Zeno

1 Ζήνων Μνασέου ἢ Δημέου, Κιτιεὺς ἀπὸ Κύπρου, πολίσματος Ἑλληνικοῦ Φοίνικας ἐποίκους ἐσχηκότος.

Τὸν τράχηλον ἐπὶ θάτερα νενευκὼς ἦν, ὥς φησι Τιμόθεος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἐν τῷ Περὶ βίων· καὶ Ἀπολλώνιος δέ φησιν ὁ Τύριος ὅτι ἰσχνὸς ἦν, ὑπομήκης, μελάγχρως - ὅθεν τις αὐτὸν εἶπεν Αἰγυπτίαν κληματίδα, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ Παροιμιῶν - παχύκνημός τε καὶ ἀπαγὴς καὶ ἀσθενής· διὸ καί φησι Περσαῖος ἐν Ὑπομνήμασι συμποτικοῖς τὰ πλεῖστα αὐτὸν δεῖπνα παραιτεῖσθαι. Ἔχαιρε δέ, φασί, σύκοις χλωροῖς καὶ ἡλιοκαΐαις.

1. Zeno, the son of Mnaseas (or Demeas), was a native of Citium in Cyprus, a Greek city which had received Phoenician settlers. He had a wry neck, says Timotheus of Athens in his book On Lives . Moreover, Apollonius of Tyre says he was lean, fairly tall, and swarthy – hence some one called him an Egyptian vine-branch, according to Chrysippus in the first book of his Proverbs . He had thick legs; he was flabby and delicate. Hence Persaeus in his Convivial Reminiscences relates that he declined most invitations to dinner. They say he was fond of eating green figs and of basking in the sun.

2 Διήκουσε δέ, καθάπερ προείρηται, Κράτητος· εἶτα καὶ Στίλπωνος ἀκοῦσαί φασιν αὐτὸν καὶ Ξενοκράτους ἔτη δέκα, ὡς Τιμοκράτης ἐν τῷ Δίωνι· ἀλλὰ καὶ Πολέμωνος. Ἑκάτων δέ φησι καὶ Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Τύριος ἐν πρώτῳ Περὶ Ζήνωνος, χρηστηριασαμένου αὐτοῦ τί πράττων ἄριστα βιώσεται, ἀποκρίνασθαι τὸν θέον, εἰ συγχρωτίζοιτο τοῖς νεκροῖς· ὅθεν ξυνέντα τὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀναγινώσκειν. Τῷ οὖν Κράτητι παρέβαλε τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. Πορφύραν ἐμπεπορευμένος ἀπὸ τῆς Φοινίκης πρὸς τῷ Πειραιεῖ ἐναυάγησεν. Ἀνελθὼν δ’ εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἤδη τριακοντούτης ἐκάθισε παρά τινα βιβλιοπώλην. Ἀναγινώσκοντος δ’ ἐκείνου τὸ δεύτερον τῶν Ξενοφῶντος Ἀπομνημονευμάτων,

2. He was a pupil of Crates, as stated above. Next they say he attended the lectures of Stilpo and Xenocrates for ten years – so Timocrates says in his Dion – and Polemo as well. It is stated by Hecato and by Apollonius of Tyre in his first book on Zeno that he consulted the oracle to know what he should do to attain the best life, and that the god’s response was that he should take on the complexion of the dead. Whereupon, perceiving what this meant, he studied ancient authors. Now the way he came across Crates was this. He was shipwrecked on a voyage from Phoenicia to Peiraeus with a cargo of purple. He went up into Athens and sat down in a bookseller’s shop, being then a man of thirty.

3 ἡσθεὶς ἐπύθετο ποῦ διατρίβοιεν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες. Εὐκαίρως δὲ παριόντος Κράτητος, ὁ βιβλιοπώλης δείξας αὐτόν φησι, « Τούτῳ παρακολούθησον. » Ἐντεῦθεν ἤκουσε τοῦ Κράτητος, ἄλλως μὲν εὔτονος πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, αἰδήμων δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὴν Κυνικὴν ἀναισχυντίαν. Ὅθεν ὁ Κράτης βουλόμενος αὐτὸν καὶ τούτου θεραπεῦσαι δίδωσι χύτραν φακῆς διὰ τοῦ Κεραμεικοῦ φέρειν. Ἐπεὶ δ’ εἶδεν αὐτὸν αἰδούμενον καὶ περικαλύπτοντα, παίσας τῇ βακτηρίᾳ κατάγνυσι τὴν χύτραν· φεύγοντος δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς φακῆς κατὰ τῶν σκελῶν ῥεούσης, φησὶν ὁ Κράτης, « Τί φεύγεις, Φοινικίδιον; οὐδὲν δεινὸν πέπονθας. »

3. As he went on reading the second book of Xenophon’s Memorabilia , he was so pleased that he inquired where men like Socrates were to be found. Crates passed by in the nick of time, so the bookseller pointed to him and said, “Follow yonder man.” From that day he became Crates’s pupil, showing in other respects a strong bent for philosophy, though with too much native modesty to assimilate Cynic shamelessness. Hence Crates, desirous of curing this defect in him, gave him a potful of lentil-soup to carry through the Ceramicus; and when he saw that he was ashamed and tried to keep it out of sight, with a blow of his staff he broke the pot. As Zeno took to flight with the lentil-soup flowing down his legs, “Why run away, my little Phoenician?” quoth Crates, “nothing terrible has befallen you.”

4 Ἕως μὲν οὖν τινὸς ἤκουε τοῦ Κράτητος· ὅτε καὶ τὴν Πολιτείαν αὐτοῦ γράψαντος, τινὲς ἔλεγον παίζοντες ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ κυνὸς οὐρᾶς αὐτὴν γεγραφέναι. Γέγραφε δὲ πρὸς τῇ Πολιτείᾳ καὶ τάδε·

Περὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν βίου,

Περὶ ὁρμῆς ἢ περὶ ἀνθρώπων φύσεως,

Περὶ παθῶν,

Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος,

Περὶ νόμου,

Περὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς παιδείας,

Περὶ ὄψεως,

Περὶ τοῦ ὅλου,

Περὶ σημείων,

Πυθαγορικά,

Καθολικά,

Περὶ λέξεων,

Προβλημάτων Ὁμηρικῶν πέντε,

Περὶ ποιητικῆς ἀκροάσεως.

Ἔστι δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ

Τέχνη καὶ

Λύσεις καὶ

Ἔλεγχοι δύο,

Ἀπομνημονεύματα Κράτητος,

Ἠθικά.

Καὶ τάδε μὲν τὰ βιβλία. Τελευταῖον δὲ ἀπέστη καὶ τῶν προειρημένων ἤκουσεν ἕως ἐτῶν εἴκοσιν· ἵνα καί φασιν αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, « Νῦν εὐπλόηκα, ὅτε νεναυάγηκα. »

4. For a certain space, then, he was instructed by Crates, and when at this time he had written his Republic , some said in jest that he had written it on Cynosura, i.e. on the dog’s tail. Besides the Republic he wrote the following works:

Of Life according to Nature.

Of Impulse, or Human Nature.

Of Emotions.

Of Duty.

Of Law.

Of Greek Education.

Of Vision.

Of the Whole World.

Of Signs.

Pythagorean Questions.

Universals.

Of Varieties of Style.

Homeric Problems, in five books.

Of the Reading of Poetry.

There are also by him:

A Handbook of Rhetoric.

Solutions.

Two books of Refutations.

Recollections of Crates.

Ethics.

This is a list of his writings. But at last he left Crates, and the men above mentioned were his masters for twenty years. Hence he is reported to have said, “I made a prosperous voyage when I suffered shipwreck.” But others attribute this saying of his to the time when he was under Crates.

5 Οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ Κράτητος τοῦτ’ αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν· ἄλλοι δὲ διατρίβοντα ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις ἀκοῦσαι τὴν ναυαγίαν καὶ εἰπεῖν, « Εὖ γε ποιεῖ ἡ τύχη προσελαύνουσα ἡμᾶς φιλοσοφίᾳ. » Ἔνιοι <δέ>, διαθέμενον Ἀθήνησι τὰ φορτία, οὕτω τραπῆναι πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν.

Ἀνακάμπτων δὴ ἐν τῇ ποικίλῃ στοᾷ τῇ καὶ Πεισιανακτίῳ καλουμένῃ, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς γραφῆς τῆς Πολυγνώτου ποικίλῃ, διετίθετο τοὺς λόγους, βουλόμενος καὶ τὸ χωρίον ἀπερίστατον ποιῆσαι. Ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν τριάκοντα τῶν πολιτῶν πρὸς τοῖς χιλίοις τετρακόσιοι ἀνῄρηντ’ ἐν αὐτῷ. Προσῄεσαν δὴ λοιπὸν ἀκούοντες αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Στωικοὶ ἐκλήθησαν καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ὁμοίως, πρότερον Ζηνώνειοι καλούμενοι, καθά φησι καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ἐπιστολαῖς. Καὶ πρότερόν γε Στωικοὶ ἐκαλοῦντο οἱ διατρίβοντες ἐν αὐτῇ ποιηταί, καθά φησιν Ἐρατοσθένης ἐν ὀγδόῃ Περὶ τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας, οἳ καὶ τὸν λόγον ἐπὶ πλεῖον ηὔξησαν.

5. A different version of the story is that he was staying at Athens when he heard his ship was wrecked and said, “It is well done of thee, Fortune, thus to drive me to philosophy.” But some say that he disposed of his cargo in Athens, before he turned his attention to philosophy.

He used then to discourse, pacing up and down in the painted colonnade, which is also called the colonnade or Portico of Pisianax, but which received its name from the painting of Polygnotus; his object being to keep the spot clear of a concourse of idlers. It was the spot where in the time of the Thirty 1400 Athenian citizens had been put to death. Hither, then, people came henceforth to hear Zeno, and this is why they were known as men of the Stoa, or Stoics; and the same name was given to his followers, who had formerly been known as Zenonians. So it is stated by Epicurus in his letters. According to Eratosthenes in his eighth book On the Old Comedy , the name of Stoic had formerly been applied to the poets who passed their time there, and they had made the name of Stoic still more famous.

6 Ἐτίμων δὴ οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι σφόδρα τὸν Ζήνωνα, οὕτως ὡς καὶ τῶν τειχῶν αὐτῷ τὰς κλεῖς παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ τιμῆσαι καὶ χαλκῇ εἰκόνι. Τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολίτας αὐτοῦ ποιῆσαι, κόσμον ἡγουμένους τὴν τἀνδρὸς εἰκόνα. Ἀντεποιοῦντο δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἱ ἐν Σιδῶνι Κιτιεῖς. Ἀπεδέχετο δ’ αὐτὸν καὶ Ἀντίγονος, καὶ εἴ ποτ’ Ἀθήναζε ἥκοι ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ πολλά τε παρεκάλει ἀφίκεσθαι ὡς αὐτόν. Ὁ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν παρῃτήσατο, Περσαῖον δ’ ἕνα τῶν γνωρίμων ἀπέστειλεν, ὃς ἦν Δημητρίου μὲν υἱός, Κιτιεὺς δὲ τὸ γένος, καὶ ἤκμαζε κατὰ τὴν τριακοστὴν καὶ ἑκατοστὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα, ἤδη γέροντος ὄντος Ζήνωνος. Ἡ δ’ ἐπιστολὴ ἡ τοῦ Ἀντιγόνου τοῦτον εἶχε τὸν τρόπον, καθὰ καὶ Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Τύριος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ Ζήνωνός φησι·

6. The people of Athens held Zeno in high honour, as is proved by their depositing with him the keys of the city walls, and their honouring him with a golden crown and a bronze statue. This last mark of respect was also shown to him by citizens of his native town, who deemed his statue an ornament to their city, and the men of Citium living in Sidon were also proud to claim him for their own. Antigonus (Gonatas) also favoured him, and whenever he came to Athens would hear him lecture and often invited him to come to his court. This offer he declined but dispatched thither one of his friends, Persaeus, the son of Demetrius and a native of Citium, who flourished in the 130th Olympiad, at which time Zeno was already an old man. According to Apollonius of Tyre in his work upon Zeno, the letter of Antigonus was couched in the following terms:

7 « Βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος Ζήνωνι φιλοσόφῳ χαίρειν.

« Ἐγὼ τύχῃ μὲν καὶ δόξῃ νομίζω προτερεῖν τοῦ σοῦ βίου, λόγου δὲ καὶ παιδείας καθυστερεῖν καὶ τῆς τελείας εὐδαιμονίας ἣν σὺ κέκτησαι. Διόπερ ἔκρινα προσφωνῆσαί σοι παραγενέσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, πεπεισμένος σε μὴ ἀντερεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἀξιούμενον. Σὺ οὖν πειράθητι ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου συμμῖξαι μοι, διειληφὼς τοῦτο διότι οὐχ ἑνὸς ἐμοῦ παιδευτὴς ἔσει, πάντων δὲ Μακεδόνων συλλήβδην. Ὁ γὰρ τὸν τῆς Μακεδονίας ἄρχοντα καὶ παιδεύων καὶ ἄγων ἐπὶ τὰ κατ’ ἀρετὴν φανερός ἐστι καὶ τοὺς ὑποτεταγμένους παρασκευάζων πρὸς εὐανδρίαν. Οἷος γὰρ ἂν ὁ ἡγούμενος ᾖ, τοιούτους εἰκὸς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ὑποτεταγμένους. »

Καὶ ὁ Ζήνων ἀντιγράφει ὧδε·

7. “King Antigonus to Zeno the philosopher, greeting.

“While in fortune and fame I deem myself your superior, in reason and education I own myself inferior, as well as in the perfect happiness which you have attained. Wherefore I have decided to ask you to pay me a visit, being persuaded that you will not refuse the request. By all means, then, do your best to hold conference with me, understanding clearly that you will not be the instructor of myself alone but of all the Macedonians taken together. For it is obvious that whoever instructs the ruler of Macedonia and guides him in the paths of virtue will also be training his subjects to be good men. As is the ruler, such for the most part it may be expected that his subjects will become.”

And Zeno’s reply is as follows:

8 « Βασιλεῖ Ἀντιγόνῳ Ζήνων χαίρειν.

« Ἀποδέχομαί σου τὴν φιλομάθειαν καθόσον τῆς ἀληθινῆς καὶ εἰς ὄνησιν τεινούσης, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τῆς δημώδους καὶ εἰς διαστροφὴν ἠθῶν ἀντέχῃ παιδείας. Ὁ δὲ φιλοσοφίας ὠρεγμένος, ἐκκλίνων δὲ τὴν πολυθρύλητον ἡδονὴν ἣ τινῶν θηλύνει νέων ψυχάς, φανερός ἐστιν οὐ μόνον φύσει πρὸς εὐγένειαν κλίνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ προαιρέσει. Φύσις δὲ εὐγενὴς μετρίαν ἄσκησιν προσλαβοῦσα, ἔτι δὲ τὸν ἀφθόνως διδάξοντα, ῥᾳδίως ἔρχεται πρὸς τὴν τελείαν ἀνάληψιν τῆς ἀρετῆς.

8. “Zeno to King Antigonus, greeting.

“I welcome your love of learning in so far as you cleave to that true education which tends to advantage and not to that popular counterfeit of it which serves only to corrupt morals. But if anyone has yearned for philosophy, turning away from much-vaunted pleasure which renders effeminate the souls of some of the young, it is evident that not by nature only, but also by the bent of his will he is inclined to nobility of character. But if a noble nature be aided by moderate exercise and further receive ungrudging instruction, it easily comes to acquire virtue in perfection.

9 Ἐγὼ δὲ συνέχομαι σώματι ἀσθενεῖ διὰ γῆρας· ἐτῶν γάρ εἰμι ὀγδοήκοντα· διόπερ οὐ δύναμαί σοι συμμῖξαι. Ἀποστέλλω δέ σοί τινας τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ συσχολαστῶν, οἳ τοῖς μὲν κατὰ ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀπολείπονται ἐμοῦ, τοῖς δὲ κατὰ σῶμα προτεροῦσιν· οἷς συνὼν οὐδενὸς καθυστερήσεις τῶν πρὸς τὴν τελείαν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀνηκόντων. »

Ἀπέστειλε δὲ Περσαῖον καὶ Φιλωνίδην τὸν Θηβαῖον, ὧν ἀμφο- τέρων Ἐπίκουρος μνημονεύει ὡς συνόντων Ἀντιγόνῳ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀριστόβουλον τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐπιστολῇ. Ἔδοξε δέ μοι καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ περὶ αὐτοῦ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπογράψαι. Καὶ ἔχει δὲ ὧδε.

9. But I am constrained by bodily weakness, due to old age, for I am eighty years old; and for that reason I am unable to join you. But I send you certain companions of my studies whose mental powers are not inferior to mine, while their bodily strength is far greater, and if you associate with these you will in no way fall short of the conditions necessary to perfect happiness.”

So he sent Persaeus and Philonides the Theban; and Epicurus in his letter to his brother Aristobulus mentions them both as living with Antigonus. I have thought it well to append the decree also which the Athenians passed concerning him. It reads as follows:

10 ΨΗΦΙΣΜΑ

« Ἐπ’ Ἀρρενίδου ἄρχοντος, ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀκαμαντίδος πέμπτης πρυτανείας, Μαιμακτηριῶνος δεκάτῃ ὑστέρᾳ, τρίτῃ καὶ εἰκοστῇ τῆς πρυτανείας, ἐκκλησία κυρία, τῶν προέδρων ἐπεψήφισεν Ἵππων Κρατιστοτέλους Ξυπεταιὼν καὶ οἱ συμπρόεδροι, Θράσων Θράσωνος Ἀνακαιεὺς εἶπεν·

« Ἐπειδὴ Ζήνων Μνασέου Κιτιεὺς ἔτη πολλὰ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐν τῇ πόλει γενόμενος ἔν τε τοῖς λοιποῖς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ὢν διετέλεσε καὶ τοὺς εἰς σύστασιν αὐτῷ τῶν νέων πορευομένους παρακαλῶν ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ σωφροσύνην παρώρμα πρὸς τὰ βέλτιστα, παράδειγμα τὸν ἴδιον βίον ἐκθεὶς ἅπασιν ἀκόλουθον ὄντα τοῖς λόγοις οἷς διελέγετο,

10. “In the archonship of Arrhenides, in the fifth prytany of the tribe Acamantis on the twenty-first day of Maemacterion, at the twenty-third plenary assembly of the prytany, one of the presidents, Hippo, the son of Cratistoteles, of the deme Xypetaeon, and his co-presidents put the question to the vote; Thraso, the son of Thraso of the deme Anacaea, moved:

“Whereas Zeno of Citium, son of Mnaseas, has for many years been devoted to philosophy in the city and has continued to be a man of worth in all other respects, exhorting to virtue and temperance those of the youth who come to him to be taught, directing them to what is best, affording to all in his own conduct a pattern for imitation in perfect consistency with his teaching, it has seemed good to the people –

11 τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ δεδόχθαι τῷ δήμῳ, ἐπαινέσαι μὲν Ζήνωνα Μνασέου Κιτιέα καὶ στεφανῶσαι χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἀρετῆς ἕνεκεν καὶ σωφροσύνης, οἰκοδομῆσαι δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τάφον ἐπὶ τοῦ Κεραμεικοῦ δημοσίᾳ· τῆς δὲ ποιήσεως τοῦ στεφάνου καὶ τῆς οἰκοδομῆς τοῦ τάφου χειροτονῆσαι τὸν δῆμον ἤδη τοὺς ἐπιμελησομένους πέντε ἄνδρας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων. Ἐγγράψαι δὲ τὸ ψήφισμα τὸν γραμματέα τοῦ δήμου ἐν στήλαις δύο καὶ ἐξεῖναι αὐτῶν θεῖναι τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ, τὴν δὲ ἐν Λυκείῳ. Τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα τὸ εἰς τὰς στήλας γινόμενον μερίσαι τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεως ὅπως ἅπαντες ἴδωσιν ὅτι ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ζῶντας τιμᾷ καὶ τελευτήσαντας.

11. and may it turn out well – to bestow praise upon Zeno of Citium, the son of Mnaseas, and to crown him with a golden crown according to the law, for his goodness and temperance, and to build him a tomb in the Ceramicus at the public cost. And that for the making of the crown and the building of the tomb, the people shall now elect five commissioners from all Athenians, and the Secretary of State shall inscribe this decree on two stone pillars and it shall be lawful for him to set up one in the Academy and the other in the Lyceum. And that the magistrate presiding over the administration shall apportion the expense incurred upon the pillars, that all may know that the Athenian people honour the good both in their life and after their death.

12 Ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν οἰκοδομὴν κεχειροτόνηνται Θράσων Ἀνακαιεύς, Φιλοκλῆς Πειραιεύς, Φαῖδρος Ἀναφλύστιος, Μέδων Ἀχαρνεύς, Σμίκυθος Συπαληττεύς[, Δίων Παιανιεύς]. »

Καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα μὲν ὧδε ἔχει.

Φησὶ δ’ Ἀντίγονος ὁ Καρύστιος οὐκ ἀρνεῖσθαι αὐτὸν εἶναι Κιτιέα. Τῶν γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἐπισκευὴν τοῦ λουτρῶνος συμβαλλομένων εἷς ὢν καὶ ἀναγραφόμενος ἐν τῇ στήλῃ, « Ζήνωνος τοῦ φιλοσόφου, » ἠξίωσε καὶ τὸ Κιτιεὺς προστεθῆναι. Ποιήσας δέ ποτε κοῖλον ἐπίθημα τῇ ληκύθῳ περιέφερε νόμισμα, λύσιν ἑτοίμην τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἵν’ ἔχοι Κράτης ὁ διδάσκαλος.

12. Thraso of the deme Anacaea, Philocles of Peiraeus, Phaedrus of Anaphlystus, Medon of Acharnae, Micythus of Sypalettus, and Dion of Paeania have been elected commissioners for the making of the crown and the building.”

These are the terms of the decree.

Antigonus of Carystus tells us that he never denied that he was a citizen of Citium. For when he was one of those who contributed to the restoration of the baths and his name was inscribed upon the pillar as “Zeno the philosopher,” he requested that the words “of Citium” should be added. He made a hollow lid for a flask and used to carry about money in it, in order that there might be provision at hand for the necessities of his master Crates.

13 Φασὶ δ’ αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ χίλια τάλαντα ἔχοντα ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ ταῦτα δανείζειν ναυτικῶς. Ἤσθιε δέ, φησί, ἀρτίδια καὶ μέλι καὶ ὀλίγον εὐώδους οἰναρίου ἔπινε. Παιδαρίοις τε ἐχρῆτο σπανίως, ἅπαξ ἢ δίς που παιδισκαρίῳ τινί, ἵνα μὴ δοκοίη μισογύνης εἶναι, σύν τε Περσαίῳ τὴν αὐτὴν οἰκίαν ᾤκει· καὶ αὐτοῦ αὐλητρίδιον εἰσαγαγόντος πρὸς αὐτόν, σπάσας πρὸς τὸν Περσαῖον αὐτὸ ἀπήγαγεν. Ἦν τε, φασίν, εὐσυμπερίφορος, ὡς πολλάκις Ἀντίγονον τὸν βασιλέα ἐπικωμάσαι αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς Ἀριστοκλέα τὸν κιθαρῳδὸν ἅμ’ αὐτῷ ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ κῶμον, εἶτα μέντοι ὑποδῦναι.

13. It is said that he had more than a thousand talents when he came to Greece, and that he lent this money on bottomry. He used to eat little loaves and honey and to drink a little wine of good bouquet. He rarely employed men-servants; once or twice indeed he might have a young girl to wait on him in order not to seem a misogynist. He shared the same house with Persaeus, and when the latter brought in a little flute-player he lost no time in leading her straight to Persaeus. They tell us he readily adapted himself to circumstances, so much so that King Antigonus often broke in on him with a noisy party, and once took him along with other revellers to Aristocles the musician; Zeno, however, in a little while gave them the sli . He disliked, they say, to be brought too near to people, so that he would take the end seat of a couch, thus saving himself at any rate from one half of such inconvenience.

14 ἐξέκλινε δέ, φησί, καὶ τὸ πολυδημῶδες, ὡς ἐπ’ ἄκρου καθίζεσθαι τοῦ βάθρου, κερδαίνοντα τὸ γοῦν ἕτερον μέρος τῆς ἐνοχλήσεως. Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ μετὰ πλειόνων δύο ἢ τριῶν περιεπάτει. Ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ χαλκὸν εἰσέπραττε τοὺς περιισταμένους, ὥστε δεδιότας τὸ διδόναι μὴ ἐνοχλεῖν, καθά φησι Κλεάνθης ἐν τῷ Περὶ χαλκοῦ· πλειόνων τε περιστάντων αὐτόν, δείξας ἐν τῇ στοᾷ κατ’ ἄκρου τὸ ξύλινον περιφερὲς τοῦ βωμοῦ ἔφη, « Τοῦτό ποτ’ ἐν μέσῳ ἔκειτο, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐμποδίζειν ἰδίᾳ ἐτέθη· καὶ ὑμεῖς οὖν ἐκ τοῦ μέσου βαστάσαντες αὑτοὺς ἧττον ἡμῖν ἐνοχλήσετε. »

Δημοχάρους δὲ τοῦ Λάχητος ἀσπαζομένου αὐτὸν καὶ φάσκοντος λέγειν καὶ γράφειν ὧν ἂν χρείαν ἔχῃ πρὸς Ἀντίγονον, ὡς ἐκείνου πάντα παρέξοντος, ἀκούσας οὐκέτ’ αὐτῷ συνδιέτριψε.

14. Nor indeed would he walk about with more than two or three. He would occasionally ask the bystanders for coppers, in order that, for fear of being asked to give, people might desist from mobbing him, as Cleanthes says in his work On Bronze. When several persons stood about him in the Colonnade he pointed to the wooden railing at the top round the altar and said, “This was once open to all, but because it was found to be a hindrance it was railed off. If you then will take yourselves off out of the way you will be the less annoyance to us.”

When Demochares, the son of Laches, greeted him and told him he had only to speak or write for anything he wanted to Antigonus, who would be sure to grant all his requests, Zeno after hearing this would have nothing more to do with him.

15 Λέγεται δὲ καὶ μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦ Ζήνωνος εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀντίγονον οἷον εἴη θέατρον ἀπολωλεκώς· ὅθεν καὶ διὰ Θράσωνος πρεσβευτοῦ παρὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ᾔτησεν αὐτῷ τὴν ἐν Κεραμεικῷ ταφήν. Ἐρωτηθεὶς δὲ διὰ τί θαυμάζει αὐτόν, « Ὅτι, » ἔφη, « πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων αὐτῷ διδομένων ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ οὐδεπώποτε ἐχαυνώθη οὐδὲ ταπεινὸς ὤφθη. »

Ἦν δὲ καὶ ζητητικὸς καὶ περὶ πάντων ἀκριβολογούμενος· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἐν τοῖς Σίλλοις φησὶν οὕτω·

Καὶ Φοίνισσαν ἴδον λιχνόγραυν σκιερῷ ἐνὶ τύφῳ

πάντων ἱμείρουσαν· ὁ δ’ ἔρρει γυργαθὸς αὐτῆς

σμικρὸς ἐών· νοῦν δ’ εἶχεν ἐλάσσονα κινδαψοῖο.

15. After Zeno’s death Antigonus is reported to have said, “What an audience I have lost.” Hence too he employed Thraso as his agent to request the Athenians to bury Zeno in the Ceramicus. And when asked why he admired him, “Because,” said he, “the many ample gifts I offered him never made him conceited nor yet appear poor-spirited.”

His bent was towards inquiry, and he was an exact reasoner on all subjects. Hence the words of Timon in his Silli :

A Phoenician too I saw, a pampered old woman ensconced in gloomy pride, longing for all things; but the meshes of her subtle web have perished, and she had no more intelligence than a banjo.

16 Ἐπιμελῶς δὲ καὶ πρὸς Φίλωνα τὸν διαλεκτικὸν διεκρίνετο καὶ συνεσχόλαζεν αὐτῷ· ὅθεν καὶ θαυμασθῆναι ὑπὸ Ζήνωνος τοῦ νεωτέρου οὐχ ἧττον Διοδώρου τοῦ διδασκάλου αὐτοῦ. Ἦσαν δὲ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ γυμνορρύπαροί τινες, ὥς φησι καὶ ὁ Τίμων·

Ὄφρα πενεστάων σύναγεν νέφος, οἳ περὶ πάντων

πτωχότατοί τ’ ἦσαν καὶ κουφότατοι βροτοὶ ἀστῶν.

Αὐτὸν δὲ στυγνόν τ’ εἶναι καὶ πικρόν, καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον συνεσπασμένον. Ἦν εὐτελής τε σφόδρα καὶ βαρβαρικῆς ἐχόμενος μικρολογίας, προσχήματι οἰκονομίας. Εἰ δέ τινα ἐπισκώπτοι, περιεσταλμένως καὶ οὐχ ἅδην, ἀλλὰ πόρρωθεν·

16. He used to dispute very carefully with Philo the logician and study along with him. Hence Zeno, who was the junior, had as great an admiration for Philo as his master Diodorus. And he had about him certain ragged dirty fellows, as Timon says in these lines:

The while he got together a crowd of ignorant serfs, who surpassed all men in beggary and were the emptiest of townsfolk.

Zeno himself was sour and of a frowning countenance. He was very niggardly too, clinging to meanness unworthy of a Greek, on the plea of economy, If he pitched into anyone he would do it concisely, and not effusively, keeping him rather at arm’s length. I mean, for example, his remark upon the fop showing himself off.

17 λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ καλλωπιζομένου ποτὲ ἔφη· ὀχέτιον γάρ τι ὀκνηρῶς αὐτοῦ ὑπερβαίνοντος, « Δικαίως, » εἶπεν, « ὑφορᾷ τὸν πηλόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ κατοπτρίσασθαι. » Ὡς δὲ Κυνικός τις οὐ φήσας ἔλαιον ἔχειν ἐν τῇ ληκύθῳ προσῄτησεν αὐτόν, οὐκ ἔφη δώσειν· ἀπελθόντα μέντοι ἐκέλευσε σκέψασθαι ὁπότερος εἴη ἀναιδέστερος. Ἐρωτικῶς δὲ διακείμενος Χρεμωνίδου, παρακαθιζόντων αὐτοῦ τε καὶ Κλεάνθους, ἀνέστη· θαυμάζοντος δὲ τοῦ Κλεάνθους ἔφη, « Καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούω τῶν ἀγαθῶν, κράτιστον εἶναι φάρμακον πρὸς τὰ φλεγμαίνοντα ἡσυχίαν. » Δυοῖν δ’ ὑπανακειμένοιν ἐν πότῳ καὶ τοῦ ὑπ’ αὐτὸν τὸν ὑφ’ ἑαυτὸν σκιμαλίζοντος τῷ ποδί, αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνον τῷ γόνατι. Ἐπιστραφέντος δέ, « Τί οὖν, » ἔφη, « οἴει τὸν ὑποκάτω σου πάσχειν ὑπὸ σοῦ; »

17. When he was slowly picking his way across a watercourse, “With good reason,” quoth Zeno, “he looks askance at the mud, for he can’t see his face in it.” When a certain Cynic declared he had no oil in his flask and begged some of him, Zeno refused to give him any. However, as the man went away, Zeno bade him consider which of the two was the more impudent. Being enamoured of Chremonides, as he and Cleanthes were sitting beside the youth, he got up, and upon Cleanthes expressing surprise, “Good physicians tell us,” said he, “that the best cure for inflammation is repose.” When of two reclining next to each other over the wine, the one who was neighbour to Zeno kicked the guest below him, Zeno himself nudged the man with his knee, and upon the man turning round, inquired, “How do you think your neighbour liked what you did to him?”

18 πρὸς δὲ τὸν φιλόπαιδα οὔτε τοὺς διδασκάλους ἔφη φρένας ἔχειν, ἀεὶ διατρίβοντας ἐν παιδαρίοις, οὔτ’ ἐκείνους. Ἔφασκε δὲ τοὺς μὲν τῶν ἀσολοίκων λόγους καὶ ἀπηρτισμένους ὁμοίους εἶναι τῷ ἀργυρίῳ τῷ Ἀλεξανδρινῷ· εὐοφθάλμους μὲν καὶ περιγεγραμμένους καθὰ καὶ τὸ νόμισμα, οὐδὲν δὲ διὰ ταῦτα βελτίονας. Τοὺς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀφωμοίου τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς τετραδράχμοις εἰκῆ μὲν κεκομμένοις καὶ σολοίκως, καθέλκειν μέντοι πολλάκις τὰς κεκαλλιγραφημένας λέξεις. Ἀρίστωνος δὲ τοῦ μαθητοῦ πολλὰ διαλεγομένου οὐκ εὐφυῶς, ἔνια δὲ καὶ προπετῶς καὶ θρασέως, « Ἀδύνατον, » εἰπεῖν, « εἰ μή σε ὁ πατὴρ μεθύων ἐγέννησεν· » ὅθεν αὐτὸν καὶ λάλον ἀπεκάλει, βραχυλόγος ὤν.

18. To a lover of boys he remarked, “Just as schoolmasters lose their common-sense by spending all their time with boys, so it is with people like you.” He used to say that the very exact expressions used by those who avoided solecisms were like the coins struck by Alexander: they were beautiful in appearance and well-rounded like the coins, but none the better on that account. Words of the opposite kind he would compare to the Attic tetradrachms, which, though struck carelessly and inartistically, nevertheless outweighed the ornate phrases. When his pupil Ariston discoursed at length in an uninspired manner, sometimes in a headstrong and over-confident way. “Your father,” said he, “must have been drunk when he begat you.” Hence he would call him a chatterbox, being himself concise in speech.

19 Πρὸς δὲ τὸν ὀψοφάγον μηδὲν τοῖς συμβιωταῖς καταλιπόντα, παρατεθέντος ποτὲ μεγάλου ἰχθύος, ἄρας οἷός τ’ ἦν κατεσθίειν· ἐμβλέψαντι δέ, « Τί οὖν, » ἔφη, « τοὺς συμβιωτὰς οἴει πάσχειν καθ’ ἡμέραν, εἰ σὺ μὴ δύνασαι ἐνεγκεῖν τὴν ἐμὴν ὀψοφαγίαν; » μειρακίου δὲ περιεργότερον παρὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἐρωτῶντος ζήτημά τι, προσήγαγε πρὸς κάτοπτρον καὶ ἐκέλευσεν ἐμβλέψαι· ἔπειτ’ ἠρώτησεν εἰ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ἁρμόττοντα εἶναι ὄψει τοιαύτῃ τοιαῦτα ζητήματα. Πρὸς δὲ τὸν φάσκοντα ὡς τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῷ Ἀντισθένης οὐκ ἀρέσκοι, χρείαν Σοφοκλέους προενεγκάμενος ἠρώτησεν εἴ τινα καὶ καλὰ ἔχειν αὐτῷ δοκεῖ· τοῦ δ’ οὐκ εἰδέναι φήσαντος, « Εἶτ’ οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, » ἔφη, « εἰ μέν τι κακὸν ἦν εἰρημένον ὑπ’ Ἀντισθένους, τοῦτ’ ἐκλεγόμενος καὶ μνημονεύων, εἰ δέ τι καλόν, οὐδ’ ἐπιβαλλόμενος κατέχειν; »

19. There was a gourmand so greedy that he left nothing for his table companions. A large fish having been served, Zeno took it up as if he were about to eat the whole. When the other looked at him, “What do you suppose,” said he, “those who live with you feel every day, if you cannot put up with my gourmandise in this single instance?” A youth was putting a question with more curiosity than became his years, whereupon Zeno led him to a mirror, and bade him look in it; after which he inquired if he thought it became anyone who looked like that to ask such questions. Some one said that he did not in general agree with Antisthenes, whereupon Zeno produced that author’s essay on Sophocles, and asked him if he thought it had any excellence; to which the reply was that he did not know. “Then are you not ashamed,” quoth he, “to pick out and mention anything wrong said by Antisthenes, while you suppress his good things without giving them a thought?”

20 Εἰπόντος δέ τινος ὅτι μικρὰ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ τὰ λογάρια τῶν φιλοσόφων, « Λέγεις, » εἶπε, « τἀληθῆ· δεῖ μέντοι καὶ τὰς συλλαβὰς αὐτῶν βραχείας εἶναι, εἰ δυνατόν. » Λέγοντος δέ τινος αὐτῷ περὶ Πολέμωνος ὡς ἄλλα προθέμενος ἄλλα λέγει, σκυθρωπάσας ἔφη, « Πόσου γὰρ <ἂν> ἠγάπας τὰ διδόμενα; » δεῖν δ’ ἔφη τόνῳ διαλεγόμενον ὥσπερ τοὺς ὑποκριτὰς τὴν μὲν φωνὴν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν μεγάλην ἔχειν, τὸ μέντοι στόμα μὴ διέλκειν· ὃ ποιεῖν τοὺς πολλὰ μὲν λαλοῦντας, ἀδύνατα δέ. Τοῖς εὖ λεγομένοις οὐκ ἔφη δεῖν καταλείπεσθαι τόπον ὥσπερ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τεχνίταις εἰς τὸ θεάσασθαι, τοὐναντίον δὲ τὸν ἀκούοντα οὕτω πρὸς τοῖς λεγομένοις γίνεσθαι ὥστε μὴ λαμβάνειν χρόνον εἰς τὴν ἐπισημείωσιν.

20. Some one having said that he thought the chain-arguments of the philosophers seemed brief and curt, Zeno replied, “You are quite right; indeed, the very syllables ought, if possible, to be clipped.” Some one remarked to him about Polemo, that his discourse was different from the subject he announced. He replied with a frown, “Well, what value would you have set upon what was given out?” He said that when conversing we ought to be earnest and, like actors, we should have a loud voice and great strength; but we ought not to open the mouth too wide, which is what your senseless chatterbox does. “Telling periods,” he said, “unlike the works of good craftsmen, should need no pause for the contemplation of their excellences; on the contrary, the hearer should be so absorbed in the discourse itself as to have no leisure even to take notes.”

21 Νεανίσκου πολλὰ λαλοῦντος ἔφη, « Τὰ ὦτά σου εἰς τὴν γλῶτταν συνερρύηκεν. » Πρὸς τὸν καλὸν εἰπόντα ὅτι οὐ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ἐρασθήσεσθαι ὁ σοφός, « Οὐδέν, » ἔφη, « ὑμῶν ἀθλιώτερον ἔσεσθαι τῶν καλῶν. » Ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τοὺς πλείστους τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἀσόφους εἶναι, τὰ δὲ μικρὰ καὶ τυχηρὰ ἀμαθεῖς. Καὶ προεφέρετο τὸ τοῦ Καφισίου, ὃς ἐπιβαλλομένου τινὸς τῶν μαθητῶν μεγάλα φυσᾶν, πατάξας εἶπεν ὡς οὐκ ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ τὸ εὖ κείμενον εἴη, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ εὖ τὸ μέγα. Νεανίσκου δέ τινος θρασύτερον διαλεγομένου, « Οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμι, » ἔφη, « μειράκιον, ἃ ἐπέρχεταί μοι. »

21. Once when a young man was talking a good deal, he said, “Your ears have slid down and merged in your tongue.” To the fair youth, who gave it as his opinion that the wise man would not fall in love, his reply was: “Then who can be more hapless than you fair youths?” He used to say that even of philosophers the greater number were in most things unwise, while about small and casual things they were quite ignorant. And he used to cite the saying of Caphisius, who, when one of his pupils was endeavouring to blow the flute lustily, gave him a slap and told him that to play well does not depend on loudness, though playing loudly may follow upon playing well. And to a youth who was talking somewhat saucily his rejoinder was, “I would rather not tell you what I am thinking, my lad.”

22 Ῥοδίου δέ τινος καλοῦ καὶ πλουσίου ἄλλως δὲ μηδέν, προσκειμένου αὐτῷ, μὴ βουλόμενος ἀνέχεσθαι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ κεκονιμένα τῶν βάθρων ἐκάθιζεν αὐτόν, ἵνα μολύνῃ τὴν χλανίδα· ἔπειτα εἰς τὸν τῶν πτωχῶν τόπον, ὥστε συνανατρίβεσθαι τοῖς ῥάκεσιν αὐτῶν· καὶ τέλος ἀπῆλθεν ὁ νεανίσκος. Πάντων ἔλεγεν ἀπρεπέστερον εἶναι τὸν τῦφον, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῶν νέων. Μὴ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰς λέξεις ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τῆς χρείας τὸν νοῦν ἀσχολεῖσθαι, μὴ ὥσπερ ἕψησίν τινα ἢ σκευασίαν ἀναλαμβάνοντας. δεῖν τ’ ἔλεγε τοὺς νέους πάσῃ κοσμιότητι χρῆσθαι ἐν πορείᾳ καὶ σχήματι καὶ περιβολῇ· συνεχές τε προεφέρετο τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ Καπανέως Εὐριπίδου στίχους, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἦν αὐτῷ

Ἥκιστα δ’ ὄλβῳ γαῦρος ἦν, φρόνημα δὲ

οὐδέν τι μεῖζον εἶχεν ἢ πένης ἀνήρ.

22. A Rhodian, who was handsome and rich, but nothing more, insisted on joining his class; but so unwelcome was this pupil, that first of all Zeno made him sit on the benches that were dusty, that he might soil his cloak, and then he consigned him to the place where the beggars sat, that he might rub shoulders with their rags; so at last the young man went away. Nothing, he declared, was more unbecoming than arrogance, especially in the young. He used also to say that it was not the words and expressions that we ought to remember, but we should exercise our mind in disposing to advantage of what we hear, instead of, as it were, tasting a well-cooked dish or well-dressed meal. The young, he thought, should behave with perfect propriety in walk, gait and dress, and he used continually to quote the lines of Euripides about Capaneus:

Large means had he, yet not the haughtiness
That springs from wealth, nor cherished prouder thoughts
Of vain ambition than the poorest man.

23 Ἔλεγε δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι τῆς οἰήσεως ἀλλοτριώτερον πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, μηδενός θ’ ἡμᾶς οὕτως εἶναι ἐνδεεῖς ὡς χρόνου. Ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ἐστι φίλος, « Ἄλλος, » <ἔφη,> « ἐγώ. » Δοῦλον ἐπὶ κλοπῇ, φασίν, ἐμαστίγου· τοῦ δ’ εἰπόντος, « Εἵμαρτό μοι κλέψαι, » ἔφη, « καὶ δαρῆναι. » Τὸ κάλλος εἶπε τῆς σωφροσύνης ἄνθος εἶναι· οἱ δὲ τοῦ κάλλους τὴν σωφροσύνην. Τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς παιδάριον μεμωλωπισμένον θεασάμενος πρὸς αὐτόν « Ὁρῶ σου » ἔφη, « τοῦ θυμοῦ τὰ ἴχνη· » πρὸς τὸν κεχρισμένον τῷ μύρῳ, « Τίς ἐστιν, » ἔφη, « ὁ γυναικὸς ὄζων; » Διονυσίου δὲ τοῦ Μεταθεμένου εἰπόντος αὐτῷ διὰ τί αὐτὸν μόνον οὐ διορθοῖ, ἔφη, « Οὐ γάρ σοι πιστεύω. » Πρὸς τὸ φλυαροῦν μειράκιον, « Διὰ τοῦτο, » εἶπε, « δύο ὦτα ἔχομεν, στόμα δὲ ἕν, ἵνα πλείονα μὲν ἀκούωμεν, ἥττονα δὲ λέγωμεν. »

23. Again he would say that if we want to master the sciences there is nothing so fatal as conceit, and again there is nothing we stand so much in need of as time. To the question “Who is a friend?” his answer was, “A second self ( alter ego ).” We are told that he was once chastising a slave for stealing, and when the latter pleaded that it was his fate to steal, “Yes, and to be beaten too,” said Zeno. Beauty he called the flower of chastity, while according to others it was chastity which he called the flower of beauty. Once when he saw the slave of one of his acquaintance marked with weals, “I see,” said he, “the imprints of your anger.” To one who had been drenched with unguent, “Who is this,” quoth he, “who smells of woman?” When Dionysius the Renegade asked, “Why am I the only pupil you do not correct?” the reply was, “Because I mistrust you.” To a stripling who was talking nonsense his words were, “The reason why we have two ears and only one mouth is that we may listen the more and talk the less.”

24 Ἐν συμποσίῳ κατακείμενος σιγῇ τὴν αἰτίαν ἠρωτήθη· ἔφη οὖν τῷ ἐγκαλέσαντι ἀπαγγεῖλαι πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὅτι παρῆν τις σιωπᾶν ἐπιστάμενος· ἦσαν δὲ οἱ ἐρωτήσαντες παρὰ Πτολεμαίου πρέσβεις ἀφικόμενοι καὶ βουλόμενοι μαθεῖν τί εἴποιεν παρ’ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα. Ἐρωτηθεὶς πῶς ἔχει πρὸς λοιδορίαν, « Καθάπερ, » εἶπεν, « εἰ πρεσβευτὴς ἀναπόκριτος ἀποστέλλοιτο. » Φησὶ δ’ Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Τύριος, ἕλκοντος αὐτὸν Κράτητος τοῦ ἱματίου ἀπὸ Στίλπωνος, εἰπεῖν, « Ὦ Κράτης, λαβὴ φιλοσόφων ἐστὶν ἐπιδέξιος ἡ διὰ τῶν ὤτων· πείσας οὖν ἕλκε τούτων· εἰ δέ με βιάζῃ, τὸ μὲν σῶμα παρὰ σοὶ ἔσται, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ παρὰ Στίλπωνι. »

24. One day at a banquet he was reclining in silence and was asked the reason: whereupon he bade his critic carry word to the king that there was one present who knew how to hold his tongue. Now those who inquired of him were ambassadors from King Ptolemy, and they wanted to know what message they should take back from him to the king. On being asked how he felt about abuse, he replied, “As an envoy feels who is dismissed without an answer.” Apollonius of Tyre tells us how, when Crates laid hold on him by the cloak to drag him from Stilpo, Zeno said, “The right way to seize a philosopher, Crates, is by the ears: persuade me then and drag me off by them; but, if you use violence, my body will be with you, but my mind with Stilpo.”

25 Συνδιέτριψε δὲ καὶ Διοδώρῳ, καθά φησιν Ἱππόβοτος· παρ’ ᾧ καὶ τὰ διαλεκτικὰ ἐξεπόνησεν. Ἤδη δὲ προκόπτων εἰσῄει καὶ πρὸς Πολέμωνα ὑπ’ ἀτυφίας, ὥστε φασὶ λέγειν ἐκεῖνον, « Οὐ λανθάνεις, ὦ Ζήνων, ταῖς κηπαίαις παρεισρέων θύραις καὶ τὰ δόγματα κλέπτων Φοινικικῶς μεταμφιεννύς. » Καὶ πρὸς τὸν δείξαντα δ’ αὐτῷ διαλεκτικὸν ἐν τῷ θερίζοντι λόγῳ ἑπτὰ διαλεκτικὰς ἰδέας πυθέσθαι, πόσας εἰσπράττεται μισθοῦ· ἀκούσαντα δὲ ἑκατόν, διακοσίας αὐτῷ δοῦναι. Τοσοῦτον ἤσκει φιλομάθειαν. Φασὶ δὲ καὶ πρῶτον καθῆκον ὠνομακέναι καὶ λόγον περὶ αὐτοῦ πεποιηκέναι. Τούς θ’ Ἡσιόδου στίχους μεταγράφειν οὕτω·

Κεῖνος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται,

ἐσθλὸς δ’ αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ.

25. According to Hippobotus he forgathered with Diodorus, with whom he worked hard at dialectic. And when he was already making progress, he would enter Polemo’s school: so far from all self-conceit was he. In consequence Polemo is said to have addressed him thus: “You slip in, Zeno, by the garden door – I’m quite aware of it – you filch my doctrines and give them a Phoenician make-up.” A dialectician once showed him seven logical forms concerned with the sophism known as “The Reaper,” and Zeno asked him how much he wanted for them. Being told a hundred drachmas, he promptly paid two hundred: to such lengths would he go in his love of learning. They say too that he first introduced the word Duty and wrote a treatise on the subject. It is said, moreover, that he corrected Hesiod’s lines thus:

He is best of all men who follows good advice: good too is he who finds out all things for himself.

26 κρείττονα γὰρ εἶναι τὸν ἀκοῦσαι καλῶς δυνάμενον τὸ λεγόμενον καὶ χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ τοῦ δι’ αὑτοῦ τὸ πᾶν συννοήσαντος· τῷ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι μόνον τὸ συνεῖναι, τῷ δ’ εὖ πεισθέντι προσεῖναι καὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν.

Ἐρωτηθεὶς δέ, φησί, διὰ τί αὐστηρὸς ὢν ἐν τῷ πότῳ διαχεῖται ἔφη, « Καὶ οἱ θέρμοι πικροὶ ὄντες βρεχόμενοι γλυκαίνονται. » Φησὶ δὲ καὶ Ἑκάτων ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν Χρειῶν ἀνίεσθαι αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις κοινωνίαις. Ἔλεγέ τε κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῖς ποσὶν ὀλισθεῖν ἢ τῇ γλώττῃ. Τὸ εὖ γίνεσθαι μὲν παρὰ μικρόν, οὐ μὴν μικρὸν εἶναι. Οἱ δὲ Σωκράτους.

26. The reason he gave for this was that the man capable of giving a proper hearing to what is said and profiting by it was superior to him who discovers everything himself. For the one had merely a right apprehension, the other in obeying good counsel superadded conduct.

When he was asked why he, though so austere, relaxed at a drinking-party, he said, “Lupins too are bitter, but when they are soaked become sweet.” Hecato too in the second book of his Anecdotes says that he indulged freely at such gatherings. And he would say, “Better to trip with the feet than with the tongue.” “Well-being is attained by little and little, and nevertheless it is no little thing itself.” [Others attribute this to Socrates.]

27 Ἦν δὲ καρτερικώτατος καὶ λιτότατος, ἀπύρῳ τροφῇ χρώμενος καὶ τρίβωνι λεπτῷ, ὥστε λέγεσθαι ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ·

Τὸν δ’ οὔτ’ ἂρ χειμὼν κρυόεις, οὐκ ὄμβρος ἀπείρων,

οὐ φλὸξ ἠελίοιο δαμάζεται, οὐ νόσος αἰνή,

οὐκ ἔροτις δήμου ἐναρεῖ μένος, ἀλλ’ ὅ γ’ ἀτειρὴς

ἀμφὶ διδασκαλίῃ τέταται νύκτας τε καὶ ἦμαρ.

Οἵ γε μὴν κωμικοὶ ἐλάνθανον ἐπαινοῦντες αὐτὸν διὰ τῶν σκωμ- μάτων. Ἵνα καὶ Φιλήμων φησὶν οὕτως ἐν δράματι Φιλοσόφοις·

Εἷς ἄρτος, ὄψον ἰσχάς, ἐπιπιεῖν ὕδωρ.

Φιλοσοφίαν καινὴν γὰρ οὗτος φιλοσοφεῖ,

πεινῆν διδάσκει καὶ μαθητὰς λαμβάνει·

οἱ δὲ Ποσειδίππου.

Ἤδη δὲ καὶ εἰς παροιμίαν σχεδὸν ἐχώρησεν. Ἐλέγετο γοῦν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ·

Τοῦ φιλοσόφου Ζήνωνος ἐγκρατέστερος.

Ἀλλὰ καὶ Ποσείδιππος Μεταφερομένοις·

Ὥστ’ ἐν ἡμέραις δέκα

εἶναι δοκεῖν Ζήνωνος ἐγκρατέστερον.

27. He showed the utmost endurance, and the greatest frugality; the food he used required no fire to dress, and the cloak he wore was thin. Hence it was said of him:

The cold of winter and the ceaseless rain
Come powerless against him: weak the dart
Of the fierce summer sun or racking pain
To bend that iron frame. He stands apart
Unspoiled by public feast and jollity:
Patient, unwearied night and day doth he
Cling to his studies of philosophy.

Nay more: the comic poets by their very jests at his expense praised him without intending it. Thus Philemon says in a play, Philosophers :

This man adopts a new philosophy.
He teaches to go hungry: yet he gets
Disciples. One sole loaf of bread his food;
His best dessert dried figs; water his drink.

Others attribute these lines to Poseidippus.

By this time he had almost become a proverb. At all events, “More temperate than Zeno the philosopher” was a current saying about him. Poseidippus also writes in his Men Transported :

So that for ten whole days
More temperate than Zeno’s self he seemed.

28 Τῷ γὰρ ὄντι πάντας ὑπερεβάλλετο τῷ τ’ εἴδει τούτῳ καὶ τῇ σεμνότητι καὶ δὴ νὴ Δία τῇ μακαριότητι· ὀκτὼ γὰρ πρὸς τοῖς ἐνενήκοντα βιοὺς ἔτη κατέστρεψεν, ἄνοσος καὶ ὑγιὴς διατελέσας. Περσαῖος δέ φησιν ἐν ταῖς Ἠθικαῖς σχολαῖς δύο καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν τελευτῆσαι αὐτόν, ἐλθεῖν δ’ Ἀθήναζε δύο καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν· ὁ δ’ Ἀπολλώνιός φησιν ἀφηγήσασθαι τῆς σχολῆς αὐτὸν ἔτη δυοῖν δέοντα ἑξήκοντα. Ἐτελεύτα δὴ οὕτως· ἐκ τῆς σχολῆς ἀπιὼν προσέπταισε καὶ τὸν δάκτυλον περιέρρηξε· παίσας δὲ τὴν γῆν τῇ χειρί, φησὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς Νιόβη,

Ἔρχομαι· τί μ’ αὔεις;

καὶ παραχρῆμα ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀποπνίξας ἑαυτόν.

28. And in very truth in this species of virtue and in dignity he surpassed all mankind, ay, and in happiness; for he was ninety-eight when he died and had enjoyed good health without an ailment to the last. Persaeus, however, in his ethical lectures makes him die at the age of seventy-two, having come to Athens at the age of twenty-two. But Apollonius says that he presided over the school for fifty-eight years. The manner of his death was as follows. As he was leaving the school he tripped and fell, breaking a toe. Striking the ground with his fist, he quoted the line from the Niobe:

I come, I come, why dost thou call for me?

and died on the spot through holding his breath.

29 Ἀθηναῖοι δ’ ἔθαψαν αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ Κεραμεικῷ καὶ ψηφίσμασι τοῖς προειρημένοις ἐτίμησαν, τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτῷ προσμαρτυροῦντες. Καὶ Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Σιδώνιος ἐποίησεν οὕτως·

Τῆνος ὅδε Ζήνων Κιτίῳ φίλος, ὅς ποτ’ Ὄλυμπον

ἔδραμεν, οὐκ Ὄσσῃ Πήλιον ἀνθέμενος,

οὐδὲ τά γ’ Ἡρακλῆος ἀέθλεε· τὰν δέ ποτ’ ἄστρα

ἀτραπιτὸν μούνας εὗρε σαοφροσύνας.

29. The Athenians buried him in the Ceramicus and honoured him in the decrees already cited above, adding their testimony of his goodness. Here is the epitaph composed for him by Antipater of Sidon:

Here lies great Zeno, dear to Citium, who scaled high Olympus, though he piled not Pelion on Ossa, nor toiled at the labours of Heracles, but this was the path he found out to the stars – the way of temperance alone.

30 Καὶ ἄλλο Ζηνόδοτος ὁ στωικός, Διογένους μαθητής·

Ἔκτισας αὐτάρκειαν, ἀφεὶς κενεαυχέα πλοῦτον,

Ζήνων, σὺν πολιῷ σεμνὸς ἐπισκυνίῳ·

ἄρσενα γὰρ λόγον εὗρες, ἐνηθλήσω δὲ προνοίᾳ,

αἵρεσιν, ἀτρέστου ματέρ’ ἐλευθερίας·

εἰ δὲ πάτρα Φοίνισσα, τίς ὁ φθόνος; οὐ καὶ ὁ Κάδμος

κεῖνος, ἀφ’ οὗ γραπτὰν Ἑλλὰς ἔχει σελίδα;

καὶ κοινῇ δὲ καὶ περὶ πάντων τῶν στωικῶν Ἀθήναιος ὁ ἐπιγραμ- ματοποιός φησιν οὕτως·

ὦ στωικῶν μύθων εἰδήμονες, ὦ πανάριστα

δόγματα ταῖς ἱεραῖς ἐνθέμενοι σελίσιν,

τὰν ἀρετὰν ψυχᾶς ἀγαθὸν μόνον· ἅδε γὰρ ἀνδρῶν

μούνα καὶ βιοτὰν ῥύσατο καὶ πόλιας.

Σαρκὸς δ’ ἡδυπάθημα, φίλον τέλος ἀνδράσιν ἄλλοις,

ἡ μία τῶν Μνήμης ἤνυσε θυγατέρων.

30. Here too is another by Zenodotus the Stoic, a pupil of Diogenes:

Thou madest self-sufficiency thy rule,
Eschewing haughty wealth, O godlike Zeno,
With aspect grave and hoary brow serene.
A manly doctrine thine: and by thy prudence
With much toil thou didst found a great new school,
Chaste parent of unfearing liberty.
And if thy native country was Phoenicia,
What need to slight thee? came not Cadmus thence,
Who gave to Greece her books and art of writing?

And Athenaeus the epigrammatist speaks of all the Stoics in common as follows:

O ye who’ve learnt the doctrines of the Porch
And have committed to your books divine
The best of human learning, teaching men
That the mind’s virtue is the only good!
She only it is who keeps the lives of men
And cities, – safer than high gates and walls.
But those who place their happiness in pleasure
Are led by the least worthy of the Muses.

31 Εἴπομεν ὡς ἐτελεύτα ὁ Ζήνων καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν τῇ Παμμέτρῳ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον·

Τὸν Κιτιᾶ Ζήνωνα θανεῖν λόγος ὡς ὑπὸ γήρως

πολλὰ καμὼν ἐλύθη μένων ἄσιτος·

οἱ δ’ ὅτι προσκόψας ποτ’ ἔφη χερὶ γαῖαν ἀλοίσας

ἔρχομαι αὐτόματος· τί δὴ καλεῖς με;

ἔνιοι γὰρ καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τελευτῆσαί φασιν αὐτόν.

Καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς τελευτῆς ταῦτα.

Φησὶ δὲ Δημήτριος ὁ Μάγνης ἐν τοῖς Ὁμωνύμοις τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ Μνασέαν πολλάκις ἅτ’ ἔμπορον Ἀθήναζε παραγίνεσθαι καὶ πολλὰ τῶν Σωκρατικῶν ἀποφέρειν ἔτι παιδὶ ὄντι τῷ Ζήνωνι· ὅθεν καὶ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι συγκεκροτῆσθαι. Καὶ οὕτως ἐλθόντα εἰς Ἀθήνας Κράτητι παραβαλεῖν.

31. We have ourselves mentioned the manner of Zeno’s death in the Pammetros (a collection of poems in various metres):

The story goes that Zeno of Citium after enduring many hardships by reason of old age was set free, some say by ceasing to take food; others say that once when he had tripped he beat with his hand upon the earth and cried, “I come of my own accord; why then call me?”

For there are some who hold this to have been the manner of his death.

So much then concerning his death.

Demetrius the Magnesian, in his work on Men of the Same Name , says of him: his father, Mnaseas, being a merchant often went to Athens and brought away many books about Socrates for Zeno while still a boy.

32 Δοκεῖ δέ, φησί, καὶ τὸ τέλος αὐτὸς ὁρίσαι τῶν πλανωμένων περὶ τὰς ἀποφάσεις. Ὤμνυε δέ, φασί, καὶ κάππαριν, καθάπερ Σωκράτης τὸν κύνα. Ἔνιοι μέντοι, ἐξ ὧν εἰσιν οἱ περὶ Κάσσιον τὸν σκεπτικόν, ἐν πολλοῖς κατηγοροῦντες τοῦ Ζήνωνος, πρῶτον μὲν τὴν ἐγκύκλιον παιδείαν ἄχρηστον ἀποφαίνειν λέγουσιν ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς Πολιτείας, δεύτερον ἐχθροὺς καὶ πολεμίους καὶ δούλους καὶ ἀλλοτρίους λέγειν αὐτὸν ἀλλήλων εἶναι πάντας τοὺς μὴ σπουδαίους, καὶ γονεῖς τέκνων καὶ ἀδελφοὺς ἀδελφῶν, <καὶ> οἰκείους οἰκείων.

32. Hence he had been well trained even before he left his native place. And thus it came about that on his arrival at Athens he attached himself to Crates. And it seems, he adds, that, when the rest were at a loss how to express their views, Zeno framed a definition of the end. They say that he was in the habit of swearing by “capers” just as Socrates used to swear by “the dog.” Some there are, and among them Cassius the Sceptic and his disciples, who accuse Zeno at length. Their first count is that in the beginning of his Republic he pronounced the ordinary education useless: the next is that he applies to all men who are not virtuous the opprobrious epithets of foemen, cnemies, slaves, and aliens to one another, parents to children, brothers to brothers, friends to friends.

33 Πάλιν ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ παριστάντα πολίτας καὶ φίλους καὶ οἰκείους καὶ ἐλευθέρους τοὺς σπουδαίους μόνον, ὥστε τοῖς στωικοῖς οἱ γονεῖς καὶ τὰ τέκνα ἐχθροί· οὐ γάρ εἰσι σοφοί. Κοινάς τε τὰς γυναῖκας δογματίζειν ὁμοίως ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς διακοσίους <στίχους> μήθ’ ἱερὰ μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε γυμνάσια ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οἰκοδομεῖσθαι. Περί τε νομίσματος οὕτως γράφειν, « Νόμισμα δ’ οὔτ’ ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκεν οἴεσθαι δεῖν κατασκευάζειν οὔτ’ ἀποδημίας ἕνεκεν. » Καὶ ἐσθῆτι δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ κελεύει χρῆσθαι ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ μηδὲν μόριον ἀποκεκρύφθαι.

33. Again, in the Republic , making an invidious contrast, he declares the good alone to be true citizens or friends or kindred or free men; and accordingly in the view of the Stoics parents and children are enemies, not being wise. Again, it is objected, in the Republic he lays down community of wives, and at line 200 prohibits the building of temples, law-courts and gymnasia in cities; while as regards a currency he writes that we should not think it need be introduced either for purposes of exchange or for travelling abroad. Further, he bids men and women wear the same dress and keep no part of the body entirely covered.

34 Ὅτι δ’ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἡ Πολιτεία καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ πολιτείας φησίν. Περί τ’ ἐρωτικῶν διείλεκται κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἐπιγραφομένης Ἐρωτικῆς τέχνης· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ταῖς Διατριβαῖς τὰ παραπλήσια γράφει. Τοιουτότροπά τινά ἐστι παρὰ τῷ Κασσίῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἰσιδώρῳ τῷ Περγαμηνῷ ῥήτορι· ὃς καὶ ἐκτμηθῆναί φησιν ἐκ τῶν βιβλίων τὰ κακῶς λεγόμενα παρὰ τοῖς στωικοῖς ὑπ’ Ἀθηνοδώρου τοῦ στωικοῦ πιστευθέντος τὴν ἐν Περγάμῳ βιβλιοθήκην· εἶτ’ ἀντιτεθῆναι αὐτά, φωραθέντος τοῦ Ἀθηνοδώρου καὶ κινδυνεύσαντος. Καὶ τοσαῦτα μὲν περὶ τῶν ἀθετουμένων αὐτοῦ.

34. That the Republic is the work of Zeno is attested by Chrysippus in his De Republica . And he discussed amatory subjects in the beginning of that book of his which is entitled “The Art of Love.” Moreover, he writes much the same in his Interludes . So much for the criticisms to be found not only in Cassius but in Isidorus of Pergamum, the rhetorician. Isidorus likewise affirms that the passages disapproved by the school were expunged from his works by Athenodorus the Stoic, who was in charge of the Pergamene library; and that afterwards, when Athenodorus was detected and compromised, they were replaced. So much concerning the passages in his writings which are regarded as spurious.

35 Γεγόνασι δὲ Ζήνωνες ὀκτώ· πρῶτος ὁ Ἐλεάτης, περὶ οὗ λέξομεν· δεύτερος αὐτὸς οὗτος· τρίτος Ῥόδιος, τὴν ἐντόπιον γεγραφὼς ἱστορίαν ἑνιαίαν· τέταρτος ἱστορικός, τὴν Πύρρου γεγραφὼς στρατείαν εἰς Ἰταλίαν καὶ Σικελίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιτομὴν τῶν πεπραγμένων Ῥωμαίοις τε καὶ Καρχηδονίοις· πέμπτος Χρυσίππου μαθητής, βιβλία μὲν ὀλίγα γεγραφώς, μαθητὰς δὲ πλείστους καταλελοιπώς· ἕκτος ἰατρὸς Ἡροφίλειος, νοῆσαι μὲν ἱκανός, γράψαι δ’ ἄτονος· ἕβδομος γραμματικός, οὗ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἐπιγράμματα φέρεται· ὄγδοος Σιδώνιος τὸ γένος, φιλόσοφος Ἐπικούρειος καὶ νοῆσαι καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι σαφής.

35. There have been eight persons of the name of Zeno. First the Eleatic, of whom more hereafter; the second our present subject; the third a Rhodian who wrote a local history in one volume; the fourth a historian who wrote about the expedition of Pyrrhus into Italy and Sicily, and besides that an epitome of the political history of Rome and Carthage; the fifth a pupil of Chrysippus, who left few writings but many disciples; the sixth a physician of the school of Herophilus, a competent practitioner, though a poor writer; the seventh a grammarian, who besides other writings has left behind him epigrams; the eighth a Sidonian by birth and an Epicurean philosopher, lucid both in thinking and in style.

36 Μαθηταὶ δὲ Ζήνωνος πολλοὶ μέν, ἔνδοξοι δὲ Περσαῖος Δημητρίου Κιτιεύς, ὃν οἱ μὲν γνώριμον αὐτοῦ, οἱ δὲ οἰκέτην ἕνα τῶν εἰς βιβλιογραφίαν πεμπομένων αὐτῷ παρ’ Ἀντιγόνου, οὗ καὶ τροφεὺς ἦν τοῦ παιδὸς Ἁλκυονέως. Διάπειραν δέ ποτε βουληθεὶς λαβεῖν αὐτοῦ ὁ Ἀντίγονος ἐποίησεν αὐτῷ πλαστῶς ἀγγελῆναι ὡς εἴη τὰ χωρία αὐτοῦ πρὸς τῶν πολεμίων ἀφῃρημένα· καὶ σκυθρωπάσαντος, « Ὁρᾷς, » ἔφη, « ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ πλοῦτος ἀδιάφορον; »

Βιβλία δὲ αὐτοῦ φέρεται τάδε·

Περὶ βασιλείας,

Πολιτεία Λακωνική,

Περὶ γάμου,

Περὶ ἀσεβείας,

Θυέστης,

Περὶ ἐρώτων,

Προτρεπτικοί,

Διατριβῶν,

Χρειῶν δʹ,

Ἀπομνημονεύματα,

Πρὸς τοὺς Πλάτωνος νόμους ζʹ.

36. Of the many disciples of Zeno the following are the most famous: Persaeus, son of Demetrius, of Citium, whom some call a pupil and others one of the household, one of those sent him by Antigonus to act as secretary; he had been tutor to Antigonus’s son Halcyoneus. And Antigonus once, wishing to make trial of him, caused some false news to be brought to him that his estate had been ravaged by the enemy, and as his countenance fell, “Do you see,” said he, “that wealth is not a matter of indifference?”

The following works are by Persaeus:

Of Kingship.

The Spartan Constitution.

Of Marriage.

Of Impiety.

Thyestes.

Of Love.

Exhortations.

Interludes.

Four books of Anecdotes.

Memorabilia.

A Reply to Plato’s Laws in seven books.

37 Ἀρίστων Μιλτιάδου Χῖος, ὁ τὴν ἀδιαφορίαν εἰσηγησάμενος. Ἥριλλος Καρχηδόνιος, ὁ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τέλος εἰπών. Διονύσιος ὁ μεταθέμενος εἰς τὴν ἡδονήν· διὰ γὰρ σφοδρὰν ὀφθαλμίαν ὤκνησεν ἔτι λέγειν τὸν πόνον ἀδιάφορον· οὗτος ἦν Ἡρακλεώτης. Σφαῖρος Βοσποριανός· Κλεάνθης Φανίου Ἄσσιος, ὁ διαδεξάμενος τὴν σχολήν· ὃν καὶ ἀφωμοίου ταῖς σκληροκήροις δέλτοις, αἳ μόλις μὲν γράφονται, διατηροῦσι δὲ τὰ γραφέντα. Διήκουσε δ’ ὁ Σφαῖρος καὶ Κλεάνθους μετὰ τὴν Ζήνωνος τελευτήν· καὶ λέξομεν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ Περὶ Κλεάνθους.

37. Ariston, the son of Miltiades and a native of Chios, who introduced the doctrine of things morally indifferent; Herillus of Carthage, who affirmed knowledge to be the end; Dionysius, who became a renegade to the doctrine of pleasure, for owing to the severity of his ophthalmia he had no longer the nerve to call pain a thing indifferent: his native place was Heraclea; Sphaerus of Bosporus; Cleanthes, son of Phanias, of Assos, his successor in the school: him Zeno used to compare to hard waxen tablets which are difficult to write upon, but retain the characters written upon them. Sphaerus also became the pupil of Cleanthes after Zeno’s death, and we shall have occasion to mention him in the Life of Cleanthes .

38 Ἦσαν δὲ Ζήνωνος μαθηταὶ καὶ οἵδε, καθά φησιν Ἱππόβοτος· Φιλωνίδης Θηβαῖος, Κάλλιππος Κορίνθιος, Ποσειδώνιος Ἀλεξανδρεύς, Ἀθηνόδωρος Σολεύς, Ζήνων Σιδώνιος.

Κοινῇ δὲ περὶ πάντων τῶν στωικῶν δογμάτων ἔδοξέ μοι ἐν τῷ Ζήνωνος εἰπεῖν βίῳ διὰ τὸ τοῦτον κτίστην γενέσθαι τῆς αἱρέσεως. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ προγεγραμμένα βιβλία πολλά, ἐν οἷς ἐλάλησεν ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν στωικῶν. Τὰ δὲ δόγματα κοινῶς ἐστι τάδε· λελέχθω δ’ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίων, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν εἰώθαμεν.

38. And furthermore the following according to Hippobotus were pupils of Zeno: Philonides of Thebes; Callippus of Corinth; Posidonius of Alexandria; Athenodorus of Soli; and Zeno of Sidon.

I have decided to give a general account of all the Stoic doctrines in the life of Zeno because he was the founder of the School. I have already given a list of his numerous writings, in which he has spoken as has no other of the Stoics. And his tenets in general are as follows. In accordance with my usual practice a summary statement must suffice.

39 Τριμερῆ φασιν εἶναι τὸν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγον· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μέν τι φυσικόν, τὸ δὲ ἠθικόν, τὸ δὲ λογικόν. Οὕτω δὲ πρῶτος διεῖλε Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐν τῷ Περὶ λόγου καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ αʹ Περὶ λόγου καὶ ἐν τῷ αʹ τῶν Φυσικῶν καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος καὶ Σύλλος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Εἰς τὰ δόγματα εἰσαγωγῶν καὶ Εὔδρομος ἐν τῇ Ἠθικῇ στοιχειώσει καὶ Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος καὶ Ποσειδώνιος.

39. Philosophic doctrine, say the Stoics, falls into three parts: one physical, another ethical, and the third logical. Zeno of Citium was the first to make this division in his Exposition of Doctrine , and Chrysippus too did so in the first book of his Exposition of Doctrine and the first book of his Physics ; and so too Apollodorus and Syllus in the first part of their Introductions to Stoic Doctrine , as also Eudromus in his Elementary Treatise on Ethics , Diogenes the Babylonian, and Posidonius.

These parts are called by Apollodorus “Heads of Commonplace”; by Chrysippus and Eudromus specific divisions; by others generic divisions.

40 Ταῦτα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὁ μὲν Ἀπολλόδωρος τόπους καλεῖ, ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος καὶ Εὔδρομος εἴδη, ἄλλοι γένη. Εἰκάζουσι δὲ ζῴῳ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ὀστοῖς μὲν καὶ νεύροις τὸ λογικὸν προσομοιοῦντες, τοῖς δὲ σαρκωδεστέροις τὸ ἠθικόν, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὸ φυσικόν. Ἢ πάλιν ᾠῷ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τὸ λογικόν, τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ ἠθικόν, τὰ δ’ ἐσωτάτω τὸ φυσικόν. Ἢ ἀγρῷ παμφόρῳ· <οὗ> τὸν μὲν περιβεβλημένον φραγμὸν τὸ λογικόν, τὸν δὲ καρπὸν τὸ ἠθικόν, τὴν δὲ γῆν ἢ τὰ δένδρα τὸ φυσικόν. Ἢ πόλει καλῶς τετειχισμένῃ καὶ κατὰ λόγον διοικουμένῃ.

Καὶ οὐθὲν μέρος τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀποκεκρίσθαι, καθά τινες αὐτῶν φασιν, ἀλλὰ μεμίχθαι αὐτά. Καὶ τὴν παράδοσιν μικτὴν ἐποίουν. Ἄλλοι δὲ πρῶτον μὲν τὸ λόγικον τάττουσι, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ φυσικόν, καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἠθικόν· ὧν ἐστι Ζήνων ἐν τῷ Περὶ λόγου καὶ Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀρχέδημος καὶ Εὔδρομος.

40. Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics, and the yolk in the centre is Physics. Or, again, they liken Philosophy to a fertile field: Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the soil or the trees. Or, again, to a city strongly walled and governed by reason.

No single part, some Stoics declare, is independent of any other part, but all blend together. Nor was it usual to teach them separately. Others, however, start their course with Logic, go on to Physics, and finish with Ethics; and among those who so do are Zeno in his treatise On Exposition , Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus.

41 Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πτολεμαεὺς Διογένης ἀπὸ τῶν ἠθικῶν ἄρχεται, ὁ δ’ Ἀπολλόδωρος δεύτερα τὰ ἠθικά, Παναίτιος δὲ καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν ἄρχονται, καθά φησι Φαινίας ὁ Ποσειδωνίου γνώριμος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ποσειδωνείων σχολῶν. Ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης ἓξ μέρη φησί, διαλεκτικόν, ῥητορικόν, ἠθικόν, πολιτικόν, φυσικόν, θεολογικόν. Ἄλλοι δ’ οὐ τοῦ λόγου ταῦτα μέρη φασίν, ἀλλ’ αὐτῆς τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ὡς Ζήνων ὁ Ταρσεύς.

Τὸ δὲ λογικὸν μέρος φασὶν ἔνιοι εἰς δύο διαιρεῖσθαι ἐπιστήμας, εἰς ῥητορικὴν καὶ εἰς διαλεκτικήν. Τινὲς δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ ὁρικὸν εἶδος, τὸ περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων· ἔνιοι δὲ τὸ ὁρικὸν περιαιροῦσιν.

41. Diogenes of Ptolemas, it is true, begins with Ethics; but Apollodorus puts Ethics second, while Panaetius and Posidonius begin with Physics, as stated by Phanias, the pupil of Posidonius, in the first book of his Lectures of Posidonius . Cleanthes makes not three, but six parts, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology. But others say that these are divisions not of philosophic exposition, but of philosophy itself: so, for instance, Zeno of Tarsus. Some divide the logical part of the system into the two sciences of rhetoric and dialectic; while some would add that which deals with definitions and another part concerning canons or criteria: some, however, dispense with the part about definitions.

42 Τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων παραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εὑρεῖν· ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ τὰς τῶν φαντασιῶν διαφορὰς ἀπευθύνουσι. Καὶ τὸ ὁρικὸν δὲ ὁμοίως πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀλήθειας· διὰ γὰρ τῶν ἐννοιῶν τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνεται. Τήν τε ῥητορικὴν ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν τοῦ εὖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐν διεξόδῳ λόγων καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν τοῦ ὀρθῶς διαλέγεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐν ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει λόγων· ὅθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν ὁρίζονται, ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων.

Καὶ τὴν μὲν ῥητορικὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι λέγουσι τριμερῆ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς εἶναι συμβουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ δικανικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐγκωμιαστικόν.

42. Now the part which deals with canons or criteria they admit as a means for the discovery of truth, since in the course of it they explain the different kinds of perceptions that we have. And similarly the part about definitions is accepted as a means of recognizing truth, inasmuch as things are apprehended by means of general notions. Further, by rhetoric they understand the science of speaking well on matters set forth by plain narrative, and by dialectic that of correctly discussing subjects by question and answer; hence their alternative definition of it as the science of statements true, false, and neither true nor false.

Rhetoric itself, they say, has three divisions: deliberative, forensic, and panegyric.

44 Εἶναι δ’ αὐτῆς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἴς τε τὴν εὕρεσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν φράσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν τάξιν καὶ εἰς τὴν ὑπόκρισιν. Τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν λόγον εἴς τε τὸ προοίμιον καὶ εἰς τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιδίκους καὶ τὸν ἐπίλογον.

Τὴν δὲ διαλεκτικὴν διαιρεῖσθαι εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν σημαινομένων καὶ τῆς φωνῆς τόπον· καὶ τὸν μὲν τῶν σημαινομένων εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν τόπον καὶ τῶν ἐκ τούτων ὑφισταμένων λεκτῶν ἀξιωμάτων καὶ αὐτοτελῶν καὶ κατηγορημάτων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὀρθῶν καὶ ὑπτίων καὶ γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ λόγων καὶ τρόπων καὶ συλλογισμῶν καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὰ πράγματα σοφισμάτων·

43. Rhetoric according to them may be divided into invention of arguments, their expression in words, their arrangement, and delivery; and a rhetorical speech into introduction, narrative, replies to opponents, and peroration.

Dialectic (they hold) falls under two heads: subjects of discourse and language. And the subjects fall under the following headings: presentations and the various products to which they give rise, propositions enunciated and their constituent subjects and predicates, and similar terms whether direct or reversed, genera and species, arguments too, moods, syllogisms and fallacies whether due to the subject matter or to the language;

44 εἶναι ψευδομένους λόγους καὶ ἀληθεύοντας καὶ ἀποφάσκοντας σωρίτας τε καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους τούτοις, ἐλλιπεῖς καὶ ἀπόρους καὶ περαίνοντας καὶ ἐγκεκαλυμμένους κερατίνας τε καὶ οὔτιδας καὶ θερίζοντας.

Εἶναι δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἴδιον τόπον καὶ τὸν προειρημένον περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνῆς, ἐν ᾧ δείκνυται ἡ ἐγγράμματος φωνὴ καὶ τίνα τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη, καὶ περὶ σολοικισμοῦ καὶ βαρβαρισμοῦ καὶ ποιημάτων καὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμμελοῦς φωνῆς καὶ περὶ μουσικῆς καὶ περὶ ὅρων κατά τινας καὶ διαιρέσεων καὶ λέξεων.

44. these including both false and true and negative arguments, sorites and the like, whether defective, insoluble, or conclusive, and the fallacies known as the Veiled, or Horned, No man, and The Mowers.

The second main head mentioned above as belonging to Dialectic is that of language, wherein are included written language and the parts of speech, with a discussion of errors in syntax and in single words, poetical diction, verbal ambiguities, euphony and music, and according to some writers chapters on terms, divisions, and style.

45 Εὐχρηστοτάτην δέ φασιν εἶναι τὴν περὶ τῶν συλλογισμῶν θεωρίαν· τὸ γὰρ ἀποδεικτικὸν ἐμφαίνειν, ὅπερ συμβάλλεσθαι πολὺ πρὸς διόρθωσιν τῶν δογμάτων, καὶ τάξιν καὶ μνήμην τὸ ἐπιστατικὸν κατάλημμα ἐμφαίνειν.

Εἶναι δὲ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν σύστημα ἐκ λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς· τὸν δὲ συλλογισμὸν λόγον συλλογιστικὸν ἐκ τούτων· τὴν δ’ ἀπόδειξιν λόγον διὰ τῶν μᾶλλον καταλαμβανομένων τὸ ἧττον καταλαμβανόμενον περαίνοντα.

Τὴν δὲ φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, τοῦ ὀνόματος οἰκείως μετενηνεγμένου ἀπὸ τῶν τύπων τῶν ἐν τῷ κηρῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ δακτυλίου γινομένων.

45. The study of syllogisms they declare to be of the greatest service, as showing us what is capable of yielding demonstration; and this contributes much to the formation of correct judgements, and their arrangement and retention in memory give a scientific character to our conception of things.

An argument is in itself a whole containing premisses and conclusion, and an inference (or syllogism) is an inferential argument composed of these. Demonstration is an argument inferring by means of what is better apprehended something less clearly apprehended.

A presentation (or mental impression) is an imprint on the soul: the name having been appropriately borrowed from the imprint made by the seal upon the wax.

46 τῆς δὲ φαντασίας τὴν μὲν καταληπτικήν, τὴν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον· καταληπτικὴν μέν, ἣν κριτήριον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων φασί, τὴν γινομένην ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπεσφραγισμένην καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην· ἀκατάληπτον δὲ ἢ τὴν μὴ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μέν, μὴ κατ’ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον· τὴν μὴ τρανῆ μηδὲ ἔκτυπον.

Αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀρετὴν ἐν εἴδει περιέχουσαν ἀρετάς· τήν τ’ ἀπροπτωσίαν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πότε δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ μή· τὴν δ’ ἀνεικαιότητα ἰσχυρὸν λόγον πρὸς τὸ εἰκός,

46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.

Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind’s assent to impressions.

47 ὥστε μὴ ἐνδιδόναι αὐτῷ· τὴν δ’ ἀνελεγξίαν ἰσχὺν ἐν λόγῳ, ὥστε μὴ ἀπάγεσθαι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἀντικείμενον· τὴν δ’ ἀματαιότητα ἕξιν ἀναφέρουσαν τὰς φαντασίας ἐπὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. Αὐτήν τε τὴν ἐπιστήμην φασὶν ἢ κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ ἢ ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου. Οὐκ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς θεωρίας τὸν σοφὸν ἄπτωτον ἔσεσθαι ἐν λόγῳ· τό τε γὰρ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος διαγινώσκεσθαι ὑπ’ αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ πιθανὸν τό τ’ ἀμφιβόλως λεγόμενον διευκρινεῖσθαι· χωρίς τ’ αὐτῆς οὐκ εἶναι ὁδῷ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

47. By wariness they mean a strong presumption against what at the moment seems probable, so as not to be taken in by it. Irrefutability is strength in argument so as not to be brought over by it to the opposite side. Earnestness (or absence of frivolity) is a habit of referring presentations to right reason. Knowledge itself they define either as unerring apprehension or as a habit or state which in reception of presentations cannot be shaken by argument. Without the study of dialectic, they say, the wise man cannot guard himself in argument so as never to fall; for it enables him to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and to discriminate what is merely plausible and what is ambiguously expressed, and without it he cannot methodically put questions and give answers.

48 Διατείνειν δὲ τὴν ἐν ταῖς ἀποφάσεσι προπέτειαν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ γινόμενα, ὥστ’ εἰς ἀκοσμίαν καὶ εἰκαιότητα τρέπεσθαι τοὺς ἀγυμνάστους ἔχοντας τὰς φαντασίας. Οὐκ ἄλλως τ’ ὀξὺν καὶ ἀγχίνουν καὶ τὸ ὅλον δεινὸν ἐν λόγοις φανήσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν· τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ εἶναι ὀρθῶς διαλέγεσθαι καὶ διαλογίζεσθαι καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρός τε τὰ προκείμενα διαλεχθῆναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἅπερ ἐμπείρου διαλεκτικῆς ἀνδρὸς εἶναι.

Ἐν οὖν τοῖς λογικοῖς ταῦτ’ αὐτοῖς δοκεῖν κεφαλαιωδῶς. Καὶ ἵνα καὶ κατὰ μέρος εἴπωμεν καὶ τάδε ἅπερ αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν εἰσαγωγικὴν τείνει τέχνην, καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπὶ λέξεως τίθησι Διοκλῆς ὁ Μάγνης ἐν τῇ Ἐπιδρομῇ τῶν φιλοσόφων, λέγων οὕτως·

48. Overhastiness in assertion affects the actual course of events, so that, unless we have our perceptions well trained, we are liable to fall into unseemly conduct and heedlessness; and in no other way will the wise man approve himself acute, nimblewitted, and generally skilful in argument; for it belongs to the same person to converse well and to argue well, to put questions to the purpose and to respond to the questions put; and all these qualifications are qualifications belonging to the skilled dialectician.

Such is, summarily stated, the substance of their logical teaching. And in order to give it also in detail, let me now cite as much of it as comes within the scope of their introductory handbook. I will quote verbatim what Diocles the Magnesian says in his Synopsis of Philosophers . These are his words:

49 « Ἀρέσκει τοῖς Στωικοῖς τὸν περὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως προτάττειν λόγον, καθότι τὸ κριτήριον, ᾧ ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν πραγμάτων γινώσκεται, κατὰ γένος φαντασία ἐστί, καὶ καθότι ὁ περὶ συγκαταθέσεως καὶ ὁ περὶ καταλήψεως καὶ νοήσεως λόγος, προάγων τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας συνίσταται. Προηγεῖται γὰρ ἡ φαντασία, εἶθ’ ἡ διάνοια ἐκλαλητικὴ ὑπάρχουσα, ὃ πάσχει ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας, τοῦτο ἐκφέρει λόγῳ. »

49. “The Stoics agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of presentation and sensation, inasmuch as the standard by which the truth of things is tested is generically a presentation, and again the theory of assent and that of apprehension and thought, which precedes all the rest, cannot be stated apart from presentation. For presentation comes first; then thought, which is capable of expressing itself, puts into the form of a proposition that which the subject receives from a presentation.”

50 Διαφέρει δὲ φαντασία καὶ φάντασμα· φάντασμα μὲν γάρ ἐστι δόκησις διανοίας οἵα γίνεται κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους, φαντασία δέ ἐστι τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ, τουτέστιν ἀλλοίωσις, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ ψυχῆς ὑφίσταται. Οὐ γὰρ δεκτέον τὴν τύπωσιν οἱονεὶ τύπον σφραγιστῆρος, ἐπεὶ ἀνένδεκτόν ἐστι πολλοὺς τύπους κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι. Νοεῖται δὲ φαντασία ἡ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατὰ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναποτετυπωμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, οἵα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος.

50. There is a difference between the process and the outcome of presentation. The latter is a semblance in the mind such as may occur in sleep, while the former is the act of imprinting something on the soul, that is a process of change, as is set forth by Chrysippus in the second book of his treatise Of the Soul (De anima) . For, says he, we must not take “impression” in the literal sense of the stamp of a seal, because it is impossible to suppose that a number of such impressions should be in one and the same spot at one and the same time. The presentation meant is that which comes from a real object, agrees with that object, and has been stamped, imprinted and pressed seal-fashion on the soul, as would not be the case if it came from an unreal object.

51 Τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν κατ’ αὐτοὺς αἱ μέν εἰσιν αἰσθητικαί, αἱ δ’ οὔ· αἰσθητικαὶ μὲν αἱ δι’ αἰσθητηρίου ἢ αἰσθητηρίων λαμβανόμεναι, οὐκ αἰσθητικαὶ δ’ αἱ διὰ τῆς διανοίας καθάπερ τῶν ἀσωμάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν λόγῳ λαμβανομένων. Τῶν δ’ αἰσθητικῶν <αἱ μὲν> ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων μετ’ εἴξεως καὶ συγκαταθέσεως γίνονται. Εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ ἐμφάσεις αἱ ὡσανεὶ ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων γινόμεναι.

Ἔτι τῶν φαντασιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι λογικαί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι· λογικαὶ μὲν αἱ τῶν λογικῶν ζῴων, ἄλογοι δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀλόγων. Αἱ μὲν οὖν λογικαὶ νοήσεις εἰσίν, αἱ δ’ ἄλογοι οὐ τετυχήκασιν ὀνόματος. Καὶ αἱ μέν εἰσι τεχνικαί, αἱ δὲ ἄτεχνοι· ἄλλως γοῦν θεωρεῖται ὑπὸ τεχνίτου εἰκὼν καὶ ἄλλως ὑπὸ ἀτέχνου.

51. According to them some presentations are data of sense and others are not: the former are the impressions conveyed through one or more sense-organs; while the latter, which are not data of sense, are those received through the mind itself, as is the case with incorporeal things and all the other presentations which are received by reason. Of sensuous impressions some are from real objects and are accompanied by yielding and assent on our part. But there are also presentations that are appearances and no more, purporting, as it were, to come from real objects.

Another division of presentations is into rational and irrational, the former being those of rational creatures, the latter those of the irrational. Those which are rational are processes of thought, while those which are irrational have no name. Again, some of our impressions are scientific, others unscientific: at all events a statue is viewed in a totally different way by the trained eye of a sculptor and by an ordinary man.

52 Αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς τό τ’ ἀφ’ ἡγεμονικοῦ πνεῦμα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διῆκον καὶ ἡ δι’ αὐτῶν κατάληψις καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια κατασκευή, καθ’ ἥν τινες πηροὶ γίνονται. Καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια δὲ αἴσθησις καλεῖται.

Ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται κατ’ αὐτοὺς αἰσθήσει μὲν λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων καὶ τραχέων καὶ λείων, λόγῳ δὲ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ προνοεῖν τούτους. Τῶν γὰρ νοουμένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ περίπτωσιν ἐνοήθη, τὰ δὲ καθ’ ὁμοιότητα, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, <τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετάθεσιν,> τὰ δὲ κατὰ σύνθεσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἐναντίωσιν.

52. The Stoics apply the term sense or sensation (αἴσθησις) to three things: (1) the current passing from the principal part of the soul to the senses, (2) apprehension by means of the senses, (3) the apparatus of the sense-organs, in which some persons are deficient. Moreover, the activity of the sense-organs is itself also called sensation. According to them it is by sense that we apprehend black and white, rough and smooth, whereas it is by reason that we apprehend the conclusions of demonstration, for instance the existence of gods and their providence. General notions, indeed, are gained in the following ways: some by direct contact, some by resemblance, some by analogy, some by transposition, some by composition, and some by contrariety.

53 Κατὰ περίπτωσιν μὲν οὖν ἐνοήθη τὰ αἰσθητά· καθ’ ὁμοιότητα δὲ τὰ ἀπό τινος παρακειμένου, ὡς Σωκράτης ἀπὸ τῆς εἰκόνος· κατ’ ἀναλογίαν δὲ αὐξητικῶς μέν, <ὡς> ὁ Τιτυὸς καὶ Κύκλωψ· μειωτικῶς δέ, ὡς ὁ Πυγμαῖος. Καὶ τὸ κέντρον δὲ τῆς γῆς κατ’ ἀναλογίαν ἐνοήθη ἀπὸ τῶν μικροτέρων σφαιρῶν. Κατὰ μετάθεσιν δέ, οἷον ὀφθαλμοὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ στήθους· κατὰ σύνθεσιν δὲ ἐνοήθη Ἱπποκένταυρος· καὶ κατ’ ἐναντίωσιν θάνατος. Νοεῖται δὲ καὶ κατὰ μετάβασίν τινα, ὡς τὰ λεκτὰ καὶ ὁ τόπος. Φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται δίκαιόν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν· καὶ κατὰ στέρησιν, οἷον ἄχειρ. Τοιάδε τινὰ καὶ περὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ νοήσεως δογματίζουσι.

53. By incidence or direct contact have come our notions of sensible things; by resemblance notions whose origin is something before us, as the notion of Socrates which we get from his bust; while under notions derived from analogy come those which we get (1) by way of enlargement, like that of Tityos or the Cyclops, or (2) by way of diminution, like that of the Pygmy. And thus, too, the centre of the earth was originally conceived on the analogy of smaller spheres. Of notions obtained by transposition creatures with eyes on the chest would be an instance, while the centaur exemplifies those reached by composition, and death those due to contrariety. Furthermore, there are notions which imply a sort of transition to the realm of the imperceptible: such are those of space and of the meaning of terms. The notions of justice and goodness come by nature. Again, privation originates notions; for instance, that of the man without hands. Such are their tenets concerning presentation, sensation, and thought.

54 Κριτήριον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας φασὶ τυγχάνειν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, τουτέστι τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ τῶν Φυσικῶν καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Βόηθος κριτήρια πλείονα ἀπολείπει, νοῦν καὶ αἴσθησιν καὶ ὄρεξιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην· ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ λόγου κριτήριά φησιν εἶναι αἴσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν· ἔστι δ’ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. Ἄλλοι δέ τινες τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων Στωικῶν τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κριτήριον ἀπολείπουσιν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ κριτηρίου φησί.

54. The standard of truth they declare to be the apprehending presentation, i.e. that which comes from a real object – according to Chrysippus in the twelfth book of his Physics and to Antipater and Apollodorus. Boethus, on the other hand, admits a plurality of standards, namely intelligence, sense-perception, appetency, and knowledge; while Chrysippus in the first book of his Exposition of Doctrine contradicts himself and declares that sensation and preconception are the only standards, preconception being a general notion which comes by the gift of nature (an innate conception of universals or general concepts). Again, certain others of the older Stoics make Right Reason the standard; so also does Posidonius in his treatise On the Standard .

55 Τῆς δὲ διαλεκτικῆς θεωρίας συμφώνως δοκεῖ τοῖς πλείστοις ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ φωνῆς ἐνάρχεσθαι τόπου. Ἔστι δὲ φωνὴ ἀὴρ πεπληγμένος ἢ τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ἀκοῆς, ὥς φησι Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος ἐν τῇ Περὶ φωνῆς τέχνῃ. Ζῴου μέν ἐστι φωνὴ ἀὴρ ὑπὸ ὁρμῆς πεπληγμένος, ἀνθρώπου δ’ ἔστιν ἔναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη, ὡς ὁ Διογένης φησίν, ἥτις ἀπὸ δεκατεσσάρων ἐτῶν τελειοῦται. Καὶ σῶμα δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ φωνὴ κατὰ τοὺς Στωικούς, ὥς φησιν Ἀρχέδημός τ’ ἐν τῇ Περὶ φωνῆς καὶ Διογένης καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ τῶν Φυσικῶν.

55. In their theory of dialectic most of them see fit to take as their starting-point the topic of voice. Now voice is a percussion of the air or the proper object of the sense of hearing, as Diogenes the Babylonian says in his handbook On Voice . While the voice or cry of an animal is just a percussion of air brought about by natural impulse, man’s voice is articulate and, as Diogenes puts it, an utterance of reason, having the quality of coming to maturity at the age of fourteen. Furthermore, voice according to the Stoics is something corporeal: I may cite for this Archedemus in his treatise On Voice , Diogenes, Antipater and Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics .

56 Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν σῶμά ἐστι· ποιεῖ δὲ ἡ φωνὴ προσιοῦσα τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν φωνούντων. Λέξις δέ ἐστιν κατὰ τοὺς Στωικούς, ὥς φησι Διογένης, φωνὴ ἐγγράμματος, οἷον Ἡμέρα. Λόγος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη, <οἷον Ἡμέρα ἐστί>. Διάλεκτος δέ ἐστι λέξις κεχαραγμένη ἐθνικῶς τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῶς, ἢ λέξις ποταπή, τουτέστι ποιὰ κατὰ διάλεκτον, οἷον κατὰ μὲν τὴν Ἀτθίδα Θάλαττα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἰάδα Ἡμέρη.

Τῆς δὲ λέξεως στοιχεῖά ἐστι τὰ εἰκοσιτέσσαρα γράμματα. Τριχῶς δὲ λέγεται τὸ γράμμα, <τό τε στοιχεῖον> ὅ τε χαρακτὴρ τοῦ στοιχείου καὶ τὸ ὄνομα, οἷον Ἄλφα·

56. For whatever produces an effect is body; and voice, as it proceeds from those who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect. Reduced to writing, what was voice becomes a verbal expression, as “day”; so says Diogenes. A statement or proposition is speech that issues from the mind and signifies something, e.g. “It is day.” Dialect (διάλεκτος) means a variety of speech which is stamped on one part of the Greek world as distinct from another, or on the Greeks as distinct from other races; or, again, it means a form peculiar to some particular region, that is to say, it has a certain linguistic quality; e.g. in Attic the word for “sea” is not θάλασσα but θάλαττα, and in Ionic “day” is not ἡμέρα but ἡμέρη.

Elements of language are the four-and-twenty letters. “Letter,” however, has three meanings: (1) the particular sound or element of speech; (2) its written symbol or character; (3) its name, as Alpha is the name of the sound A.

57 φωνήεντα δέ ἐστι τῶν στοιχείων ἑπτά, α, ε, η, ι, ο, υ, ω· ἄφωνα δὲ ἕξ, β, γ, δ, κ, π, τ. Διαφέρει δὲ φωνὴ καὶ λέξις, ὅτι φωνὴ μὲν καὶ ὁ ἦχός ἐστι, λέξις δὲ τὸ ἔναρθρον μόνον. Λέξις δὲ λόγου διαφέρει, ὅτι λόγος ἀεὶ σημαντικός ἐστι, λέξις δὲ καὶ ἀσήμαντος, ὡς ἡ βλίτυρι, λόγος δὲ οὐδαμῶς. Διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ λέγειν τοῦ προφέρεσθαι· προφέρονται μὲν γὰρ αἱ φωναί, λέγεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα, ἃ δὴ καὶ λεκτὰ τυγχάνει.

Τοῦ δὲ λόγου ἐστὶ μέρη πέντε, ὥς φησι Διογένης τ’ ἐν τῷ Περὶ φωνῆς καὶ Χρύσιππος, ὄνομα, προσηγορία, ῥῆμα, σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον· ὁ δ’ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ τὴν μεσότητα τίθησιν ἐν τοῖς Περὶ λέξεως καὶ τῶν λεγομένων.

57. Seven of the letters are vowels, a, e, ē i, o, u, ō, and six are mutes, b, g, d, k, p, t. There is a difference between voice and speech; because, while voice may include mere noise, speech is always articulate. Speech again differs from a sentence or statement, because the latter always signifies something, whereas a spoken word, as for example βλίτυρι, may be unintelligible – which a sentence never is. And to frame a sentence is more than mere utterance, for while vocal sounds are uttered, things are meant, that is, are matters of discourse.

58 Ἔστι δὲ προσηγορία μὲν κατὰ τὸν Διογένην μέρος λόγου σημαῖνον κοινὴν ποιότητα, οἷον Ἄνθρωπος, Ἵππος· ὄνομα δέ ἐστι μέρος λόγου δηλοῦν ἰδίαν ποιότητα, οἷον Διογένης, Σωκράτης· ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι μέρος λόγου σημαῖνον ἀσύνθετον κατηγόρημα, ὡς ὁ Διογένης, ἤ, ὥς τινες, στοιχεῖον λόγου ἄπτωτον, σημαῖνόν τι συντακτὸν περί τινος ἢ τινῶν, οἷον Γράφω, Λέγω· σύνδεσμος δέ ἐστι μέρος λόγου ἄπτωτον, συνδοῦν τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου· ἄρθρον δέ ἐστι στοιχεῖον λόγου πτωτικόν, διορίζον τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς, οἷον Ὁ, Ἡ, Τό, Οἱ, Αἱ, Τά.

58. There are, as stated by Diogenes in his treatise on Language and by Chrysippus, five parts of speech: proper name, common noun, verb, conjunction, article. To these Antipater in his work On Words and their Meaning adds another part, the “mean.”

A common noun or appellative is defined by Diogenes as part of a sentence signifying a common quality, e.g. man, horse; whereas a name is a part of speech expressing a quality peculiar to an individual, e.g. Diogenes, Socrates. A verb is, according to Diogenes, a part of speech signifying an isolated predicate, or, as others define it, an un-declined part of a sentence, signifying something that can be attached to one or more subjects, e.g. “I write,” “I speak.” A conjunction is an indeclinable part of speech, binding the various parts of a statement together; and an article is a declinable part of speech, distinguishing the genders and numbers of nouns, e.g. ὁ, ἡ, τό, οἱ, αἱ, τά.

59 Ἀρεταὶ δὲ λόγου εἰσὶ πέντε, Ἑλληνισμός, σαφήνεια, συντομία, πρέπον, κατασκευή. Ἑλληνισμὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστι φράσις ἀδιάπτωτος ἐν τῇ τεχνικῇ καὶ μὴ εἰκαίᾳ συνηθείᾳ· σαφήνεια δέ ἐστι λέξις γνωρίμως παριστᾶσα τὸ νοούμενον· συντομία δέ ἐστι λέξις αὐτὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα περιέχουσα πρὸς δήλωσιν τοῦ πράγματος· πρέπον δέ ἐστι λέξις οἰκεία τῷ πράγματι· κατασκευὴ δὲ λέξις ἐκπεφευγυῖα τὸν ἰδιωτισμόν. Ὁ δὲ βαρβαρισμὸς ἐκ τῶν κακιῶν λέξις ἐστὶ παρὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων Ἑλλήνων, σολοικισμὸς δέ ἐστι λόγος ἀκαταλλήλως συντεταγμένος.

59. There are five excellences of speech – pure Greek, lucidity, conciseness, appropriateness, distinction. By good Greek is meant language faultless in point of grammar and free from careless vulgarity. Lucidity is a style which presents the thought in a way easily understood; conciseness a style that employs no more words than are necessary for setting forth the subject in hand; appropriateness lies in a style akin to the subject; distinction in the avoidance of colloquialism. Among vices of style barbarism is violation of the usage of Greeks of good standing; while there is solecism when the sentence has an incongruous construction.

60 Ποίημα δέ ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιός φησιν ἐν τῇ Περὶ λέξεως εἰσαγωγῇ, λέξις ἔμμετρος ἢ ἔνρυθμος μετὰ σκευῆς τὸ λογοειδὲς ἐκβεβηκυῖα· τὸ ἔνρυθμον δ’ εἶναι τό

Γαῖα μεγίστη καὶ Διὸς αἰθήρ.

Ποίησις δέ ἐστι σημαντικὸν ποίημα, μίμησιν περιέχον θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπείων.

Ὅρος δέ ἐστιν, ὥς φησιν Ἀντίπατρος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ ὅρων, λόγος κατ’ ἀνάλυσιν ἀπαρτιζόντως ἐκφερόμενος, ἤ, ὡς Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ ὅρων, ἰδίου ἀπόδοσις. Ὑπογραφὴ δέ ἐστι λόγος τυπωδῶς εἰσάγων εἰς τὰ πράγματα, ἢ ὅρος ἁπλούστερον τὴν τοῦ ὅρου δύναμιν προσενηνεγμένος. Γένος δέ ἐστι πλειόνων καὶ ἀναφαιρέτων ἐννοημάτων σύλληψις, οἷον Ζῷον· τοῦτο γὰρ περιείληφε τὰ κατὰ μέρος ζῷα.

60. Posidonius in his treatise On Style defines a poetical phrase as one that is metrical or rhythmical, thus mechanically avoiding the character of prose; an example of such rhythmical phrase is:

O mightiest earth, O sky, God’s canopy.

And if such poetical phraseology is significant and includes a portrayal or representation of things human and divine, it is poetry.

A term is, as stated by Antipater in his first book On Terms , a word which, when a sentence is analysed, is uttered with complete meaning; or, according to Chrysippus in his book On Definitions , is a rendering back one’s own. Delineation is a statement which brings one to a knowledge of the subject in outline, or it may be called a definition which embodies the force of the definition proper in a simpler form. Genus (in logic) is the comprehension in one of a number of inseparable objects of thought: e.g. Animal; for this includes all particular animals.

61 Ἐννόημα δέ ἐστι φάντασμα διανοίας, οὔτε τὶ ὂν οὔτε ποιόν, ὡσανεὶ δέ τι ὂν καὶ ὡσανεὶ ποιόν, οἷον γίνεται ἀνατύπωμα ἵππου καὶ μὴ παρόντος.

Εἶδος δέ ἐστι τὸ ὑπὸ γένους περιεχόμενον, ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ζῴου ὁ ἄνθρωπος περιέχεται. Γενικώτατον δέ ἐστιν ὃ γένος ὂν γένος οὐκ ἔχει, οἷον τὸ ὄν· εἰδικώτατον δέ ἐστιν ὃ εἶδος ὂν εἶδος οὐκ ἔχει, ὥσπερ ὁ Σωκράτης.

Διαίρεσις δέ ἐστι γένους ἡ εἰς τὸ προσεχῆ εἴδη τομή, οἷον Τῶν ζῴων τὰ μέν ἐστι λογικά, τὰ δὲ ἄλογα. Ἀντιδιαίρεσις δέ ἐστι γένους εἰς εἶδος τομὴ κατὰ τοὐναντίον, ὡς ἂν κατ’ ἀπόφασιν, οἷον Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθά, τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθά. Ὑποδιαίρεσις δέ ἐστι διαίρεσις ἐπὶ διαιρέσει, οἷον Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθά, τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθά, καὶ Τῶν οὐκ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέν ἐστι κακά, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάφορα.

61. A notion or object of thought is a presentation to the intellect, which though not really substance nor attribute is quasi-substance or quasi-attribute. Thus an image of a horse may rise before the mind, although there is no horse present.

Species is that which is comprehended under genus: thus Man is included under Animal. The highest or most universal genus is that which, being itself a genus, has no genus above: namely, reality or the real; and the lowest and most particular species is that which, being itself a species, has no species below it, e.g. Socrates.

Division of a genus means dissection of it into its proximate species, thus: Animals are either rational or irrational (dichotomy). Contrary division dissects the genus into species by contrary qualities: for example, by means of negation, as when all things that are are divided into good and not good. Subdivision is division applied to a previous division: for instance, after saying, “Of things that are some are good, some are not good,” we proceed, “and of the not good some are bad, some are neither good nor bad (morally indifferent).”

62 Μερισμὸς δέ ἐστι γένους εἰς τόπους κατάταξις, ὡς ὁ Κρῖνις· οἷον Τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέν ἐστι περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα.

Ἀμφιβολία δέ ἐστι λέξις δύο ἢ καὶ πλείονα πράγματα σημαίνουσα λεκτικῶς καὶ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔθος, ὥσθ’ ἅμα τὰ πλείονα ἐκδέξασθαι κατὰ ταύτην τὴν λέξιν· οἷον Αὐλητρὶς πέπτωκε· δηλοῦνται γὰρ δι’ αὐτῆς τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον, Οἰκία τρὶς πέπτωκε, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον, Αὐλήτρια πέπτωκε.

Διαλεκτικὴ δέ ἐστιν, ὥς φησι Ποσειδώνιος, ἐπιστήμη ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων· τυγχάνει δ’ αὕτη, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππός φησι, περὶ σημαίνοντα καὶ σημαινόμενα. Ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ περὶ φωνῆς θεωρίᾳ τοιαῦτα λέγεται τοῖς Στωικοῖς.

62. Partition in logic is (according to Crinis) classification or distribution of a genus under heads: for instance, Of goods some are mental, others bodily.

Verbal ambiguity arises when a word properly, rightfully, and in accordance with fixed usage denotes two or more different things, so that at one and the same time we may take it in several distinct senses: e.g. in Greek, where by the same verbal expression may be meant in the one case that “A house has three times” fallen, in the other that “a dancing-girl” has fallen.

Posidonius defines Dialectic as the science dealing with truth, falsehood, and that which is neither true nor false; whereas Chrysippus takes its subject to be signs and things signified. Such then is the gist of what the Stoics say in their theory of language.

63 Ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν σημαινομένων τόπῳ τέτακται ὁ περὶ λεκτῶν καὶ αὐτοτελῶν καὶ ἀξιωμάτων καὶ συλλογισμῶν λόγος καὶ ὁ περὶ ἐλλιπῶν τε καὶ κατηγορημάτων καὶ ὀρθῶν καὶ ὑπτίων.

Φασὶ δὲ [τὸ] λεκτὸν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν λογικὴν ὑφιστάμενον. Τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν λέγουσιν εἶναι αὐτοτελῆ οἱ Στωικοί, τὰ δ’ ἐλλιπῆ. Ἐλλιπῆ μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ ἀναπάρτιστον ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφοράν, οἷον Γράφει· ἐπιζητοῦμεν γάρ, Τίς; αὐτοτελῆ δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπηρτισμένην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφοράν, οἷον Γράφει Σωκράτης. Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἐλλιπέσι λεκτοῖς τέτακται τὰ κατηγορήματα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς αὐτοτελέσι τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ οἱ συλλογισμοὶ καὶ τὰ ἐρωτήματα καὶ τὰ πύσματα.

63. To the department dealing with things as such and things signified is assigned the doctrine of expressions, including those which are complete in themselves, as well as judgements and syllogisms and that of defective expressions comprising predicates both direct and reversed.

By verbal expression they mean that of which the content corresponds to some rational presentation. Of such expressions the Stoics say that some are complete in themselves and others defective. Those are defective the enunciation of which is unfinished, as e.g. “writes,” for we inquire “Who?” Whereas in those that are complete in themselves the enunciation is finished, as “Socrates writes.” And so under the head of defective expressions are ranged all predicates, while under those complete in themselves fall judgements, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries.

64 Ἔστι δὲ τὸ κατηγόρημα τὸ κατά τινος ἀγορευόμενον ἢ πρᾶγμα συντακτὸν περί τινος ἢ τινῶν, ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἀπολλόδωρόν φασιν, ἢ λεκτὸν ἐλλιπὲς συντακτὸν ὀρθῇ πτώσει πρὸς ἀξιώματος γένεσιν. Τῶν δὲ κατηγορημάτων τὰ μέν ἐστι συμβάματα, οἷον τὸ « Διὰ πέτρας πλεῖν. » Καὶ τὰ μέν ἐστι τῶν κατηγορημάτων ὀρθά, ἃ δ’ ὕπτια, ἃ δ’ οὐδέτερα. Ὀρθὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ συντασσόμενα μιᾷ τῶν πλαγίων πτώσεων πρὸς κατηγορήματος γένεσιν, οἷον Ἀκούει, Ὁρᾷ, Διαλέγεται· ὕπτια δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ συντασσόμενα τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ, οἷον Ἀκούομαι, Ὁρῶμαι· οὐδέτερα δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ μηδετέρως ἔχοντα, οἷον Φρονεῖν, Περιπατεῖν. Ἀντιπεπονθότα δέ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς ὑπτίοις, ἃ ὕπτια ὄντα ἐνεργήματα [δέ] ἐστιν, οἷον Κείρεται· ἐμπεριέχει γὰρ αὑτὸν ὁ κειρόμενος. Πλάγιαι δὲ πτώσεις εἰσὶ γενικὴ καὶ δοτικὴ καὶ αἰτιατική.

64. A predicate is, according to the followers of Apollodorus, what is said of something; in other words, a thing associated with one or more subjects; or, again, it may be defined as a defective expression which has to be joined on to a nominative case in order to yield a judgement. Of predicates some are adjectival , as e.g. “to sail through rocks.” Again, some predicates are direct, some reversed, some neither. Now direct predicates are those that are constructed with one of the oblique cases, as “hears,” “sees,” “converses”; while reversed are those constructed with the passive voice, as “I am heard,” “I am seen.” Neutral are such as correspond to neither of these, as “thinks,” “walks.” Reflexive predicates are those among the passive, which, although in form passive, are yet active operations, as “he gets his hair cut”:

65 Ἀξίωμα δέ ἐστιν ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος· ἢ πρᾶγμα αὐτοτελὲς ἀποφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππός φησιν ἐν τοῖς Διαλεκτικοῖς ὅροις, « Ἀξίωμά ἐστι τὸ ἀποφαντὸν ἢ καταφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ, οἷον Ἡμέρα ἐστί, Δίων περιπατεῖ. » Ὠνόμασται δὲ τὸ ἀξίωμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀξιοῦσθαι ἢ ἀθετεῖσθαι· ὁ γὰρ λέγων Ἡμέρα ἐστίν, ἀξιοῦν δοκεῖ τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι. Οὔσης μὲν οὖν ἡμέρας, ἀληθὲς γίνεται τὸ προκείμενον ἀξίωμα· μὴ οὔσης δέ, ψεῦδος.

65. for here the agent includes himself in the sphere of his action. The oblique cases are genitive, dative, and accusative.

A judgement is that which is either true or false, or a thing complete in itself, capable of being denied in and by itself, as Chrysippus says in his Dialectical Definitions : “A judgement is that which in and by itself can be denied or affirmed, e.g. `It is day,’ `Dion is walking.’” The Greek word for judgement (ἀξίωμα) is derived from the verb ἀξιοῦν, as signifying acceptance or rejection; for when you say “It is day,” you seem to accept the fact that it is day. Now, if it really is day, the judgement before us is true, but if not, it is false.

66 Διαφέρει δ’ ἀξίωμα καὶ ἐρώτημα καὶ πύσμα, προστακτικὸν καὶ ὁρκικὸν καὶ ἀρατικὸν καὶ ὑποθετικὸν καὶ προσαγορευτικὸν καὶ πρᾶγμα ὅμοιον ἀξιώματι. Ἀξίωμα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὃ λέγοντες ἀποφαινόμεθα, ὅπερ ἢ ἀληθές ἐστιν ἢ ψεῦδος. Ἐρώτημα δέ ἐστι πρᾶγμα αὐτοτελὲς μέν, ὡς καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα, αἰτητικὸν δὲ ἀποκρίσεως, οἷον « Ἆρά γ’ ἡμέρα ἐστί; » τοῦτο δ’ οὔτε ἀληθές ἐστιν οὔτε ψεῦδος, ὥστε τὸ μὲν « Ἡμέρα ἐστίν » ἀξίωμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ « Ἆρά γ’ ἡμέρα ἐστίν; » ἐρώτημα. Πύσμα δέ ἐστι πρᾶγμα πρὸς ὃ συμβολικῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐρωτήματος, Ναί, ἀλλὰ εἰπεῖν « Οἰκεῖ ἐν τῷδε τῷ τόπῳ. »

66. There is a difference between judgement, interrogation, and inquiry, as also between imperative, adjurative, optative, hypothetical, vocative, whether that to which these terms are applied be a thing or a judgement. For a judgement is that which, when we set it forth in speech, becomes an assertion, and is either false or true: an interrogation is a thing complete in itself like a judgement but demanding an answer, e.g. “Is it day?” and this is so far neither true nor false. Thus “It is day” is a judgement; “Is it day?” an interrogation. An inquiry is something to which we cannot reply by signs, as you can nod Yes to an interrogation; but you must express the answer in words, “He lives in this or that place.”

67 Προστακτικὸν δέ ἐστι πρᾶγμα ὃ λέγοντες προστάσσομεν, οἷον,

Σὺ μὲν βάδιζε τὰς ἐπ’ Ἰνάχου ῥοάς.

Ὁρκικὸν δέ ἐστι πρᾶγμα <προσαγορευτικὸν δέ ἐστι πρᾶγμα> ὃ εἰ λέγοι τις, προσαγορεύοι ἄν, οἷον,

Ἀτρείδη κύδιστε, ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον.

Ὅμοιον δ’ ἐστὶν ἀξιώματι ὃ τὴν ἐκφορὰν ἔχον ἀξιωματικὴν παρά τινος μορίου πλεονασμὸν ἢ πάθος ἔξω πίπτει τοῦ γένους τῶν ἀξιωμάτων, οἷον,

Καλός γ’ ὁ παρθενών, <καὶ>

Ὡς Πριαμίδῃσιν ἐμφερὴς ὁ βουκόλος.

67. An imperative is something which conveys a command: e.g.

Go thou to the waters of Inachus.

An adjurative utterance is something ... A vocative utterance is something the use of which implies that you are addressing some one; for instance:

Most glorious son of Atreus, Agamemnon, lord of men.

A quasi-proposition is that which, having the enunciation of a judgement, yet in consequence of the intensified tone or emotion of one of its parts falls outside the class of judgements proper, e.g.

Yea, fair indeed the Parthenon!
How like to Priam’s sons the cowherd is!

68 Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπαπορητικόν τι πρᾶγμα διενηνοχὸς ἀξιώματος, ὃ εἰ λέγοι τις, ἀποροίη ἄν·

Ἆρ’ ἔστι συγγενές τι λύπη καὶ βίος;

οὔτε δ’ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν οὔτε ψευδῆ τὰ ἐρωτήματα καὶ τὰ πύσματα

καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια, τῶν ἀξιωμάτων ἢ ἀληθῶν ἢ ψευδῶν

ὄντων.

Τῶν ἀξιωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἁπλᾶ, τὰ δ’ οὐχ ἁπλᾶ, ὥς φασιν οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον καὶ Ἀρχέδημον καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρον καὶ Ἀντίπατρον καὶ Κρῖνιν. Ἁπλᾶ μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ συνεστῶτα ἐξ ἀξιώματος μὴ διαφορουμένου [ἢ ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων], οἷον τὸ « Ἡμέρα ἐστίν »· οὐχ ἁπλᾶ δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ συνεστῶτ’ ἐξ ἀξιώματος διαφορουμένου ἢ ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων.

68. There is also, differing from a proposition or judgement, what may be called a timid suggestion, the expression of which leaves one at a loss, e.g.

Can it be that pain and life are in some sort akin?

Interrogations, inquiries and the like are neither true nor false, whereas judgements (or propositions) are always either true or false.

The followers of Chrysippus, Archedemus, Athenodorus, Antipater and Crinis divide propositions into simple and not simple. Simple are those that consist of one or more propositions which are not ambiguous, as “It is day.” Not simple are those that consist of one or more ambiguous propositions.

69 Ἐξ ἀξιώματος μὲν διαφορουμένου, οἷον « Εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, <ἡμέρα ἐστίν> »· ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων δέ, οἷον « Εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστι. »

Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἁπλοῖς ἀξιώμασίν ἐστι τὸ ἀποφατικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀρνητικὸν καὶ τὸ στερητικὸν καὶ τὸ κατηγορικὸν καὶ τὸ καταγορευτικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὐχ ἁπλοῖς ἀξιώμασι τὸ συνημμένον καὶ τὸ παρασυνημμένον καὶ τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον καὶ τὸ διεζευγμένον καὶ τὸ αἰτιῶδες καὶ τὸ διασαφοῦν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ διασαφοῦν τὸ ἧττον. Καὶ ἀποφατικὸν μὲν οἷον « Οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἐστίν. » Εἶδος δὲ τούτου τὸ ὑπεραποφατικόν. Ὑπεραποφατικὸν δ’ ἐστὶν ἀποφατικὸν ἀποφατικοῦ, οἷον « Οὐχὶ ἡμέρα <οὐκ> ἔστι »· τίθησι δὲ τὸ « Ἡμέρα ἐστίν. »

69. They may, that is, consist either of a single ambiguous proposition, e.g. “If it is day, it is day,” or of more than one proposition, e.g. “If it is day, it is light.”

With simple propositions are classed those of negation, denial, privation, affirmation, the definitive and the indefinitive; with those that are not simple the hypothetical, the inferential, the coupled or complex, the disjunctive, the causal, and that which indicates more or less. An example of a negative proposition is “It is not day.” Of the negative proposition one species is the double negative. By double negative is meant the negation of a negation, e.g. “It is not not-day.” Now this presupposes that it is day.

70 Ἀρνητικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐξ ἀρνητικοῦ μορίου καὶ κατηγορήματος, οἷον « Οὐδεὶς περιπατεῖ »· στερητικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐκ στερητικοῦ μορίου καὶ ἀξιώματος κατὰ δύναμιν, οἷον « Ἀφιλάνθρωπός ἐστιν οὗτος »· κατηγορικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐκ πτώσεως ὀρθῆς καὶ κατηγορήματος, οἷον « Δίων περιπατεῖ »· καταγορευτικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐκ πτώσεως ὀρθῆς δεικτικῆς καὶ κατηγορήματος, οἷον « Οὗτος περιπατεῖ »· ἀόριστον δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐξ ἀορίστου μορίου ἢ ἀορίστων μορίων <καὶ κατηγορήματος>, οἷον « Τὶς περιπατεῖ, » « Ἐκεῖνος κινεῖται. »

70. A denial contains a negative part or particle and a predication: such as this, “No one is walking.” A privative proposition is one that contains a privative particle reversing the effect of a judgement, as, for example, “This man is unkind.” An affirmative or assertory proposition is one that consists of a noun in the nominative case and a predicate, as “Dion is walking.” A definitive proposition is one that consists of a demonstrative in the nominative case and a predicate, as “This man is walking.” An indefinitive proposition is one that consists of an indefinite word or words and a predicate, e.g. “Some one is walking,” or “There’s some one walking”; “He is in motion.”

71 Τῶν δ’ οὐχ ἁπλῶν ἀξιωμάτων συνημμένον μέν ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν ταῖς Διαλεκτικαῖς φησι καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ Διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ, τὸ συνεστὸς διὰ τοῦ « Εἰ » συναπτικοῦ συνδέσμου. Ἐπαγγέλλεται δ’ ὁ σύνδεσμος οὗτος ἀκολουθεῖν τὸ δεύτερον τῷ πρώτῳ, οἷον « Εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστι. » Παρασυνημμένον δέ ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ Κρῖνίς φησιν ἐν τῇ Διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ, ἀξίωμα ὃ ὑπὸ τοῦ « Ἐπεί » συνδέσμου παρασυνῆπται ἀρχόμενον ἀπ’ ἀξιώματος καὶ λῆγον εἰς ἀξίωμα, οἷον « Ἐπεὶ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστιν. » Ἐπαγγέλλεται δ’ ὁ σύνδεσμος ἀκολουθεῖν τε τὸ δεύτερον τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὑφεστάναι.

71. Of propositions that are not simple the hypothetical, according to Chrysippus in his Dialectics and Diogenes in his Art of Dialectic , is one that is formed by means of the conditional conjunction “If.” Now this conjunction promises that the second of two things follows consequentially upon the first, as, for instance, “If it is day, it is light.” An inferential proposition according to Crinis in his Art of Dialectic is one which is introduced by the conjunction “Since” and consists of an initial proposition and a conclusion; for example, “Since it is day-time, it is light.” This conjunction guarantees both that the second thing follows from the first and that the first is really a fact.

72 Συμπεπλεγμένον δέ ἐστιν ἀξίωμα ὃ ὑπό τινων συμπλεκτικῶν συνδέσμων συμπέπλεκται, οἷον « Καὶ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ καὶ φῶς ἐστι. » Διεζευγμένον δέ ἐστιν ὃ ὑπὸ τοῦ « Ἢτοι » διαζευκτικοῦ συνδέσμου διέζευκται, οἷον « Ἤτοι ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἢ νύξ ἐστιν. » Ἐπαγγέλλεται δ’ ὁ σύνδεσμος οὗτος τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἀξιωμάτων ψεῦδος εἶναι. Αἰτιῶδες δέ ἐστιν ἀξίωμα τὸ συντασσόμενον διὰ τοῦ « Διότι, » οἷον « διότι ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστιν »· οἱονεὶ γὰρ αἴτιόν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ δευτέρου. Διασαφοῦν δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀξίωμά ἐστι τὸ συνταττόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ διασαφοῦντος τὸ μᾶλλον συνδέσμου καὶ τοῦ <« Ἤ »> μέσου τῶν ἀξιωμάτων τασσομένου, οἷον « Μᾶλλον ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἢ νύξ ἐστι. »

72. A coupled proposition is one which is put together by certain coupling conjunctions, e.g. “It is day-time and it is light.” A disjunctive proposition is one which is constituted such by the disjunctive conjunction “Either,” as e.g. “Either it is day or it is night.” This conjunction guarantees that one or other of the alternatives is false. A causal proposition is constructed by means of the conjunction “Because,” e.g. “Because it is day, it is light.” For the first clause is, as it were, the cause of the second. A proposition which indicates more or less is one that is formed by the word signifying “rather” and the word “than” in between the clauses, as, for example, “It is rather day-time than night.”

73 Διασαφοῦν δὲ τὸ ἧττον ἀξίωμά ἐστι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ προκειμένῳ, οἷον « Ἡττον νύξ ἐστιν ἢ ἡμέρα ἐστίν. » Ἔτι τῶν ἀξιωμάτων κατά τ’ ἀλήθειαν καὶ ψεῦδος ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ὧν τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐστὶν ἀποφατικόν, οἷον τὸ « Ἡμέρα ἐστί » καὶ τὸ « Οὐχ ἡμέρα ἐστί. » Συνημμένον οὖν ἀληθές ἐστιν οὗ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λήγοντος μάχεται τῷ ἡγουμένῳ, οἷον « Εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστι. » Τοῦτ’ ἀληθές ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ « Οὐχὶ φῶς, » ἀντικείμενον τῷ λήγοντι, μάχεται τῷ « Ἡμέρα ἐστί. » Συνημμένον δὲ ψεῦδός ἐστιν οὗ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λήγοντος οὐ μάχεται τῷ ἡγουμένῳ, οἷον « Εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, Δίων περιπατεῖ »· τὸ γὰρ « Οὐχὶ Δίων περιπατεῖ » οὐ μάχεται τῷ « Ἡμέρα ἐστί. »

73. Opposite in character to the foregoing is a proposition which declares what is less the fact, as e.g. “It is less or not so much night as day.” Further, among propositions there are some which in respect of truth and falsehood stand opposed to one another, of which the one is the negative of the other, as e.g. the propositions “It is day” and “It is not day.” A hypothetical proposition is therefore true, if the contradictory of its conclusion is incompatible with its premiss, e.g. “If it is day, it is light.” This is true. For the statement “It is not light,” contradicting the conclusion, is incompatible with the premiss “It is day.” On the other hand, a hypothetical proposition is false, if the contradictory of its conclusion does not conflict with the premiss, e.g. “If it is day, Dion is walking.” For the statement “Dion is not walking” does not conflict with the premiss “It is day.”

74 Παρασυνημμένον δ’ ἀληθὲς μέν ἐστιν ὃ ἀρχόμενον ἀπ’ ἀληθοῦς εἰς ἀκόλουθον λήγει, οἷον « Ἐπεὶ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, ἥλιός ἐστιν ὑπὲρ γῆς. » Ψεῦδος δ’ ὃ ἢ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἄρχεται ἢ μὴ εἰς ἀκόλουθον λήγει, οἷον « Ἐπεὶ νύξ ἐστι, Δίων περιπατεῖ, » ἂν ἡμέρας οὔσης λέγηται. Αἰτιῶδες δ’ ἀληθὲς μέν ἐστιν ὃ ἀρχόμενον ἀπ’ ἀληθοῦς εἰς ἀκόλουθον λήγει, οὐ μὴν ἔχει τῷ λήγοντι τὸ ἀρχόμενον ἀκόλουθον, οἷον « Διότι ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστι »· τῷ μὲν γὰρ « Ἡμέρα ἐστίν » ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ « Φῶς ἐστι, » τῷ δὲ « Φῶς ἐστιν » οὐχ ἕπεται τὸ « Ἡμέρα ἐστίν. » Αἰτιῶδες δὲ ψεῦδός ἐστιν ὃ ἤτοι ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἄρχεται ἢ μὴ εἰς ἀκόλουθον λήγει ἢ ἔχει τῷ λήγοντι τὸ ἀρχόμενον ἀνακόλουθον, οἷον « Διότι νύξ ἐστι, Δίων περιπατεῖ. »

74. An inferential proposition is true if starting from a true premiss it also has a consequent conclusion, as e.g. “Since it is day, the sun is above the horizon.” But it is false if it starts from a false premiss or has an inconsequent conclusion, as e.g. “Since it is night, Dion is walking,” if this be said in day-time. A causal proposition is true if its conclusion really follows from a premiss itself true, though the premiss does not follow conversely from the conclusion, as e.g. “Because it is day, it is light,” where from the “it is day” the “it is light” duly follows, though from the statement “it is light” it would not follow that “it is day.” But a causal proposition is false if it either starts from a false premiss or has an inconsequent conclusion or has a premiss that does not correspond with the conclusion, as e.g. “Because it is night, Dion is walking.”

75 Πιθανὸν δέ ἐστιν ἀξίωμα τὸ ἄγον εἰς συγκατάθεσιν, οἷον « Εἴ τίς τι ἔτεκεν, ἐκείνη ἐκείνου μήτηρ ἐστί. » Ψεῦδος δὲ τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὄρνις ᾠοῦ ἐστι μήτηρ.

Ἔτι τε τὰ μέν ἐστι δυνατά, τὰ δ’ ἀδύνατα· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα, τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα. Δυνατὸν μὲν τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, τῶν ἐκτὸς μὴ ἐναντιουμένων εἰς τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, οἷον « Ζῇ Διοκλῆς »· ἀδύνατον δὲ ὃ μή ἐστιν ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, οἷον « Ἡ γῆ ἵπταται. » Ἀναγκαῖον δέ ἐστιν ὅπερ ἀληθὲς ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ψεῦδος εἶναι, ἢ ἐπιδεκτικὸν μέν ἐστι, τὰ δ’ ἐκτὸς αὐτῷ ἐναντιοῦται πρὸς τὸ ψεῦδος εἶναι, οἷον « Ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ. » Οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δέ ἐστιν ὃ καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν καὶ ψεῦδος οἷόν τε εἶναι, τῶν ἐκτὸς μηδὲν ἐναντιουμένων, οἷον τὸ « Περιπατεῖ Δίων. »

75. A probable judgement is one which induces to assent, e.g. “Whoever gave birth to anything, is that thing’s mother.” This, however, is not necessarily true; for the hen is not mother of an egg.

Again, some things are possible, others impossible; and some things are necessary, others are not necessary. A proposition is possible which admits of being true, there being nothing in external circumstances to prevent it being true, e.g. “Diocles is alive.” Impossible is one which does not admit of being true, as e.g. “The earth flies.” That is necessary which besides being true does not admit of being false or, while it may admit of being false, is prevented from being false by circumstances external to itself, as “Virtue is beneficial.” Not necessary is that which, while true, yet is capable of being false if there are no external conditions to prevent, e.g. “Dion is walking.”

76 Εὔλογον δέ ἐστιν ἀξίωμα τὸ πλείονας ἀφορμὰς ἔχον εἰς τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, οἷον « Βιώσομαι αὔριον. »

Καὶ ἄλλαι δὲ διαφοραί εἰσι ἀξιωμάτων καὶ μεταπτώσεις αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀληθῶν εἰς ψεύδη καὶ ἀντιστροφαί, περὶ ὧν ἐν τῷ πλάτει λέγομεν.

Λόγος δέ ἐστιν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Κρῖνίν φασι, τὸ συνεστηκὸς ἐκ λήμματος [ἢ λημμάτων] καὶ προσλήψεως καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς, οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος, « Εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστι· ἡμέρα δέ ἐστι· φῶς ἄρα ἐστί. » Λῆμμα μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ « Εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστι »· πρόσληψις τὸ « Ἡμέρα δέ ἐστιν »· ἐπιφορὰ δὲ τὸ « Φῶς ἄρα ἐστί. » Τρόπος δέ ἐστιν οἱονεὶ σχῆμα λόγου, οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος, « Εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. »

76. A reasonable proposition is one which has to start with more chances of being true than not, e.g. “I shall be alive to-morrow.”

And there are other shades of difference in propositions and grades of transition from true to false – and conversions of their terms – which we now go on to describe broadly.

An argument, according to the followers of Crinis, consists of a major premiss, a minor premiss, and a conclusion, such as for example this: “If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore it is light.” Here the sentence “If it is day, it is light” is the major premiss, the clause “it is day” is the minor premiss, and “therefore it is light” is the conclusion. A mood is a sort of outline of an argument, like the following: “If the first, then the second; but the first is, therefore the second is.”

77 Λογότροπος δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων σύνθετον, οἷον « Εἰ ζῇ Πλάτων, ἀναπνεῖ Πλάτων· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. » Παρεισήχθη δὲ ὁ λογότροπος ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς μακροτέραις συντάξεσι τῶν λόγων μηκέτι τὴν πρόσληψιν μακρὰν οὖσαν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ συντόμως ἐπενεγκεῖν, « Τὸ δὲ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. »

Τῶν δὲ λόγων οἱ μέν εἰσιν ἀπέραντοι, οἱ δὲ περαντικοί. Ἀπέραντοι μὲν ὧν τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς οὐ μάχεται τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῇ, οἷον οἱ τοιοῦτοι, « Εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστι· ἡμέρα δέ ἐστι· περιπατεῖ ἄρα Δίων. »

77. Symbolical argument is a combination of full argument and mood; e.g. “If Plato is alive, he breathes; but the first is true, therefore the second is true.” This mode of argument was introduced in order that when dealing with long complex arguments we should not have to repeat the minor premiss, if it be long, and then state the conclusion, but may arrive at the conclusion as concisely as possible: if A, then B.

Of arguments some are conclusive, others inconclusive. Inconclusive are such that the contradictory of the conclusion is not incompatible with combination of the premisses, as in the following: “If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore Dion walks.”

78 Τῶν δὲ περαντικῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν ὁμωνύμως τῷ γένει λέγονται περαντικοί· οἱ δὲ συλλογιστικοί. Συλλογιστικοὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν οἱ ἤτοι ἀναπόδεικτοι ὄντες ἢ ἀναγόμενοι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους κατά τι τῶν θεμάτων ἤ τινα, οἷον οἱ τοιοῦτοι, « Εἰ περιπατεῖ Δίων, κινεῖται ἄρα Δίων. » Περαντικοὶ δέ εἰσιν εἰδικῶς οἱ συνάγοντες μὴ συλλογιστικῶς, οἷον οἱ τοιοῦτοι, « Ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ καὶ νύξ ἐστι· ἡμέρα δέ ἐστιν· οὐκ ἄρα νύξ ἐστιν. » Ἀσυλλόγιστοι δ’ εἰσὶν οἱ παρακείμενοι μὲν πιθανῶς τοῖς συλλογιστικοῖς, οὐ συνάγοντες δέ, οἷον « Εἰ ἵππος ἐστὶ Δίων, ζῷόν ἐστι Δίων· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἵππος οὐκ ἔστι Δίων· οὐκ ἄρα ζῷόν ἐστι Δίων. »

78. Of conclusive some are denoted by the common name of the whole class, “conclusive proper,” others are called syllogistic. The syllogistic are such as either do not admit of, or are reducible to such as do not admit of, immediate proof in respect of one or more of the premisses; e.g. “If Dion walks, then Dion is in motion; but Dion is walking, therefore Dion is in motion.” Conclusive specifically are those which draw conclusions, but not by syllogism; e.g. the statement “It is both day and night” is false: “now it is day; therefore it is not night.” Arguments not syllogistic are those which plausibly resemble syllogistic arguments, but are not cogent proof; e.g. “If Dion is a horse, he is an animal; but Dion is not a horse, therefore he is not an animal.”

79 Ἔτι τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς. Ἀληθεῖς μὲν οὖν εἰσι λόγοι οἱ δι’ ἀληθῶν συνάγοντες, οἷον « Εἰ ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ, ἡ κακία βλάπτει· <ἀλλὰ μὴν ὠφελεῖ ἡ ἀρετή· ἡ κακία ἄρα βλάπτει>. » Ψευδεῖς δέ εἰσιν οἱ τῶν λημμάτων ἔχοντές τι ψεῦδος ἢ ἀπέραντοι ὄντες, οἷον « Εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστιν· ἡμέρα δέ ἐστι· ζῇ ἄρα Δίων. » Καὶ δυνατοὶ δ’ εἰσὶ λόγοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καὶ ἀναγκαῖοι καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖοι· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἀναπόδεικτοί τινες, τῷ μὴ χρῄζειν ἀποδείξεως, ἄλλοι μὲν παρ’ ἄλλοις, παρὰ δὲ τῷ Χρυσίππῳ πέντε, δι’ ὧν πᾶς λόγος πλέκεται· οἵτινες λαμβάνονται ἐπὶ τῶν περαντικῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συλλογισμῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τροπικῶν.

79. Further, arguments may be divided into true and false. The former draw their conclusions by means of true premisses; e.g. “If virtue does good, vice does harm; but virtue does good, therefore vice does harm.” Those are false which have error in the premisses or are inconclusive; e.g. “If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore Dion is alive.” Arguments may also be divided into possible and impossible, necessary and not necessary. Further, there are statements which are indemonstrable because they do not need demonstration; they are employed in the construction of every argument. As to the number of these, authorities differ; Chrysippus makes them five. These are assumed alike in reasoning specifically conclusive and in syllogisms both categorical and hypothetical.

80 Πρῶτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ἐν ᾧ πᾶς λόγος συντάσσεται ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἡγουμένου, ἀφ’ οὗ ἄρχεται τὸ συνημμένον καὶ τὸ λῆγον ἐπιφέρει, οἷον « Εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. » Δεύτερος δ’ ἐστὶν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ διὰ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἡγουμένου ἔχων συμπέρασμα, οἷον « Εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν φῶς οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἐστίν. » Ἡ γὰρ πρόσληψις γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τῷ λήγοντι καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορὰ ἐκ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τῷ ἡγουμένῳ. Τρίτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ δι’ ἀποφατικῆς συμπλοκῆς καὶ ἑνὸς τῶν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ ἐπιφέρων τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ, οἷον « Οὐχὶ τέθνηκε Πλάτων καὶ ζῇ Πλάτων· ἀλλὰ μὴν τέθνηκε Πλάτων· οὐκ ἄρα ζῇ Πλάτων. »

80. The first kind of indemonstrable statement is that in which the whole argument is constructed of a hypothetical proposition and the clause with which the hypothetical proposition begins, while the final clause is the conclusion; as e.g. “If the first, then the second; but the first is, therefore the second is.” The second is that which employs a hypothetical proposition and the contradictory of the consequent, while the conclusion is the contradictory of the antecedent; e.g. “If it is day, it is light; but it is night, therefore it is not day.” Here the minor premiss is the contradictory of the consequent; the conclusion the contradictory of the antecedent. The third kind of indemonstrable employs a conjunction of negative propositions for major premiss and one of the conjoined propositions for minor premiss, concluding thence the contradictory of the remaining proposition; e.g. “It is not the case that Plato is both dead and alive; but he is dead, therefore Plato is not alive.”

81 Τέταρτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ διὰ διεζευγμένου καὶ ἑνὸς τῶν ἐν τῷ διεζευγμένῳ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ ἔχων συμπέρασμα, οἷον « Ἤτοι τὸ πρῶτον ἢ τὸ δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον. » Πέμπτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ἐν ᾧ πᾶς λόγος συντάσσεται ἐκ διεζευγμένου καὶ <τοῦ> ἑνὸς τῶν ἐν τῷ διεζευγμένῳ ἀντικειμένου καὶ ἐπιφέρει τὸ λοιπόν, οἷον « Ἤτοι ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἢ νύξ ἐστιν· οὐχὶ δὲ νύξ ἐστιν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἐστίν. »

Ἐπ’ ἀληθεῖ δ’ ἀληθὲς ἕπεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωικούς, ὡς τῷ « Ἡμέρα ἐστὶ » τὸ « Φῶς ἐστι »· καὶ ψεύδει ψεῦδος, ὡς τῷ « Νύξ ἐστι » ψεύδει τὸ « Σκότος ἐστί »· καὶ ψεύδει ἀληθές, ὡς τῷ « Ἵπτασθαι τὴν γῆν » τὸ « Εἶναι τὴν γῆν. » Ἀληθεῖ μέντοι ψεῦδος οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ· τῷ γὰρ « Εἶναι τὴν γῆν » τὸ « Πέτεσθαι τὴν γῆν » οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ.

81. The fourth kind employs a disjunctive proposition and one of the two alternatives in the disjunction as premisses, and its conclusion is the contradictory of the other alternative; e.g. “Either A or B; but A is, therefore B is not.” The fifth kind is that in which the argument as a whole is constructed of a disjunctive proposition and the contradictory of one of the alternatives in the disjunction, its conclusion being the other alternative; e.g. “Either it is day or it is night; but it is not night, therefore it is day.”

From a truth a truth follows, according to the Stoics, as e.g. “It is light” from “It is day”; and from a falsehood a falsehood, as “It is dark” from “It is night,” if this latter be untrue. Also a truth may follow from a falsehood; e.g. from “The earth flies” will follow “The earth exists”; whereas from a truth no falsehood will follow, for from the existence of the earth it does not follow that the earth flies aloft.

82 Καὶ ἄποροι δέ τινές εἰσι λόγοι ἐγκεκαλυμμένοι καὶ διαλεληθότες καὶ σωρῖται καὶ κερατίδες καὶ οὔτιδες. Ἔστι δὲ ἐγκεκαλυμμένος, οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος « Οὐχὶ τὰ μὲν δύο ὀλίγα ἐστίν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ τρία, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα μέν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ τέσσαρα καὶ οὕτω μέχρι τῶν δέκα· τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα ἐστί· καὶ τὰ δέκα ἄρα. » Οὔτις δέ ἐστι λόγος συνακτικὸς ἐξ ἀορίστου καὶ ὡρισμένου συνεστώς, πρόσληψιν δὲ καὶ ἐπιφορὰν ἔχων, οἷον « Εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνος ἐν Ῥόδῳ. <Ἀλλὰ μήν ἐστί τις ἐνταῦθα· οὐκ ἄρα τίς ἐστιν ἐν Ῥόδῳ>. »

82. There are also certain insoluble arguments: the Veiled Men, the Concealed, Sorites, Horned Folk, the Nobodies. The Veiled is as follows: . . . “It cannot be that if two is few, three is not so likewise, nor that if two or three are few, four is not so; and so on up to ten. But two is few, therefore so also is ten.” . . . The Nobody argument is an argument whose major premiss consists of an indefinite and a definite clause, followed by a minor premiss and conclusion; for example, “If anyone is here, he is not in Rhodes; but there is some one here, therefore there is not anyone in Rhodes.” . . .

83 Καὶ τοιοῦτοι μὲν ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς οἱ Στωικοί, ἵνα μάλιστα κρατύνωσι διαλεκτικὸν ἀεὶ εἶναι τὸν σοφόν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ πράγματα διὰ τῆς ἐν λόγοις θεωρίας ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅσα τε τοῦ φυσικοῦ τόπου τυγχάνει καὶ αὖ πάλιν ὅσα τοῦ ἠθικοῦ (εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ λογικὸν τί δεῖ λέγειν;) περί τ’ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος, ὅπως διέταξαν οἱ νόμοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις, οὐκ ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. Δυοῖν δ’ οὔσαιν συνηθείαιν ταῖν ὑποπιπτούσαιν τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἡ μὲν τί ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων σκοπεῖ, ἡ δὲ τί καλεῖται. Καὶ ὧδε μὲν αὐτοῖς ἔχει τὸ λογικόν.

83. Such, then, is the logic of the Stoics, by which they seek to establish their point that the wise man is the true dialectician. For all things, they say, are discerned by means of logical study, including whatever falls within the province of Physics, and again whatever belongs to that of Ethics. For else, say they, as regards statement and reasoning Physics and Ethics could not tell how to express themselves, or again concerning the proper use of terms, how the laws have defined various actions. Moreover, of the two kinds of common-sense inquiry included under Virtue one considers the nature of each particular thing, the other asks what it is called. Thus much for their logic.

84 Τὸ δ’ ἠθικὸν μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας διαιροῦσιν εἴς τε τὸν περὶ ὁρμῆς καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τόπον καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ παθῶν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ τέλους περί τε τῆς πρώτης ἀξίας καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν. Οὕτω δ’ ὑποδιαιροῦσιν οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον καὶ Ἀρχέδημον καὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Ταρσέα καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρον καὶ Διογένην καὶ Ἀντίπατρον καὶ Ποσειδώνιον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κιτιεὺς Ζήνων καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης, ὡς ἂν ἀρχαιότεροι, ἀφελέστερον περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διέλαβον. Οὗτοι δὲ διεῖλον καὶ τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικόν.

84. The ethical branch of philosophy they divide as follows: (1) the topic of impulse; (2) the topic of things good and evil; (3) that of the passions; (4) that of virtue; (5) that of the end; (6) that of primary value and of actions; (7) that of duties or the befitting; and (8) of inducements to act or refrain from acting. The foregoing is the subdivision adopted by Chrysippus, Archedemus, Zeno of Tarsus, Apollodorus, Diogenes, Antipater, and Posidonius, and their disciples. Zeno of Citium and Cleanthes treated the subject somewhat less elaborately, as might be expected in an older generation. They, however, did subdivide Logic and Physics as well as Ethics.

85 Τὴν δὲ πρώτην ὁρμήν φασι τὸ ζῷον ἴσχειν ἐπὶ τὸ τηρεῖν ἑαυτό, οἰκειούσης αὐτὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ τελῶν, πρῶτον οἰκεῖον λέγων εἶναι παντὶ ζῴῳ τὴν αὑτοῦ σύστασιν καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείδησιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀλλοτριῶσαι εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτὸ <αὑτῷ> τὸ ζῷον, οὔτε ποιήσασαν αὐτό, μήτ’ ἀλλοτριῶσαι μήτ’ [οὐκ] οἰκειῶσαι. Ἀπολείπεται τοίνυν λέγειν συστησαμένην αὐτὸ οἰκειῶσαι πρὸς ἑαυτό· οὕτω γὰρ τά τε βλάπτοντα διωθεῖται καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα προσίεται.

85. An animal’s first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends : his words are, “The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof”; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it.

86 Ὃ δὲ λέγουσί τινες, πρὸς ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν πρώτην ὁρμὴν τοῖς ζῴοις, ψεῦδος ἀποφαίνουσιν. Ἐπιγέννημα γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν, ἡδονὴν εἶναι ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν ἡ φύσις ἐπιζητήσασα τὰ ἐναρμόζοντα τῇ συστάσει ἀπολάβῃ· ὃν τρόπον ἀφιλαρύνεται τὰ ζῷα καὶ θάλλει τὰ φυτά. Οὐδέν τε, φασί, διήλλαξεν ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων, ὅτι χωρὶς ὁρμῆς καὶ αἰσθήσεως κἀκεῖνα οἰκονομεῖ καὶ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν τινα φυτοειδῶς γίνεται. Ἐκ περιττοῦ δὲ τῆς ὁρμῆς τοῖς ζῴοις ἐπιγενομένης, ᾗ συγχρώμενα πορεύεται πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα, τούτοις μὲν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν διοικεῖσθαι· τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῖς λογικοῖς κατὰ τελειοτέραν προστασίαν δεδομένου, τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν ὀρθῶς γίνεσθαι <τού>τοις κατὰ φύσιν· τεχνίτης γὰρ οὗτος ἐπιγίνεται τῆς ὁρμῆς.

86. As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal’s existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature’s rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically.

87 Διόπερ πρῶτος ὁ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως τέλος εἶπε τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν· ἄγει γὰρ πρὸς ταύτην ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ Ποσειδώνιος καὶ Ἑκάτων ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τελῶν πάλιν δ’ ἴσον ἐστὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν τῷ κατ’ ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων ζῆν, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ τελῶν·

87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man ) to designate as the end “life in agreement with nature” (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure , as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends . Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus ; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe.

88 μέρη γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ἡμέτεραι φύσεις τῆς τοῦ ὅλου. Διόπερ τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατά τε τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων, οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ὧν ἀπαγορεύειν εἴωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διί, καθηγεμόνι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι· εἶναι δ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὔροιαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ’ ἑκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὅλων διοικητοῦ βούλησιν. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Διογένης τέλος φησὶ ῥητῶς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ. Ἀρχέδημος δὲ τὸ πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα ἐπιτελοῦντα ζῆν.

88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions.

89 Φύσιν δὲ Χρύσιππος μὲν ἐξακούει, ᾗ ἀκολούθως δεῖ ζῆν, τήν τε κοινὴν καὶ ἰδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην· ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης τὴν κοινὴν μόνην ἐκδέχεται φύσιν, ᾗ ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ μέρους.

Τήν τ’ ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην· καὶ αὐτὴν δι’ αὑτὴν εἶναι αἱρετήν, οὐ διά τινα φόβον ἢ ἐλπίδα ἤ τι τῶν ἔξωθεν· ἐν αὐτῇ τ’ εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἅτ’ οὔσῃ ψυχῇ πεποιημένῃ πρὸς τὴν ὁμολογίαν παντὸς τοῦ βίου. Διαστρέφεσθαι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον, ποτὲ μὲν διὰ τὰς τῶν ἔξωθεν πραγματειῶν πιθανότητας, ποτὲ δὲ διὰ τὴν κατήχησιν τῶν συνόντων· ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις ἀφορμὰς δίδωσιν ἀδιαστρόφους.

89. By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man, whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature of the individual.

And virtue, he holds, is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for its own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive. Moreover, it is in virtue that happiness consists; for virtue is the state of mind which tends to make the whole of life harmonious. When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates. For the starting-points of nature are never perverse.

90 Ἀρετὴ δ’ ἡ μέν τις κοινῶς παντὶ τελείωσις. Ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντος· καὶ ἡ ἀθεώρητος, ὥσπερ ὑγίεια· καὶ ἡ θεωρηματική, ὡς φρόνησις. Φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Ἑκάτων ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ ἀρετῶν ἐπιστημονικὰς μὲν εἶναι καὶ θεωρηματικὰς τὰς ἐχούσας τὴν σύστασιν ἐκ θεωρημάτων, ὡς φρόνησιν καὶ δικαιοσύνην· ἀθεωρήτους δὲ τὰς κατὰ παρέκτασιν θεωρουμένας ταῖς ἐκ τῶν θεωρημάτων συνεστηκυίαις, καθάπερ ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχύν. Τῇ γὰρ σωφροσύνῃ τεθεωρημένῃ ὑπαρχούσῃ συμβαίνει ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ παρεκτείνεσθαι τὴν ὑγίειαν, καθάπερ τῇ ψαλίδος οἰκοδομίᾳ τὴν ἰσχὺν ἐπιγίνεσθαι.

90. Virtue, in the first place, is in one sense the perfection of anything in general, say of a statue; again, it may be non-intellectual, like health, or intellectual, like prudence. For Hecato says in his first book On the Virtues that some are scientific and based upon theory, namely, those which have a structure of theoretical principles, such as prudence and justice; others are non-intellectual, those that are regarded as co-extensive and parallel with the former, like health and strength. For health is found to attend upon and be co-extensive with the intellectual virtue of temperance, just as strength is a result of the building of an arch.

91 Καλοῦνται δ’ ἀθεώρητοι ὅτι μὴ ἔχουσι συγκαταθέσεις, ἀλλ’ ἐπιγίνονται καὶ περὶ φαύλους [γίνονται], ὡς ὑγίεια, ἀνδρεία. Τεκμήριον δὲ τοῦ ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν φησιν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ Ἠθικοῦ λόγου τὸ γενέσθαι ἐν προκοπῇ τοὺς περὶ Σωκράτην, Διογένην, Ἀντισθένην. Εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὴν κακίαν ὑπαρκτὴν διὰ τὸ ἀντικεῖσθαι τῇ ἀρετῇ. Διδακτήν τ’ εἶναι αὐτήν, λέγω δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ τέλους φησὶ καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τοῖς Προτρεπτικοῖς καὶ Ἑκάτων· ὅτι δὲ διδακτή ἐστι, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἀγαθοὺς ἐκ φαύλων.

91. These are called non-intellectual, because they do not require the mind’s assent; they supervene and they occur even in bad men: for instance, health, courage. The proof, says Posidonius in the first book of his treatise on Ethics , that virtue really exists is the fact that Socrates, Diogenes, and Antisthenes and their followers made moral progress. And for the existence of vice as a fundamental fact the proof is that it is the opposite of virtue. That it, virtue, can be taught is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his work On the End , by Cleanthes, by Posidonius in his Protreptica , and by Hecato; that it can be taught is clear from the case of bad men becoming good.

92 Παναίτιος μὲν οὖν δύο φησὶν ἀρετάς, θεωρητικὴν καὶ πρακτικήν· ἄλλοι δὲ λογικὴν καὶ φυσικὴν καὶ ἠθικήν· τέτταρας δὲ οἱ περὶ Ποσειδώνιον καὶ πλείονας οἱ περὶ Κλεάνθην καὶ Χρύσιππον καὶ Ἀντίπατρον. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀπολλοφάνης μίαν λέγει, τὴν φρόνησιν.

Τῶν δ’ ἀρετῶν τὰς μὲν πρώτας, τὰς δὲ ταύταις ὑποτεταγμένας. Πρώτας μὲν τάσδε, φρόνησιν, ἀνδρείαν, δικαιοσύνην, σωφροσύνην· ἐν εἴδει δὲ τούτων μεγαλοψυχίαν, ἐγκράτειαν, καρτερίαν, ἀγχίνοιαν, εὐβουλίαν· καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν εἶναι ἐπιστήμην κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων, τὴν δ’ ἀνδρείαν ἐπιστήμην ὧν αἱρετέον καὶ εὐλαβητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων·

92. Panaetius, however, divides virtue into two kinds, theoretical and practical; others make a threefold division of it into logical, physical, and ethical; while by the school of Posidonius four types are recognized, and more than four by Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, and their followers. Apollophanes for his part counts but one, namely, practical wisdom.

Amongst the virtues some are primary, some are subordinate to these. The following are the primary: wisdom, courage, justice, temperance. Particular virtues are magnanimity, continence, endurance, presence of mind, good counsel. And wisdom they define as the knowledge of things good and evil and of what is neither good nor evil; courage as knowledge of what we ought to choose, what we ought to beware of, and what is indifferent; justice . . .;

93 τὴν δὲ <δικαιοσύνην> τὴν δὲ μεγαλοψυχίαν ἐπιστήμην <ἢ> ἕξιν ὑπεράνω ποιοῦσαν τῶν συμβαινόντων κοινῇ φαύλων τε καὶ σπουδαίων·

τὴν δ’ ἐγκράτειαν διάθεσιν ἀνυπέρβατον τῶν κατ’ ὀρθὸν λόγον ἢ ἕξιν ἀήττητον ἡδονῶν. Τὴν δὲ καρτερίαν ἐπιστήμην ἢ ἕξιν ὧν ἐμμενετέον καὶ μὴ καὶ οὐδετέρων. Τὴν δ’ ἀγχίνοιαν ἕξιν εὑρετικὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα· τὴν δ’ εὐβουλίαν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι ποῖα καὶ πῶς πράττοντες πράξομεν συμφερόντως.

Ἀνὰ λόγον δὲ καὶ τῶν κακιῶν τὰς μὲν εἶναι πρώτας, τὰς δ’ ὑπὸ ταύτας· οἷον ἀφροσύνην μὲν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ ἀκολασίαν ἐν ταῖς πρώταις, ἀκρασίαν δὲ καὶ βραδύνοιαν καὶ κακοβουλίαν ἐν ταῖς ὑπὸ ταύτας· εἶναι δ’ ἀγνοίας τὰς κακίας, ὧν αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐπιστῆμαι.

93. magnanimity as the knowledge or habit of mind which makes one superior to anything that happens, whether good or evil equally; continence as a disposition never overcome in that which concerns right reason, or a habit which no pleasures can get the better of; endurance as a knowledge or habit which suggests what we are to hold fast to, what not, and what is indifferent; presence of mind as a habit prompt to find out what is meet to be done at any moment; good counsel as knowledge by which we see what to do and how to do it if we would consult our own interests.

Similarly, of vices some are primary, others subordinate: e.g. folly, cowardice, injustice, profligacy are accounted primary; but incontinence, stupidity, ill-advisedness subordinate. Further, they hold that the vices are forms of ignorance of those things whereof the corresponding virtues are the knowledge.

94 Ἀγαθὸν δὲ κοινῶς μὲν τὸ τὶ ὄφελος, ἰδίως δ’ ἤτοι ταὐτὸν ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον ὠφελείας. Ὅθεν αὐτήν τε τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μετέχον αὐτῆς ἀγαθὸν τριχῶς οὕτω λέγεσθαι· οἷον τὸ <μὲν> ἀγαθὸν ἀφ’ οὗ συμβαίνει <ὠφελεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ καθ’ ὃ συμβαίνει>, ὡς τὴν πρᾶξιν τὴν κατ’ ἀρετήν· ὑφ’ οὗ δέ, ὡς τὸν σπουδαῖον τὸν μετέχοντα τῆς ἀρετῆς.

Ἄλλως δ’ οὕτως ἰδίως ὁρίζονται τὸ ἀγαθόν, « Τὸ τέλειον κατὰ φύσιν λογικοῦ [ἢ] ὡς λογικοῦ. » Τοιοῦτο δ’ εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν, ὥς<τε> μετέχοντα τάς τε πράξεις τὰς κατ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ τοὺς σπουδαίους εἶναι· ἐπιγεννήματα δὲ τήν τε χαρὰν καὶ τὴν εὐφροσύνην καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια.

94. Good in general is that from which some advantage comes, and more particularly what is either identical with or not distinct from benefit. Whence it follows that virtue itself and whatever partakes of virtue is called good in these three senses – viz. as being (1) the source from which benefit results; or (2) that in respect of which benefit results, e.g. the virtuous act; or (3) that by the agency of which benefit results, e.g. the good man who partakes in virtue.

Another particular definition of good which they give is “the natural perfection of a rational being qua rational.” To this answers virtue and, as being partakers in virtue, virtuous acts and good men; as also its supervening accessories, joy and gladness and the like.

95 Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἀφροσύνην, δειλίαν, ἀδικίαν, καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια· μετέχοντα δὲ κακίας τάς τε πράξεις τὰς κατὰ κακίαν καὶ τοὺς φαύλους· ἐπιγεννήματα δὲ τήν τε δυσθυμίαν καὶ τὴν δυσφροσύνην καὶ τὰ ὅμοια.

Ἔτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ δ’ ἐκτός, τὰ δ’ οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν οὔτ’ ἐκτός. Τὰ μὲν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κατὰ ταύτας πράξεις· τὰ δ’ ἐκτὸς τό τε σπουδαίαν ἔχειν πατρίδα καὶ σπουδαῖον φίλον καὶ τὴν τούτων εὐδαιμονίαν· τὰ δ’ οὔτ’ ἐκτὸς οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν τὸ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι σπουδαῖον καὶ εὐδαίμονα.

95. So with evils: either they are vices, folly, cowardice, injustice, and the like; or things which partake of vice, including vicious acts and wicked persons as well as their accompaniments, despair, moroseness, and the like.

Again, some goods are goods of the mind and others external, while some are neither mental nor external. The former include the virtues and virtuous acts; external goods are such as having a good country or a good friend, and the prosperity of such. Whereas to be good and happy oneself is of the class of goods neither mental nor external.

96 Ἀνάπαλιν δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὰ μὲν περὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι, τὰς κακίας καὶ τὰς κατ’ αὐτὰς πράξεις· τὰ δ’ ἐκτὸς τὸ ἄφρονα πατρίδα ἔχειν καὶ ἄφρονα φίλον καὶ τὴν τούτων κακοδαιμονίαν· τὰ δ’ οὔτε ἐκτὸς οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν τὸ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι φαῦλον καὶ κακοδαίμονα.

Ἔτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι τελικά, τὰ δὲ ποιητικά, τὰ δὲ τελικὰ καὶ ποιητικά. Τὸν μὲν οὖν φίλον καὶ τὰς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ γινομένας ὠφελείας ποιητικὰ εἶναι ἀγαθά· θάρσος δὲ καὶ φρόνημα καὶ ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην καὶ ἀλυπίαν καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν κατ’ ἀρετὴν πρᾶξιν τελικά.

96. Similarly of things evil some are mental evils, namely, vices and vicious actions; others are outward evils, as to have a foolish country or a foolish friend and the unhappiness of such; other evils again are neither mental nor outward, e.g. to be yourself bad and unhappy.

Again, goods are either of the nature of ends or they are the means to these ends, or they are at the same time end and means. A friend and the advantages derived from him are means to good, whereas confidence, high-spirit, liberty, delight, gladness, freedom from pain, and every virtuous act are of the nature of ends.

97 Ποιητικὰ δὲ καὶ τελικὰ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ <τὰς ἀρετάς>. Καθὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀποτελοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ποιητικά ἐστιν ἀγαθά· καθὸ δὲ συμπληροῦσιν αὐτήν, ὥστε μέρη αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι, τελικά. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι τελικά, τὰ δὲ ποιητικά, τὰ δ’ ἀμφοτέρως ἔχοντα. Τὸν μὲν ἐχθρὸν καὶ τὰς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ γινομένας βλάβας ποιητικὰ εἶναι· κατάπληξιν δὲ καὶ ταπεινότητα καὶ δουλείαν καὶ ἀτερπίαν καὶ δυσθυμίαν καὶ περιλυπίαν καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν κατὰ κακίαν πρᾶξιν τελικά· ἀμφοτέρως δ’ ἔχοντα <τὰς κακίας>, ἐπεὶ καθὸ μὲν ἀποτελοῦσι τὴν κακοδαιμονίαν ποιητικά ἐστι· καθὸ δὲ συμπληροῦσιν αὐτήν, ὥστε μέρη αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι, τελικά.

97. The virtues (they say) are goods of the nature at once of ends and of means. On the one hand, in so far as they cause happiness they are means, and on the other hand, in so far as they make it complete, and so are themselves part of it, they are ends. Similarly of evils some are of the nature of ends and some of means, while others are at once both means and ends. Your enemy and the harm he does you are means; consternation, abasement, slavery, gloom, despair, excess of grief, and every vicious action are of the nature of ends. Vices are evils both as ends and as means, since in so far as they cause misery they are means, but in so far as they make it complete, so that they become part of it, they are ends.

98 Ἔτι τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέν εἰσιν ἕξεις, τὰ δὲ διαθέσεις, τὰ δ’ οὔθ’ ἕξεις οὔτε διαθέσεις. Διαθέσεις μὲν αἱ ἀρεταί, ἕξεις δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, οὔτε δ’ ἕξεις οὔτε διαθέσεις αἱ ἐνέργειαι. Κοινῶς δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν μικτὰ μέν ἐστιν εὐτεκνία καὶ εὐγηρία, ἁπλοῦν δ’ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν ἐπιστήμη. Καὶ ἀεὶ μὲν παρόντα αἱ ἀρεταί, οὐκ ἀεὶ δέ, οἷον χαρά, περιπάτησις.

Πᾶν δ’ ἀγαθὸν συμφέρον εἶναι καὶ δέον καὶ λυσιτελὲς καὶ χρήσιμον καὶ εὔχρηστον καὶ καλὸν καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ αἱρετὸν καὶ δίκαιον.

98. Of mental goods some are habits, others are dispositions, while others again are neither the one nor the other. The virtues are dispositions, while accomplishments or avocations are matters of habit, and activities as such or exercise of faculty neither the one nor the other. And in general there are some mixed goods: e.g. to be happy in one’s children or in one’s old age. But knowledge is a pure good. Again, some goods are permanent like the virtues, others transitory like joy and walking-exercise.

99 Συμφέρον μὲν ὅτι φέρει τοιαῦτα ὧν συμβαινόντων ὠφελούμεθα· δέον δ’ ὅτι συνέχει ἐν οἷς χρή· λυσιτελὲς δ’ ὅτι λύει τὰ τελούμενα εἰς αὐτό, ὥστε τὴν ἀντικατάλλαξιν τὴν ἐκ τῆς πραγματείας ὑπεραίρειν τῇ ὠφελείᾳ· χρήσιμον δ’ ὅτι χρείαν ὠφελείας παρέχεται· εὔχρηστον δ’ ὅτι τὴν χρείαν ἐπαινετὴν ἀπεργάζεται· καλὸν δ’ ὅτι συμμέτρως ἔχει πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χρείαν· ὠφέλιμον δ’ ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὥστε ὠφελεῖν· αἱρετὸν δ’ ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὥστε εὐλόγως αὐτὸ αἱρεῖσθαι· δίκαιον δ’ ὅτι νόμῳ ἐστὶ σύμφωνον καὶ κοινωνίας ποιητικόν.

99. All good (they say) is expedient, binding, profitable, useful, serviceable, beautiful, beneficial, desirable, and just or right. It is expedient, because it brings about things of such a kind that by their occurrence we are benefited. It is binding, because it causes unity where unity is needed; profitable, because it defrays what is expended on it, so that the return yields a balance of benefit on the transaction. It is useful, because it secures the use of benefit; it is serviceable, because the utility it affords is worthy of all praise. It is beautiful, because the good is proportionate to the use made of it; beneficial, because by its inherent nature it benefits; choiceworthy, because it is such that to choose it is reasonable. It is also just or right, inasmuch as it is in harmony with law and tends to draw men together.

100 Καλὸν δὲ λέγουσι τὸ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν παρὰ τὸ πάντας ἀπέχειν τοὺς ἐπιζητουμένους ἀριθμοὺς ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἢ τὸ τελέως σύμμετρον. Εἴδη δ’ εἶναι τοῦ καλοῦ τέτταρα, δίκαιον, ἀνδρεῖον, κόσμιον, ἐπιστημονικόν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖσδε τὰς καλὰς πράξεις συντελεῖσθαι. Ἀνὰ λόγον δὲ καὶ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ εἶναι εἴδη τέτταρα, τό τ’ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δειλὸν καὶ ἄκοσμον καὶ ἄφρον. Λέγεσθαι δὲ τὸ καλὸν μοναχῶς μὲν τὸ ἐπαινετοὺς παρεχόμενον τοὺς ἔχοντας <ἢ> ἀγαθὸν ἐπαίνου ἄξιον· ἑτέρως δὲ τὸ εὖ πεφυκέναι πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον· ἄλλως δὲ τὸ ἐπικοσμοῦν, ὅταν λέγωμεν μόνον τὸν σοφὸν ἀγαθὸν <καὶ> καλὸν εἶναι.

100. The reason why they characterize the perfect good as beautiful is that it has in full all the “factors” required by nature or has perfect proportion. Of the beautiful there are (say they) four species, namely, what is just, courageous, orderly and wise; for it is under these forms that fair deeds are accomplished. Similarly there are four species of the base or ugly, namely, what is unjust, cowardly, disorderly, and unwise. By the beautiful is meant properly and in an unique sense that good which renders its possessors praiseworthy, or briefly, good which is worthy of praise; though in another sense it signifies a good aptitude for one’s proper function; while in yet another sense the beautiful is that which lends new grace to anything, as when we say of the wise man that he alone is good and beautiful.

101 Λέγουσι δὲ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καθά φησιν Ἑκάτων ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ Περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ· εἶναι δὲ τοῦτο ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς, ᾧ ἐστιν ἴσον τὸ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν καλὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἰσοδυναμεῖν τῷ καλῷ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅπερ ἴσον ἐστὶ τούτῳ. Ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, καλόν ἐστιν· ἔστι δὲ καλόν· ἀγαθὸν ἄρα ἐστί.

Δοκεῖ δὲ πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἴσα εἶναι καὶ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἐπ’ ἄκρον εἶναι αἱρετὸν καὶ μήτ’ ἄνεσιν μήτ’ ἐπίτασιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι. Τῶν δ’ ὄντων φασὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δ’ οὐδέτερα.

101. And they say that only the morally beautiful is good. So Hecato in his treatise On Goods , book iii., and Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful . They hold, that is, that virtue and whatever partakes of virtue consists in this: which is equivalent to saying that all that is good is beautiful, or that the term “good” has equal force with the term “beautiful,” which comes to the same thing. “Since a thing is good, it is beautiful; now it is beautiful, therefore it is good.” They hold that all goods are equal and that all good is desirable in the highest degree and admits of no lowering or heightening of intensity. Of things that are, some, they say, are good, some are evil, and some neither good nor evil (that is, morally indifferent).

102 Ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὖν τάς τ’ ἀρετάς, φρόνησιν, δικαιοσύνην, ἀνδρείαν, σωφροσύνην καὶ τὰ λοιπά· κακὰ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, ἀφροσύνην, ἀδικίαν καὶ τὰ λοιπά. Οὐδέτερα δὲ ὅσα μήτ’ ὠφελεῖ μήτε βλάπτει, οἷον ζωή, ὑγίεια, ἡδονή, κάλλος, ἰσχύς, πλοῦτος, εὐδοξία, εὐγένεια· καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία, θάνατος, νόσος, πόνος, αἶσχος, ἀσθένεια, πενία, ἀδοξία, δυσγένεια καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια, καθά φησιν Ἑκάτων ἐν ἑβδόμῳ Περὶ τέλους καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Ἠθικῇ καὶ Χρύσιππος. Μὴ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτ’ ἀγαθά, ἀλλ’ ἀδιάφορα κατ’ εἶδος προηγμένα.

102. Goods comprise the virtues of prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and the rest; while the opposites of these are evils, namely, folly, injustice, and the rest. Neutral (neither good nor evil, that is) are all those things which neither benefit nor harm a man: such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fair fame and noble birth, and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like. This Hecato affirms in his De fine , book vii., and also Apollodorus in his Ethics , and Chrysippus. For, say they, such things (as life, health, and pleasure) are not in themselves goods, but are morally indifferent, though falling under the species or subdivision “things preferred.”

103 Ὡς γὰρ ἴδιον θερμοῦ τὸ θερμαίνειν, οὐ τὸ ψύχειν, οὕτω καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ὠφελεῖν, οὐ τὸ βλάπτειν· οὐ μᾶλλον δ’ ὠφελεῖ ἢ βλάπτει ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια· οὐκ ἄρ’ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε πλοῦτος οὔθ’ ὑγίεια. Ἔτι τέ φασιν, ᾧ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν· πλούτῳ δὲ καὶ ὑγιείᾳ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι· οὐκ ἄρ’ ἀγαθὸν πλοῦτος καὶ ὑγίεια. Ποσειδώνιος μέντοι καὶ ταῦτά φησι τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι. Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν φασιν Ἑκάτων τ’ ἐν τῷ ἐνάτῳ Περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ἡδονῆς·

103. For as the property of hot is to warm, not to cool, so the property of good is to benefit, not to injure; but wealth and health do no more benefit than injury, therefore neither wealth nor health is good. Further, they say that that is not good of which both good and bad use can be made; but of wealth and health both good and bad use can be made; therefore wealth and health are not goods. On the other hand, Posidonius maintains that these things too are among goods. Hecato in the ninth book of his treatise On Goods , and Chrysippus in his work On Pleasure , deny that pleasure is a good either; for some pleasures are disgraceful, and nothing disgraceful is good.

104 εἶναι γὰρ καὶ αἰσχρὰς ἡδονάς, μηδὲν δ’ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι ἀγαθόν. Ὠφελεῖν δέ ἐστι κινεῖν ἢ ἴσχειν κατ’ ἀρετήν, βλάπτειν δὲ κινεῖν ἢ ἴσχειν κατὰ κακίαν.

Διχῶς δὲ λέγεσθαι ἀδιάφορα· ἅπαξ μὲν τὰ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συνεργοῦντα, ὡς ἔχει πλοῦτος, δόξα, ὑγίεια, ἰσχὺς καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ χωρὶς τούτων εὐδαιμονεῖν, τῆς ποιᾶς αὐτῶν χρήσεως εὐδαιμονικῆς οὔσης ἢ κακοδαιμονικῆς. Ἄλλως δὲ λέγεται ἀδιάφορα τὰ μήθ’ ὁρμῆς μήτ’ ἀφορμῆς κινητικά, ὡς ἔχει τὸ ἀρτίας ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς τρίχας ἢ περιττάς, ἢ ἐκτεῖναι τὸν δάκτυλον ἢ συστεῖλαι, τῶν προτέρων ἀδιαφόρων οὐκέθ’ οὕτω λεγομένων·

104. To benefit is to set in motion or sustain in accordance with virtue; whereas to harm is to set in motion or sustain in accordance with vice.

The term “indifferent” has two meanings: in the first it denotes the things which do not contribute either to happiness or to misery, as wealth, fame, health, strength, and the like; for it is possible to be happy without having these, although, if they are used in a certain way, such use of them tends to happiness or misery. In quite another sense those things are said to be indifferent which are without the power of stirring inclination or aversion; e.g. the fact that the number of hairs on one’s head is odd or even or whether you hold out your finger straight or bent. But it was not in this sense that the things mentioned above were termed indifferent,

105 ὁρμῆς γάρ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνα καὶ ἀφορμῆς κινητικά. Διὸ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐκλέγεται, <τὰ δὲ ἀπεκλέγεται>, τῶν [δ’] ἑτέρων ἐπίσης ἐχόντων πρὸς αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγήν.

Τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τὰ μὲν λέγουσι προηγμένα, τὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα· προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ἔχοντα ἀξίαν, ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα. Ἀξίαν δὲ τὴν μέν τινα λέγουσι σύμβλησιν πρὸς τὸν ὁμολογούμενον βίον, ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ πᾶν ἀγαθόν· τὴν δὲ εἶναι μέσην τινὰ δύναμιν ἢ χρείαν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον, ὅμοιον εἰπεῖν ἥντινα προσφέρεται πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον πλοῦτος ἢ ὑγίεια· τὴν δ’ εἶναι ἀξίαν ἀμοιβὴν δοκιμαστοῦ, ἣν ἂν ὁ ἔμπειρος τῶν πραγμάτων τάξῃ, ὅμοιον εἰπεῖν ἀμείβεσθαι πυροὺς πρὸς τὰς σὺν ἡμιόνῳ κριθάς.

105. they being quite capable of exciting inclination or aversion. Hence of these latter some are taken by preference, others are rejected, whereas indifference in the other sense affords no ground for either choosing or avoiding.

Of things indifferent, as they express it, some are “preferred,” others “rejected.” Such as have value, they say, are “preferred,” while such as have negative, instead of positive, value are “rejected.” Value they define as, first, any contribution to harmonious living, such as attaches to every good; secondly, some faculty or use which indirectly contributes to the life according to nature: which is as much as to say “any assistance brought by wealth or health towards living a natural life”; thirdly, value is the full equivalent of an appraiser, as fixed by an expert acquainted with the facts – as when it is said that wheat exchanges for so much barley with a mule thrown in.

106 Προηγμένα μὲν οὖν εἶναι ἃ καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ψυχικῶν εὐφυΐαν, τέχνην, προκοπὴν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ζωήν, ὑγίειαν, ῥώμην, εὐεξίαν, ἀρτιότητα, κάλλος καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκτὸς πλοῦτον, δόξαν, εὐγένειαν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. Ἀποπροηγμένα δ’ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ψυχικῶν ἀφυΐαν, ἀτεχνίαν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν θάνατον, νόσον, ἀσθένειαν, καχεξίαν, πήρωσιν, αἶσχος καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκτὸς πενίαν, ἀδοξίαν, δυσγένειαν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια· οὔτε δὲ προήχθη οὔτ’ ἀποπροήχθη τὰ οὐδετέρως ἔχοντα.

106. Thus things of the preferred class are those which have positive value, e.g. amongst mental qualities, natural ability, skill, moral improvement, and the like; among bodily qualities, life, health, strength, good condition, soundness of organs, beauty, and so forth; and in the sphere of external things, wealth, fame, noble birth, and the like. To the class of things “rejected” belong, of mental qualities, lack of ability, want of skill, and the like; among bodily qualities, death, disease, weakness, being out of condition, mutilation, ugliness, and the like; in the sphere of external things, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and so forth. But again there are things belonging to neither class; such are not preferred, neither are they rejected.

107 Ἔτι τῶν προηγμένων τὰ μὲν δι’ αὑτὰ προῆκται, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ καὶ δι’ αὑτὰ καὶ δι’ ἕτερα. Δι’ αὑτὰ μὲν εὐφυΐα, προκοπὴ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· δι’ ἕτερα δὲ πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· δι’ αὑτὰ δὲ καὶ δι’ ἕτερα ἰσχύς, εὐαισθησία, ἀρτιότης. Δι’ αὑτὰ μέν, ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν ἐστί· δι’ ἕτερα δέ, ὅτι περιποιεῖ χρείας οὐκ ὀλίγας. Ὁμοίως δ’ ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἀποπροηγμένον κατὰ τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον.

Ἔτι δὲ καθῆκόν φασιν εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογόν [τε] ἴσχει ἀπολογισμόν, οἷον τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα διατείνει· ὁρᾶσθαι γὰρ κἀπὶ τούτων καθήκοντα.

107. Again, of things preferred some are preferred for their own sake, some for the sake of something else, and others again both for their own sake and for the sake of something else. To the first of these classes belong natural ability, moral improvement, and the like; to the second wealth, noble birth, and the like; to the last strength, perfect faculties, soundness of bodily organs. Things are preferred for their own sake because they accord with nature; not for their own sake, but for the sake of something else, because they secure not a few utilities. And similarly with the class of things rejected under the contrary heads.

Furthermore, the term Duty is applied to that for which, when done, a reasonable defence can be adduced, e.g. harmony in the tenor of life’s process, which indeed pervades the growth of plants and animals. For even in plants and animals, they hold, you may discern fitness of behaviour.

108 Κατωνομάσθαι δ’ οὕτως ὑπὸ πρώτου Ζήνωνος τὸ καθῆκον, ἀπὸ τοῦ κατά τινας ἥκειν τῆς προσονομασίας εἰλημμένης. Ἐνέργημα δ’ αὐτὸ εἶναι ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκεῖον. Τῶν γὰρ καθ’ ὁρμὴν ἐνεργουμένων τὰ μὲν καθήκοντα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον<, τὰ δ’ οὔτε καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον>.

Καθήκοντα μὲν οὖν εἶναι ὅσα λόγος αἱρεῖ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔχει γονεῖς τιμᾶν, ἀδελφούς, πατρίδα, συμπεριφέρεσθαι φίλοις· παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον δέ, ὅσα μὴ αἱρεῖ λόγος, ὡς ἔχει τὰ τοιαῦτα, γονέων ἀμελεῖν, ἀδελφῶν ἀφροντιστεῖν, φίλοις μὴ συνδιατίθεσθαι, πατρίδα ὑπερορᾶν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια·

108. Zeno was the first to use this term καθῆκον of conduct. Etymologically it is derived from κατά τινας ἥκειν, i.e. reaching as far as, being up to, or incumbent on so and so. And it is an action in itself adapted to nature’s arrangements. For of the acts done at the prompting of impulse some, they observe, are fit and meet, others the reverse, while there is a third class which is neither the one nor the other.

Befitting acts are all those which reason prevails with us to do; and this is the case with honouring one’s parents, brothers and country, and intercourse with friends. Unbefitting, or contrary to duty, are all acts that reason deprecates, e.g. to neglect one’s parents, to be indifferent to one’s brothers, not to agree with friends, to disregard the interests of one’s country, and so forth.

109 οὔτε δὲ καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον ὅσα οὔθ’ αἱρεῖ λόγος πράττειν οὔτ’ ἀπαγορεύει, οἷον κάρφος ἀνελέσθαι, γραφεῖον κρατεῖν ἢ στλεγγίδα καὶ τὰ ὅμοιατούτοις.

Καὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι καθήκοντα ἄνευ περιστάσεως, τὰ δὲ περιστατικά. Καὶ ἄνευ περιστάσεως τάδε, ὑγιείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· κατὰ περίστασιν δὲ τὸ πηροῦν ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν κτῆσιν διαρριπτεῖν. Ἀνὰ λόγον δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. Ἔτι τῶν καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ καθήκει, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἀεί. Καὶ ἀεὶ μὲν καθήκει τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν, οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι καὶ περιπατεῖν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια.

109. Acts which fall under neither of the foregoing classes are those which reason neither urges us to do nor forbids, such as picking up a twig, holding a style or a scraper, and the like.

Again, some duties are incumbent unconditionally, others in certain circumstances. Unconditional duties are the following: to take proper care of health and one’s organs of sense, and things of that sort. Duties imposed by circumstances are such as maiming oneself and sacrifice of property. And so likewise with acts which are violations of duty. Another division is into duties which are always incumbent and those which are not. To live in accordance with virtue is always a duty, whereas dialectic by question and answer or walking-exercise and the like are not at all times incumbent. The same may be said of the violations of duty.

110 Ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέσοις τι καθῆκον, ὡς τὸ πείθεσθαι τοὺς παῖδας τοῖς παιδαγωγοῖς.

Φασὶ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ὀκταμερῆ· μέρη γὰρ αὐτῆς τά τε πέντε αἰσθητήρια καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν μόριον καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτὴ ἡ διάνοια, καὶ τὸ γεννητικόν. Ἐκ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ἐπιγίνεσθαι τὴν διαστροφὴν ἐπὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀφ’ ἧς πολλὰ πάθη βλαστάνειν καὶ ἀκαταστασίας αἴτια. Ἔστι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις ἢ ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα.

110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.

According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.

The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions , book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure.

111 Τῶν δὲ παθῶν τὰ ἀνωτάτω, καθά φησιν Ἑκάτων ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ παθῶν καὶ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ Περὶ παθῶν, εἶναι γένη τέτταρα, λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, ἡδονήν. Δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ παθῶν· ἥ τε γὰρ φιλαργυρία ὑπόληψίς ἐστι τοῦ τὸ ἀργύριον καλὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ μέθη δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ὁμοίως καὶ τἄλλα.

Καὶ τὴν μὲν λύπην εἶναι συστολὴν ἄλογον· εἴδη δ’ αὐτῆς ἔλεον, φθόνον, ζῆλον, ζηλοτυπίαν, ἄχθος, ἐνόχλησιν, ἀνίαν, ὀδύνην, σύγχυσιν. Ἕλεον μὲν οὖν εἶναι λύπην ὡς ἐπ’ ἀναξίως κακοπαθοῦντι, φθόνον δὲ λύπην ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς, ζῆλον δὲ λύπην ἐπὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ παρεῖναι ὧν αὐτὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, ζηλοτυπίαν δὲ λύπην ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ παρεῖναι ἃ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχει,

111. They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions : avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.

And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others’ prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself.

112 ἄχθος δὲ λύπην βαρύνουσαν, ἐνόχλησιν λύπην στενοχωροῦσαν καὶ δυσχωρίαν παρασκευάζουσαν, ἀνίαν λύπην ἐκ διαλογισμῶν μένουσαν ἢ ἐπιτεινομένην, ὀδύνην λύπην ἐπίπονον, σύγχυσιν λύπην ἄλογον, ἀποκναίουσαν καὶ κωλύουσαν τὰ παρόντα συνορᾶν.

Ὁ δὲ φόβος ἐστὶ προσδοκία κακοῦ. Εἰς δὲ τὸν φόβον ἀνάγεται καὶ ταῦτα· δεῖμα, ὄκνος, αἰσχύνη, ἔκπληξις, θόρυβος, ἀγωνία. Δεῖμα μὲν οὖν ἐστι φόβος δέος ἐμποιῶν, αἰσχύνη δὲ φόβος ἀδοξίας, ὄκνος δὲ φόβος μελλούσης ἐνεργείας, ἔκπληξις δὲ φόβος ἐκ φαντασίας ἀσυνήθους πράγματος, θόρυβος δὲ φόβος μετὰ κατεπείξεως φωνῆς, ἀγωνία δὲ <φόβος ἀδήλου πράγματος>.

112. Heaviness or vexation is grief which weighs us down, annoyance that which coops us up and straitens us for want of room, distress a pain brought on by anxious thought that lasts and increases, anguish painful grief, distraction irrational grief, rasping and hindering us from viewing the situation as a whole.

Fear is an expectation of evil. Under fear are ranged the following emotions: terror, nervous shrinking, shame, consternation, panic, mental agony. Terror is a fear which produces fright; shame is fear of disgrace; nervous shrinking is a fear that one will have to act; consternation is fear due to a presentation of some unusual occurrence;

113 Ἡ δ’ ἐπιθυμία ἐστὶν ἄλογος ὄρεξις, ὑφ’ ἣν τάττεται καὶ ταῦτα· σπάνις, μῖσος, φιλονεικία, ὀργή, ἔρως, μῆνις, θυμός. Ἔστι δ’ ἡ μὲν σπάνις ἐπιθυμία τις ἐν ἀποτεύξει καὶ οἷον κεχωρισμένη ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος, τεταμένη δὲ διακενῆς ἐπ’ αὐτὸ καὶ σπωμένη· μῖσος δ’ ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία τις τοῦ κακῶς εἶναί τινι μετὰ προκοπῆς τινος καὶ παρατάσεως· φιλονεικία δ’ ἐπιθυμία τις περὶ αἱρέσεως· ὀργὴ δ’ ἐπιθυμία τιμωρίας τοῦ δοκοῦντος ἠδικηκέναι οὐ προσηκόντως· ἔρως δέ ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία τις οὐχὶ περὶ σπουδαίους· ἔστι γὰρ ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον.

113. panic is fear with pressure exercised by sound; mental agony is fear felt when some issue is still in suspense.

Desire or craving is irrational appetency, and under it are ranged the following states: want, hatred, contentiousness, anger, love, wrath, resentment. Want, then, is a craving when it is baulked and, as it were, cut off from its object, but kept at full stretch and attracted towards it in vain. Hatred is a growing and lasting desire or craving that it should go ill with somebody. Contentiousness is a craving or desire connected with partisanship; anger a craving or desire to punish one who is thought to have done you an undeserved injury. The passion of love is a craving from which good men are free; for it is an effort to win affection due to the visible presence of beauty.

114 Μῆνις δέ ἐστιν ὀργή τις πεπαλαιωμένη καὶ ἐπίκοτος, ἐπιτηρη- τικὴ δέ, ὅπερ ἐμφαίνεται διὰ τῶνδε·

Εἴ περ γάρ τε χόλον γε καὶ αὐτῆμαρ καταπέψῃ,

ἀλλά τε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον, ὄφρα τελέσσῃ.

Ὁ δὲ θυμός ἐστιν ὀργὴ ἀρχομένη.

Ἡδονὴ δέ ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν, ὑφ’ ἣν τάττεται κήλησις, ἐπιχαιρεκακία, τέρψις, διάχυσις. Κήλησις μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡδονὴ δι’ ὤτων κατακηλοῦσα· ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς· τέρψις δέ, οἷον τρέψις, προτροπή τις ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνειμένον· διάχυσις δ’ ἀνάλυσις ἀρετῆς.

114. Wrath is anger which has long rankled and has become malicious, waiting for its opportunity, as is illustrated by the lines:

Even though for the one day he swallow his anger, yet doth he still keep his displeasure thereafter in his heart, till he accomplish it.

Resentment is anger in an early stage.

Pleasure is an irrational elation at the accruing of what seems to be choiceworthy; and under it are ranged ravishment, malevolent joy, delight, transport. Ravishment is pleasure which charms the ear. Malevolent joy is pleasure at another’s ills. Delight is the mind’s propulsion to weakness, its name in Greek (τέρψις) being akin to τρέψις or turning. To be in transports of delight is the melting away of virtue.

115 Ὡς δὲ λέγεταί τινα ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀρρωστήματα, οἷον ποδάγρα καὶ ἀρθρίτιδες, οὕτω κἀπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς φιλοδοξία καὶ φιληδονία καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια. Τὸ γὰρ ἀρρώστημά ἐστι νόσημα μετ’ ἀσθενείας, τὸ δὲ νόσημα οἴησις σφόδρα δοκοῦντος αἱρετοῦ. Καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος εὐεμπτωσίαι τινὲς λέγονται, οἷον κατάρρους καὶ διάρροια, οὕτω κἀπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰσιν εὐκαταφορίαι, οἷον φθονερία, ἐλεημοσύνη, ἔριδες καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια.

115. And as there are said to be certain infirmities in the body, as for instance gout and arthritic disorders, so too there is in the soul love of fame, love of pleasure, and the like. By infirmity is meant disease accompanied by weakness; and by disease is meant a fond imagining of something that seems desirable. And as in the body there are tendencies to certain maladies such as colds and diarrhoea, so it is with the soul, there are tendencies like enviousness, pitifulness, quarrelsomeness, and the like.

116 Εἶναι δὲ καὶ εὐπαθείας φασὶ τρεῖς, χαράν, εὐλάβειαν, βούλησιν. Καὶ τὴν μὲν χαρὰν ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τῇ ἡδονῇ, οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔπαρσιν· τὴν δ’ εὐλάβειαν τῷ φόβῳ, οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔκκλισιν. Φοβηθήσεσθαι μὲν γὰρ τὸν σοφὸν οὐδαμῶς, εὐλαβηθήσεσθαι δέ. Τῇ δ’ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τὴν βούλησιν, οὖσαν εὔλογον ὄρεξιν. Καθάπερ οὖν ὑπὸ τὰ πρῶτα πάθη πίπτει τινά, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὑπὸ τὰς πρώτας εὐπαθείας· καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν βούλησιν εὔνοιαν, εὐμένειαν, ἀσπασμόν, ἀγάπησιν· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν εὐλάβειαν αἰδῶ, ἁγνείαν· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν χαρὰν τέρψιν, εὐφροσύνην, εὐθυμίαν.

116. Also they say that there are three emotional states which are good, namely, joy, caution, and wishing. Joy, the counterpart of pleasure, is rational elation; caution, the counterpart of fear, rational avoidance; for though the wise man will never feel fear, he will yet use caution. And they make wishing the counterpart of desire (or craving), inasmuch as it is rational appetency. And accordingly, as under the primary passions are classed certain others subordinate to them, so too is it with the primary eupathies or good emotional states. Thus under wishing they bring well-wishing or benevolence, friendliness, respect, affection; under caution, reverence and modesty; under joy, delight, mirth, cheerfulness.

117 Φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τὸν σοφόν, διὰ τὸ ἀνέμπτωτον εἶναι· εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ἀπαθῆ τὸν φαῦλον, ἐν ἴσῳ λεγόμενον τῷ σκληρῷ καὶ ἀτέγκτῳ. Ἄτυφόν τ’ εἶναι τὸν σοφόν· ἴσως γὰρ ἔχειν πρός τε τὸ ἔνδοξον καὶ τὸ ἄδοξον. Εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ἄτυφον, κατὰ τὸν εἰκαῖον τεταγμένον, ὅς ἐστι φαῦλος. Καὶ αὐστηροὺς δέ φασιν εἶναι πάντας τοὺς σπουδαίους τῷ μήτ’ αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν μήτε παρ’ ἄλλων τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν προσδέχεσθαι. Καὶ ἄλλον δὲ εἶναι αὐστηρόν, παραπλησίως λεγόμενον τῷ αὐστηρῷ οἴνῳ, ᾧ πρὸς μὲν φαρμακοποιίαν χρῶνται, πρὸς δὲ πρόποσιν οὐ πάνυ.

117. Now they say that the wise man is passionless, because he is not prone to fall into such infirmity. But they add that in another sense the term apathy is applied to the bad man, when, that is, it means that he is callous and relentless. Further, the wise man is said to be free from vanity; for he is indifferent to good or evil report. However, he is not alone in this, there being another who is also free from vanity, he who is ranged among the rash, and that is the bad man. Again, they tell us that all good men are austere or harsh, because they neither have dealings with pleasure themselves nor tolerate those who have. The term harsh is applied, however, to others as well, and in much the same sense as a wine is said to be harsh when it is employed medicinally and not for drinking at all.

118 Ἀκιβδήλους τοὺς σπουδαίους φυλακτικούς τ’ εἶναι τοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον αὑτοὺς παριστάνειν, διὰ παρασκευῆς τῆς τὰ φαῦλα μὲν ἀποκρυπτούσης, τὰ δ’ ὑπάρχοντα ἀγαθὰ φαίνεσθαι ποιούσης. Ἀπλάστους <τε>· περιῃρηκέναι γὰρ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τὸ πλάσμα καὶ τῷ εἴδει.

Ἀπράγμονάς τ’ εἶναι· ἐκκλίνειν γὰρ τὸ πράττειν τι παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. Καὶ οἰνωθήσεσθαι μέν, οὐ μεθυσθήσεσθαι δέ. Ἔτι δ’ οὐδὲ μανήσεσθαι· προσπεσεῖσθαι μέντοι ποτὲ αὐτῷ φαντασίας ἀλλοκότους διὰ μελαγχολίαν ἢ λήρησιν, οὐ κατὰ τὸν τῶν αἱρετῶν λόγον, ἀλλὰ παρὰ φύσιν. Οὐδὲ μὴν λυπηθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, διὰ τὸ τὴν λύπην ἄλογον εἶναι συστολὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς Ἀπολλόδωρός φησιν ἐν τῇ Ἠθικῇ.

118. Again, the good are genuinely in earnest and vigilant for their own improvement, using a manner of life which banishes evil out of sight and makes what good there is in things appear. At the same time they are free from pretence; for they have stripped off all pretence or “make-up” whether in voice or in look. Free too are they from all business cares, declining to do anything which conflicts with duty. They will take wine, but not get drunk. Nay more, they will not be liable to madness either; not but what there will at times occur to the good man strange impressions due to melancholy or delirium, ideas not determined by the principle of what is choiceworthy but contrary to nature. Nor indeed will the wise man ever feel grief; seeing that grief is irrational contraction of the soul, as Apollodorus says in his Ethics .

119 Θείους τ’ εἶναι· ἔχειν γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς οἱονεὶ θεόν. Τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἄθεον. Διττὸν δ’ εἶναι τὸν ἄθεον, τόν τ’ ἐναντίως τῷ θείῳ λεγόμενον καὶ τὸν ἐξουθενητικὸν τοῦ θείου· ὅπερ οὐκ εἶναι περὶ πάντα φαῦλον. Θεοσεβεῖς τε τοὺς σπουδαίους· ἐμπείρους γὰρ εἶναι τῶν περὶ θεοὺς νομίμων· εἶναί τε τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἐπιστήμην θεῶν θεραπείας. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ θύσειν αὐτοὺς θεοῖς ἁγνούς θ’ ὑπάρχειν· ἐκνεύειν γὰρ τὰ περὶ θεοὺς ἁμαρτήματα. Καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἄγασθαι αὐτούς· ὁσίους τε γὰρ εἶναι καὶ δικαίους πρὸς τὸ θεῖον. Μόνους θ’ ἱερέας τοὺς σοφούς· ἐπεσκέφθαι γὰρ περὶ θυσιῶν, ἱδρύσεων, καθαρμῶν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς οἰκείων.

119. They are also, it is declared, godlike; for they have a something divine within them; whereas the bad man is godless. And yet of this word – godless or ungodly – there are two senses, one in which it is the opposite of the term “godly,” the other denoting the man who ignores the divine altogether: in this latter sense, as they note, the term does not apply to every bad man. The good, it is added, are also worshippers of God; for they have acquaintance with the rites of the gods, and piety is the knowledge of how to serve the gods. Further, they will sacrifice to the gods and they keep themselves pure; for they avoid all acts that are offences against the gods, and the gods think highly of them: for they are holy and just in what concerns the gods. The wise too are the only priests; for they have made sacrifices their study, as also the building of temples, purifications, and all the other matters appertaining to the gods.

120 Δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ γονέας σεβήσεσθαι καὶ ἀδελφοὺς ἐν δευτέρᾳ μοίρᾳ μετὰ τοὺς θεούς. Φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὰ τέκνα φιλοστοργίαν φυσικὴν εἶναι αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐν φαύλοις μὴ εἶναι. Ἀρέσκει τ’ αὐτοῖς ἴσα ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῶν Ἠθικῶν ζητημάτων καὶ Περσαῖος καὶ Ζήνων. Εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὲς ἀληθοῦς μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ψεῦδος ψεύδους· οὕτως οὐδ’ ἀπάτη ἀπάτης, οὐδ’ ἁμάρτημα ἁμαρτήματος. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἑκατὸν σταδίους ἀπέχων Κανώβου καὶ ὁ ἕνα ἐπίσης οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν Κανώβῳ· οὕτω καὶ ὁ πλέον καὶ ὁ ἔλαττον ἁμαρτάνων ἐπίσης οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ κατορθοῦν.

120. The Stoics approve also of honouring parents and brothers in the second place next after the gods. They further maintain that parental affection for children is natural to the good, but not to the bad. It is one of their tenets that sins are all equal: so Chrysippus in the fourth book of his Ethical Questions , as well as Persaeus and Zeno. For if one truth is not more true than another, neither is one falsehood more false than another, and in the same way one deceit is not more so than another, nor sin than sin. For he who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus and he who is only one furlong away are equally not in Canopus, and so too he who commits the greater sin and he who commits the less are equally not in the path of right conduct.

121 Ἡρακλείδης μέντοι ὁ Ταρσεύς, Ἀντιπάτρου τοῦ Ταρσέως γνώριμος, καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος ἄνισά φασι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα.

Πολιτεύσεσθαί φασι τὸν σοφὸν ἂν μή τι κωλύῃ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ Περὶ βίων· καὶ γὰρ κακίαν ἐφέξειν καὶ ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν παρορμήσειν. Καὶ γαμήσειν, ὡς ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν Πολιτείᾳ, καὶ παιδοποιήσεσθαι. Ἔτι τε μὴ δοξάσειν τὸν σοφόν, τουτέστι ψεύδει μὴ συγκαταθήσεσθαι μηδενί. Κυνιεῖν τ’ αὐτόν· εἶναι γὰρ τὸν κυνισμὸν σύντομον ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν ὁδόν, ὡς Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Ἠθικῇ. Γεύσεσθαί τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων σαρκῶν κατὰ περίστασιν. Μόνον τ’ ἐλεύθερον, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους δούλους· εἶναι γὰρ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐξουσίαν αὐτοπραγίας, τὴν δὲ δουλείαν στέρησιν αὐτοπραγίας.

121. But Heraclides of Tarsus, who was the disciple of Antipater of Tarsus, and Athenodorus both assert that sins are not equal.

Again, the Stoics say that the wise man will take part in politics, if nothing hinders him – so, for instance, Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Various Types of Life – since thus he will restrain vice and promote virtue. Also (they maintain) he will marry, as Zeno says in his Republic , and beget children. Moreover, they say that the wise man will never form mere opinions, that is to say, he will never give assent to anything that is false; that he will also play the Cynic, Cynicism being a short cut to virtue, as Apollodorus calls it in his Ethics ; that he will even turn cannibal under stress of circumstances. They declare that he alone is free and bad men are slaves, freedom being power of independent action, whereas slavery is privation of the same;

122 Εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλην δουλείαν τὴν ἐν ὑποτάξει καὶ τρίτην τὴν ἐν κτήσει τε καὶ ὑποτάξει, ᾗ ἀντιτίθεται ἡ δεσποτεία, φαύλη οὖσα καὶ αὕτη.

Οὐ μόνον δ’ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι τοὺς σοφούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλέας, τῆς βασιλείας οὔσης ἀρχῆς ἀνυπευθύνου, ἥτις περὶ μόνους ἂν τοὺς σοφοὺς συσταίη, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ κυρίως κεχρῆσθαι Ζήνωνα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν· ἐγνωκέναι γάρ φησι δεῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, μηδένα δὲ τῶν φαύλων ἐπίστασθαι ταῦτα. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀρχικοὺς δικαστικούς τε καὶ ῥητορικοὺς μόνους εἶναι, τῶν δὲ φαύλων οὐδένα. Ἔτι καὶ ἀναμαρτήτους, τῷ ἀπεριπτώτους εἶναι ἁμαρτήματι.

122. though indeed there is also a second form of slavery consisting in subordination, and a third which implies possession of the slave as well as his subordination; the correlative of such servitude being lordship; and this too is evil. Moreover, according to them not only are the wise free, they are also kings; kingship being irresponsible rule, which none but the wise can maintain: so Chrysippus in his treatise vindicating Zeno’s use of terminology. For he holds that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary attribute of the ruler, and that no bad man is acquainted with this science. Similarly the wise and good alone are fit to be magistrates, judges, or orators, whereas among the bad there is not one so qualified.

123 Ἀβλαβεῖς τ’ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλους βλάπτειν οὔθ’ αὑτούς. Ἐλεήμονάς τε μὴ εἶναι συγγνώμην τ’ ἔχειν μηδενί· μὴ γὰρ παριέναι τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἐπιβαλλούσας κολάσεις, ἐπεὶ τό γ’ εἴκειν καὶ ὁ ἔλεος αὐτή θ’ ἡ ἐπιείκεια οὐδένειά ἐστι ψυχῆς πρὸς κολάσεις προσποιουμένης χρηστότητα· μηδ’ οἴεσθαι σκληροτέρας αὐτὰς εἶναι. Ἔτι γε τὸν σοφὸν οὐδὲν θαυμάζειν τῶν δοκούντων παραδόξων, οἷον Χαρώνεια καὶ ἀμπώτιδας καὶ πηγὰς θερμῶν ὑδάτων καὶ πυρὸς ἀναφυσήματα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἐν ἐρημίᾳ φασι βιώσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος· κοινωνικὸς γὰρ φύσει καὶ πρακτικός. Τὴν μέντοι ἄσκησιν ἀποδέξεται ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ σώματος ὑπομονῆς.

123. Furthermore, the wise are infallible, not being liable to error. They are also without offence; for they do no hurt to others or to themselves. At the same time they are not pitiful and make no allowance for anyone; they never relax the penalties fixed by the laws, since indulgence and pity and even equitable consideration are marks of a weak mind, which affects kindness in place of chastizing. Nor do they deem punishments too severe. Again, they say that the wise man never wonders at any of the things which appear extraordinary, such as Charon’s mephitic caverns, ebbings of the tide, hot springs or fiery eruptions. Nor yet, they go on to say, will the wise man live in solitude; for he is naturally made for society and action.

124 Εὔξεταί τε, φασίν, ὁ σοφός, αἰτούμενος τὰ ἀγαθὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, καθά φησι Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ καθηκόντων καὶ Ἑκάτων ἐν τρίτῳ Περὶ παραδόξων. Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ἐν μόνοις τοῖς σπουδαίοις εἶναι, διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα· φασὶ δ’ αὐτὴν κοινωνίαν τινὰ εἶναι τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον, χρωμένων ἡμῶν τοῖς φίλοις ὡς ἑαυτοῖς. Δι’ αὑτόν θ’ αἱρετὸν τὸν φίλον ἀποφαίνονται καὶ τὴν πολυφιλίαν ἀγαθόν. Ἔν τε τοῖς φαύλοις μὴ εἶναι φιλίαν μηδενί τε τῶν φαύλων φίλον εἶναι. Πάντας τε τοὺς ἄφρονας μαίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ φρονίμους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἴσην τῇ ἀφροσύνῃ μανίαν πάντα πράττειν.

124. He will, however, submit to training to augment his powers of bodily endurance.

And the wise man, they say, will offer prayers, and ask for good things from the gods: so Posidonius in the first book of his treatise On Duties , and Hecato in his third book On Paradoxes . Friendship, they declare, exists only between the wise and good, by reason of their likeness to one another. And by friendship they mean a common use of all that has to do with life, wherein we treat our friends as we should ourselves. They argue that a friend is worth having for his own sake and that it is a good thing to have many friends. But among the bad there is, they hold, no such thing as friendship, and thus no bad man has a friend. Another of their tenets is that the unwise are all mad, inasmuch as they are not wise but do what they do from that madness which is the equivalent of their folly.

125 Πάντα τ’ εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν σοφόν, ὡς καὶ πάντα φαμὲν τὰ αὐλήματα εὖ αὐλεῖν τὸν Ἰσμηνίαν. Καὶ τῶν σοφῶν δὲ πάντα εἶναι· δεδωκέναι γὰρ αὐτοῖς παντελῆ ἐξουσίαν τὸν νόμον. Τῶν δὲ φαύλων εἶναί τινα λέγεται, ὃν τρόπον καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων, ἄλλως μὲν τῆς πόλεως, ἄλλως δὲ τῶν χρωμένων φαμέν.

Τὰς δ’ ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰ θεωρήματα κοινά, καθάπερ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ ἀρετῶν φησιν, Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν, Ἑκάτων δὲ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ Περὶ ἀρετῶν.

125. Furthermore, the wise man does all things well, just as we say that Ismenias plays all airs on the flute well. Also everything belongs to the wise. For the law, they say, has conferred upon them a perfect right to all things. It is true that certain things are said to belong to the bad, just as what has been dishonestly acquired may be said, in one sense, to belong to the state, in another sense to those who are enjoying it.

They hold that the virtues involve one another, and that the possessor of one is the possessor of all, inasmuch as they have common principles, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his work On Virtues , Apollodorus in his Physics according to the Early School , and Hecato in the third book of his treatise On Virtues .

126 Τὸν γὰρ ἐνάρετον θεωρητικόν τ’ εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὸν τῶν ποιητέων. Τὰ δὲ ποιητέα καὶ αἱρετέα ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπομενητέα καὶ ἐμμενετέα καὶ ἀπονεμητέα, ὥστ’ εἰ τὰ μὲν αἱρετικῶς ποιεῖ, τὰ δ’ ὑπομενητικῶς, τὰ δ’ ἀπονεμητικῶς, τὰ δ’ ἐμμενητικῶς, φρόνιμός τ’ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ δίκαιος καὶ σώφρων. Κεφαλαιοῦσθαί θ’ ἑκάστην τῶν ἀρετῶν περί τι ἴδιον κεφάλαιον, οἷον τὴν ἀνδρείαν περὶ τὰ ὑπομενητέα, τὴν φρόνησιν περὶ τὰ ποιητέα καὶ μὴ καὶ οὐδέτερα· ὁμοίως τε καὶ τὰς ἄλλας περὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα τρέπεσθαι. Ἕπονται δὲ τῇ μὲν φρονήσει εὐβουλία καὶ σύνεσις, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ εὐταξία καὶ κοσμιότης, τῇ δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ ἰσότης καὶ εὐγνωμοσύνη, τῇ δὲ ἀνδρείᾳ ἀπαραλλαξία καὶ εὐτονία.

126. For if a man be possessed of virtue, he is at once able to discover and to put into practice what he ought to do. Now such rules of conduct comprise rules for choosing, enduring, staying, and distributing; so that if a man does some things by intelligent choice, some things with fortitude, some things by way of just distribution, and some steadily, he is at once wise, courageous, just, and temperate. And each of the virtues has a particular subject with which it deals, as, for instance, courage is concerned with things that must be endured, practical wisdom with acts to be done, acts from which one must abstain, and those which fall under neither head. Similarly each of the other virtues is concerned with its own proper sphere. To wisdom are subordinate good counsel and understanding; to temperance, good discipline and orderliness; to justice, equality and fair-mindedness; to courage, constancy and vigour.

127 Ἀρέσκει δ’ αὐτοῖς μηδὲν μεταξὺ εἶναι ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, τῶν Περιπατητικῶν μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας εἶναι λεγόντων τὴν προκοπήν· ὡς γὰρ δεῖν φασιν ἢ ὀρθὸν εἶναι ξύλον ἢ στρεβλόν, οὕτως ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, οὔτε δὲ δικαιότερον οὔτ’ ἀδικώτερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. Καὶ μὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος μὲν ἀποβλητήν, Κλεάνθης δὲ ἀναπόβλητον· ὁ μὲν ἀποβλητὴν διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίαν, ὁ δὲ ἀναπόβλητον διὰ βεβαίους καταλήψεις· καὶ αὐτὴν δι’ <αὑτὴν> αἱρετὴν εἶναι. Αἰσχυνόμεθα γοῦν ἐφ’ οἷς κακῶς πράττομεν, ὡς ἂν μόνον τὸ καλὸν εἰδότες ἀγαθόν. Αὐτάρκη τ’ εἶναι αὐτὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, καθά φησι Ζήνων καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ Ἑκάτων ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ ἀγαθῶν.

127. It is a tenet of theirs that between virtue and vice there is nothing intermediate, whereas according to the Peripatetics there is, namely, the state of moral improvement. For, say the Stoics, just as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust. Nor again are there degrees of justice and injustice; and the same rule applies to the other virtues. Further, while Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, Cleanthes maintains that it cannot. According to the former it may be lost in consequence of drunkenness or melancholy; the latter takes it to be inalienable owing to the certainty of our mental apprehension. And virtue in itself they hold to be worthy of choice for its own sake. At all events we are ashamed of bad conduct as if we knew that nothing is really good but the morally beautiful. Moreover, they hold that it is in itself sufficient to ensure well-being: thus Zeno, and Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Virtues , and Hecato in the second book of his treatise On Goods :

128 « Εἰ γάρ, » φησίν, « αὐτάρκης ἐστὶν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία πρὸς τὸ πάντων ὑπεράνω ποιεῖν, ἔστι δὲ μέρος τῆς ἀρετῆς, αὐτάρκης ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καταφρονοῦσα καὶ τῶν δοκούντων ὀχληρῶν. » Ὁ μέντοι Παναίτιος καὶ Ποσειδώνιος οὐκ αὐτάρκη λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ χρείαν εἶναί φασι καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ χορηγίας καὶ ἰσχύος.

Ἀρέσκει δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ διὰ παντὸς χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ὡς οἱ περὶ Κλεάνθην φασίν· ἀναπόβλητος γάρ ἐστι καὶ πάντοτε τῇ ψυχῇ χρῆται οὔσῃ τελείᾳ ὁ σπουδαῖος. Φύσει τε τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ μὴ θέσει, ὡς καὶ τὸν νόμον καὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ.

128. “For if magnanimity by itself alone can raise us far above everything, and if magnanimity is but a part of virtue, then too virtue as a whole will be sufficient in itself for well-being – despising all things that seem troublesome.” Panaetius, however, and Posidonius deny that virtue is self-sufficing: on the contrary, health is necessary, and some means of living and strength.

Another tenet of theirs is the perpetual exercise of virtue, as held by Cleanthes and his followers. For virtue can never be lost, and the good man is always exercising his mind, which is perfect. Again, they say that justice, as well as law and right reason, exists by nature and not by convention: so Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful .

129 Δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς μηδὲ διὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν ἀφίστασθαι φιλοσοφίας, ἐπεὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ προλείψειν ὅλον τὸν βίον, ὡς καὶ Ποσειδώνιός φησιν ἐν τοῖς Προτρεπτικοῖς. Εὐχρηστεῖν δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος.

Ἔτι ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς μηδὲν εἶναι ἡμῖν δίκαιον πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα, διὰ τὴν ἀνομοιότητα, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν πρώτῳ Περὶ καθήκοντος. Καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι δὲ τὸν σοφὸν τῶν νέων τῶν ἐμφαινόντων διὰ τοῦ εἴδους τὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφυΐαν, ὥς φησι Ζήνων ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ βίων καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Ἠθικῇ.

129. Neither do they think that the divergence of opinion between philosophers is any reason for abandoning the study of philosophy, since at that rate we should have to give up life altogether: so Posidonius in his Exhortations . Chrysippus allows that the ordinary Greek education is serviceable.

It is their doctrine that there can be no question of right as between man and the lower animals, because of their unlikeness. Thus Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Justice , and Posidonius in the first book of his De officio . Further, they say that the wise man will feel affection for the youths who by their countenance show a natural endowment for virtue. So Zeno in his Republic , Chrysippus in book i. of his work On Modes of Life , and Apollodorus in his Ethics .

130 Εἶναι δὲ τὸν ἔρωτα ἐπιβολὴν φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον· καὶ μὴ εἶναι συνουσίας, ἀλλὰ φιλίας. Τὸν γοῦν Θρασωνίδην καίπερ ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ ἔχοντα τὴν ἐρωμένην, διὰ τὸ μισεῖσθαι ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῆς. Εἶναι οὖν τὸν ἔρωτα φιλίας, ὡς καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἔρωτός φησι· καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐπίμεμπτον αὐτόν. Εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὥραν ἄνθος ἀρετῆς.

Βίων δὲ τριῶν ὄντων, θεωρητικοῦ καὶ πρακτικοῦ καὶ λογικοῦ, τὸν τρίτον φασὶν αἱρετέον· γεγονέναι γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐπίτηδες τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον πρὸς θεωρίαν καὶ πρᾶξιν. Εὐλόγως τέ φασιν ἐξάξειν ἑαυτὸν τοῦ βίου τὸν σοφὸν καὶ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος καὶ ὑπὲρ φίλων, κἂν ἐν σκληροτέρᾳ γένηται ἀλγηδόνι ἢ πηρώσεσιν ἢ νόσοις ἀνιάτοις.

130. Their definition of love is an effort toward friendliness due to visible beauty appearing, its sole end being friendship, not bodily enjoyment. At all events, they allege that Thrasonides, although he had his mistress in his power, abstained from her because she hated him. By which it is shown, they think, that love depends upon regard, as Chrysippus says in his treatise Of Love , and is not sent by the gods. And beauty they describe as the bloom or flower of virtue.

Of the three kinds of life, the contemplative, the practical, and the rational, they declare that we ought to choose the last, for that a rational being is expressly produced by nature for contemplation and for action. They tell us that the wise man will for reasonable cause make his own exit from life, on his country’s behalf or for the sake of his friends, or if he suffer intolerable pain, mutilation, or incurable disease.

131 Ἀρέσκει δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας δεῖν παρὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς, ὥστε τὸν ἐντυχόντα τῇ ἐντυχούσῃ χρῆσθαι, καθά φησι Ζήνων ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ πολιτείας, ἀλλ’ ἔτι Διογένης ὁ κυνικὸς καὶ Πλάτων. Πάντας τε παῖδας ἐπίσης στέρξομεν πατέρων τρόπον καὶ ἡ ἐπὶ μοιχείᾳ ζηλοτυπία περιαιρεθήσεται. Πολιτείαν δ’ ἀρίστην τὴν μικτὴν ἔκ τε δημοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας.

Καὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς δόγμασι τοιαῦτα λέγουσι καὶ τούτων πλείω μετὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἀποδείξεων· ταῦτα δ’ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίοις ἡμῖν λελέχθω καὶ στοιχειωδῶς.

131. It is also their doctrine that amongst the wise there should be a community of wives with free choice of partners, as Zeno says in his Republic and Chrysippus in his treatise On Government [and not only they, but also Diogenes the Cynic and Plato]. Under such circumstances we shall feel paternal affection for all the children alike, and there will be an end of the jealousies arising from adultery. The best form of government they hold to be a mixture of democracy, kingship, and aristocracy (or the rule of the best).

Such, then, are the statements they make in their ethical doctrines, with much more besides, together with their proper proofs: let this, however, suffice for a statement of them in a summary and elementary form.

132 Τὸν δὲ φυσικὸν λόγον διαιροῦσιν εἴς τε τὸν περὶ σωμάτων τόπον καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ στοιχείων καὶ θεῶν καὶ περάτων καὶ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ. Καὶ οὕτω μὲν εἰδικῶς, γενικῶς δ’ εἰς τρεῖς τόπους, τόν τε περὶ κόσμου καὶ τὸν περὶ τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τρίτον τὸν αἰτιολογικόν.

Τὸν δὲ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου διαιρεῖσθαί φασιν εἰς δύο μέρη. Μιᾷ γὰρ σκέψει ἐπικοινωνεῖν αὐτοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων, καθ’ ἣν ζητοῦσι περί τε τῶν ἀπλανῶν καὶ τῶν πλανωμένων, οἷον εἰ ὁ ἥλιός ἐστι τηλικοῦτος ἡλίκος φαίνεται, καὶ ὁμοίως εἰ ἡ σελήνη, καὶ περὶ δινήσεως καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων τούτοις ζητημάτων.

132. Their physical doctrine they divide into sections (1) about bodies; (2) about principles; (3) about elements; (4) about the gods; (5) about bounding surfaces and space whether filled or empty. This is a division into species; but the generic division is into three parts, dealing with (i.) the universe; (ii.) the elements; (iii.) the subject of causation.

The part dealing with the universe admits, they say, of division into two: for with one aspect of it the mathematicians also are concerned, in so far as they treat questions relating to the fixed stars and the planets, e.g. whether the sun is or is not just so large as it appears to be, and the same about the moon, the question of their revolutions, and other inquiries of the same sort.

133 Ἑτέραν δ’ αὐτοῦ σκέψιν εἶναι ἥτις μόνοις τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἐπιβάλλει, καθ’ ἣν ζητεῖται ἥ τ’ οὐσία αὐτοῦ [καὶ εἰ ὁ ἥλιος καὶ οἱ ἀστέρες ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους] καὶ εἰ γενητὸς ἢ ἀγένητος καὶ εἰ ἔμψυχος ἢ ἄψυχος καὶ εἰ φθαρτὸς ἢ ἄφθαρτος καὶ εἰ προνοίᾳ διοικεῖται καὶ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. Τόν τ’ αἰτιολογικὸν εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν διμερῆ· μιᾷ δ’ αὐτοῦ ἐπισκέψει ἐπικοινωνεῖν τὴν τῶν ἰατρῶν ζήτησιν, καθ’ ἣν ζητοῦσι περί τε τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ γινομένων καὶ περὶ σπερμάτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ὁμοίων· τοῦ δ’ ἑτέρου καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, οἷον πῶς ὁρῶμεν, τίς ἡ αἰτία τῆς κατοπτρικῆς φαντασίας, ὅπως νέφη συνίσταται, βρονταὶ καὶ ἴριδες καὶ ἅλως καὶ κομῆται καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια.

133. But there is another aspect or field of cosmological inquiry, which belongs to the physicists alone: this includes such questions as what the substance of the universe is, whether the sun and the stars are made up of form and matter, whether the world has had a beginning in time or not, whether it is animate or inanimate, whether it is destructible or indestructible, whether it is governed by providence, and all the rest. The part concerned with causation, again, is itself subdivided into two. And in one of its aspects medical inquiries have a share in it, in so far as it involves investigation of the ruling principle of the soul and the phenomena of soul, seeds, and the like. Whereas the other part is claimed by the mathematicians also, e.g. how vision is to be explained, what causes the image on the mirror, what is the origin of clouds, thunder, rainbows, halos, comets, and the like.

134 Δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. Τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θέον· τοῦτον γὰρ ἀΐδιον ὄντα διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα. Τίθησι δὲ τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο Ζήνων μὲν ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐν τῷ Περὶ οὐσίας, Κλεάνθης δ’ ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῶν ἀτόμων, Χρύσιππος δ’ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν πρὸς τῷ τέλει, Ἀρχέδημος δ’ ἐν τῷ Περὶ στοιχείων καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τοῦ Φυσικοῦ λόγου. Διαφέρειν δέ φασιν ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα· τὰς μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἀγενήτους <καὶ> ἀφθάρτους, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα κατὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν φθείρεσθαι. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσωμάτους εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ ἀμόρφους, τὰ δὲ μεμορφῶσθαι.

134. They hold that there are two principles in the universe, the active principle and the passive. The passive principle, then, is a substance without quality, i.e. matter, whereas the active is the reason inherent in this substance, that is God. For he is everlasting and is the artificer of each several thing throughout the whole extent of matter. This doctrine is laid down by Zeno of Citium in his treatise On Existence , Cleanthes in his work On Atoms , Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics towards the end, Archedemus in his treatise On Elements , and Posidonius in the second book of his Physical Exposition . There is a difference, according to them, between principles and elements; the former being without generation or destruction, whereas the elements are destroyed when all things are resolved into fire. Moreover, the principles are incorporeal and destitute of form, while the elements have been endowed with form.

135 Σῶμα δ’ ἐστίν, ὥς φησιν Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ, τὸ τριχῆ διαστατόν, εἰς μῆκος, εἰς πλάτος, εἰς βάθος· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ στερεὸν σῶμα καλεῖται. Ἐπιφάνεια δ’ ἐστὶ σώματος πέρας ἢ τὸ μῆκος καὶ πλάτος μόνον ἔχον βάθος δ’ οὔ· ταύτην δὲ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν πέμπτῳ Περὶ μετεώρων καὶ κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν καὶ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἀπολείπει. Γραμμὴ δ’ ἐστὶν ἐπιφανείας πέρας ἢ μῆκος ἀπλατὲς ἢ τὸ μῆκος μόνον ἔχον. Στιγμὴ δ’ ἐστὶ γραμμῆς πέρας, ἥτις ἐστὶ σημεῖον ἐλάχιστον.

135. Body is defined by Apollodorus in his Physics as that which is extended in three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth. This is also called solid body. But surface is the extremity of a solid body, or that which has length and breadth only without depth. That surface exists not only in our thought but also in reality is maintained by Posidonius in the third book of his Celestial Phenomena . A line is the extremity of a surface or length without breadth, or that which has length alone. A point is the extremity of a line, the smallest possible mark or dot.

God is one and the same with Reason, Fate, and Zeus; he is also called by many other names.

136 Ἕν τ’ εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ εἱμαρμένην καὶ Δία· πολλαῖς τ’ ἑτέραις ὀνομασίαις προσονομάζεσθαι. Κατ’ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ’ αὑτὸν ὄντα τρέπειν τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ· καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου, τοιόνδε ὑπολείπεσθαι ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ, εὐεργὸν αὑτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἑξῆς γένεσιν· εἶτ’ ἀπογεννᾶν πρῶτον τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἀέρα, γῆν. Λέγει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν Ζήνων τ’ ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν καὶ Ἀρχέδημος ἔν τινι Περὶ στοιχείων.

136. In the beginning he was by himself; he transformed the whole of substance through air into water, and just as in animal generation the seed has a moist vehicle, so in cosmic moisture God, who is the seminal reason of the universe, remains behind in the moisture as such an agent, adapting matter to himself with a view to the next stage of creation. Thereupon he created first of all the four elements, fire, water, air, earth. They are discussed by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole , by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics , and by Archedemus in a work On Elements . An element is defined as that from which particular things first come to be at their birth and into which they are finally resolved.

137 Ἔστι δὲ στοιχεῖον ἐξ οὗ πρώτου γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα καὶ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον ἀναλύεται. Τὰ δὴ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα εἶναι ὁμοῦ τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην· εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν πῦρ τὸ θερμόν, τὸ δ’ ὕδωρ τὸ ὑγρόν, τόν τ’ ἀέρα τὸ ψυχρὸν, καὶ τὴν γῆν τὸ ξηρόν. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔτι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος. Ἀνωτάτω μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι, ἐν ᾧ πρώτην τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν γεννᾶσθαι, εἶτα τὴν τῶν πλανωμένων· μεθ’ ἣν τὸν ἀέρα, εἶτα τὸ ὕδωρ, ὑποστάθμην δὲ πάντων τὴν γῆν, μέσην ἁπάντων οὖσαν.

Λέγουσι δὲ κόσμον τριχῶς· αὐτόν τε τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἁπάσης οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιόν, ὃς δὴ ἄφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγένητος, δημιουργὸς ὢν τῆς διακοσμήσεως, κατὰ χρόνων ποιὰς περιόδους ἀναλίσκων εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ γεννῶν·

137. The four elements together constitute unqualified substance or matter. Fire is the hot element, water the moist, air the cold, earth the dry. Not but what the quality of dryness is also found in the air. Fire has the uppermost place; it is also called aether, and in it the sphere of the fixed stars is first created; then comes the sphere of the planets, next to that the air, then the water, and lowest of all the earth, which is at the centre of all things.

The term universe or cosmos is used by them in three senses: (1) of God himself, the individual being whose quality is derived from the whole of substance; he is indestructible and ingenerable, being the artificer of this orderly arrangement, who at stated periods of time absorbs into himself the whole of substance and again creates it from himself. (2)

138 καὶ αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμον εἶναι λέγουσι· καὶ τρίτον τὸ συνεστηκὸς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. Καὶ ἔστι κόσμος ὁ ἰδίως ποιὸς τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας ἤ, ὥς φησι Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῇ Μετεωρολογικῇ στοιχειώσει, σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων ἢ σύστημα ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γεγονότων. Οὐρανὸς δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐσχάτη περιφέρεια ἐν ᾗ πᾶν ἵδρυται τὸ θεῖον.

Τὸν δὴ κόσμον διοικεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν, καθά φησι Χρύσιππός τ’ ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ Περὶ προνοίας καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ τρισκαιδεκάτῳ Περὶ θεῶν, εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ, καθάπερ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλ’ ἤδη δι’ ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον, δι’ ὧν δὲ ἧττον.

138. Again, they give the name of cosmos to the orderly arrangement of the heavenly bodies in itself as such; and (3) in the third place to that whole of which these two are parts. Again, the cosmos is defined as the individual being qualifying the whole of substance, or, in the words of Posidonius in his elementary treatise on Celestial Phenomena , a system made up of heaven and earth and the natures in them, or, again, as a system constituted by gods and men and all things created for their sake. By heaven is meant the extreme circumference or ring in which the deity has his seat.

The world, in their view, is ordered by reason and providence: so says Chrysippus in the fifth book of his treatise On Providence and Posidonius in his work On the Gods , book iii. – inasmuch as reason pervades every part of it, just as does the soul in us. Only there is a difference of degree; in some parts there is more of it, in others less.

139 Δι’ ὧν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἕξις κεχώρηκεν, ὡς διὰ τῶν ὀστῶν καὶ τῶν νεύρων· δι’ ὧν δὲ ὡς νοῦς, ὡς διὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ζῷον ὄντα καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικόν, ἔχειν ἡγεμονικὸν μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, καθά φησιν Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Τύριος ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ Περὶ κόσμου. Χρύσιππος δ’ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ προνοίας καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανόν φασι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου, Κλεάνθης δὲ τὸν ἥλιον. Ὁ μέντοι Χρύσιππος διαφορώτερον πάλιν τὸ καθαρώτατον τοῦ αἰθέρος ἐν ταὐτῷ, ὃ καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν λέγουσιν αἰσθητικῶς ὥσπερ κεχωρηκέναι διὰ τῶν ἐν ἀέρι καὶ διὰ τῶν ζῴων ἁπάντων καὶ φυτῶν· διὰ δὲ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς καθ’ ἕξιν.

139. For through some parts it passes as a “hold” or containing force, as is the case with our bones and sinews; while through others it passes as intelligence, as in the ruling part of the soul. Thus, then, the whole world is a living being, endowed with soul and reason, and having aether for its ruling principle: so says Antipater of Tyre in the eighth book of his treatise On the Cosmos . Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Providence and Posidonius in his book On the Gods say that the heaven, but Cleanthes that the sun, is the ruling power of the world. Chrysippus, however, in the course of the same work gives a somewhat different account, namely, that it is the purer part of the aether; the same which they declare to be preeminently God and always to have, as it were in sensible fashion, pervaded all that is in the air, all animals and plants, and also the earth itself, as a principle of cohesion.

140 Ἕνα τὸν κόσμον εἶναι καὶ τοῦτον πεπερασμένον, σχῆμ’ ἔχοντα σφαιροειδές· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν κίνησιν ἁρμοδιώτατον τὸ τοιοῦτον, καθά φησι Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ τοῦ Φυσικοῦ λόγου καὶ οἱ περὶ Ἀντίπατρον ἐν τοῖς περὶ κόσμου. Ἔξωθεν δ’ αὐτοῦ περικεχυμένον εἶναι τὸ κενὸν ἄπειρον, ὅπερ ἀσώματον εἶναι· ἀσώματον δὲ τὸ οἷόν τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ σωμάτων οὐ κατεχόμενον· ἐν δὲ τῷ κόσμῳ μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν, ἀλλ’ ἡνῶσθαι αὐτόν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀναγκάζειν τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια σύμπνοιαν καὶ συντονίαν. Φησὶ δὲ περὶ τοῦ κενοῦ Χρύσιππος μὲν ἐν τῷ Περὶ κενοῦ καὶ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν τεχνῶν καὶ Ἀπολλοφάνης ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν δευτέρῳ τοῦ Φυσικοῦ λόγου.

140. The world, they say, is one and finite, having a spherical shape, such a shape being the most suitable for motion, as Posidonius says in the fifth book of his Physical Discourse and the disciples of Antipater in their works on the Cosmos. Outside of the world is diffused the infinite void, which is incorporeal. By incorporeal is meant that which, though capable of being occupied by body, is not so occupied. The world has no empty space within it, but forms one united whole. This is a necessary result of the sympathy and tension which binds together things in heaven and earth. Chrysippus discusses the void in his work On Void and in the first book of his Physical Sciences ; so too Apollophanes in his Physics , Apollodorus, and Posidonius in his Physical Discourse , book ii. But these, it is added [i.e. sympathy and tension], are likewise bodies.

141 Εἶναι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀσώματα ὁμοίως. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἀσώματον, διάστημα ὄντα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως. Τούτου δὲ τὸν μὲν παρῳχηκότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀπείρους, τὸν δὲ ἐνεστῶτα πεπερασμένον. Ἀρέσκει δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ φθαρτὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, ἅτε γενητὸν τῷ λόγῳ τῶν δι’ αἰσθήσεως νοουμένων, οὗ τε τὰ μέρη φθαρτά ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου φθαρτά· εἰς ἄλληλα γὰρ μεταβάλλει· φθαρτὸς ἄρα ὁ κόσμος. Καὶ εἴ τι ἐπιδεκτικόν ἐστι τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς, φθαρτόν ἐστι· καὶ ὁ κόσμος δέ· ἐξαυχμοῦται γὰρ καὶ ἐξυδατοῦται.

141. Time too is incorporeal, being the measure of the world’s motion. And time past and time future are infinite, but time present is finite. They hold that the world must come to an end, inasmuch as it had a beginning, on the analogy of those things which are understood by the senses. And that of which the parts are perishable is perishable as a whole. Now the parts of the world are perishable, seeing that they are transformed one into the other. Therefore the world itself is doomed to perish. Moreover, anything is destructible if it admits of deterioration; therefore the world is so, for it is first evaporated and again dissolved into water.

142 Γίνεσθαι δὲ τὸν κόσμον ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς ἡ οὐσία τραπῇ δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὑγρότητα, εἶτα τὸ παχυμερὲς αὐτοῦ συστὰν ἀποτελεσθῇ γῆ, τὸ δὲ λεπτομερὲς ἐξαραιωθῇ, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐπὶ πλέον λεπτυνθὲν πῦρ ἀπογεννήσῃ. Εἶτα κατὰ μίξιν ἐκ τούτων φυτά τε καὶ ζῷα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γένη. Περὶ δὴ οὖν τῆς γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τοῦ κόσμου φησὶ Ζήνων μὲν ἐν τῷ Περὶ ὅλου, Χρύσιππος δ’ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν πρώτῳ Περὶ κόσμου καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Ἀντίπατρος ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ Περὶ κόσμου. Παναίτιος δ’ ἄφθαρτον ἀπεφήνατο τὸν κόσμον.

Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ζῷον ὁ κόσμος καὶ λογικὸν καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ νοερὸν καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ φησὶν Περὶ προνοίας καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος [φησιν] ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ καὶ Ποσειδώνιος·

142. The world, they hold, comes into being when its substance has first been converted from fire through air into moisture and then the coarser part of the moisture has condensed as earth, while that whose particles are fine has been turned into air, and this process of rarefaction goes on increasing till it generates fire. Thereupon out of these elements animals and plants and all other natural kinds are formed by their mixture. The generation and the destruction of the world are discussed by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole , by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics , by Posidonius in the first book of his work On the Cosmos , by Cleanthes, and by Antipater in his tenth book On the Cosmos . Panaetius, however, maintained that the world is indestructible.

The doctrine that the world is a living being, rational, animate and intelligent, is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Providence , by Apollodorus in his Physics , and by Posidonius.

143 ζῷον μὲν οὕτως ὄντα, οὐσίαν ἔμψυχον αἰσθητικήν. Τὸ γὰρ ζῷον τοῦ μὴ ζῴου κρεῖττον· οὐδὲν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κρεῖττον· ζῷον ἄρ’ ὁ κόσμος. Ἔμψυχον δέ, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ἐκεῖθεν οὔσης ἀποσπάσματος. Βόηθος δέ φησιν οὐκ εἶναι ζῷον τὸν κόσμον. Ὅτι θ’ εἷς ἐστι Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν πρώτῳ τοῦ Φυσικοῦ λόγου. Τὸ δὲ πᾶν λέγεται, ὥς φησιν Ἀπολλόδωρος, ὅ τε κόσμος καὶ καθ’ ἕτερον τρόπον τὸ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῦ ἔξωθεν κενοῦ σύστημα. Ὁ μὲν οὖν κόσμος πεπερασμένος ἐστί, τὸ δὲ κενὸν ἄπειρον.

143. It is a living thing in the sense of an animate substance endowed with sensation; for animal is better than non-animal, and nothing is better than the world, ergo the world is a living being. And it is endowed with soul, as is clear from our several souls being each a fragment of it. Boethus, however, denies that the world is a living thing. The unity of the world is maintained by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole , by Chrysippus, by Apollodorus in his Physics , and by Posidonius in the first book of his Physical Discourse . By the totality of things, the All, is meant, according to Apollodorus, (1) the world, and in another sense (2) the system composed of the world and the void outside it. The world then is finite, the void infinite.

144 Τῶν δ’ ἄστρων τὰ μὲν ἀπλανῆ συμπεριφέρεσθαι τῷ ὅλῳ οὐρανῷ, τὰ δὲ πλανώμενα κατ’ ἰδίας κινεῖσθαι κινήσεις. Τὸν δ’ ἥλιον λοξὴν τὴν πορείαν ποιεῖσθαι διὰ τοῦ ζωδιακοῦ κύκλου· ὁμοίως καὶ τὴν σελήνην ἑλικοειδῆ. Εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον εἰλικρινὲς πῦρ, καθά φησι Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ ἑβδόμῳ Περὶ μετεώρων· καὶ μείζονα τῆς γῆς, ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ ἕκτῳ τοῦ Φυσικοῦ λόγου· ἀλλὰ καὶ σφαιροειδῆ, ὡς οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν τοῦτόν φασιν, ἀναλόγως τῷ κόσμῳ. Πῦρ μὲν οὖν εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ πυρὸς πάντα ποιεῖ· μείζω δὲ τῆς γῆς τῷ πᾶσαν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ φωτίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν. Καὶ τὸ τὴν γῆν δὲ κωνοειδῆ σκιὰν ἀποτελεῖν τὸ μείζονα εἶναι σημαίνει· πάντοθεν δὲ βλέπεσθαι διὰ τὸ μέγεθος.

144. Of the stars some are fixed, and are carried round with the whole heaven; others, the wandering stars or planets, have their special motions. The sun travels in an oblique path through the zodiac. Similarly the moon travels in a spiral path. The sun is pure fire: so Posidonius in the seventh book of his Celestial Phenomena . And it is larger than the earth, as the same author says in the sixth book of his Physical Discourse . Moreover it is spherical in shape like the world itself according to this same author and his school. That it is fire is proved by its producing all the effects of fire; that it is larger than the earth by the fact that all the earth is illuminated by it; nay more, the heaven beside. The fact too that the earth casts a conical shadow proves that the sun is greater than it. And it is because of its great size that it is seen from every part of the earth.

145 Γεωδεστέραν δὲ τὴν σελήνην, ἅτε καὶ προσγειοτέραν οὖσαν. Τρέφεσθαι δὲ τὰ ἔμπυρα ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα, τὸν μὲν ἥλιον ἐκ τῆς μεγάλης θαλάττης νοερὸν ὄντα ἄναμμα· τὴν δὲ σελήνην ἐκ ποτίμων ὑδάτων, ἀερομιγῆ τυγχάνουσαν καὶ πρόσγειον οὖσαν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ ἕκτῳ τοῦ Φυσικοῦ λόγου· τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς. Δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς σφαιροειδῆ εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄστρα καὶ τὴν γῆν ἀκίνητον οὖσαν. Τὴν δὲ σελήνην οὐκ ἴδιον ἔχειν φῶς, ἀλλὰ παρ’ ἡλίου λαμβάνειν ἐπιλαμπομένην.

Ἐκλείπειν δὲ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον ἐπιπροσθούσης αὐτῷ σελήνης κατὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μέρος, ὡς Ζήνων ἀναγράφει ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ ὅλου.

145. The moon, however, is of a more earthy composition, since it is nearer to the earth. These fiery bodies and the stars generally derive their nutriment, the sun from the wide ocean, being a fiery kindling, though intelligent; the moon from fresh waters, with an admixture of air, close to the earth as it is: thus Posidonius in the sixth book of his Physics ; the other heavenly bodies being nourished from the earth. They hold that the stars are spherical in shape and that the earth too is so and is at rest; and that the moon does not shine by her own light, but by the borrowed light of the sun when he shines upon her.

An eclipse of the sun takes place when the moon passes in front of it on the side towards us, as shown by Zeno with a diagram in his treatise On the Whole .

146 Φαίνεται γὰρ ὑπερχομένη ταῖς συνόδοις καὶ ἀποκρύπτουσα αὐτὸν καὶ πάλιν παραλλάττουσα· γνωρίζεται δὲ τοῦτο διὰ λεκάνης ὕδωρ ἐχούσης. Τὴν δὲ σελήνην ἐμπίπτουσαν εἰς τὸ τῆς γῆς σκίασμα· ὅθεν καὶ ταῖς πανσελήνοις ἐκλείπειν μόναις, καίπερ κατὰ διάμετρον ἱσταμένην κατὰ μῆνα τῷ ἡλίῳ, ὅτι κατὰ λοξοῦ ὡς πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον κινουμένη παραλλάττει τῷ πλάτει, ἢ βορειοτέρα ἢ νοτιωτέρα γινομένη. Ὅταν μέντοι τὸ πλάτος αὐτῆς κατὰ τὸν ἡλιακὸν καὶ τὸν διὰ μέσων γένηται, εἶτα διαμετρήσῃ τὸν ἥλιον, τότ’ ἐκλείπει· γίνεται δὲ τὸ πλάτος αὐτῆς κατὰ τὸν διὰ μέσων ἐν χηλαῖς καὶ σκορπίῳ καὶ κριῷ καὶ ταύρῳ, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Ποσειδώνιον.

146. For the moon is seen approaching at conjunctions and occulting it and then again receding from it. This can best be observed when they are mirrored in a basin of water. The moon is eclipsed when she falls into the earth’s shadow: for which reason it is only at the full moon that an eclipse happens , although she is in opposition to the sun every month; because the moon moves in an oblique orbit, diverging in latitude relatively to the orbit of the sun, and she accordingly goes farther to the north or to the south. When, however, the moon’s motion in latitude has brought her into the sun’s path through the zodiac, and she thus comes diametrically opposite to the sun, there is an eclipse. Now the moon is in latitude right on the zodiac, when she is in the constellations of Cancer, Scorpio, Aries and Taurus: so Posidonius and his followers tell us.

147 Θεὸν δ’ εἶναι ζῷον ἀθάνατον, λογικόν, τέλειον ἢ νοερὸν ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, κακοῦ παντὸς ἀνεπίδεκτον, προνοητικὸν κόσμου τε καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ· μὴ εἶναι μέντοι ἀνθρωπόμορφον. Εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν δημιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων καὶ ὥσπερ πατέρα πάντων κοινῶς τε καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ τὸ διῆκον διὰ πάντων, ὃ πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις προσονομάζεται κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις. Δία μὲν γάρ φασι δι’ ὃν τὰ πάντα, Ζῆνα δὲ καλοῦσι παρ’ ὅσον τοῦ ζῆν αἴτιός ἐστιν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ζῆν κεχώρηκεν, Ἀθηνᾶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς αἰθέρα διάτασιν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ αὐτοῦ, Ἥραν δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἀέρα, καὶ Ἥφαιστον κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ τεχνικὸν πῦρ, καὶ Ποσειδῶνα κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ ὑγρόν, καὶ Δήμητραν κατὰ τὴν εἰς γῆν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας προσηγορίας ἐχόμενοί τινος οἰκειότητος ἀπέδοσαν.

147. The deity, say they, is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent in happiness, admitting nothing evil , taking providential care of the world and all that therein is, but he is not of human shape. He is, however, the artificer of the universe and, as it were, the father of all, both in general and in that particular part of him which is all-pervading, and which is called many names according to its various powers. They give the name Dia (Δία) because all things are due to (διά) him; Zeus (Ζῆνα) in so far as he is the cause of life (ζῆν) or pervades all life; the name Athena is given, because the ruling part of the divinity extends to the aether; the name Hera marks its extension to the air; he is called Hephaestus since it spreads to the creative fire; Poseidon, since it stretches to the sea; Demeter, since it reaches to the earth. Similarly men have given the deity his other titles, fastening, as best they can, on some one or other of his peculiar attributes.

148 Οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ Ζήνων μέν φησι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ θεῶν καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν πρώτῳ Περὶ θεῶν. Καὶ Ἀντίπατρος ἐν ἑβδόμῳ Περὶ κόσμου ἀεροειδῆ φησιν αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν· Βόηθος δὲ ἐν τῇ Περὶ φύσεως οὐσίαν θεοῦ τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν.

Φύσιν δὲ ποτὲ μὲν ἀποφαίνονται τὴν συνέχουσαν τὸν κόσμον, ποτὲ δὲ τὴν φύουσαν τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς. Ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις ἐξ αὑτῆς κινουμένη κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ αὑτῆς ἐν ὡρισμένοις χρόνοις καὶ τοιαῦτα δρῶσα ἀφ’ οἵων ἀπεκρίθη.

148. The substance of God is declared by Zeno to be the whole world and the heaven, as well as by Chrysippus in his first book Of the Gods , and by Posidonius in his first book with the same title. Again, Antipater in the seventh book of his work On the Cosmos says that the substance of God is akin to air, while Boethus in his work On Nature speaks of the sphere of the fixed stars as the substance of God. Now the term Nature is used by them to mean sometimes that which holds the world together, sometimes that which causes terrestrial things to spring up. Nature is defined as a force moving of itself, producing and preserving in being its offspring in accordance with seminal principles within definite periods, and effecting results homogeneous with their sources.

149 Ταύτην δὲ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος στοχάζεσθαι καὶ ἡδονῆς, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δημιουργίας. Καθ’ εἱμαρμένην δέ φασι τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι Χρύσιππος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ εἱμαρμένης καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν δευτέρῳ Περὶ εἱμαρμένης καὶ Ζήνων, Βόηθος δ’ ἐν πρώτῳ Περὶ εἱμαρμένης. Ἔστι δ’ εἱμαρμένη αἰτία τῶν ὄντων εἰρομένη ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν ὁ κόσμος διεξάγεται.

Καὶ μὴν καὶ μαντικὴν ὑφεστάναι πᾶσάν φασιν, εἰ καὶ πρόνοιαν εἶναι· καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τέχνην ἀποφαίνουσι διά τινας ἐκβάσεις, ὥς φησι Ζήνων τε καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ μαντικῆς καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ δυοδεκάτῳ τοῦ Φυσικοῦ λόγου καὶ ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ Περὶ μαντικῆς. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Παναίτιος ἀνυπόστατον αὐτήν φησιν.

149. Nature, they hold, aims both at utility and at pleasure, as is clear from the analogy of human craftsmanship. That all things happen by fate or destiny is maintained by Chrysippus in his treatise De fato , by Posidonius in his De fato , book ii., by Zeno and by Boethus in his De fato , book i. Fate is defined as an endless chain of causation, whereby things are, or as the reason or formula by which the world goes on. What is more, they say that divination in all its forms is a real and substantial fact, if there is really Providence. And they prove it to be actually a science on the evidence of certain results: so Zeno, Chrysippus in the second book of his De divinatione , Athenodorus, and Posidonius in the second book of his Physical Discourse and the fifth book of his De divinatione . But Panaetius denies that divination has any real existence.

150 Οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην, ὡς καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν καὶ Ζήνων. Ὕλη δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἧς ὁτιδηποτοῦν γίνεται. Καλεῖται δὲ διχῶς, οὐσία τε καὶ ὕλη, ἥ τε τῶν πάντων καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους. Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὅλων οὔτε πλείων οὔτ’ ἐλάττων γίνεται, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους <καὶ πλείων καὶ ἐλάττων>. Σῶμα δέ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἡ οὐσία, καὶ πεπερασμένη καθά φησιν Ἀντίπατρος ἐν δευτέρῳ Περὶ οὐσίας καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ. Καὶ παθητὴ δέ ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ αὐτός φησιν· εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἄτρεπτος, οὐκ ἂν τὰ γινόμενα ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐγίνετο· ἔνθεν κἀκ<ολουθ>εῖν ὡς ἥ τε τομὴ εἰς ἄπειρόν ἐστιν. (Ἣν ἄπειρον <οὐκ εἰς ἄπειρόν> φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος· οὐ γάρ ἐστί τι ἄπειρον, εἰς ὃ γίνεται ἡ τομή. Ἀλλ’ ἀκατάληκτός ἐστι.)

150. The primary matter they make the substratum of all things: so Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics , and Zeno. By matter is meant that out of which anything whatsoever is produced. Both substance and matter are terms used in a twofold sense according as they signify (1) universal or (2) particular substance or matter. The former neither increases nor diminishes, while the matter of particular things both increases and diminishes. Body according to them is substance which is finite: so Antipater in his second book On Substance , and Apollodorus in his Physics . Matter can also be acted upon, as the same author says, for if it were immutable, the things which are produced would never have been produced out of it. Hence the further doctrine that matter is divisible ad infinitum . Chrysippus says that the division is not ad infinitum , but itself infinite; for there is nothing infinitely small to which the division can extend. But nevertheless the division goes on without ceasing.

151 Καὶ τὰς κράσεις δὲ διόλου γίνεσθαι, καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν, καὶ μὴ κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ παράθεσιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰς πέλαγος ὀλίγος οἶνος βληθεὶς ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἀντιπαρεκταθήσεται, εἶτα συμφθαρήσεται.

Φασὶ δ’ εἶναι καί τινας δαίμονας ἀνθρώπων συμπάθειαν ἔχοντας, ἐπόπτας τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων· καὶ ἥρωας τὰς ὑπολελειμμένας τῶν σπουδαίων ψυχάς.

Τῶν δ’ ἐν ἀέρι γινομένων χειμῶνα μὲν εἶναί φασι τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς ἀέρα κατεψυγμένον διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου πρόσω ἄφοδον, ἔαρ δὲ τὴν εὐκρασίαν τοῦ ἀέρος κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς πορείαν.

151. Hence, again, their explanation of the mixture of two substances is, according to Chrysippus in the third book of his Physics , that they permeate each other through and through, and that the particles of the one do not merely surround those of the other or lie beside them. Thus, if a little drop of wine be thrown into the sea, it will be equally diffused over the whole sea for a while and then will be blended with it.

Also they hold that there are daemons (δαίμονες) who are in sympathy with mankind and watch over human affairs. They believe too in heroes, that is, the souls of the righteous that have survived their bodies.

Of the changes which go on in the air, they describe winter as the cooling of the air above the earth due to the sun’s departure to a distance from the earth; spring as the right temperature of the air consequent upon his approach to us;

152 Θέρος δὲ τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς ἀέρα καταθαλπόμενον τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου πρὸς ἄρκτον πορείᾳ, μετόπωρον δὲ τῇ παλινδρομίᾳ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀφ’ ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι. <Τοὺς δ’ ἀνέμους ἀέρος εἶναι ῥύσεις· παραλλαττούσας δὲ τὰς ἐπωνυμίας γίνεσθαι> παρὰ τοὺς τόπους ἀφ’ ὧν ῥέουσι. Τῆς δὲ γενέσεως αὐτῶν αἴτιον γίνεσθαι τὸν ἥλιον ἐξατμίζοντα τὰ νέφη. Ἶριν δ’ εἶναι αὐγὰς ἀφ’ ὑγρῶν νεφῶν ἀνακεκλασμένας ἤ, ὡς Ποσειδώνιός φησιν ἐν τῇ Μετεωρολογικῇ, ἔμφασιν ἡλίου τμήματος ἢ σελήνης ἐν νέφει δεδροσισμένῳ κοίλῳ καὶ συνεχεῖ πρὸς φαντασίαν, ὡς ἐν κατόπτρῳ φανταζομένην κατὰ κύκλου περιφέρειαν. Κομήτας δὲ καὶ πωγωνίας καὶ λαμπαδίας πυρὰ εἶναι ὑφεστῶτα πάχους ἀέρος εἰς τὸν αἰθερώδη τόπον ἀνενεχθέντος.

152. summer as the heating of the air above the earth when he travels to the north; while autumn they attribute to the receding of the sun from us. As for the winds, they are streams of air, differently named according to the localities from which they blow. And the cause of their production is the sun through the evaporation of the clouds. The rainbow is explained as the reflection of the sun’s rays from watery clouds or, as Posidonius says in his Meteorology , an image of a segment of the sun or moon in a cloud suffused with dew, which is hollow and visible without intermission, the image showing itself as if in a mirror in the form of a circular arch. Comets, bearded stars, and meteors are fires which arise when dense air is carried up to the region of aether.

153 Σέλας δὲ πυρὸς ἀθρόου ἔξαψιν ἐν ἀέρι φερομένου ταχέως καὶ φαντασίαν μήκους ἐμφαίνοντος. Ὑετὸν δ’ ἐκ νέφους μεταβολὴν εἰς ὕδωρ, ἐπειδὰν ἢ ἐκ γῆς ἢ ἐκ θαλάττης ἀνενεχθεῖσα ὑγρασία ὑφ’ ἡλίου [καὶ] μὴ τυγχάνῃ κατεργασίας· καταψυχθὲν δὲ τοῦτο πάχνην καλεῖσθαι. Χάλαζαν δὲ νέφος πεπηγός, ὑπὸ πνεύματος διαθρυφθέν· χιόνα δ’ ὑγρὸν ἐκ νέφους πεπηγότος, ὡς Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ τοῦ Φυσικοῦ λόγου· ἀστραπὴν δ’ ἔξαψιν νεφῶν παρατριβομένων ἢ ῥηγνυμένων ὑπὸ πνεύματος, ὡς Ζήνων ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ ὅλου· βροντὴν δὲ τὸν τούτων ψόφον ἐκ παρατρίψεως ἢ ῥήξεως·

153. A shooting star is the sudden kindling of a mass of fire in rapid motion through the air, which leaves a trail behind it presenting an appearance of length. Rain is the transformation of cloud into water, when moisture drawn up by the sun from land or sea has been only partially evaporated. If this is cooled down, it is called hoar-frost. Hail is frozen cloud, crumbled by a wind; while snow is moist matter from a cloud which has congealed: so Posidonius in the eighth book of his Physical Discourse . Lightning is a kindling of clouds from being rubbed together or being rent by wind, as Zeno says in his treatise On the Whole ; thunder the noise these clouds make when they rub against each other or burst.

154 κεραυνὸν δ’ ἔξαψιν σφοδρὰν μετὰ πολλῆς βίας πίπτουσαν ἐπὶ γῆς, νεφῶν παρατριβομένων ἢ ῥηγνυμένων ὑπὸ πνεύματος. Οἱ δὲ συστροφὴν πυρώδους ἀέρος βιαίως καταφερομένην. Τυφῶνα δὲ κεραυνὸν πολύν, βίαιον καὶ πνευματώδη ἢ πνεῦμα καπνῶδες ἐρρωγότος νέφους· πρηστῆρα <δὲ> νέφος περισχισθὲν πυρὶ μετὰ πνεύματος. <Σεισμοὺς δὲ γίνεσθαι ῥυέντος πνεύματος> εἰς τὰ κοιλώματα τῆς γῆς ἢ καθειρχθέντος πνεύματος ἐν τῇ γῇ, καθά φησι Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῇ ὀγδόῃ· εἶναι δ’ αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν σεισματίας, τοὺς δὲ χασματίας, τοὺς δὲ κλιματίας, τοὺς δὲ βρασματίας.

154. Thunderbolt is the term used when the fire is violently kindled and hurled to the ground with great force as the clouds grind against each other or are torn by the wind. Others say that it is a compression of fiery air descending with great force. A typhoon is a great and violent thunderstorm whirlwind-like, or a whirlwind of smoke from a cloud that has burst. A “prester” is a cloud rent all round by the force of fire and wind. Earthquakes, say they, happen when the wind finds its way into, or is imprisoned in, the hollow parts of the earth: so Posidonius in his eighth book; and some of them are tremblings, others openings of the earth, others again lateral displacements, and yet others vertical displacements.

155 Ἀρέσκει δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν διακόσμησιν ὧδε ἔχειν· μέσην τὴν γῆν κέντρου λόγον ἐπέχουσαν, μεθ’ ἣν τὸ ὕδωρ σφαιροειδές, ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ κέντρον τῇ γῇ, ὥστε τὴν γῆν ἐν ὕδατι εἶναι· μετὰ τὸ ὕδωρ δ’ ἀέρα ἐσφαιρωμένον. Κύκλους δ’ εἶναι ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ πέντε, ὧν πρῶτον ἀρκτικὸν ἀεὶ φαινόμενον, δεύτερον τροπικὸν θερινόν, τρίτον ἰσημερινόν, τέταρτον χειμερινὸν τροπικόν, πέμπτον ἀνταρκτικὸν ἀφανῆ. Λέγονται δὲ παράλληλοι καθότι οὐ συννεύουσιν εἰς ἀλλήλους· γράφονται μέντοι περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κέντρον. Ὁ δὲ ζωδιακὸς λοξός ἐστιν, ὡς ἐπιὼν τοὺς παραλλήλους.

155. They maintain that the parts of the world are arranged thus. The earth is in the middle answering to a centre; next comes the water, which is shaped like a sphere all round it, concentric with the earth, so that the earth is in water. After the water comes a spherical layer of air. There are five celestial circles: first, the arctic circle, which is always visible; second, the summer tropic; third, the circle of the equinox; fourth, the winter tropic; and fifth, the antarctic, which is invisible to us. They are called parallel, because they do not incline towards one another; yet they are described round the same centre. The zodiac is an oblique circle, as it crosses the parallel circles.

156 Ζῶναί τ’ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς εἰσι πέντε· πρώτη βόρειος [καὶ] ὑπὲρ τὸν ἀρκτικὸν κύκλον, ἀοίκητος διὰ ψῦχος· δευτέρα εὔκρατος· τρίτη ἀοίκητος ὑπὸ καυμάτων, ἡ διακεκαυμένη καλουμένη· τετάρτη ἡ ἀντεύκρατος· πέμπτη νότιος, ἀοίκητος διὰ ψῦχος.

Δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς τὴν μὲν φύσιν εἶναι πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὁδῷ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πνεῦμα πυροειδὲς καὶ τεχνοειδές· τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν αἰσθητικὴν <φύσιν>. Ταύτην δ’ εἶναι τὸ συμφυὲς ἡμῖν πνεῦμα· διὸ καὶ σῶμα εἶναι καὶ μετὰ τὸν θάνατον ἐπιμένειν· φθαρτὴν δ’ ὑπάρχειν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὅλων ἄφθαρτον, ἧς μέρη εἶναι τὰς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις.

156. And there are five terrestrial zones: first, the northern zone which is beyond the arctic circle, uninhabitable because of the cold; second, a temperate zone; a third, uninhabitable because of great heats, called the torrid zone; fourth, a counter-temperate zone; fifth, the southern zone, uninhabitable because of its cold.

Nature in their view is an artistically working fire, going on its way to create; which is equivalent to a fiery, creative, or fashioning breath. And the soul is a nature capable of perception. And they regard it as the breath of life, congenital with us; from which they infer first that it is a body and secondly that it survives death. Yet it is perishable, though the soul of the universe, of which the individual souls of animals are parts, is indestructible.

157 Ζήνων δ’ ὁ Κιτιεὺς καὶ Ἀντίπατρος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ Ποσειδώνιος πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν· τούτῳ γὰρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι ἔμπνους καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου κινεῖσθαι. Κλεάνθης μὲν οὖν πάσας ἐπιδιαμένειν μέχρι <τῆς> ἐκπυρώσεως, Χρύσιππος δὲ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν μόνων.

Μέρη δὲ ψυχῆς λέγουσιν ὀκτώ, τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἡμῖν σπερματικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ τὸ λογιστικόν. Ὁρᾶν δὲ τοῦ μεταξὺ τῆς ὁράσεως καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φωτὸς ἐντεινομένου κωνοειδῶς, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν δευτέρῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος. Γίνεσθαι μέντοι τὸ κωνοειδὲς τοῦ ἀέρος πρὸς τῇ ὄψει, τὴν δὲ βάσιν πρὸς τῷ ὁρωμένῳ· ὡς διὰ βακτηρίας οὖν τοῦ ταθέντος ἀέρος τὸ βλεπόμενον ἀναγγέλλεσθαι.

157. Zeno of Citium and Antipater, in their treatises De anima , and Posidonius define the soul as a warm breath; for by this we become animate and this enables us to move. Cleanthes indeed holds that all souls continue to exist until the general conflagration; but Chrysippus says that only the souls of the wise do so.

They count eight parts of the soul: the five senses, the generative power in us, our power of speech, and that of reasoning. They hold that we see when the light between the visual organ and the object stretches in the form of a cone: so Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics and Apollodorus. The apex of the cone in the air is at the eye, the base at the object seen. Thus the thing seen is reported to us by the medium of the air stretching out towards it, as if by a stick.

158 Ἀκούειν δὲ τοῦ μεταξὺ τοῦ φωνοῦντος καὶ τοῦ ἀκούοντος ἀέρος πληττομένου σφαιροειδῶς, εἶτα κυματουμένου καὶ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς προσπίπτοντος, ὡς κυματοῦται τὸ ἐν τῇ δεξαμενῇ ὕδωρ κατὰ κύκλους ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐμβληθέντος λίθου. Τὸν δὲ ὕπνον γίνεσθαι ἐκλυομένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ τόνου περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. Αἰτίας δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἀπολείπουσι τὰς περὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τροπάς.

Σπέρμα δὲ λέγουσιν εἶναι τὸ οἷόν τε γεννᾶν τοιαῦτ’ ἀφ’ οἵου καὶ αὐτὸ ἀπεκρίθη· ἀνθρώπου δὲ σπέρμα, ὃ μεθίησιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος μεθ’ ὑγροῦ, συγκιρνᾶσθαι τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσι κατὰ μιγμὸν τοῦ τῶν προγόνων λόγου.

158. We hear when the air between the sonant body and the organ of hearing suffers concussion, a vibration which spreads spherically and then forms waves and strikes upon the ears, just as the water in a reservoir forms wavy circles when a stone is thrown into it. Sleep is caused, they say, by the slackening of the tension in our senses, which affects the ruling part of the soul. They consider that the passions are caused by the variations of the vital breath.

Semen is by them defined as that which is capable of generating offspring like the parent. And the human semen which is emitted by a human parent in a moist vehicle is mingled with parts of the soul, blended in the same ratio in which they are present in the parent.

159 Εἶναι δ’ αὐτὸ Χρύσιππός φησιν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ τῶν Φυσικῶν πνεῦμα κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰς τὴν γῆν καταβαλλομένων σπερμάτων, ἃ παλαιωθέντα οὐκέτι φύεται, ὡς δῆλον διαπεπνευκυίας αὐτοῖς τῆς δυνάμεως. Καὶ ἀφ’ ὅλων δὲ τῶν σωμάτων αὐτό φασι καταφέρεσθαι οἱ περὶ τὸν Σφαῖρον· πάντων γοῦν γεννητικὸν εἶναι τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν. Τὸ δὲ τῆς θηλείας ἄγονον ἀποφαίνονται· ἄτονόν τε γὰρ εἶναι καὶ ὀλίγον καὶ ὑδατῶδες, ὡς ὁ Σφαῖρός φησιν.

Ἡγεμονικὸν δ’ εἶναι τὸ κυριώτατον τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν ᾧ αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ ὁρμαὶ γίνονται καὶ ὅθεν ὁ λόγος ἀναπέμπεται· ὅπερ εἶναι ἐν καρδίᾳ.

159. Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics declares it to be in substance identical with vital breath or spirit. This, he thinks, can be seen from the seeds cast into the earth, which, if kept till they are old, do not germinate, plainly because their fertility has evaporated. Sphaerus and his followers also maintain that semen derives its origin from the whole of the body; at all events every part of the body can be reproduced from it. That of the female is according to them sterile, being, as Sphaerus says, without tension, scanty, and watery. By ruling part of the soul is meant that which is most truly soul proper, in which arise presentations and impulses and from which issues rational speech. And it has its seat in the heart.

160 Ταῦτα μὲν καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ τὸ ὅσον ἡμῖν ἀποχρώντως ἔχειν δοκεῖ στοχαζομένοις τῆς συμμετρίας τοῦ συγγράμματος. Ἃ δέ τινες ἐξ αὐτῶν διηνέχθησαν, ἔστι τάδε.

Αρίστων

Ἀρίστων ὁ Χῖος ὁ Φάλανθος ἐπικαλούμενος Σειρήν. Τέλος ἔφησεν εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαφόρως ἔχοντα ζῆν πρὸς τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας μηδ’ ἡντινοῦν ἐν αὐτοῖς παραλλαγὴν ἀπολείποντα, ἀλλ’ ἐπίσης ἐπὶ πάντων ἔχοντα· εἶναι γὰρ ὅμοιον τὸν σοφὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑποκριτῇ, ὃς ἄν τε Θερσίτου ἄν τε Ἀγαμέμνονος πρόσωπον ἀναλάβῃ, ἑκάτερον ὑποκρίνεται προσηκόντως. Τόν τε φυσικὸν τόπον καὶ τὸν λογικὸν ἀνῄρει, λέγων τὸν μὲν εἶναι ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, τὸν δ’ οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, μόνον δὲ τὸν ἠθικὸν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

160. Such is the summary of their Physics which I have deemed adequate, my aim being to preserve a due proportion in my work. But the points on which certain of the Stoics differed from the rest are the following.