“Rhetoric,” and its cognates in other languages, is derived from the Greek word rhêkorikê, the art or technique of a rhêtôr, or public speaker. The word first appears in Plato’s dialogue Gorgias, written in the second decade of the fourth century B.C., but dramatically set a generation earlier. In conversation with Socrates (453a2), Gorgias defines rhêkorikê as “the worker of persuasion.” “Persuasion” (peithô) was used in earlier Greek to describe what came to be called “rhetoric.”1 Another Greek word often used of rhetoric is logos, literally “word,” but also meaning “speech, argument, reason.”
Rhetoric in Greece was specifically the civic art of public speaking as it developed under constitutional government, especially in Athenian democracy of the fifth and fourth centuries. This art was described and discussed in handbooks, speeches, dialogues, treatises, and lectures and was expanded and developed by teachers of public speaking, philosophers, and practicing orators to produce what we call “classical rhetoric,” social and political practices and a body of texts that describe or illustrate that practice. Classical rhetoric, in turn, was transmitted to the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the modern period, adapted to the needs of each era, but repeatedly drawing new inspiration from the major classical sources, especially from writings of Cicero, but at times from readings of Plato, Aristotle, Quintilian, or other Greek or Latin sources.
Rhetoric in the sense of techniques of persuasion is a phenomenon of all human cultures, and analogies to it are also found in animal communication.2 All communication involves rhetoric. A speaker or writer has some kind of purpose, and rhetoric includes the ways of accomplishing, or attempting to accomplish, that purpose within a given culture. The Greeks and Romans thought of this purpose as persuasion, but by that they meant something more general than persuasion as understood by a modern social scientist. Purposes cover a spectrum from converting hearers to a view opposed to that previously held, to implanting a conviction or belief not otherwise entertained, to teaching or exposition, to entertainment and demonstration of the cleverness of the speaker. Persuasion can be accomplished by direct means, such as force, threats, or bribes, or it can be done symbolically by the use of signs, of which the most important are spoken and written words or gestures.
Every communication is rhetorical because it uses some technique to affect the beliefs, actions, or emotions of an audience. The simplest verbal techniques are pitch, volume, and repetition, as in “help, Help, HELP!” The white pages of the telephone directory show a relatively low degree of rhetoric. Their main rhetorical technique is alphabetization, which accomplishes the purpose of allowing a reader to find a particular name easily, and except for occasional flashes of bold type their author does not seek to influence a reader to call one number rather than another. The yellow pages are distinctly more rhetorical, seeking to make an effect upon the reader and using visualization of products and other typographical devices to influence a decision.
Some definitions will help to trace the influence and adaptations of classical rhetoric through western history. One is the concept of primary rhetoric. Primary rhetoric is the conception of rhetoric held by the Greeks when artistic techniques were first described in the fifth century B.C. Rhetoric was primarily an art of persuasion; it was primarily something used in civic life; it was primarily oral. Primary rhetoric involves utterance on a specific occasion; it is an act not a text, though subsequently it can be treated as a text. The primacy of primary rhetoric is a fundamental fact in the classical tradition: through the time of the Roman Empire teachers of rhetoric, whatever was the real situation of their students, took as their nominal goal the training of persuasive public speakers; even in the early Middle Ages, when there was reduced practical opportunity to exercise civic rhetoric, the definition and content of rhetorical theory as set forth by Isidore and Alcuin, for example, show the same civic assumption; the revival of classical rhetoric in Renaissance Italy was foreshadowed by renewed need for civic rhetoric in the cities of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; and the great period of neoclassical rhetoric was the time when public speaking emerged as a major force in church and state in France, England, and America.
Secondary rhetoric, on the other hand, refers to rhetorical techniques as found in discourse, literature, and art forms when those techniques are not being used for an oral, persuasive purpose. In secondary rhetoric the speech act is not of central importance; that role is taken over by a text. Frequent manifestations of secondary rhetoric are commonplaces, figures of speech, and tropes in written works. Much literature, art, and informal discourse is decorated by secondary rhetoric, which may be a mannerism of the historical period in which it is composed. Secondary rhetoric, however, contributes to accomplishing the purpose of the speaker or writer, but indirectly or at a secondary level. It provides ways of emphasizing ideas or making them vivid. It enlivens the page and relieves the tedium of the reader. It may demonstrate the writer’s education, eloquence, or skill, and it thus often makes the writer more acceptable to an audience.
It has been a persistent characteristic of classical rhetoric in almost every stage of its history to move from primary to secondary forms, occasionally then reversing the pattern. For this phenomenon the Italian term letteraturizzazione has been coined. Letteraturizzazione is the tendency of rhetoric to shift focus from persuasion to narration, from civic to personal contexts, and from speech to literature, including poetry. Such slippage can be observed in Greece in the Hellenistic period, in the time of the Roman Empire, in medieval France, and from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries in Europe, and still occurs to today: rhetoric as understood in English departments of colleges and universities is largely secondary rhetoric. The primary cause of the letteraturizzazione of rhetoric was probably the place given rhetoric in education through the centuries, combined with limited opportunities for public speaking and an increased role for writing in society.
There is also a secondary rhetoric in arts other than literature. In antiquity, the analogy between rhetoric and painting or sculpture was repeatedly noticed—by Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian among others—and an analogy to architecture is occasionally mentioned as well. Writers on the arts sometimes borrowed terminology from rhetoric. In the Renaissance and later, treatises on music, painting, and other arts borrowed the structure and categories of classical rhetoric. Rhetorical techniques are also evident in political propaganda throughout history, in which forms of speech, writing (inscriptions, for example), drama, ritual, art, architecture, and public works and largess were combined to strengthen or impose the power of the regime.
Traditional rhetoric is rhetorical practice as found in traditional cultures that do not use writing and have been relatively untouched by western civilization. The forms and functions of rhetoric in societies without writing are discussed in a recent book by George A. Kennedy, entitled Comparative Rhetoric, published by Oxford University Press. Among the themes of that book are that rhetoric in traditional societies is primarily a means of attaining consensus, and the existence all over the world of levels of formal language required for serious discourse. The book also discusses rhetoric in ancient societies in the Near East, India, and China where writing was introduced. Although oral societies generally have words for an “orator,” for various speech genres, and sometimes for rhetorical devices, and many accord high honor to eloquence, conceptualized theories of rhetoric are found only in societies that use writing, and even there full conceptualization is slow to emerge. Speakers cannot explain well how they do what they do, and skill is learned by imitation, not by rule. This includes the early history of rhetoric in Greece. In The Apology (21e) Plato makes Socrates ridicule the inability of fifth-century Athenian politicians and poets to describe what they were nevertheless often able to do well.
Conceptualization of rhetorical techniques, the synthesis of a meta-rhetoric, as it is sometimes now called, has taken place in sophisticated, literate societies in varying degrees depending on the practical need for rhetorical instruction, the extent to which the society is introspective, and the rhetorical values the society holds. The Instruction of Ptahhotep, written in Egypt in the early second millennium B.C., is sometimes regarded as the earliest handbook of public speaking.3 In third-century B.C. China, Han Fei-tzu wrote a work on power politics that includes discussion of ways to persuade,4 and about the same time Kautilya in India wrote an extensive discussion of politics and rhetoric that has features in common with Greek rhetorical theory.5 A major difference between metarhetoric in Greece and in other literate cultures is that in Greece theories of rhetoric were developed largely for speakers in the lawcourts, whereas elsewhere judicial rhetoric is not a major consideration; and only in Greece, and thus in western Europe, was rhetoric separated from political and ethical philosophy to form a specific discipline that became a feature of formal education. Isocrates and Aristotle, despite great differences in their thinking, were largely responsible for this second development.
In an attempt to understand the nature of rhetoric and its historical manifestations we are fortunate to have on record descriptions of the circumstances and contents of speeches, and thus of traditional rhetoric, that were composed before the conceptualization of a metarhetoric. Such records exist in the Near East, China, and India. In the West, early Greek literature, and in particular the Homeric poems Iliad and Odyssey, give a vivid picture of speech in a society that did not yet use writing. The poems are the artistic result of a tradition of oral composition describing great events of the end of the second millennium B.C. They probably attained approximately the form in which we read them in the eighth century and were written down, perhaps from dictation, in the following century. It is true, of course, that neither of these works is a verbatim account of what someone actually said. What matters is that speech as found in the poems provides a detailed picture of what and how someone might have spoken under the conditions imagined, and they contain also observations about the nature and functions of speech of a traditional nature. Additional evidence comes from two other early Greek poems, Theogony and Works and Days by Hesiod.6
The Homeric poems portray Greek society before the introduction of writing. This society had its own oral poetry, the songs of bards on heroic or mythological subjects. How such poetry can be created and transmitted is now reasonably well understood from study of modern oral poets in the Balkans and other areas.7 Oral bards do not memorize songs as a whole but recreate them on each delivery from common elements: the structure of folktales; themes or incidents useful in the telling of many stories, such as festivals, banquets, sacrifices, duels, councils, or journeys, adapted to the needs of the context; and formulas or verbatim repetitions consisting of whole passages, single lines, phrases, or epithets useful as building blocks in the narrative. A bard learned the craft by listening to other bards, trying to imitate them, and accumulating a reservoir of structures, themes, and formulas. In the singing of a really successful bard there is also an element that neither the bard nor the audience fully understands: “inspiration.” The bard feels a god, in Greek poems a “muse,” singing to and through him.
In the society described in the Homeric poems and in other traditional societies the world over, to a degree also in literate societies, public speaking is learned the same way. A would-be orator listens to older speakers and acquires knowledge of past precedent, as well as a sense of rhetorical conventions, formal styles, and what is effective. Through imitation and practice the speaker builds self-assurance in speaking and acquires techniques and a collection of examples, stock phrases, and themes. The Homeric orator is always understood as speaking extempore, and sometimes with inspiration from a god.
Achilles, the hero of the Iliad, is said to have been taught by Phoenix to be “a speaker of words and a doer of deeds” (Iliad 9.443). These are the two great areas of distinction for the Homeric hero, and Achilles and Odysseus excel at both. Because the Homeric poems, after being written down in the seventh century B.C., became the textbooks out of which Greek students learned to read and were venerated as the bibles of the culture, the attitude toward speech in the Iliad strongly influenced the conception of the orator in Greco-Roman civilization. As in most other cultures, an eloquent speaker is greatly admired, but unlike most other cultures, where harmony and consensus are valued, the Greeks not only tolerated but admired open contention. The Greek male orator, like the Greek male athlete, seeks to win and gains honor from defeating an opponent.8 Anger, retribution, and personal attacks were acceptable in public. This is evident in the spirited debates, even mud-slinging, between Agamemnon and Achilles beginning in the first book of the Iliad, and acceptance of contentious debate remained a distinctive feature of Greek culture and has remained a characteristic of western rhetoric except when constrained by autocratic government or religious authority.
Unlike Achilles, Telemachus, the son of Odysseus, has been left at home, and in the opening books of the Odyssey he is faced with the difficult situation of how to deal with the suitors besetting his mother. He has had no model in oratory. In the second book he succeeds in summoning an assembly of the men of Ithaca, before whom he presents his complaints, but he lacks adequate authority to prevail, even though the goddess Athene gives him a physical charisma beyond his years. The effective Homeric orator must have authority. It comes partly from a position in society by birth, but must be bolstered by what he has done, by how he carries himself, by what sanctions he can bring to support his words. Because personality is important, different styles of delivery emerge. Menelaus is described as speaking rapidly, clearly, and simply, while Odysseus bursts out in a veritable storm of oratory (Iliad 3.212–24). Nestor, oldest of the orators, is garrulous, but his words are compared to honey (Iliad 1.247–52). Such differences become important in defining the characters of style and delivery in classical rhetoric.
Classical rhetoricians later became interested in defining the species of oratory: When are speeches employed and how do they differ with different functions? Beginning with Aristotle, the usual classification is into deliberative, judicial, and epideictic forms. Deliberative rhetoric was viewed as concerned with determination of the advantages of some future action; judicial rhetoric with the determination of the justice or legality of a past action; epideictic with praise or blame of what was honorable or dishonorable. The Homeric poems do not reveal any perception of different kinds of oratory or any indication that, as in some traditional societies, different dialects or levels of formality were regarded as appropriate for different settings, but oratory is used in a variety of contexts. Many of the occasions for speech in the Homeric poems are personal encounters, more appropriate for conversation than for oratory, but when Odysseus is asked in the Odyssey to tell who he is, he regularly replies with a formal speech—and regularly the contents are totally fictitious. Lying was endemic in western oratory from its beginning and produced the repeated, if ineffective, protests of Plato and other philosophers that the only valid rhetoric was that speaking the truth. In addition to casual encounters, oratory in the Homeric poems is engendered by formal deliberative occasions, often with open clash of opinions and allegations. These include meetings of the council of leaders of the army; the assembly of the soldiers in the Iliad or of the citizens of cities in the Odyssey; and embassies, both official such as that to Achilles in Iliad, Book 9, or unofficial as in Book 24. Some speeches in councils, in assemblies, or on embassies are declarative, in that a person with some power or authority simply announces what he is going to do—for example, Agamemnon’s announcement to the council in Book 2 of the Iliad that he will test the army; others are debates about what should be done in a particular situation. The only trial in the Homeric poems is that carved on the shield of Achilles described in Book 18 of the Iliad, but some speeches are calls for justice and resemble judicial occasions, as, for example, the debate between Agamemnon and Achilles in the first book of the Iliad or Telemachus’s complaints in the second book of the Odyssey. There are also some speeches that anticipate the occasions of later epideictic oratory, such as the speeches of lament for Hector in the eighteenth and twenty-fourth books of the Iliad and Achilles’ speech of consolation to Priam in Iliad, Book 24 (599–620).9
The ninth book of the Iliad contains perhaps the finest set of speeches in the poem and is interesting for study because it shows differences in technique of three different orators and the reply of Achilles to each. Some of the techniques employed anticipate categories of classical rhetoric. The occasion is the embassy sent by the Greek army with the consent of its commander-in-chief, Agamemnon, to try to persuade Achilles to return to battle after he has withdrawn in anger at his treatment by Agamemnon. There are three ambassadors, Odysseus, Phoenix, and Ajax, chosen for their potential influence on Achilles. He acknowledges (9.204) that they are the men he loves most.
Odysseus speaks first, and his address is the most carefully organized in the group. It falls into five parts. First he addresses Achilles and expresses thanks for his hospitality (225–28), establishing a cordial tone. This corresponds to the proemium, or introduction, of a classical oration, which seeks the attention and goodwill of an audience. Second, he states a proposition (228–31): the Greek ships will be destroyed unless Achilles returns to help the army. The contrast between the pleasant setting beside the campfire and the realities of the military situation is a startling note. Odysseus may be thought to exaggerate the danger slightly, for his own purposes, but only slightly. In any event, his description of the situation is direct, clear, and brief. He then moves on to a third part, a narration of how the situation developed (232–46). This too is clear and rapid, and predominance is given to actions of Achilles’ rival Hector, leader of the Trojans. At the end of the narration Hector’s threat to the ships is amplified in three clauses (“tricolon,” in the terminology of later rhetoric): he threatens “to cut off the stern tops of the ships,” “to torch the ships themselves with ravening fire,” and “to cut down the Greeks as they rush from the smoke.” The clauses are arranged in a “climax” both in meaning and in length; in the Greek there are four words plus four words plus seven words. The fourth part of Odysseus’s speech is his exhortation, “Up! If, late as it is, you want to rescue the Greeks” (247–48). This introduces the proof, the reasons that Achilles should return to battle (249–306). There are five reasons given. The first is ethical: he will regret it later if he fails to help the Greeks. The second is an appeal to authority: Achilles’ father, Odysseus says, had advised him to control his anger and avoid quarrels. Achilles’ father’s words are directly quoted as though he were speaking. This is a dramatic device that is given development in classical rhetoric as the figure prosopopoeia. The third reason is nonartistic; that is, it is not an idea originating in the speaker’s art but a list of specific inducements offered by Agamemnon to Achilles if he will come back. Some of these are available immediately, including seven tripods and ten talents of gold, along with return of Achilles’ concubine Briseis, whom Agamemnon claims not to have touched. Other inducements are promises of prizes when Troy has been taken, including twenty Trojan women and Agamemnon’s daughter as wife. These two lists are the largest element in the speech. The fourth reason that Achilles should return is pity for the Achaeans and the glory he will gain from them if he comes. Such an appeal to emotions could be described by the rhetorical term pathos. Emotional appeal is often a feature of the epilogue or conclusion of a classical speech. The final reason is also emotional: the present circumstances offer Achilles a chance to kill Hector, who now boasts that no one is his equal.
Odysseus’s argument is based on an attempt to identify the interests of Achilles with those of the other Greeks. The attempt to arouse emotion is rather obvious, and the psychological devices are rather flagrant, particularly waving the red flag of Hector’s vaunting victory in proud Achilles’ face. Odysseus’s remarks in fact prove counterproductive.
In contrast to Odysseus’s formal and carefully ordered speech, Achilles’ reply is personal and rather digressive, though it has some structural framework beneath the surface. After a polite introductory apology at being so negative, his remarks fall into three groups: his view of the situation, his reaction to the specific offers of Agamemnon, and his advice to the ambassadors. His general reaction is that fighting gets one nowhere: “Fate is the same for one who does nothing and one who fights” (318). Such general statements become a feature of classical rhetoric under the label “maxims” or sententiae. He introduces a simile, comparing himself to a mother bird (323). He uses irony: “Let Agamemnon sleep with Briseis and enjoy himself” (336–37). Lines repeatedly begin with the same words, a device known as anaphora: “Not even” or “not even if.” As for Hector, he has shown his fear of Achilles. Achilles will now fight no more and says he plans to sail home the next morning. This threat has not previously been mentioned and apparently results from Odysseus’s reference to Hector at the end of his speech. Achilles takes a more extreme position in defense than he would have otherwise, for under the force of the following discourses he will gradually retreat from what he says here.
In the next part of his speech Achilles proceeds to reject Agamemnon’s offers in detail. The character (êthos) of Agamemnon, which he regards as evil, is to him a more important factor than the gifts offered or the emotional appeals that have been made. His own character, even personality, emerges clearly: he is moody, sensitive, offended, but idealistic and principled in his way. If Odysseus’s appeal can be called generally “pathetical,” Achilles’ response is generally “ethical,” that is, based on the character of himself and Agamemnon. He makes no mention of his father, but does cite the tragic choice offered him by his mother: a short life made glorious by victory at Troy, or an inglorious return to a long life at home. The last part of Achilles’ speech is his advice to the ambassadors (421–29). They should go back to the Greek camp and find some other solution to the problem. Let Phoenix stay with Achilles and decide if he wants to go home with him to Greece.
Phoenix then takes up the appeal to Achilles with a long and very personal speech. His remarks have two special features. The first is an extended account of his own early life and his relationship to Achilles (434–96). Its object is to establish Phoenix in the role and with the authority of a parent to Achilles. This is followed (497–528) by an appeal on religious ground to Achilles to give up his anger. The second special feature of Phoenix’s speech is the story of Meleager (529–99), which provides a parallel to Achilles’ situation: What happens to a hero who withdraws from his duty? This is analogous to the use of examples by later orators. At the end, Phoenix briefly sums up his main points: If you wait you will eventually have to come, but without gifts and honor.
Achilles’ reply to Phoenix is brief: I have enough honor; it does not become you to take Agamemnon’s side; stay and share my life. But Achilles is not unaffected by Phoenix’s appeal, and the latter’s speech is not counterproductive in the way Odysseus’s was. Achilles no longer says that he will leave in the morning. Rather, he will decide in the morning whether to leave or not. It is difficult of course to say specifically what produced this change of heart, but the general nature of Phoenix’s speech would suggest that Achilles has been touched by his personal appeal. He finds it harder to say no to Phoenix, and he may have been impressed by the example of Meleager.
The third ambassador is Ajax, who throughout the Iliad is presented as a blunt soldier. His short speech here does not begin by addressing Achilles. Instead, he turns aside (apostrophê in classical rhetoric) to speak to Odysseus, saying essentially, “let’s go home—we are wasting our time.” But he obviously intends for Achilles to hear and easily slips into the second person, referring to Achilles (636), reminds him of the inducements offered to him, and concludes with a protestation of love and honor from Achilles’ friends. This appeal, added to Phoenix’s, has an effect on Achilles. He further retreats from his declared intention to go home and tells Ajax that though his anger at Agamemnon remains great, he will stay in the Troad, and if Hector breaks through to his own camp, he will fight him.
Much can be learned about classical rhetorical traditions from the ninth book of the Iliad. Many devices of invention, arrangement, and style were clearly in use long before they were identified and named. The role of ethos, or character, is particularly strong and results in quite different presentations by the three orators, but there are instances of statements with supporting reasons, what in classical rhetoric came to be called enthymemes. Individually, the speeches show a sense of structure, and as a group there are balances between the speeches: Phoenix and Achilles in the center, framed by Odysseus and Ajax. Classical literature, including Greek oratory, has a predilection for balance, symmetry, and framing.
For all the artistic quality of the speeches, the ninth book of the Iliad is a picture of the failure of rhetoric in dealing with a highly personal situation. Arguments based on practical expediencies are not persuasive, and the attempt to awaken passions is here counterproductive. Personal loyalty and friendships are what make the greatest impression. In the first work of European literature we are brought face to face with some of the limitations of rhetoric.
A syllabic script known as Linear B was used in Greece for commercial record keeping in the late second millennium, the Mycenaean Age. Widespread destruction took place in the twelfth and eleventh centuries, and knowledge of writing was lost. With improved conditions by the eighth century, the Greeks adapted to the needs of their own language a form of Phoenician alphabetic writing. By the seventh century, traditional oral poetry was being preserved in writing on papyrus imported from Egypt, and by the sixth century new works were being published in written form; that is, handwritten copies were made and circulated. Books and readers, however, were few until the second half of the fifth century, when there was a marked increase in literacy in Athens and some other cities, and bookstores and personal libraries are known to have existed.10 The increased use of writing in the fifth and fourth centuries is known as the “literate revolution” in Greece and has been compared to changes resulting from the introduction of printing in Europe in the fifteenth century and of electronic technology in the twentieth century.11 The reasons for the literate revolution are not easily specified; it probably resulted from a combination of influences. The Greeks had become aware of the extensive use of writing in the Near East for commercial, administrative, religious, and literary purposes and saw its utility. For some individual Greeks, opportunities for education and study increased with increased wealth. The needs of Athens’s military and commercial empire led to increased use of writing for communication over distances. An increase in literacy was encouraged by democracy and participation in public affairs by a growing number of people.
Opposition to reliance on written texts was occasionally voiced. The sophist Alcidamas wrote a short work entitled Against Those Writing Written Texts,12 and Plato criticizes writing at the end of Phaedrus on the ground that it destroys memory and that a written text cannot defend itself in dialogue. The effect of writing on the history of rhetoric was, however, largely positive. Writing made possible the circulation of the early handbooks of rhetoric, to be discussed in the Chapter 2, and the publication of speeches by orators and sophists that could be read, studied, and imitated at leisure. It also encouraged precision in the use of words and facilitated revision and polishing of a text. It may have contributed to the use of longer, more complex sentences. For the audience, writing made it possible to reread a text, to compare statements made in one passage with those in another, to quote passages accurately, and to study the style and artistry of the text. Generally, writing facilitated collection of facts, study of science, and research on many subjects. Finally, writing preserved knowledge of the past; without written texts we would know little of Greek civilization.13
The sixth, fifth, and fourth centuries in Greece constituted one of the greatest creative periods in history. It marked the development of the intellectual and artistic basis for western civilization that featured the emergence of philosophy, science, literature, and art as those subjects have been defined and studied ever since. Greek thinkers sought to give a nonmythological account of why things are as they are; they attempted to make generalizations and define the relationship of universals to particulars, employing abstract language as never before. A consciousness of both natural and social forces began to be felt for the first time, and attempts were made to define and describe them. Rhetoric was one of the things the Greeks sought to describe, and as in other areas of humanistic consciousness, description of rhetoric involved movement in two directions: toward general statements of rules applicable in all situations, and toward a breaking down of universals into categories and subcategories that better define the particulars.
Out of this intellectual fervor there emerged three approaches to rhetoric that are continuing strands in its tradition throughout the history of western Europe. The first and most conceptualized of these strands may be called technical rhetoric in that it is the rhetorical theory of a technê, or rhetorical handbook. Technical rhetoric grew out of the needs of democracies in Syracuse and Athens, and it remained primarily concerned with public address. Of the three factors in the speech situation identified by Aristotle (Rhetoric 1.3.1)—speaker, speech, and audience—technical rhetoric concentrates on the speech at the expense of the other two. It is pragmatic; it shows how to present a subject efficiently and effectively but makes no attempt to judge the morality of the speaker and pays little attention to the audience. The characteristic definition of rhetoric in this technical tradition is “the art of persuasion.” Technical rhetoric of the fifth and fourth centuries in Greece is the ancestor of Latin manuals of rhetoric, including Cicero’s On Invention and Rhetoric for Herennius. Its focus on public life, and especially on speech in the lawcourts, made it attractive to Romans, who transmitted it in turn to the western Middle Ages and thus to later times. Technical rhetoric repeatedly experienced letteraturizzazione and was often reduced to guides to composition and style.
The second strand, also a development of the fifth century B.C., is sophistic rhetoric, rhetoric as understood by Gorgias and other sophists, carried to full development by Isocrates in the fourth century, revived in the Second Sophistic of Roman times, and converted to Christianity by preachers like Gregory of Nazianzus in later antiquity. Sophistic rhetoric was a stronger strand in the Byzantine tradition than in the western Middle Ages but reemerged as a powerful force in the Renaissance. It emphasizes the speaker rather than the speech or audience and is responsible for the image of the ideal orator leading society to noble fulfillment of national ideals. Some sophistic rhetoric is deliberative, some epideictic. It is often ceremonial and cultural rather than active and political, and though moral in tone, it tends not to press for difficult decisions or immediate action. Sophistic rhetoric is a natural spawning ground for amplification, elaborate conceits, and stylistic refinement, and thus is often criticized, but it has positive qualities that have ensured its survival. Like technical rhetoric, the sophistic strand often has experienced letteraturizzazione, seen in large-scale works of literature that are intended to be read and enjoyed for their eloquence.
The third strand, philosophical rhetoric, began with Socrates’ objections to technical and sophistical rhetoric in dialogues by Plato. It tended to deemphasize the speaker and to stress the validity of the message and the effect on an audience. Philosophical rhetoric has close ties to dialectic or logic, to ethics and political theory, and sometimes to psychology. Its natural topic is deliberation about the best interests of the audience, but the philosophical strand in discussions of rhetoric is often found in combination with technical or sophistic rhetoric. Aristotle’s Rhetoric is a classic work in the philosophical tradition, but it also contains much technical rhetoric. Cicero’s dialogue On the Orator attempts a synthesis of all three traditions. In the Middle Ages, the chief manifestation of philosophical rhetoric is in dialectic. In the Renaissance the philosophical view of rhetoric inspired the transfer of invention from rhetoric to dialectic, but a purer strain reappeared in the work of Bacon and Fénelon in the seventeenth century.
Women rarely spoke in public in classical Greece, but there is some evidence of their rhetorical skills and of their voices in ancient society. The ancient Greek woman who is best known directly from her own words is Sappho of Lesbos.14 She wrote lyric poetry on themes of love and marriage in the first half of the sixth century B.C., over a century before the first writing about rhetoric, and she may have directed a kind of finishing school for young girls. Her poetry was greatly admired in antiquity. The grammarians of Alexandria included her works in their canons of classical poetry, and extensive fragments of it have been recovered in modern times from papyri written in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Her works, however, were not copied into codex manuscripts in the early Middle Ages, perhaps because of Christian distaste for homosexual love, and thus are known to us only from the chance survival of papyri and from quotations by male authors of the Roman period. The author of On Sublimity, known as Longinus, who was perhaps writing in the second century after Christ, quotes (10.2) one short poem and praises it for its vividness. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a rhetorician of the late first century B.C., quotes (On Composition 23) Sappho’s “Prayer to Aphrodite” as an example of elegance of style. In this poem, Sappho prays to the goddess of love to come to her again and describes her previous manifestation in a golden chariot pulled by fluttering sparrows: “Whom now,” Aphrodite says, “do you long for Peitho to bring to your love? Who, Sappho, wrongs you?” Peitho, goddess of persuasion, appears elsewhere in Sappho’s poetry, and indeed, much of her writing deals directly or indirectly with the emotional basis of amatory persuasion. Her poetic and rhetorical skills, like those of other early Greek poets, can be attributed to her own genius, experience, and observation, and to imitation and adaptation of earlier poetry, especially the Homeric epics. Fragments of the poetry of one other woman, Corinna of Tanagra, have been found on papyri. They include parts of a poem describing a song contest between mountain gods and of another poem foretelling the destiny of the daughters of Aesopus who married gods.15
Speeches attributed to women in Greek literature were written by men, but they often portray women as skillful artisans of speech. They include the divine and human women speakers in the Iliad and Odyssey and in the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. Sophocles’ Antigone, in the play of that name, is especially adept at argument in her debates with Creon and Ismene over her right to bury her brother, and characters in Euripides’ plays—Medea, Hecuba, Helen, Andromache, and others—are shown utilizing techniques of contemporary sophistry. These women characters are all imagined as living and speaking in the heroic past, when aristocratic women may have enjoyed a fuller participation in society than was true in Athens in the classical period. Respectable Athenian women and girls were largely secluded at home. Many learned to read and write, and some may have exercised great influence through husbands, sons, and brothers, but their primary responsibilities were those of wives and mothers; ordinarily they did not take meals with men or have much opportunity for intellectual engagement with men. They did attend public religious festivals, including theatrical productions (the female roles were, however, played by men in costume). There were some athletic games for girls, but women did not participate in meetings of the political assembly or hold any offices, except as priestesses, and there, like nuns, they were under the control of male superiors. Their sworn depositions could be entered into evidence, but they could not speak or even appear in the lawcourts. When Aristophanes, in Lysistrata and Thesmophoriazusae, imagines contemporary women engaging in a strike and holding political debates, this is intended to be outrageously funny. The comedies of Menander, describing Athenian society in the second half of the fourth century, seem to suggest that by that time women had some greater freedom of action than had been true earlier, and this was probably also true in Greek-speaking Hellenistic cities.16
Exceptions to the closeted life of Athenian women were found in the class of hetairai, members of which were largely foreign born. These ranged from persons of great influence like Aspasia of Miletus, who lived for many years with Pericles and bore him a son, to skilled female musicians and dancers who performed at festivals and symposia, noncitizen concubines in permanent relationships with a man, and prostitutes.
There is no record of any woman student of the sophists, but some women studied in the greater privacy of philosophical schools, and a few wrote works on philosophical subjects.17 A short piece, “On Human Nature” by Aesara of Lucania, an early Pythagorian, has survived.18 Two women are named among the students in Plato’s Academy, Lastheneia of Mantinea and Axiothea of Phliasa, both non-Athenians (see Diogenes Laertius 3.46). Nothing is known of them except their names. A woman named Leontium was a member of the philosophical school of Epicurus in the late fourth century and wrote a work, now lost, on the nature of the gods, attacking the views of Theophrastus (Cicero On the Nature of the Gods 1.93). The sixty-first oration of the philosopher-sophist Dio Chrysostom is a dialogue between Dio and a woman friend about the representation of women in the Iliad. The most famous woman philosopher, Hypatia, lived at the end of antiquity. She taught Neoplatonic philosophy in Alexandria in the fifth century after Christ, wrote commentaries, now lost, on philosophical texts, and was murdered by Christians at the instigation of Bishop Cyril.19
The women who had the greatest opportunity to influence public affairs and who would have had some occasion to speak in public were those few women who became queens of Greek cities. For example, Artemisia, Queen of Caria, accompanied Xerxes on his invasion of Greece in 480 B.C. and commanded a naval contingent at the battle of Salamis. Herodotus, who clearly admired her, attributes to her two short speeches in which she gives frank, practical advice to the king (Herodotus 8.68 and 102). A second Artemisia succeeded her husband, Mausolus, as Queen of Caria in 353 B.C. In her husband’s memory she built the Mausoleum, one of the Seven Wonders of the World, and sponsored a rhetorical contest in which leading sophists of the time participated (Aulus Gellius 10.18). Later Greek queens include Cleopatra in Egypt in the first century B.C., described in Plutarch’s life of Antony, and Zenobia, Queen of Palmyra in the third century after Christ, who brought the famous rhetorician Cassius Longinus to live at her court to advise her. The most famous woman writer of the Byzantine period in Greece was the royal princess Anna Comnena, who lived in the twelfth century. She is the author of The Alexiad, a history of her own time, and the preface speaks of her education in grammar, rhetoric, and philosophy.20
Plato’s attitude toward women seems to have been ambiguous. References to women in his dialogues are sometimes negative, but in Laws, one of his last works, he describes an ideal constitution in which women are to be educated, are to participate in politics, and are even to hold public offices (Laws 785b). No women appear directly in the Platonic dialogues, where emotional relationships are those of male homosexuality, but in Symposium (201d–212c) Socrates reports an extended conversation on philosophical love with a priestess named Diotima.21 She may well have been a real person, though the speech is certainly Plato’s dramatic creation. In Menexenus (236b–c) Socrates speaks of a conversation with Aspasia, attributes to her the famous funeral oration of Pericles, and claims to have learned from her the funeral oration that he subsequently recites. Plato’s objective in Menexenus and the interpretation of “Aspasia” are very controversial. One reading of the dialogue suggests that Plato’s attribution of an Athenian funeral oration to the non-Athenian Aspasia is directed at those naive enough to listen to the words of an outsider.22
Aristotle did not regard rhetoric as a faculty limited only to men. In his treatise on the subject he quotes examples of rhetorical techniques attributed to women, and in 1.5.6 he says that happiness is only half present in states where the condition of women is poor. On the other hand, in Politics 1.13.11 he quotes with approval Sophocles’ line “A modest silence is a woman’s crown,” and in general he seems to have had a negative opinion of women’s intellectual abilities.
There are many good recent publications on women in Greece and Rome.23 Women played a somewhat more public role in Roman society than in Greek, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. Reference to women and rhetoric will also be found in later chapters.24 In the Renaissance and Neoclassical periods texts by women begin to be numerous enough to be the basis of description of a women’s rhetoric. As later chapters will explain, there are records of public speeches by women, including epideictic orations in the Renaissance, but most women’s rhetoric is to be found in other genres, especially in lyric poetry, novels, dramas, and letters.