The second Dáil was supposed to meet on 1 July 1922 to dissolve formally so that the new Dáil could come into existence, but the Provisional Government announced that it should ‘stand prorogued to Saturday, the 15th day of July next’. It would have been irresponsible to convene the Dáil amid the heavy fighting that continued at the Four Courts. The postponement announcement was accompanied by the names of Collins and Diarmuid O’Hegarty.. 1.. However, the Dáil was supreme, so Collins and his colleague had no legal authority to postpone it. ‘Professions of faith in the people’s will are empty phrases when the people’s representatives are treated with contempt,’ Labour leader Thomas Johnson complained.. 2..
While pro-Treaty candidates had won ninety-two seats in the general election, Sinn Féin won only fifty-eight of those. Labour and anti-Treaty Sinn Féin had fifty-three seats between them, with the result that seventeen independent deputies held the balance of power. This undoubtedly helped to explain the Provisional Government’s reluctance to convene the Dáil.
‘What really happened was that the executive usurped the government of the country and by a coup d’état established a new government,’ de Valera later contended. ‘It was really in . consequence of that that I felt that I could consistently and constitutionally take up arms and fight for the constitution.’. 3..
If Collins had upheld the election pact, it would have been a violation of the Treaty. He admitted as much after the election when a reporter of the Sunday Express asked whether de Valera would be excluded from the cabinet. ‘Acceptance of the Treaty by members of the Provisional Government is a clause of the Treaty,’ Collins replied.. 4.. Whether he or his opponents had first violated the election pact may be debatable, but Collins certainly made no effort to uphold his end of that agreement afterwards.
De Valera and others slipped out of Dublin and headed for Munster, which was a republican stronghold. De Valera served for a time as adjutant to Seán Moylan, the director of operations, at IRA headquarters in Clonmel, but the republican operations were a shambles. As early as the second week in July, Erskine Childers was writing that ‘Dev says we should surrender while we are strong’.. 5..
‘It may be well to keep open some avenue or avenues to peace,’ Collins wrote to his librarian friend Thomas Gay. ‘We don’t wish for any surrender of their principles.’ Yet it was necessary for his opponents to accept the verdict of the people in favour of the Treaty. The government had shown its determination to uphold the people’s rights, and it had ‘answered the challenge to governmental authority by the recovery of General O’Connell’ and by clearing out the occupied buildings in Dublin. ‘Every constitutional way is open to them to win the people to their side, and we will meet them in every way if only they will obey the people’s will and accept the authority of [the] government of the people,’ Collins insisted. ‘That alone is our concern.’. 6.. The . opponents of the Treaty had been taught a lesson, and he was confident that the Provisional Government would be in a strong position so long as the Irish people were aware that it was prepared to be reasonable. Having gained an important advantage by the surrender of O’Connor and Mellows at the Four Courts, he was anxious not to make the mistake of building sympathy for them by taking ‘resolute action beyond what is required’.. 7..
One of those killed in the fighting in Dublin was Cathal Brugha, who was mortally wounded at the Hamman Hotel on O’Connell Street. Despite Brugha’s animosity towards him, Collins still recognised Brugha’s sincerity. ‘Many would not have forgiven had they been in my place,’ Collins wrote. ‘Yet I would forgive him anything. Because of his sincerity I would forgive him anything … At worst he was a fanatic – though in what has been a noble cause,’ he continued. ‘At best I numbered him among the very few who would have given their all that this country – now torn by civil war – should have its freedom.’. 8..
Collins decided to devote all his energies to ending the Civil War by asking the cabinet to appoint him commander-in-chief. He essentially wrote his own terms for taking over the army. ‘It would be well, I think, if the government issue a sort of official instruction to me nominating the War Council of Three, and appointing me to act by special order of the government as commander-in-chief during the period of hostilities,’ he wrote to Griffith.. 9.. He asked for a general address to be issued calling on him to carry on the fight for Irish freedom, this time against the armed minority who were trying to establish a dictatorship without regard to the wishes of the people.
The government promptly responded with an address to . the public signed by Griffith and all the other members of the cabinet. It was really a piece of propaganda designed to dramatise the determination of both Collins and the government to end the fighting as quickly as possible. ‘You have been entrusted with supreme command of the National Army, and with General Mulcahy and General O’Duffy you have been constituted a War Council to direct the military operations now in progress,’ the address began. ‘The Irregular’s method of warfare is utterly destructive of the economic life of the nation. Sheer brigandage is a fair term to apply to it. Wherever they go they burn and wreck property, destroy roads, railways and bridges; seize food, clothing, and supplies even from the poorest people; conscript men into their ranks, and use forced labour. In short they are doing their best to ruin and demoralise the country.’. 10..
Other senior army appointments included Joe McGrath as director of intelligence with the rank of major general, Kevin O’Higgins as assistant adjutant general with the rank of commandant general, and Diarmuid O’Hegarty with the rank of commandant general on the general staff. In a technical sense it appeared that Collins was firmly establishing the principle of civilian control and taking his orders from Griffith and the Provisional Government, but the reality was somewhat different.
W. T. Cosgrave took over as acting chairman of the Provisional Government. Some later suggested that this amounted to a coup d’état in which Collins was ousted, but it was done at his request. De Valera suggested it was a tactical move so that Collins could ingratiate himself with the soldiers, who were mistrustful of all politicians. It was a way of building up rapport with the men to prosecute the war more effectively. Peter Young, for many years . the army archivist, argues that it was an astute move to bolster army morale. ‘Putting him in uniform, at the head of an army defending the existence of the new state, and with a press that was largely pro-Treaty, raised his stature to heroic proportions,’ Young argued. ‘The army as well as the general population required a sense of identity. Without the appointment of Collins as commander-in-chief, it is only too likely that it would have been beset by the local rivalries and animosities.’. 11.. As leader he exuded an authority and control that nobody else could have commanded. Collins was obviously aware of that, seeing that he spent so much time in the following weeks visiting army units on tours of inspection.
Collins and Cosgrave got on well together, even though they were very different characters. Cosgrave saw himself as primarily a politician. He had first been elected as a Sinn Féin candidate to Dublin Corporation in 1909. He was greatly underestimated by many of his contemporaries. De Valera dismissed him as ‘a ninny’ and Kevin O’Higgins reportedly sneered at him as ‘a Dublin corporator’. Collins was reputed to have sworn in exasperation ‘at the clerical susceptibility of Cosgrave’s personality’, but they had an easy relationship with each other. Cosgrave later recalled how Oliver St John Gogarty and the Big Fellow used to call out to his home and deliberately shock him. Collins would roar with laughter at Cosgrave’s stunned expression as Gogarty made irreverent remarks. ‘I often thought that pair of rascals took more delight in shocking me than in talking serious business when they came out to tea,’ Cosgrave recalled.. 12..
Cosgrave wrote to Collins ‘that the government should be kept in constant touch with the military situation throughout the . country’, and that the army authorities should report regularly to him ‘as acting chairman, similar to those reports which were formerly supplied to you’.. 13.. The nature of the subsequent correspondence, however, was more like Collins informing the government about what he had decided to do, rather than seeking permission to do it. Cosgrave seemed to be consulting him, rather than the other way around.
‘The government have a vague war policy but absolutely no civil policy,’ Churchill noted. ‘Individual members of the administration all wait on Mr Collins.’. 14..
When Collins decided to postpone the Dáil for another two weeks until the end of July, he instructed Kathleen McKenna of the publicity department to emphasise that he hoped the struggle would be ended in two to three weeks. ‘We suggest once more that the government would act wisely in explaining to the country the nature and extent of the resistance that remains to be overcome,’ Collins advised. ‘A perfectly frank statement on the subject would define the army’s goal and would secure not merely the whole-hearted, but the intelligent co-operation of the Irish people.’. 15..
The Cork Harbour Commission – which was sympathetic to the republicans – wrote complaining about the suspension of the Dáil. Collins was careful to reply openly in a reasonable manner. This was not the brash, arrogant young man who had announced back in April 1919 that they were going to initiate the War of Independence whether people wanted it or not.. 16.. ‘Even now it is a simple matter to end hostilities if those who are opposing the people’s will but turn from their resistance and give the people the chance they desire,’ Collins replied. ‘No member of . the government wishes to prolong the struggle, but equally, no member of the government, and, I am certain, no right thinking man in the whole of Ireland can contemplate without a shudder, the triumph of an armed minority over the people.’. 17..
Collins was still waging a somewhat reluctant war and he was anxious for peace on moderate terms. When Thomas Gay wrote complaining about the hardline approach being taken by the Provisional Government, Collins seemed to agree. ‘Generally speaking, what you say represents to a very large degree my own feelings about the main situation,’ Collins replied. ‘Anybody who is out for blood or scalps is of little use to the country; equally, of course, the real issue cannot be departed from.’. 18..
‘Our Press Organs should be very reticent in their tone about both active Irregular and Political Opponents,’ Collins warned Cosgrave. ‘Much of the criticism lately has been inclined towards abuse. This is not good from our point of view, and it is not the best way to tackle them.’ He did not doubt that many of them deserved to be abused, but they were not ‘the real driving force’ on the irregular side. ‘The men who are prepared to go to the extreme limit are misguided, but practically all of them are sincere,’ he continued. ‘Our propaganda should be on a more solid and permanent basis even if what may look to be advantages have to be sacrificed.’. 19..
De Valera, who had always functioned primarily as a propagandist, was despondent about the press coverage from the republican standpoint. ‘The newspapers are as usual more deadly to our cause than the machine guns,’ he wrote.. 20..
The convening of the new Dáil on 26 July was postponed for a third time until 12 August 1922. ‘No one knows when the Dáil . will assemble,’ Churchill noted. ‘I think it came to be taken for granted that the opening will be delayed as long as possible.’. 21..
Collins demonstrated a keen awareness of the situation. ‘We are in a strong position,’ he wrote to Mulcahy. ‘The opponents have shown themselves entirely without an objective.’ They had no cohesive plans, immediate or long term. ‘These leaders are waiting for something to turn up. When the Four Courts were attacked they said “the people are coming round to us” – but the people have resolutely refused to come round to them, and they must realise that without the people they have no hope.’ Collins was anxious to avoid recrimination. It was pointless placing blame, he warned Mulcahy. ‘What matters is not the past six months but the present position and the future six months and after the future six months, the entire future.’. 22..
Collins was perceptive about the government’s public image and agreed with Desmond Fitzgerald that censorship should be kept on broad, general lines. ‘It should be very nominal,’ he advised Mulcahy. ‘We might get more good from a communication to the press giving them general lines to go on rather [than] relying on the public spirit to omit certain things.’. 23.. He was anxious for the government to take responsibility for decisions, while the cabinet seemed quite content to leave things to him. ‘It was decided that the government will support the military authorities in whatever steps they may consider necessary to restore order in districts where military operations have ceased, but in which outbreaks of violence still continue,’ he wrote to Mulcahy. ‘I am afraid it is not very helpful to us, and we shall therefore have to frame proposals to be sanctioned by government.’. 24..
He asked the government to introduce an element of martial . law by deeming certain areas liable to military searches and demanding that all arms should be surrendered by a specified date. He was calling the shots but he was anxious to avoid any appearance of military dictatorship. ‘When the military effort is ended with the defeat of the hostile forces, peace can be said to have been restored. But peace will have to be maintained!’ He wanted local committees to promote confidence so that the people would ‘become actively interested in the new life of the nation’.. 25..
Some members of the government were more militant than their military counterparts. Cosgrave wrote to Collins on 27 July, suggesting that the government should issue a proclamation warning all concerned that ‘the troops have orders to shoot persons found sniping, ambushing or in possession of bombs, or interfering with railway or road communications, in areas in which military operations have ceased’.. 26.. Fearing that this would be tantamount to giving soldiers the right to execute people in cold blood, Collins objected. He was mindful that there were friends of his on the other side. Before responding to Cosgrave, he wrote to Harry Boland:
Harry – It has come to this! Of all things it has come to this.
It is my power to arrest and destroy you. This I cannot do.
If you will think over the influence which has dominated you it should change your ideal.
You are walking under false colours. If no word of mine will change your attitude then you are beyond all hope – my hope.. 27..
Next day Collins replied to Cosgrave saying that the decision on the kind of proclamation suggested would be a matter for the . government and the army would loyally implement it, but he was opposed to the idea. Drastic actions were needed, but allowing them to engage in summary executions was going too far. It was necessary to be mindful that there would be exceptions such as ‘a man who deliberately shoots a soldier and then throws down his rifle and puts up his hands’.. 28..
Ironically, the following day there were serious questions about the circumstances in which Harry Boland was shot and mortally wounded supposedly ‘trying to escape’. Collins was ‘grief-stricken’ at a cabinet meeting some hours later. ‘He spoke bitterly but movingly of his former comrade,’ according to Ernest Blythe. ‘The man who shot him must come forward and say he did it,’ Collins declared. ‘We are a government now and we cannot have any more of the business of shooting a man and running away.’. 29..
‘Last night I passed Vincent’s Hospital and saw a small crowd outside,’ Collins wrote to Kitty Kiernan. ‘My mind went in to him laying dead there and I thought of the times together, and, whatever good there is in any wish of mine, he certainly had it. Although the gap of 8 or 9 months was not forgotten – of course no one can ever forget it – I only thought of him with the friendship of the days of 1918 and 1919.’. 30..
Collins was told that on his deathbed Boland asked his sister Kathleen, ‘Have they got Mick Collins yet?’
‘I don’t believe it so far as I’m concerned and, if he did say it, there is no necessity to believe it,’ Collins wrote to Kitty Kiernan. ‘I’d send a wreath but I suppose they’d return it torn up.’. 31..
Kitty was obviously very upset when she replied. ‘I have lost a good friend in Harry – and no matter what, I’ll always believe in . his genuineness, that I was the one and only. I think you have also lost a friend. I am sure you are sorry after him.’. 32..
The three of them had been involved in a love triangle. Boland had wished to marry Kitty before her relationship blossomed with Collins. Maybe her remarks hit a sore spot, because he was apparently not as sympathetic about Boland as he might have been when he and Kitty had lunch together in a private room at the Shelbourne Hotel that day. He later asked Kitty not to misunderstand whatever he had said about Boland. ‘You’ll also appreciate my feelings about the splendid men we have lost on our side, and the losses they are and the bitterness they cause, and the anguish. There is no one who feels it all more than I do. My condemnation is all for those who would put themselves up as paragons of Irish nationality, and all the others as being not worthy of concern.’. 33..