In Monty’s eyes, his Tac HQs in North Africa, Sicily and Italy had been a great success, allowing him to run his battles from close to the front, where he could be in constant touch with his formation commanders. That this was far from satisfactory to the staff at Main HQ was, if understood at all by Monty, of insufficient concern to cause him to change the arrangements. On the contrary, whereas Tac had been run on a fairly informal basis in the Mediterranean, it now became institutionalized.
One of the last and most junior officers to be summoned back from Italy was Paul Odgers1 at the end of March. When he reported at St Paul’s he was told that he had been selected to form and train Tac, which was already planned to be much larger than its Eighth Army predecessors. Odgers had worked in G (Ops) and had had relatively modest experience of Tac and little personal contact with Monty, but he had evidently caught Freddie’s eye as a capable organizer. He now found himself given all the backing he needed to meet Monty’s requirements.
The role of Tac was, for the first time, given expression in writing in its operational instructions:
2. The primary role of Tac HQ 21 Army Group is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed both as regards the progress of the battle being fought by the forward troops and as regards the general operational picture as seen by Main HQ 21 Army Group.
3. Tac HQ is not executive; that is to say it will not issue orders to Armies. Any verbal instructions given by the Commander-in-Chief will be transmitted to Main HQ where the appropriate branch will be responsible for detailed action and the issue of executive orders as required.
4. By virtue of its primary role Tac HQ will often be in a position to serve as a forward information and liaison centre for Main HQ. All information received by Tac HQ, which is unlikely to reach Main HQ by other channels, will be passed back to Main HQ by W/T or Liaison Officer, or by telephone when available.2
Tac’s major concern was with operations and thus G (Ops), with its G (Liaison) section, was the only staff branch initially represented.3 This would change during the campaign, when there was a significant influx of GSI staff. The other major element of Tac was communications, represented by both Royal Signals and a small Phantom detachment. The balance was made up of Camp and Transport personnel, an infantry platoon and an armoured car troop for defence and a Field Security (later called Counter Intelligence) section. Immediately before D-Day, the numbers of officers* and men in each group were as follows: