To understand the origins of the 20 July Plot, it is necessary first to say a few words about the way in which Hitler and the National Socialists (Nazis) gained power in Germany, and the origins of the widespread opposition to their rule. Although never securing a democratic majority, the Nazis managed to turn Germany into an authoritarian state through emergency laws, enabling acts and plebiscites. This so-called ‘legal revolution’ was particularly difficult for the political Left to challenge. The trades unions, the Socialists and the Communists had an opportunity to unseat the Nazis in 1933, while their respective organizations were still relatively strong. However, lack of a common aim and mutual mistrust meant that it was impossible to establish a unified ‘Left’. This was certainly not helped by the KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands – German Communist Party), which fought the Nazis on the streets, but also attacked the Socialists because of their desire to seek power through the ballot box.
This inability to produce a consensus proved disastrous. In May 1933 the trades unions were dissolved and, in July 1933, all political parties were outlawed. A number of prominent left-wing leaders fled the country and sought to effect change from without. Those that stayed established underground groups, but these were ruthlessly crushed by the Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei – Secret State Police) and any remaining hope that a Communist-led government would gain popular support was extinguished by the Nazi–Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939. The attack on the Soviet Union in 22 June 1941 provided a glimmer of hope, but the war against the Bolsheviks brought greater surveillance and persecution of the Communists within Germany and meant there was little chance to coordinate opposition.
The opposition offered by the Left was therefore divided and unable to establish a united movement capable of confronting the Nazis. This was not the case with the Church, but for a number of reasons it, too, failed to speak with a single voice against Hitler. Indeed, at the outset it actually welcomed the Nazi experiment, which seemed to espouse Christian values. Even before coming to power, the Nazis had looked to absorb the Protestant Church into the movement with the establishment of the Deutsche Christen (German Christians). Following the Nazi accession to power on 30 January 1933, this group sought to control the Protestant Church with some success, but ultimately the Deutsche Christen splintered and differences between it and the mainstream Church diminished to such an extent that, in the end, it was treated no differently by Germany’s Nazi government.
Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, the former mayor of Leipzig and one of the leaders of German resistance to Hitler, appears at the People’s Court, having been arrested after the failed coup in August 1944. Found guilty, he was kept alive because he continued to name names in an effort to show the Nazis the extent of the resistance. He was hanged in February 1945. (Topfoto)
Having failed to absorb the Protestant Church, the Nazis moved from a policy of grudging acceptance to outright opposition and, in 1941, called for the Church to be eliminated completely. Church leaders continued to protest against Nazism, but this stand could not be described as political resistance; rather, it was a fight to preserve the autonomy of the Protestant Church. This reluctance to move into the political arena was the result of a number of factors, not the least of which was the problem of Church versus State – to attack the Nazis was to attack Germany. This was particularly true following the outbreak of war, as the Church put patriotic duty above attempts to attack the regime. Moreover, the fight against Bolshevism proved a persuasive argument for both Protestants and Catholics, neutralizing much of the opposition against the Nazis.
The position of the Catholic Church was different from that of the Protestants because of the extra-national dimension of the Church of Rome. On 20 July 1933 the Vatican signed a concordat with Germany recognizing the Nazi regime, which made opposition to the Nazis difficult. As such, the Catholic Church never sanctioned political resistance, but individuals – both Protestant and Catholic – did demur and played a part in the plot of 20 July, and the Nazis continued to fear the power of the Church.
The pastor and theologian Martin Niemöller neatly captured the state of German opposition in Germany at that time when he wrote:
When the Nazis came for the Communists
I was silent
I wasn’t a Communist
When the Nazis came for the Social Democrats
I was silent
I wasn’t a Social Democrat
When the Nazis came for the Trade Unionists
I was silent
I wasn’t a Trade Unionist
When the Nazis came for the Jews
I was silent
I wasn’t a Jew
When the Nazis came for me
There was no one left to Protest (quoted in McDonough 2001: 38)
Bendlerstrasse, now Stauffenbergstrasse, where the Bendlerblock was located. This was the location of the headquarters of the Replacement Army. It is still used by the German Ministry of Defence and is also home to the German Resistance Memorial Centre. Just visible in the bottom right is the entrance to the courtyard where von Stauffenberg and his compatriots were executed. (Author)
Neither the political Left nor the Church were able to challenge the Nazis and, while there was opposition to Hitler and the Nazis from other quarters, including the civil service and academia, it was never possible to unite the various groups into a single movement. Only one group could realistically remove Hitler from power, and that was the army. However, at the outset this powerful body, by adopting a neutral stance, served to consolidate Nazi rule. Promised autonomy by Hitler, the army acquiesced in the murder of Kurt von Schleicher, a former general and the last Chancellor of the Weimar Republic, in the Night of the Long Knives and, following the death of President Hindenburg on 2 August 1934, accepted an oath swearing allegiance to Hitler. Moreover, it could be argued, initially at least, that the aims of the army and the Nazis were broadly aligned, both parties sharing a desire to overturn the punitive peace agreed at Versailles and to expand the armed forces.
In the pre-war period, then, the army was content to carry out its duty and not get involved in politics. Opposition was generally confined to the conscience of individuals, rather than any coordinated action by the army as a whole. The Army High Command (known as the Oberkommando des Heeres – OKH – from 1936) did depart momentarily from this course as Hitler’s expansionist aims became clear. In 1936, in contravention of the terms of the peace agreed at Versailles, Hitler planned to remilitarize the Rhineland. Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, Generalstabschef des Heeres (Chief of the Army General Staff), implored his superiors – Generalfeldmarschall Werner von Blomberg, Reichskreigsminister (Minister of Defence) and also Oberbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht (Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces) and Generaloberst Werner Freiherr von Fritsch, Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres (Army Commander-in-Chief) – to act, but they did nothing.1 The following year Blomberg and Fritsch attended the Hossbach conference (5 November 1937), where Hitler outlined his policy of Lebensraum (living space). Both commanders were shocked, but within months they had been replaced, their positions undermined by personal intrigues.
At the same time Hitler used this crisis to strengthen his hold over the military. All members of the Wehrmacht were already required to make a personal oath of loyalty to the Führer. In February 1938 Hitler established the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW – High Command of the German Armed Forces) and made himself Oberster Befehlshaber (Supreme Commander), with General der Artillerie (General of Artillery), later Generalfeldmarschall, Wilhelm Keitel appointed as OKW chief of staff.
The army, though, still had a powerful voice, and Beck continued to press Fritsch’s replacement, Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Brauchitsch, to act. Though sympathetic, Brauchitsch did nothing to influence Hitler and, with the Western powers seemingly unwilling to take action, Beck resigned in August 1938. A close associate of Beck’s, Generalmajor Hans Oster, continued to plot against the Nazis. Working in the central department (Abteilung Z) of the Abwehr (military intelligence), he had many contacts and was protected by Konteradmiral Wilhelm Canaris, the head of the Abwehr. In the summer of 1938 plans were hatched to arrest Hitler following the outbreak of war in Europe, which now seemed inevitable. His incarceration would be followed by the establishment of a military junta until power could be passed back to a democratic government. Contacts were made with the Western powers to apprise them of the plan, but the conspirators were ignored and, on 30 September 1938, the Munich Peace Agreement was signed, which effectively cut the ground from beneath the conspirators.
The German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 and the outbreak of war changed the complexion of resistance to Hitler. The army grew in size and strength and was therefore in many respects better placed to oppose the Nazi regime. However, the expansion of the army, the creation of the Luftwaffe and especially the growth of the Waffen-SS (Armed SS), the military wing of the Nazis’ Schutzstaffel (protection squad), saw the ranks of the armed forces swollen with Nazis, which served to undermine the strength of the officer class – the mainstay of the resistance. Moreover, the war also made resistance to Hitler more difficult because it blurred the edges between Germany and the Nazi government. It would be difficult to attack Hitler without possible criticism of stabbing the country in the back. This was a powerful charge, because it resonated with the stab-in-the-back theory expounded after World War I. In 1918 politicians had signed an armistice when, it was argued, the German Army had not been defeated in the field. Significantly, it was also difficult to act against Hitler while he was enjoying success. On 1 September 1939 Germany invaded Poland and, in a little over a month, Hitler’s military, in conjunction with Soviet forces, proved victorious.
With the defeat of Poland, Hitler’s gaze turned west and plans were developed for the invasion of France, which was scheduled for October 1939. The army, nervous about the prospect of another European war with France and Britain, expressed deep misgivings and the attack was delayed. In the interval further attempts were made to win over Western governments. This showed signs of success and Britain and France guaranteed friendly relations with a non-Nazi Germany, provided that all expansionist plans were renounced. However, despite knowing about this deal, Brauchitsch failed to act once again and, in April 1940, Germany occupied Denmark and Norway. Peace talks with the Western powers ended and this seeming duplicity generated a mistrust of the German military that lasted until the end of the war.2
The invasion of France and the Low Countries – about which Oster warned the West3 – was launched on 10 May 1940; within weeks the British had evacuated the Continent and France had surrendered, leaving the opposition with little or no hope of help from the outside. Change would have to come from within, but chances were slim. Any act against Hitler would be seen as treason. Moreover, for those officers who had conspired to remove Hitler because his actions threatened to destroy Germany and all they held dear was to some extent pacified by the victories. Plans to overthrow Hitler continued, but, with little support inside or outside the country, the movement was fuelled only by the belief among conspirators that they were morally right.
On 22 June 1941 Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Just like it had in the West the Wehrmacht won a series of startling victories, but it soon became clear that war on the Eastern Front was going to be different, not least because of the brutal way Hitler was waging war. The people of the occupied territories, whom the Nazis viewed as Untermenschen (subhumans), were systematically abused – particularly the Jews, who were rounded up and shot or sent to concentration camps. Hitler was also increasingly involved in directing military operations, which worried many in the army. In the bitter winter of 1941/42 Hitler insisted that his exhausted forces capture Moscow and, when Generaloberst Erich Hoepner, who had formed part of the conspiracy to remove Hitler before the war, dared to defy Hitler’s orders by withdrawing troops of his Panzergruppe 4 (4th Armoured Group), he was removed from his command. Hoepner did not forget this humiliation and it strengthened his conviction that Hitler should be removed. A number of other senior officers were also dismissed or asked to be relieved of their command and, on 19 December 1941, Hitler made himself Army Commander-in-Chief, vice Brauchitsch. In 1942 the Wehrmacht resumed its offensive on the Eastern Front, but now Hitler changed the focus of the attack with the main effort in the south. On 28 June, Fall Blau (Case Blue) was launched and in September the first German troops entered Stalingrad. Hitler was determined to capture the city and Stalin was equally determined it would not fall. In November the Soviet leader launched a counter-attack, which saw Generalfeldmarschall Friedrich Paulus’s 6. Armee (Sixth Army) encircled in the city and steadily annihilated; Paulus surrendered on 31 January 1943. Many in the army were now convinced that the only way to save Germany was to remove Hitler from power.
1 The Reichswehr (German Armed Forces), created after World War I, became the Wehrmacht in 1935; the Reichsheer (German Army) was renamed the Heer.
2 In Britain and France some felt that the peace overtures by the army were a ruse to enable the Germans to attack Scandinavia.
3 He provided the dates of the planned attack.