The men of Bee’s and Bartow’s brigades were hot and thirsty by the time they found themselves rushing toward Matthews Hill about 11:00 a.m. Many of the inexperienced soldiers had neglected to fill their canteens that morning; some drank standing water out of mud holes. The brown water “was not fit for a dog to drink, but it was the only chance,” recalled one of the men. Many wondered if the dash toward Matthews Hill was better than lying near the Henry House under the angry fire of the Federal artillery pieces. “The projectiles sung and whizzed and exploded over us, around us, and a very few among us,” noted John Reed of the 8th Georgia, part of Bartow’s Brigade. It did not get much better as the men approached Matthews Hill. According to Reed, “I could hear the bullets zipping and zeeing among us like angry bees, and I knew that our men were falling fast.” Some may have recalled Col. Bartow’s remarks to them the night before—that the two armies would soon meet in combat. “But remember boys, that battle and fighting mean death,” explained the colonel, “and probably before sunrise some of us will be dead.”1
As Bee’s regiments arrived on Matthews Hill, he slotted them into position to the right of Evans’ embattled brigade. The 2nd Mississippi (along with two companies of the 11th Mississippi) slipped into the space between the six companies of the 4th South Carolina on the left and the 4th Alabama on the right. The 8th Georgia of Bartow’s Brigade came next, forming at a slight angle running to the northeast. This deployment allowed Bartow’s Georgians to throw an enfilade fire into the flank of the 2nd Rhode Island which, together with the 1st Rhode Island, fought in the front yard of the Matthews house. Because of a pine thicket, the 8th Georgia was forced to squeeze into a space only 110 yards in length (rather than the customary 200 or so yards) and the right side of the line was in the thicket. Many men recalled that they were ordered to lie down after reaching their position.2
Seeing the growing strength of enemy soldiers, Burnside countered by reinforcing his own lines. He quickly brought up his entire brigade to Matthews Hill, but not before the men shed their valued knapsacks and blankets. The two Rhode Island regiments (1st and 2nd) sidled to their left to allow room for the 71st New York while the 2nd New Hampshire formed in reserve behind Reynolds’ artillery. As Burnside’s soldiers formed a strong line on the left (eastern) side of Manassas-Sudley Road, Col. Andrew Porter prepared his men for battle on the right side of the road. Griffin’s battery also galloped up and prepared to open fire on the enemy. This movement caused considerable confusion when the battery intermingled with the New Yorkers. Because he outranked Burnside, Porter assumed command of the division.3
Gen. Heintzelman’s division, meanwhile, continued its march toward Sudley Ford. As he drew near the ford he spun off two regiments, the 1st Minnesota and the 11th Massachusetts, and sent them trotting toward the sound of the firing. Capt. James Ricketts’ battery joined the move toward Matthews Hill. The Minnesota regiment marched through woods and fields to the east of the road, while the Bay Staters marched down the road. Following in their wake Heintzelman ordered the 1st Michigan and Arnold’s battery to form as a reserve. Arnold moved his guns east of the creek; it is unclear where the Michiganders took up their position.4
For a while it looked as though Bee and Bartow would hold their own on Matthews Hill. The right flank, Bartow’s 8th Georgia, extended beyond the left flank of the 2nd Rhode Island. Burnside tried to correct the problem by spreading the 2nd Rhode Island farther east in the direction of Bull Run. This thinned the line without any appreciable relief. The two sides fired away at one another along the quarter of a mile front. After the battle, a member of the 1st Rhode Island remembered that “shells were exploding and [the] cannon roaring made such a noise that the cry of the wounded could not be heard.”5