Monty’s first battle was fought less than three weeks after his arrival, much as he had been briefed by Freddie to expect. Although Rommel would be constrained for space by the Qattara Depression, intelligence from ULTRA, which was received on 17 August, confirmed that he would mount an attack from the southern end of his front in the full moon period at the end of the month, using the traditional right hook. There was subsequent controversy as to whether or not Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith had planned much the same battle, and there is certainly evidence that they realized the vital strategic position of the Alam Halfa Ridge. It is equally clear that, apart from digging defences for a brigade on the ridge, no further action had been taken by the time Monty arrived; indeed, two days beforehand Belchem had found only two Cypriot labour companies there.
Monty immediately assessed the situation and, together with Mainwaring and the Operations team and the recently arrived Horrocks, now commanding XIII Corps, began to make his dispositions. The Alam Halfa Ridge, 12 miles behind and almost at a right angle to the British front line, represented an obstacle to any attempt by the enemy to hook widely in a north-easterly direction and a threat to his left flank if he decided to advance directly to the east. Strongly garrisoned and with artillery and tanks covering the exits, it would constitute a considerable barrier. Monty’s first move was to ask that 44 Division, newly arrived in Egypt, should be sent up immediately to provide the static garrison. There was some resistance from GHQ on the grounds that the division was still untrained, an observation which went down badly with both Monty and Horrocks, as it had been under their command in both XII Corps and South-Eastern Army. Accounts differ as to what happened, with both Monty and Freddie writing subsequently that Monty telephoned Alexander directly, whilst John Harding, still the DCGS, maintained that it was he who had spoken to the C-in-C and obtained his approval for the move. Either way, 44 Division arrived very quickly, Belchem having spent a whole night making the necessary arrangements, and its infantry brigades were positioned on and to the east of the ridge, with both the divisional artillery and additional guns from XIII Corps placed within the divisional perimeter.
The main fighting force, however, came from Eighth Army’s armoured brigades. The most important position, on the south-western end of the ridge, was held by 22 Armoured Brigade, its Grant tanks dug in on broken ground on the slopes, with anti-tank guns concealed on an area of flat ground in front of them. Pip Roberts, the brigade commander, was given explicit instructions to remain in his positions and to resist the temptation to attack if the Germans showed signs of retreating. The Grants of 8 Armoured Brigade were located to the east to forestall any attempt to move around that side of the ridge, and both brigades came under the command of 10 Armoured Division. Meanwhile, 7 Armoured Division, holding the southernmost sector of the front, was instructed to withdraw in the face of an attack, but to harass the attackers as they advanced. Finally, 23 Armoured Brigade, equipped with Valentine infantry tanks, was positioned to the north-west of the ridge to forestall any attempt to reach the sea along the rear of the British front line, as had been tried by Rommel at Gazala.