessed the existing situation rather optimistically. It presumed that the enemy in the south was beaten and, having abandoned Kursk, Khar’kov, and Belgorod, was withdrawing behind the Dnepr River and was essentially weakened along the remaining axes. Therefore, despite the serious situation in which the forces of the Briansk and Voronezh Fronts found themselves as a result of the long winter offensive, the Stavka VGK decided not only to continue it but also to conduct new offensive operations in the sectors of these fronts ….

The main characteristic of the planned operations was the fact that, for the achievement of its final objectives, the fronts had to fulfill a series of consecutive missions: at first to defeat the enemy in the Orel region, then in the Briansk and Rzhev regions, and, finally, east of Smolensk. Furthermore, if there were insufficient forces for the first stage, then large reserves were required for the subsequent operations. The possibility of their creation appeared only after the capitulation of German forces at Stalingrad, when seven armies were immediately freed up ….

Overall, the concept of the operation was rather complicated. The operations of all of the fronts were so closely interwoven and intercon nected that any disruption of cooperation between them could lead to the disruption of the entire concept. Not only the efforts of the forces that were operating along the mixed — central and western — axes had to be coordinated carefully but also the attacks of the fronts in each of them.³⁶⁶

Despite revealing in full the Stavka’s ambitious offensive plans for operations during the late winter of 1942–1943 and describing these operations in unprecedented detail and with a degree of candor absent in previous Soviet studies of the war, the fact remains that comprehensive studies of these operations have yet to be written.

By consistently ignoring, overlooking, or minimizing the importance these operations during the Red Army’s winter campaign of 1942–1943, Soviet as well as Russian historians have perpetuated certain enduring myths regarding the nature of Soviet military strategy during the war, the role played by Stalin and other members of the Stavka in its formulation, and how this strategy governed the operations of the Red Army.

The most enduing of these myths is the proposition that, having failed to master the art of strategic concentration when organizing the Red Army’s offensive operations during 1941 and most of 1942, Stalin and the Stavka finally began concentrating their forces properly during the fall of 1942 and to an even greater extent as the war proceeded. According to this myth, when the dictator and his key advisers planned the Red Army’s offensives in the Leningrad (Tikhvin), Moscow, and Rostov regions during November and December 1941, the expanded offensive during the winter of 1941–1942, the offensives during the spring of 1942 to pre-empt the planned German offensive in the summer of 1942, and, finally, the counteroffensives, counterstrokes, and counterattacks during the summer and early fall of 1942 to thwart the German advance toward Stalingrad, they frequently planned and conducted offensive actions along too many strategic and operational axes. As a result, by requiring the Red Army to achieve too much with too few forces, they dispersed its forces, dissipated its strength, and sharply curtailed its ultimate offensive success.

This myth goes on to assert that, beginning in November 1942, throughout the course of the winter campaign of 1942–1943, and to an ever-increasing extent during the war’s subsequent campaigns, Stalin and his Stavka routinely concen trated the Red Army’s offensive efforts along the most critical strategic axes, thus avoiding the mistakes they made earlier in the war and materially improving the army’s combat performance. Thus, by concentrating their forces along the southwestern strategic axis in the fall of 1942 and the winter of 1942–1943, they were able to achieve signal victory in the Stalingrad region and drive German forces westward to the Kursk region and the line of the Northern Donets and Mius Rivers. Similarly, by concentrating their forces along the central axis in the summer of 1943, they were able to emerge victorious in the decisive battle for Kursk and subsequently drive German forces back to the Dnepr River. According to this myth, by skillfully concentrating the Red Army’s forces along the most decisive strategic axes during each subsequent wartime campaign, Stalin and his Stavka were able to achieve victory after strategic victory throughout 1944 and 1945, culminating in the Red Army’s victorious march on Berlin April 1945.³⁶⁷

Supplementing this myth are two closely associated corollaries. The first maintains that virtually all of the offensive operations the Red Army conducted elsewhere along the front during these campaigns were only secondary and diversionary in nature. The second argues that Stalin, who strictly followed his own strategic counsel in 1942 and the eight months of 1942, began heeding the advice of his chief military advisers as he prepared the Red Army for the offensives it conducted during November 1942 and its winter offensive of 1942–1943. Thereafter, according to this corollary, Stalin gave his senior military advisers, in particular, Marshals Zhukov and Vasilevsky, an ever-increasing role formulating the strategy governing the Red Army’s offensive operations to war’s end.

Close examination of the offensive operations the Red Army conducted during the winter campaign of 1942–1942, as well as during subsequent campaigns in the war, explodes this myth and its two associated corollaries. It is now abundantly clear that, as had been the case in previous wartime campaigns, during the winter of 1942–1943 and throughout the remainder of the war, Stalin remained convinced the most useful military strategy the Red Army could pursue was to apply maximum pressure against the Germans’ strategic defenses by conducting simultaneous offensive operations along as many strategic axes of the front as possible. The dictator did so because, appreciating the numerical superiority of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht , he was certain that, if attacked everywhere, the German defense was likely to crack and break somewhere. This is precisely the strategy Stalin adopted when he launched Operations Mars and Uranus in November 1942 and, once again, when he unleashed offensive operations by multiple fronts simultaneously along all three strategic axes spanning the entire breadth of the Soviet-German front in February and March 1943 (see Map 117).

Although the employment of this strategy had proven ill-founded during previous wartime campaigns, it began yielding noticeably greater successes beginning in the late 1942. First it produced victory in the Stalingrad region during November and December 1942. Later, it projected the Red Army’s forces forward into the Kursk and Viaz’ma regions and to the Northern Donets and Mius Rivers by early March 1943, despite the setbacks they experienced in the Donbas, Khar’kov, and Belgorod regions. Even though the Red Army failed to achieve the ambitious objectives Stalin and his Stavka assigned to it during the winter campaign of 1942–1943, the experience it derived from these operations would pay immense dividends in the summer of 1943. Then, after thwarting the last German offensive of the war at Kursk, it embarked on a strategic offensive of its own that drove German forces back to the Dnepr River. Thereafter, as subsequent volumes in this series will demonstrate, contrary to previous assertions, whenever possible, Stalin would continue to maintain maximum pressure on German defenses by ordering the Red Army to conduct offensive operations along multiple strategic axes.³⁶⁸

In regard to the two corollaries, first, examination of the offensive operations the Red Army conducted during the winter campaign of 1942–1942 and thereafter demonstrates that many if not most of the offensives it conducted along so-called secondary axes, which have been described as diversionary in nature, were in fact part and parcel of Stalin’s deliberate strategy to maintain maximum pressure on German defenses. It is also clear that Soviet historians have concealed or at least deemphasized these offensives either because they failed or to protect the reputations of those senior commanders who planned and conducted them. Second, there is also no evidence indicating that Stalin ever relinquished his role as chief architect of the military strategy the Soviet Union and its Red Army pursued during the war. On the contrary, close examination of key wartime documents (Stavka , NKO, and General Staff) show that the dictator dominated military deci-sion-making as much in the spring of 1945 as he had during the initial period of the war, often on matters tactical and operational as well as strategic.