Chapter 13

Jutland

As tension mounted in 1914, the Grand Fleet, under the command of Admiral Jellicoe, moved to its war station at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands, with little to entertain those members of the crew who were not avid ornithologists. The Grand Fleet had twenty-four battleships, including HMS Revenge which was part of the 1st Division of the 1st Battle Squadron, along with HMS Iron Duke (Captain Frederic Dreyer; Admiral Sir John Jellicoe), HMS Hercules (Captain Bernard) and HMS Agincourt (Captain Doughty). The Battlecruiser Fleet, under Admiral David Beatty, was based further south at Rosyth. This consisted of six battle-cruisers and four fast battleships of the Queen Elizabeth class, including HMS Warspite, fourteen light cruisers and twenty-seven destroyers.

The total British Grand Fleet numbered 150 warships, including Dreadnoughts, pre-Dreadnoughts, battlecruisers, armoured cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers, seaplane carriers and minelayers. The German High Seas Fleet numbered eighty-nine warships, including Dreadnoughts, pre-Dreadnoughts, battlecruisers, light cruisers and destroyers. Knowing that they were unlikely to defeat the British en masse, the Germans devised a plan to attack the Grand Fleet piecemeal, their first target being the battlecruiser fleet under Admiral Beatty. The plan was to lure Beatty out of port by sending five fast German battlecruisers to trail their coats near the British coast. Once Beatty emerged to chase them, he would be met by a line of waiting German submarines and the whole force of the German High Seas Fleet would descend upon him.

The plan had every chance of success and Beatty, like Prince Rupert centuries before, had the sort of temperament that might have made such a chase more likely. That the plan failed, however, was partly due to good fortune for the British and partly due to the work of British Naval Intelligence. The cryptographic branch of the Admiralty, known as Room 40, decoded intercepts, aided by captured German naval codebooks. The Signalbuch der kaiserlichen Marine (SKM) had been passed to the British by the Russians, who had taken it from the captured German cruiser Madgeburg; the Handelsschiffsverkehrbuch (HVB) had been taken from a German steamer by a Royal Australian Navy vessel; and the Verkehrsbuch, which contained codes used by naval attachés and embassies, was said to have been dredged up by a British trawler from a sunken German destroyer.

The tempting excursion by the German battlecruisers was planned for 31 May 1914 but, unknown to the Germans, Room 40 had already decoded the initial sailing orders by 30 May. That same day, the signal was being read by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe. By 5.30 p.m. the entire British Grand Fleet, including Beatty’s detachment at Rosyth, and Vice Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram’s 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron at Invergordon, up the Scottish coast, was making ready to sail. The German quest for a piecemeal battle had been denied. Rather than entice some of the British fleet out for a partial battle, the entire British Grand Fleet was at sea before any German vessels could set their trap.

At the point of sailing, when the ship had been closed down for action, the sound of a side drum was heard on HMS Revenge. This may not appear strange in ordinary circumstances – surely some marine drummer was practising or someone was bidding an eccentric farewell from the shore – but no explanation could be found. At this point a possible solution was suggested, not from within the bounds of reason but from the treasure trove of legend. Sir Francis Drake, once master of Revenge at the time of the Armada, had taken a snare drum with him on his voyages round the world. When he returned, he ordered that the drum should be kept at his home in Buckland Abbey, Devon, and that at any time that England should be in dire peril it should be sounded so that he could return to defend his country. The sentiment was recorded in poetry by Sir Henry Newbolt:

Drake’s Drum

Drake he’s in his hammock an’ a thousand mile away,

(Capten, art tha sleepin’ there below?)

Slung atween the round shot in Nombre Dios Bay,

An’ dreamin’ arl the time o’ Plymouth Hoe.

Yarnder lumes the island, yarnder lie the ships,

Wi’ sailor lads a-dancin’ heel-an’-toe,

An’ the shore-lights flashin’, an’ the night-tide dashin’

He sees et arl so plainly as he saw et long ago.

Drake he was a Devon man, an’ ruled the Devon seas,

(Capten, art tha sleepin’ there below?),

Rovin’ tho’ his death fell, he went wi’ heart at ease,

An’ dreamin’ arl the time o’ Plymouth Hoe.

‘Take my drum to England, hang et by the shore,

Strike et when your powder’s runnin’ low;

If the Dons sight Devon, I’ll quit the port o’ Heaven,

An’ drum them up the Channel as we drummed them long ago.’

Drake he’s in his hammock till the great Armadas come,

(Capten, art tha sleepin’ there below?),

Slung atween the round shot, listenin’ for the drum,

An’ dreamin’ arl the time o’ Plymouth Hoe.

Call him on the deep sea, call him up the Sound,

Call him when ye sail to meet the foe;

Where the old trade’s plyin’ an’ the old flag flyin’,

They shall find him, ware an’ wakin’, as they found him long ago.¹

If any body of people was entitled to hear the sound of Drake’s drum it was the crew of the ninth successor of Drake’s Revenge as they set out for a battle that would indeed decide the fate of England in the biggest ship-to-ship battle of all time.

British signals intelligence had served the British well up to this point, but a mistake was made when an officer misunderstood a message given to him by Room 40 pertaining to Admiral Hipper’s callsign, DK. The German Admiral only used this callsign in port – when he was at sea it was altered. The message received by the British fleet was that Admiral Hipper was still in port, though he had in fact set sail. At 2.00 p.m. on 31 May, far from being in port, Admiral Hipper was about 50 miles due east of the approaching Admiral Beatty. By 2.20 p.m., Beatty’s scouts had reported enemy ships. A neutral Danish steamer had become the focus of interest of light units from both sides and soon shots were being exchanged. The British fired at the German destroyers in the area while the Germans managed to hits HMS Galatea.

Beatty changed course in an attempt to cut the German forces off from their base but his speed and failures to signal changes in direction meant that his heavy forces, the potent 5th Battle Squadron, comprising the Queen Elizabeth class battleships, were left behind. Beatty therefore went into battle without the use initially of some of the most powerful battleships then at sea, namely HMS Barham (Captain Craig; Rear Admiral Evan Thomas), HMS Valiant (Captain Woollcombe), HMS Warspite (Captain Philpotts) and HMS Malaya (Captain Boyle). As a result either of poor signalling or failure to read signals correctly, the 5th Battle Squadron was about 10 miles behind Beatty at the vital moment of initial engagement with German forces.

Admiral Hipper turned south-east to lead Admiral Beatty towards Admiral Scheer who was approaching about 50 miles away with the main German force. Despite the surprise encounter, the initial German plan of piecemeal destruction still seemed possible.

Beatty appears to have compounded the error – even if it was not entirely his own – whereby the most powerful element of his force was out of range, by delaying the order to fire upon the retreating Germans for a period of about ten minutes when they were within range.

The British and German ships began to engage. Beatty’s flagship Lion took a hit on her ‘Q’ turret but a quick-thinking Royal Marines officer, Major Francis Harvey, though mortally wounded, ordered the magazine doors to be shut and the magazine itself to be flooded. This postponed the day that the rest of the crew would join him in the next life. HMS Indefatigable was not so lucky and was sunk by a series of piercingly accurate shells. Hipper continued to run for the south, luring the British towards the approaching Scheer. HMS Queen Mary was hit and exploded, sinking with the loss of almost all hands.

Hipper’s ploy of leading the British towards more powerful German forces was working but now the 5th Battle Squadron, mounting 15in guns, was coming into range and it meant business.

The Germans regarded these super-battleships with understandable trepidation. These were vessels that could almost match the speed of their fast cruisers and yet fire shells twice the size. Now these 15in shells began to hit home. Seydlitz, Moltke and van der Tann took direct hits. The Germans weaved to avoid more. The question was whether they could find refuge among the advancing German main fleet or be wiped out. A German account described the experience of being on the receiving end of 15in shells from the 5th Battle Squadron as ‘highly depressing, nerve-racking and exasperating’², sentiments with which it is possible to sympathize.

At 4.30 p.m. the German High Seas Fleet was spotted. The tables had turned and, having already lost two of his cruisers, Admiral Beatty was in no way inclined to take on the full might of the German Kriegsmarine – now it was his turn to lead the Germans towards British forces equipped to deal with them. He ordered the naval equivalent of an about turn – 180º – to head north towards Admiral Jellicoe and the Grand Fleet. If the Germans could play the game of chase me until you meet my big brother, the British could play it too.

Bad signalling meant that the 5th Battle Squadron was again delayed in manoeuvring, exposing it dangerously to enemy fire from the advancing German main fleet. Ships began to take hits, though they gave as good as they got.

Despite their formidable rearguard, Admiral Beatty’s cruisers were now not unlike the Scots Greys at Waterloo, chased by Polish lancers. They knew they could not afford to miss a single step or slow down one jot, lest they be skewered by their pursuers. The more the German fleet chased, however, the closer they were drawn towards their nemesis – the British Grand Fleet.

As Admiral Jellicoe got wind of his approaching adversary, he attempted to piece together various bits of information that would enable him to make the right decisions at the right time about the use of his formidable force. The security of the British Isles ultimately rested on its naval forces and should the wrong move be made with a force as powerful as this the result could have been cataclysmic. Winston Churchill was well aware that Jellicoe held the fate of Britain in his hands. HMS Revenge, which had fought at that other critical moment in British history in the presence of the Armada, was once again a leading player in a battle where Britain’s fortunes hung in the balance.

The order Jellicoe would have to give would be to change the formation of the force from its cruising deployment to a battle line. The critical element in this order would be the choice of course set for the battle line. If Jellicoe got this wrong, the German fleet might gain a tactical advantage that would enable them to severely damage and perhaps defeat the superior British force.

Unfortunately for Jellicoe, the information on which to base this monumental decision was sparse. Admiral Beatty took some time to relay the precise position of the German fleet in answer to a direct question from Admiral Jellicoe. The position was confused further by a variety of factors, including the presence of skirmishing advance forces and the fact that Admiral Scheer had made a turn back towards the main German fleet once he realized he was heading into troubled waters. Accurate positions were not sent by British forces closest to the enemy, namely the 5th Battle Squadron, probably because they were at a critical stage in their manoeuvring away from the German High Seas fleet. HMS Malaya had sustained significant damage and was almost lost. Despite his failures in communications, however, Beatty was in fact doing Jellicoe a favour by continuing to engage the German fleet.

At about 6.00 p.m., Beatty’s cruisers were in sight of Jellicoe’s battle fleet and continued to hold a course to cut in front of them, firing all the while at German units. This continued arc held by the British Battle Cruiser Squadron forced the Germans into a favour-able aspect relative to Jellicoe’s oncoming force.

As the different elements of the British forces combined, a series of breathtaking manoeuvres took place reminiscent of Italian racing drivers meeting at a roundabout. In the midst of this, the rudder on HMS Warspite jammed and she performed a death-defying turn which at one point took her straight towards the German fleet, which concentrated fire on her. Warspite took at least six direct hits at this time but continued to fire back and, once she had regained control, was ordered back to Rosyth for repairs, bloody but unbowed.

Like Wellington at Waterloo in 1815, as the French Old Guard breasted the ridge, Jellicoe could cry his own version of ‘Now Maitland; now’s your chance’, and at 6.15 he gave the order for the British Grand Fleet to deploy to the south-east.

One by one, the great ships turned to port, their physical presence awe-inspiring to those who watched, their names echoing down the centuries of past naval and military glories: King George V – Orion – Iron Duke – Benbow – Colossus – Marlborough – Ajax – Monarch – Royal Oak – Bellerophon – Collingwood – Revenge – Centurion – Conqueror – Superb – Temeraire – Neptune – Hercules – Erin – Thunderer – Canada – Vanguard – St Vincent – Agincourt.

Despite the paucity of information about the enemy’s whereabouts, Jellicoe had made a prescient and accurate deployment that would not only place his fleet in a favourable position with regard to the remaining daylight, but which gave him the key tactical advantage of crossing the T of the advancing German column. This simply meant that whereas all the British guns could be brought to bear on the enemy, only a few of the German guns could be fired in return.

There has been much discussion about the Battle of Jutland and opinions aired as to who won the battle. Suffice it to say that, once Jellicoe had correctly deployed his fleet into battle order, the advancing German fleet ran into the iron walls of England. This fleet was the most powerful ever to put to sea in the history of the Royal Navy. It was in an optimum disposition and bearing, give or take a few degrees, with all guns bearing on the enemy. At this juncture Admiral Scheer knew precisely what his options were. There were only two: retreat to Wilhelmshaven or be annihilated.

Admiral Scheer also knew, however, that headlong retreat posed its own dangers in view of the proximity of British forces, so to cover his retreat he devised an ingenious series of counter-attacks and other ploys designed to disconcert and confuse his pursuers. It is a testimony to Scheer’s skills that these tactics and ploys largely worked and prevented the British from wreaking the heavy defeat upon the Germans at sea that they otherwise might have done.

Despite the fact that the cruiser Invincible had blown up, the Germans knew that there was no competition against the might of the Grand Fleet and Scheer ordered a turn of 16 points to starboard together – an emergency escape move that had been rehearsed for just such a contingency. The Germans created a smokescreen to cover their departure and, fearing an attack by torpedoes, Jellico did not give chase.

With the shelter of night still too far away for comfort, Scheer ordered a surprise turn back towards the British. Like a limping old dog pursued by baying wolves, he turned to bare his teeth to keep the enemy at bay. The move, though startling to the British, did not have the desired effect and they doggedly shadowed him as he once again turned south-east.

German torpedo boats were sent into the attack but the withering weight of fire from the British forced Scheer to repeat his battle about-turn, which he achieved by 7.20. The attack by cruisers to cover the retreat was led by the cruiser Derflinger, which had already inflicted considerable damage on the British. HMS Revenge had the range of Derflinger at 7.11 and began to straddle her with shells before scoring at least five direct hits. When Derflinger moved out of sight, Revenge concentrated on the German destroyers which were making a torpedo attack and made an emergency turn at 7.35 to avoid torpedoes fired directly at her.

The Germans’ fierce counter-attack to cover their retreat seems to have had the desired effect as from now on the major engagements between heavy ships on both sides were over.

The skill shown by HMS Revenge and others in dodging the torpedoes desperately launched at them by the German destroyers suggests that Jellicoe need not have ordered the entire fleet to turn away 45º as this gave the Germans the time they needed to put distance between themselves and the pursuing British. With the wisdom of hindsight, one could surmise that a Nelson would have allowed his commanders more initiative to take individual avoiding action as they deemed fit, and as Revenge had demonstrated, they were quite capable of doing so.

Although the Germans had succeeded in placing a useful distance between themselves and the British, the battle was by no means over. Jellicoe decided not to commit heavy forces to a night attack and had a course set to the south-west, designed to cut Scheer off. By 9.30 p.m., the German fleet turned to the south-east and was now following the British fleet, which still did not fully engage them. A series of fierce encounters took place during the night between cruisers, destroyers and battleships which were to prove costly to the British. The destroyers Tipperary, Ardent, Fortune, Sparrowhawk and Turbulent were sunk as well as the cruiser Black Prince.

Despite the British advantage in signals intelligence, some vital reports of the German positions were not passed on soon enough and Jellicoe was suspicious of some that were. Had these messages carried more authority, Jellicoe might have taken more decisive action with his heavy forces.

As it was, Scheer managed to reach the Horn Reef relatively unscathed and at 3.54 a.m. he ordered all his battle-scarred ships into port. The British had missed their chance to destroy the German fleet at sea but the Germans knew they had had a lucky escape and the High Seas Fleet would never set sail again to challenge the Royal Navy.

Following the main action at Jutland, HMS Revenge, along with other elements of the fleet, conducted a series of sweeps in the North Sea to ensure that the Kriegsmarine had not decided to try their luck again. By now, however, the Germans had realized that they could not alter the strategic position so far as surface forces were concerned. The British were prepared to sacrifice other commitments around the world in order to ensure that they had an overwhelming advantage over the German High Seas Fleet. In view of this, the Germans embarked on a submarine warfare strategy that would be sustained through the remainder of the First World War and into the Second World War. Submarines, for obvious reasons, did not have the dignity and physical presence of surface warships, nor could they show the flag in quite the same way. The switch of strategy was therefore emblematic of the failure of the Kaiser’s ambition to match his British Royal cousins in sea power, and the failure of his naval strategy would mark the end of his rule in Germany.

Despite the fact that they did not sail out of port, the High Seas Fleet remained a fleet in being and, as German fortunes waned on land, the temptation rose to use these floating titans in a last attempt to break British power. Without troubling his superiors with the details, Admiral Scheer devised a plan to sail out to meet the British. The British naval stranglehold, however, had caused dire shortages of food and other essential supplies in Germany. There had been a communist revolution already in Russia and communist notions were spreading among disenchanted servicemen. Admiral Scheer’s plan failed and the repercussions would topple the Kaiser himself.

The High Seas Fleet would sail from Wilhelmshaven again but not cleared for action. Under the terms of the Armistice of 11 November 1918, the fleet sailed under British escort for internment at Scapa Flow. The plan was that the German ships would eventually be shared out among the victorious powers as prizes. Although the German ships were ordered to haul down their ensign by Admiral Beatty as a mark of their defeat, the Germans maintained enough pride in their fleet not to want it handed out piecemeal to their former foes. On 21 June 1919, as the 1st British Battle Squadron under Admiral Fremantle, flying his flag in HMS Revenge, set sail for an exercise, Admiral Reuter gave the order for the entire German fleet to be scuttled. Although the British tried desperately to stop it, there was little they could do and almost every ship sank.

The question remains, was it worth it? The First World War has not been viewed with the clarity afforded to its successor. The Second World War would rightly be seen as a just war against one of the most evil regimes in the history of humanity that would perpetrate an unparalleled crime against the Jewish people by murdering about six million of them – men, women and children – in concentration camps and through other forms of murder. Other ‘undesirables’ would also be removed as well, including Christians, Communists, the disabled, gypsies and whoever else got in the way. The First World War by contrast was painted in retrospect in various shades and mostly came to be seen as an unnecessary war foisted upon the working class by unthinking toffs. Close analysis of the facts would prove otherwise. British command structures proved to be adaptable and in due course open to new technology. Artillery methods were perfected and ground-breaking inventions such as the tank were introduced by the British along with tactics to match.

The underlying issue was one that was familiar to England and to Britain: once again she was faced with an attempt at European hegemony by one of the Continental powers, in this case Germany. She had either to fight or wait to be invaded.