Tensions were raised considerably on 11 February when the IRA in Clones, County Monaghan, tried to arrest a group of nineteen Ulster Special Constabulary men who were travelling from Belfast to Enniskillen by rail. Part of their journey was through County Monaghan. They had to change trains, with a half-hour layover, in Clones. They had already boarded the second train when Commander Matt Fitzpatrick of the IRA approached with his revolver drawn and called on them to surrender. One of the men responded by shooting Fitzpatrick in the head and he died instantly. Some of the Special Constables claimed the IRA fired first. Both sides were apparently convinced that the other side was responsible for the extended gun battle that became known as the Clones Affray. A sergeant and three Ulster Special Constables were killed on the train, eight others were wounded and the IRA took five as prisoners.
‘It is possible that the tragedy was the result of a genuine misunderstanding on both sides,’ Hamar Greenwood reported. ‘Its real origin is to be found in the unfortunate error of judgment of the person responsible for sending a body of armed Special Constabulary into southern Ireland at a time when their presence was almost certain to arouse the suspicion that a reprisal was being attempted for the recent raids into northern territory.’ He added that the ‘deplorable political consequences’ had ‘their inevitable . sequel’ in the outbreak of further violence in Belfast, where thirty-nine people were murdered over the next three days.. 1..
On 13 February a bomb was thrown among some twenty Catholic children playing in the Weaver Street area, killing two instantly and fatally wounding four others. ‘In my opinion,’ Churchill wrote to Collins, ‘it is the worst thing that has happened in Ireland in the last three years.’. 2.. When the funerals of the four Ulster Special Constabulary officers killed in Clones were held, passions in Belfast were further inflamed.
‘The difficulty is that the so-called Irish Republican Army organisation in County Monaghan are incensed at the arrest and detention in prison of certain Monaghan men who were arrested in the territory of the northern government, a month ago,’ Churchill told the House of Commons. They were ‘proceeding to play in a football match at Derry, but they were arrested because they were recognised “as the commander and headquarters staff of the Monaghan division of the so-called Irish Republican Army”’.. 3..
General Macready was deeply uneasy about Churchill’s decision to delay the further withdrawal of British soldiers. ‘The suspension of the evacuation of troops from southern Ireland was no doubt ordered for good reasons,’ Macready reported. ‘I have not been informed what those reasons were. I hope, however, that when the evacuation is allowed to proceed it will be continued without interruption and with all reasonable expedition.’ He added, ‘Our continued presence in southern Ireland only acts as an irritant.’. 4..
Some in Britain were clearly suspicious that the Provisional Government was involved in the hostage-taking. ‘The latest raids, in which responsible Irish officers have taken part, speak ill for . the effectiveness of the Provisional Government, and they have done much to imperil the Irish settlement,’ the Daily Telegraph noted. ‘The first question which occurs to us in considering the attack upon Ulster is – Who did it?’ the Morning Post asked. ‘Was it, as the Lord Chancellor suggests, merely some wild men not yet under the control of the Provisional Government, or was it done with the cognisance, or even at the direction of that Government.’. 5..
Robert Lynn, a unionist MP from Belfast, told the House of Commons that Eoin O’Duffy was behind the raids and that some of the captured raiders were in the uniform of the army of the Provisional Government. This was undoubtedly correct, but Churchill did not assume that the Provisional Government was actually implicated just because some of those arrested were in the uniform of the new army. O’Duffy was officially chief of staff of not only the new army being formed, but also the whole IRA. Yet he and Collins were obviously not in control of its anti-Treaty elements. Churchill clearly did not suspect that Collins was implicated in taking the hostages. ‘I am satisfied,’ he told parliament, ‘that the Provisional Government are using the whole of their influence and authority, as far as it goes, to procure their [the hostages’] release.’. 6..
Churchill was also reported as saying, ‘We have been in constant communication with the Irish Provisional Government, and they have assured me that they are doing, and will do everything in their power to secure the liberation of the persons kidnapped in the raids of last Thursday. We believe that such is their sincere wish and intention. The extent of their powers at the present time is much more doubtful.’ At this point he exhibited uncharacteristic patience towards Irish nationalism. ‘We are passing through . a very difficult interim period, and until the Irish Provisional Government are properly equipped with properly constituted powers we cannot expect that they can have the control which is necessary, and which every civilised government has over its agents and forces,’ he added. ‘Therefore, we should not judge them at this stage by exactly the same rules as those by which we should judge an established government.’. 7.. Lord Birkenhead assured the House of Lords that ‘Collins is in an extremely trying and anxious position; and I believe that he is doing his best to carry out the letter and spirit of his obligation.’. 8..
‘It was inevitable that the arrest and detention by the Belfast authorities of prominent IRA officers, who were proceeding to a football match, and the failure to notify in time the reprieve of the Derry prisoners, should be met locally by the seizure of prominent unionists,’ Collins explained in a further telegram to Churchill on 16 February. ‘I and those who work with me in the teeth of many difficulties are ready to settle all this matter in a spirit of peace and goodwill. In fact, we have already given proof of our sincerity by the – some say premature – withdrawal of the Belfast boycott. There can, however, be no real peace until the other side meet us in the same spirit and until the British government ceases to support the aggression of the dissenting population in East Ulster.’. 9..
Under pressure from London, Craig was prepared to agree to release ‘the Monaghan footballers’, after the Provisional Government was credited with arranging the release of twenty-six of the forty-three hostages on 16 February. The British cabinet was informed, however, that Craig only agreed to the release ‘on condition that the Provisional Government would recognise the validity of the decisions of the Ulster courts and would give a . solemn undertaking not to ask in future for the release of any more prisoners on political grounds’.. 10..
That day Churchill announced the setting up of a border commission to act as a peace-keeping agency to mediate in any future border disputes. ‘I suggested this Commission in the first instance only as an alternative to drastic steps which Parliament would otherwise expect me to take for securing the area of Northern Ireland,’ Churchill telegraphed Collins two days before the announcement was made.. 11.. The commission achieved very little and soon faded away. ‘To those who knew anything of the two component parts of the Commission, the IRA and Ulster representatives,’ General Macready wrote, ‘the scheme was foredoomed to failure, though no doubt it looked very attractive in Whitehall … From the first, in spite of the loyal efforts of the British officers [to make the border commission work], the whole affair was a farce.’. 12..
Collins sent Churchill a telegram on 16 February arguing for a resumption of the withdrawal of British soldiers:
I have seen it suggested in the English Press that the suspension of the evacuation of the British troops from Ireland is for the purpose of helping the Provisional Government of Ireland. The best way in which the British government could help us at the present time is not by suspending the carrying out of the Treaty, but by so adhering to its spirit and letter that Ireland will be convinced that Britain is really delivering the goods this time. Many people in Ireland believe that even at this late hour England will again trick us, and this belief is used as much as possible to our disadvantage by those who oppose us.
. The people and government of England should understand that Ireland has just emerged from the Black and Tan era, and that it is inevitable that feeling should continue for a time to be suspicious, not only of England’s good faith, but of the good sense of any Irishmen who would trust England.. 13..
The frequent killing of nationalists in the north had the potential to undermine the Treaty settlement by weakening support for the Provisional Government within nationalist Ireland. Collins sought to exploit this in his relations with the colonial secretary. Some 2,000 ordinary police, Ulster Special Constabulary and British soldiers occupied the small nationalist town of Newry and were throwing their weight around, ‘tracking every person suspected of having nationalist sympathies and in general doing their best to make trouble,’ Collins complained. This was ‘only possible under the protection of British troops’ who were ‘apparently part of a determined plan to exasperate nationalist feeling beyond endurance, and therefore stir up strife between neighbours,’ he continued. ‘I have already pointed out to you the inevitable result of their policy.’. 14..
However, Collins had not just gone along with O’Duffy’s dangerous kidnapping scheme; he had actually added a reckless touch of his own by sending two members of his old Squad – Joe Dolan and Charlie Byrne – to England to kill the hangman John Ellis and his assistant William Willis. ‘Mick Collins told us to get them at all cost, but if we were captured we could not expect any help from him, as we could not identify ourselves as part of the newly formed National Army,’ Dolan later recalled.. 15..
‘We were told to get in touch with a man named Paddy Daly, . who was one of the Liverpool Irish Volunteers,’ Dolan continued. ‘He would show us where to go to find the men who we were to shoot, and that he would give us the assistance of whatever number of Liverpool Irish Volunteers as we might consider necessary.’ They met Daly and arrangements were made. ‘I undertook the shooting of Ellis, and six or seven of the Liverpool men came along with me,’ Dolan explained. ‘We went by train to Rochdale where Ellis lives, and some of the Liverpool Volunteers conducted me to the house and pointed it out to me. I walked up to the door alone and knocked at the door, which was opened by Mrs Ellis.’ She said her husband was not there. ‘I did not believe her at the time,’ Dolan continued. ‘I forced my way into the house and looked around. There was no one there and I had to accept her assurance that he had left already for Ireland. Our boats had probably crossed.’. 16..
Willis was from the Manchester area, so Charlie Byrne went after him with some Manchester Volunteers. Their motorcar broke down on the way. ‘Charlie wanted to hold up the first car that came along and commandeer it to carry out the job, but the others would not hear of this,’ according to Dolan.. 17.. The mission was therefore aborted, but Willis had probably left for Ireland by that time anyway.
The Provisional Government was deliberately trying to destabilise conditions in Northern Ireland. Richard Mulcahy, the minister for defence, noted that ‘the general aim underlying all operations in Carsonia is to disorganise the economic structure of the territory and to make the hostile inhabitants realise that aiding and abetting the activities of the Enemy does not pay’.. 18.. On 24 February, Mulcahy, on Collins’ instructions, commanded . O’Duffy to pay sixty IRA volunteers £3 a week to form the Belfast Guard to protect nationalists in the city.
While Collins may not have masterminded the taking of the unionist hostages, he certainly approved of the whole thing and must share responsibility for the tragic sequence of events sparked by these kidnappings. His aggressive IRA policy in Northern Ireland proved counterproductive in the existing volatile sectarian mix. Although he seemed to get away with the reckless gamble personally, the only gain was the release of the so-called ‘Monaghan footballers’. In the process, however, uncontrollable passions were roused and many people lost their lives in Belfast and Clones.
Griffith feared that the explosive violence in Northern Ireland could well prompt a re-think on the attitude of British politicians in relation to the boundary commission. ‘If the British government stands firmly on this situation we’ll be saved,’ he wrote to Collins on 15 February. ‘Otherwise disaster.’. 19..