Auchinleck came to the Middle East with his reputation standing high, in Churchill’s eyes at least. Whereas Wavell had been slow to respond to the crisis in Iraq and had seemed to the Prime Minister almost reluctant to commit troops there, Auchinleck had reacted vigorously, despatching a division from India and reinforcing by air the small garrison at Habbaniya sufficiently strongly to drive away the threatening Iraqis, even before Wavell’s relieving column arrived from Palestine.
Unusually for an officer of the Indian Army, ‘the Auk’, as he was popularly known, had held a corps command in the UK at the beginning of the war, taking part of his HQ to Norway in April 1940 in the closing stages of the short campaign there, which he had quickly recognized was a lost cause. He had organized the inevitable evacuation skilfully and was rewarded on his return with Southern Command, where he succeeded Brooke. There he attracted the favourable attention of the Prime Minister, but also the scorn of Montgomery, one of his corps commanders, with whom he completely failed to establish a good relationship. Both men were delighted when Auchinleck became C-in-C India, an appointment which the latter regarded at the time as both the pinnacle and the likely finale of his career. Now he found himself back where the action was the hottest.
The Prime Minister did not allow the new man time to settle in. On the contrary, he began where he had left off with Wavell, applying considerable pressure for a new offensive to be undertaken immediately. Like Wavell, Auchinleck was a consummate professional soldier and he resisted any attempt to make him attack before he was ready. First the Syrian campaign required to be finished. In Egypt new formations were arriving, but they all required time for acclimatization and training, whilst the tanks sent from the UK had to be modified for desert conditions. Auchinleck did, however, begin to plan a major operation and travelled to London in late July to present his preliminary plans to the Prime Minister and the CIGS, General Sir John Dill.
Auchinleck’s new offensive was to employ both the existing XIII Corps and a new XXX Corps. An Army would be required to control the whole battlefield, and this was to the first field formation of such a size to see action since the demise of the British Expeditionary Force in June 1940. The choice of its commander was the first of many matters over which Auchinleck and Churchill disagreed. The Prime Minister favoured ‘Jumbo’ Wilson, although he had never met him, whilst Auchinleck preferred Alan Cunningham. On the evidence, this was the right decision. Wilson had been resoundingly defeated in Greece and had made heavier weather than anticipated in Syria. He was also, although this might not have weighed heavily with the 66-year old Prime Minister, approaching his sixtieth birthday. Cunningham, on the other hand, had recently conducted a successful campaign against the Italians in Somaliland and Ethiopia and was familiar with desert conditions. Churchill accepted Auchinleck’s choice rather grumpily, but it was to come back to bite the C-in-C in due course. The Prime Minister was also forced to give in to Auchinleck’s insistence that he would be unable to mount the offensive until November.
It was on 10 September 1941 that HQ Western Army was formed at Pirbright Camp, Abbasia, and on 27 September that its designation was changed to HQ Eighth Army. Even to Auchinleck, who hardly knew Cunningham, the appointment of the Army Commander must have seemed something of a risk, so the choice of a first-class Brigadier General Staff was seen by many as an insurance policy. The man selected was Sandy Galloway. Galloway already had considerable experience as a general staff officer. He had served in Egypt in the 1930s as the Brigade Major of the Canal Brigade and had been on the Directing Staff at Camberley. Possibly as a result of the latter appointment, he was chosen to open the new Staff College at Haifa as its Commandant in February 1940. That August he became Wilson’s BGS at BTE, in which capacity he was involved in the planning for Operation COMPASS, before following Wilson to Greece, where he was instrumental in organizing the successful evacuation of the bulk of W Force from ports in the Peloponnese. With a reputation for both common sense and decisiveness, he was trusted by Arthur Smith, formerly Wavell’s and now Auchinleck’s Chief of Staff, and by other senior officers at GHQ Egypt and in the War Office.
Galloway began to assemble his side of the staff, selecting, where possible, officers he knew. The staff of Western Desert Force, with Harding still the BGS, had mostly continued with XIII Corps, so he had to look outside. One of the first men Galloway picked was David Belchem, a young officer from the Royal Tank Regiment who had been in the first intake at Haifa before progressing to Wavell’s Intelligence Staff in Cairo. Hoping to return to his regiment, Belchem had found himself posted instead as GSO2 (Ops) at W Force, where he worked for Galloway and acted as his right-hand man during the evacuation. Back in Cairo, with clear ideas as to how a campaign should not be fought, he once again applied to return to regimental duty, only to be picked by Galloway as GSO1 (Staff Duties), which at least meant promotion to acting lieutenant colonel.
‘Staff Duties’ is a misnomer for what is a key General Staff branch. Lieutenant General Sir Ronald Weeks, Deputy CIGS from 1942 to 1945, was to say later that the Director of Staff Duties at the War Office should have been called the Director of Organization, and the same applied further down the line. In an army HQ the GSO1 (SD) acted as the main link between the GSO1 (Ops) and the A & Q staff. The former translated the plans of the commander into action, whilst the latter provided the necessary manning (A) and the provisioning and movement (Q). The SD branch acted as co-ordinator between them, organizing the allocation and deployment, and sometimes even the creation, of formations and units to meet the requirements of the order of battle. Belchem excelled at the job: Charles Richardson, who joined the HQ in the following summer, described him as ‘sharp as a knife … clear, accurate and decisive in every emergency’.1
Galloway’s opposite number on the administrative side of the HQ was the Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General, Charles Miller, a cavalryman and an exact contemporary of Galloway’s at Camberley, who arrived from holding the same position at BTE. Miller’s Q branch was led by Brian Robertson, the Assistant Quartermaster General. The son of Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, the CIGS in the Great War from 1915 to 1918, Robertson had served in the Royal Engineers on the Western Front but had left the Army in 1934 due to what he saw as the lack of career prospects. He accepted a management position in South Africa with Dunlop, at the time one of the largest British companies, and was still there when war broke out in 1939. His attempts to rejoin the British Army were rebuffed – at 43 he was considered too old – and he volunteered instead for the Union Defence Force.2 As an AQMG in the South African Expeditionary Force he accompanied his adopted countrymen to Kenya, whence they provided the backbone of Cunningham’s campaign to drive the Italians out of first Somaliland and then Ethiopia, culminating in the capture of Addis Ababa. The success of the campaign was due in large part to the efforts of Robertson and his colleagues to keep the supply lines going, straightforward enough whilst the force remained close to the coast, especially when the ports of Kismayu and Mogadishu were opened up, but vastly more difficult when Cunningham split up his force, both arms of which had to cross difficult country and one of them the Ogaden desert. Cunningham not only gave full credit to Robertson in his despatches, but invited him to become AQMG at Eighth Army, making a direct appeal to the Chief of Staff of the Union of South Africa, who was most reluctant to let him go. Once in place, Robertson began to pull together a talented team, which included two officers from very different social backgrounds: Oliver Poole, an old Etonian who had arrived in the Middle East with the Warwickshire Yeomanry and who very quickly showed an affinity for complex planning, and Rimmel ‘Rim’ Lymer, a Lancastrian who had joined the Royal Army Service Corps as a Territorial and who was to specialize in supply and transport.
Galloway and Miller both held the rank of brigadier, as did a small number of officers who acted as advisers to the army commander on the activities of the various combat arms, including the Brigadiers Royal Artillery and Anti-Aircraft and the Deputy Directors of Supply and Transport, Ordnance Services and Medical Services. In charge of communications was Brigadier ‘Slap’ White, the Chief Signals Officer, who had commanded the Divisional Signals of 4 Indian Division in the Western Desert and Eritrea and then served briefly as CSO in East Africa Command prior to his move to Eighth Army. With wireless notoriously unreliable at this stage of the war, particularly in the armoured divisions, and fixed lines only really practicable when the army was at a standstill, his work was cut out to ensure that formations and units could communicate with each other and, most importantly at army level, with the RAF. It was as well, in the words of Charles Richardson, that White was ‘efficient, imperturbable and charming’.3 Eighth Army Signals directly employed more men than any other branch of the HQ.
Perhaps the most unusual of the senior officers was the Chief Royal Engineer, Brigadier Frederick Kisch. At 53, Fred Kisch was much older than most of his colleagues. He had served with distinction during the Great War in Flanders and Mesopotamia and had been a member of the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Leaving the Army shortly afterwards, he joined the Zionist Commission (later the Jewish Agency) in Palestine, becoming its head for the Jerusalem region. His background enabled him to form excellent relationships with the British military authorities and he was one of the few leading Jews to be on good terms with Arab leaders in Jordan and elsewhere. He was both popular and exceptionally capable at his job.
Whilst Galloway and the General Staff at the Advanced HQ focused on planning the forthcoming operation, Miller, Robertson and the Q Staff at the Main and Rear HQs organized dumps for stores, fuel and ammunition. The prevailing feature of the Desert War was the existence of only one metalled road between Tripoli and Alexandria, running parallel to the coast. The Western Desert Railway had reached Mersa Matruh by April 1936 and work began on extending it in October 1940. By November 1941 it had reached Misheifa, 93 miles west of Marsa Matruh, on the escarpment due south of Sidi Barrani, where extensive marshalling yards, loops and spurs were constructed. However, the railhead was still 60 miles from the frontier and the onward journey was by lorry or tanker across the desert. Much of the front could only be reached by rough tracks, including the Advanced HQ near Fort Maddalena.
The plan developed by Cunningham and Galloway involved the advance of both corps, with the defeat of the German armour as the primary objective, followed only once this had happened by the relief of Tobruk and the expulsion of Axis forces from Cyrenaica. The main thrust would come from XXX Corps, substantially an armoured formation and commanded by a cavalryman who was new to the desert, Willoughby Norrie. Its spearhead was 7 Armoured Division, under the command of ‘Strafer’ Gott, one of the most experienced desert leaders and the man who had taken the Support Group across the desert to cut off the Italians at Beda Fomm. Of the division’s two armoured brigades, 22 Armoured Brigade had recently arrived in the Middle East ahead of its original parent, 1 Armoured Division. As it was equipped with the new Crusader cruiser tank, of whose performance hopes ran high and whose name was given to the whole operation, it temporarily replaced 4 Armoured Brigade for the operation. Meanwhile, 7 Armoured Brigade for the most part retained its old A13 tanks. The division’s plan was to drive to the north-west from its positions near Fort Maddalena, to dominate the desert tracks leading to the Axis lines around Gabr Saleh and, by so doing, to bring to battle Rommel’s armour, which it outnumbered. Once it had defeated the panzers, it would take the key German airfield at Sidi Rezegh, south of Tobruk. Additional support would be provided by the two brigades of 1 South African Division and by 22 Guards (Motor) Brigade. In the meantime, 4 Armoured Brigade, equipped with American Stuart light tanks, very fast but lightly armed and armoured, would move forward independently at the same time as and parallel to 7 Armoured Division, but its main task was to provide left flank protection for XIII Corps.
XIII Corps in the north, with its front lying between the escarpment just east of Halfaya Pass and a position opposite a group of fortified Axis positions south-west of Fort Capuzzo known as the Omars, was substantially an infantry formation. It comprised 2 New Zealand and 4 Indian Divisions, supported by 1 Army Tank Brigade, still equipped with Matilda infantry tanks. Its role was to envelop the Axis defences around Bardia and the Omars and, only when the armoured battle had been won, to advance along to coast road towards Tobruk. Its GOC was Reade Godwin-Austen, who had commanded a division under Cunningham in East Africa.
Also included in the plan was the garrison of Tobruk, now consisting of the Polish Carpathian Brigade and 70 Division, which had relieved the Australians. Under the command of Ronald Scobie, it was to hold its position until such time as an opportunity emerged to break out to meet the relieving forces.
The XXX Corps advance began on 18 November and initially achieved complete surprise: 7 Armoured Division made good progress, reaching its objective at Gabr Saleh without being detected. Cunningham was puzzled at the lack of response, but now decided that the larger part of the division, comprising the HQ, 7 Armoured Brigade and the Support Group, should press on to take Sidi Rezegh airfield, detaching 22 Armoured Brigade to deal with an Italian force known to be at Bir Gubi to the west, while 4 Armoured Brigade remained at Gabr Saleh, initially seeing off a German battle group. However, both it and 22 Armoured Brigade suffered significant tank losses in their engagements.
Norrie’s armour was now dangerously dispersed. On 20 November, 15 Panzer Division attacked 4 Armoured Brigade, causing further serious losses, and 22 Armoured Brigade was ordered to assist. The Germans withdrew, but only to join 21 Panzer Division in a combined attack on Sidi Rezegh, where the rest of Gott’s division was drawn into vicious fighting on 21 and 22 November. Although 22 Armoured Brigade and 4 Armoured Brigade arrived at the battle, they lost many tanks in the process and the latter’s HQ was overrun. Not for the last time, the British proved unable to deal with the enemy’s tactics, being all too easily drawn on to the lethal German 88mm anti-tank guns. The British solution to the lack of penetration of their shells at any but the closest range, especially where the Stuarts were concerned, was to charge, usually with disastrous results.
At Cunningham’s Advanced HQ, intelligence on XXX Corps’ activities had been poor, indeed the initial armoured success had led the army commander to believe that all was going well, so much so that he authorized XIII Corps to begin its advance. On 23 November he learnt to his horror that not only had his armour been decimated, but that 5 South African Brigade, coming up behind it, had been destroyed. His flank was now effectively unprotected. Believing that there was no alternative to withdrawal, he ordered the HQ to move back and drafted signals to the corps commanders to do likewise. Galloway, who disagreed strongly with this decision, spoke immediately by phone to Jock Whiteley, Auchinleck’s BGS (Operations), briefing him on the situation and recommending that the C-in-C should fly up as soon as possible, at the same time delaying the order to the HQ staff to move. Cunningham also sent a signal asking for Auchinleck to come immediately.
Whilst waiting for Auchinleck to arrive, Galloway went on his own initiative to Norrie’s HQ, where he met Godwin-Austen. Having described the situation, he asked for the corps commanders’ views. Godwin-Austin was totally against calling off his own operation, whilst Norrie, who was away but spoke to Godwin-Austen by phone, confirmed that he could hold on for at least another day. At the subsequent conference back at Eighth Army HQ, Galloway was asked for his opinion and said firmly that the offensive should continue, offering the corps commanders’ views in support. Auchinleck also saw Miller alone and asked him what he thought of the situation. Miller replied that Eighth Army had the resources to keep going for at least another week, whereas it was his understanding that Rommel was running short of supplies. Auchinleck agreed with the two staff officers and ordered Cunningham to press the attacks both on Sidi Rezegh and on the Axis forces around Tobruk.
Rommel chose this moment to disengage from the battle at Sidi Rezegh and ‘dash to the wire’, his counter-attack on Eighth Army’s lines of communication on the Egyptian frontier. On the morning of 24 November it looked as if he might succeed, as his thrust sent hundreds of British soft-skinned vehicles fleeing back to the frontier in confusion, whilst he also overran XXX Corps HQ, forcing Cunningham, who was visiting it, to leave in undignified haste. However, this allowed Gott time to regroup, whilst the artillery of 4 Indian Division stopped the Germans only a few miles from Robertson’s supply dumps. Cunningham had by now lost Auchinleck’s confidence and was replaced by Neil Ritchie, Auchinleck’s DCGS and also his former BGS at Southern Command in 1940, whilst Auchinleck himself assumed tactical control until the outcome was assured. Although there was much hard fighting to come, in due course the Axis army was forced to retreat and Tobruk was relieved.
Galloway’s role in the moment of crisis during Operation CRUSADER had been vital. It became clear subsequently that Auchinleck, armed with intelligence from ULTRA that the Axis forces were under considerable strain and likely to have to withdraw if the pressure on them could be maintained, was determined to continue. However, it was Galloway’s action in asking for the C-in-C to come up immediately while at the same time delaying the withdrawal of the HQ and canvassing the two corps commanders, which prevented a precipitate retreat and allowed Auchinleck time to take control. Auchinleck was also strengthened in his decision to carry on by the confidence expressed by Miller and Robertson that the supply situation remained good.
Eighth Army’s advance to the west was contested, but the Axis forces were both outnumbered and suffering from severe supply problems and retreated back into Tripolitania. Ritchie remained in command. There were those who thought at the time, and most historians have agreed subsequently, that Auchinleck should have used the brief pause to replace Ritchie, possibly with Godwin-Austen, who had proved his resolve in CRUSADER, possibly with Wilson, or possibly with a completely new commander brought out from the UK. Auchinleck decided against a change, notwithstanding that Ritchie’s reputation was as a staff officer4 and that he had no experience as a field commander,
It was perhaps unfortunate that Galloway immediately took over Ritchie’s job as Deputy Chief of the General Staff at GHQ Middle East, before returning to the UK in the following May to become Director of Staff Duties at the War Office. His successor as BGS at Eighth Army was Harold ‘Dixie’ Redman, who was to have a successful career as a staff officer5 but was probably not what Ritchie needed, especially when Rommel struck back unexpectedly on 21 January 1942. The first formation he encountered was 1 Armoured Division, which was new to the desert, as 22 Armoured Brigade, originally one of its components, was refitting after CRUSADER. David Belchem, a tank man himself, visited the division shortly after it reached the front to see if he could provide it with any assistance and ‘came away with great misgivings’,6 which turned out to be only too well founded. Its GOC, Herbert Lumsden, had been wounded and was temporarily relieved by Frank Messervy, who had no time to get to know his command. Four days into Rommel’s advance it was no longer an effective fighting force. Francis Tuker, Messervy’s replacement at 4 Indian Division, agreed with Godwin-Austen that he should withdraw in good order from his position around Benghazi along the coast road, only to have the latter overruled directly by Ritchie, who ordered Tuker to mount a defence. This proved impracticable and, although the Indians managed to extract themselves without heavy losses, Godwin-Austen, one of the best commanders on the British side, asked to be relieved of his command as he felt that Ritchie had displayed a lack of confidence in him. The highly capable and longstanding BGS of XIII Corps, John Harding, left at much the same time to take up the position of Director of Military Training at GHQ Middle East. Gott replaced Godwin-Austen, whilst his new BGS was a fellow 60th Rifleman, Bobby Erskine.
Rommel’s attack had been opportunistic and successful, but his force remained weakened after CRUSADER and the best he could do was push Ritchie back to a line running south from Gazala, which both sides settled down to fortify.