The beaches themselves were more difficult than those at Utah, casualties were very high and it was some time before the survivors of 1 and 29 US Divisions had the strength to attack from their precarious positions behind the sea wall. It was mid-morning before they managed to do so, and only then through a combination of weight of numbers, impressive leadership and heroic effort. By nightfall, the perimeter was well short of what was expected. The attackers had managed to get across the coast road, but their hold on the beachhead was still tenuous.

The situation on Second Army’s beaches was better, since 50 Division on Gold, 3 Canadian Division on Juno and 3 Division on Sword, each supported by an armoured brigade and with commandos on their flanks, managed to get ashore with fewer casualties than expected and to move inland to depths of between five and eight miles by the end of D-Day, linking up on the left with 6 Airborne Division.

The only organized counter-attack on D-Day came against the British and Canadians, when 21 Panzer Division attempted to drive a passage to the sea between Juno and Sword. This was repelled by enfilading fire from Allied tanks and artillery, although a garrison held out in the village of Douvres until 17 June. The response by the Germans was otherwise feeble. Neither the Kriegsmarine nor the Luftwaffe made any significant impact on the progress of the Allied armada and, whilst the former managed to mount some E-Boat attacks subsequently, the latter continued to be more notable by its absence. Most importantly, Hitler did not sanction the release of Panzer Group West, with its powerful 12 SS Panzer and Panzer Lehr Divisions, until the afternoon of D-Day. By that time, with Allied air superiority making movement in daylight very dangerous, it was too late to make any impression on the landings.

The lodgements were consolidated over the next few days, notably at Omaha, and by 10 June there was a continuous Allied front. Caen, however, the capture of which had been a D-Day objective, remained firmly in German hands. Monty was not interested in the capture of ‘trophy’ towns and cities, but Caen was fundamental to his strategy. It was a key communications centre, but also, more importantly, the hinge around which he planned to build his front in the east, drawing in the German armoured divisions and destroying them there whilst the Americans cleared the Cotentin Peninsula, captured Cherbourg and prepared for a break-out.

The British and Canadian failure to take Caen on D-Day was due partly to the presence of 21 Panzer Division, but also to a strong inclination by some of the attackers, once they were ashore, to dig in rather than press on. The 2nd Battalion King’s Shropshire Light Infantry nevertheless advanced towards the city, but its armoured support failed to materialize. It came tantalisingly close, but had to withdraw after sustaining heavy losses. Further attacks were mounted on 7 and 8 June but were repulsed, and it became clear that the Germans on the direct approach were too strong.

Monty now adopted the alternative tactic of envelopment, using two of his old Eighth Army formations, 7 Armoured and 51 Highland Divisions. He wanted to incorporate into the operation an airborne assault by 1 Airborne Division south of Caen, but to his fury this was vetoed by Leigh-Mallory. On 12 June, however, it seemed that 7 Armoured Division had found a hole in the German line. Undertaking a wide right hook from north of Tilly-sur-Seulles, it approached the town of Villers-Bocage from the west. Villers-Bocage was well behind the German front line and commanded one of the main roads leading south-west from Caen, which would have been seriously threatened by its capture. The division was, however, on its own: 50 Division, the third of Monty’s desert formations, was intended to attack in support, but found its way blocked by the Panzer Lehr Division and made no progress.

Entering Villers-Bocage in the lead, the County of London Yeomanry had the misfortune to encounter a detachment led by Hauptmann Michael Wittman, whose Tiger tanks rampaged along their column, wreaking enormous damage. The detachment destroyed up to 14 tanks, most of which were accounted for by Wittman himself, a similar number of carriers and half-tracks and two anti-tank guns. The attack ground to a halt in confusion and, lacking support, 7 Armoured Division was forced to beat an undignified retreat with significant further losses. Carol Mather, who was the unlucky LO sent to the division at the time, described Villers-Bocage as ‘a death trap’, and it was certainly the scene of a major setback. The Germans rapidly closed the gap in their line and also easily repulsed a left hook mounted by 51 Division from 6 Airborne Division’s area. Until further reinforcements arrived, Monty lacked the resources for another initiative.

The separation of Main HQ from Tac and the fighting troops began to make an immediate impact. Freddie was in daily touch with Monty by scrambler phone, but his responsibilities included not only controlling the work of Main itself, now at full stretch in all branches, but also acting as 21st Army Group’s principal contact with Eisenhower, Ramsay and Leigh-Mallory. It was usually important that he remained at Southwick, close to SHAEF and the Allied Naval HQ, rather than being absent on visits across the Channel. For his visits to Tac, however, he was much helped by being allocated his own C-47 by Eisenhower. On these occasions he greatly enlivened the discussions in Monty’s mess, so much so that when he was not there the personal staff were ordered to talk more.

Freddie’s inability to spend much time in the battle area meant that it was vital that his own liaison officers should function extremely effectively. There were resident LOs at each army, Bigland at First US Army, Major H. T. N. Batchelor, another Eighth Army ‘old boy’, at Second Army and Major W. A. Fife at First Canadian Army, as soon as it had landed in July. In addition to these, Llewellyn had up to a dozen other officers, both British and American, available to make trips to armies in the field and to man the Information Room at Main. These appointments tended to be temporary, often officers resting from or preparing to return to the front, but all of them battle-experienced. If he had time, Llewellyn would induct them himself, going across to Normandy on a number of occasions. He also ran a small number of staff lieutenants as couriers of ‘Officers only’ despatches.

It was clearly important that the fighting formations should not be swamped by LOs, so those from Main HQ were not usually allowed to visit subordinate HQs directly, but instead required to obtain their information from three sources. Two of these were at the Army HQs, the first of which was the Resident LO, to whom they were obliged to report and by whom they were briefed. In his absence their first point of contact was the GSO3 (Ops), followed by other branches as appropriate. The second source of information was the respective Army’s own liaison officers, on their return from corps and divisions. The third was Tac itself, in its capacity as a forward information and liaison centre for Main, each LO being obliged to include it in his itinerary. The information sought was essentially the same as that requested by Eighth Army in Italy, but the priorities were explicitly spelt out. These were the army commander’s intentions and future plans, the line of the forward troops, the enemy reaction on land, the enemy reaction in the air and the situation of the supporting arms. In addition, each LO was required to return with a trace of the Army Operations Room map.

The organization of Main HQ LO visits to the operational area was made more difficult by their having to cross the Channel each time. A Naval Despatch Boat shuttle service was set up immediately between Whale Island, Portsmouth, and Gold Beach, leaving and arriving five times in each 24 hours, but taking seven hours for the crossing. At least one LO returned for each of the twice daily situation reports at Main at 08.00 and 20.00. The time spent on travel was highly unsatisfactory, but matters improved as soon as the opening of airfields permitted a good air service. Now LOs could leave Main daily at 17.30, arriving at Tac at 19.30, spend the next day on their visits and catch a return flight at 10.00 on the following day, arriving back at Main at 12.30. Each one produced a handwritten report, but urgent information could be communicated from the relevant Army HQ by scrambler phone or in cipher by W/T.

Llewellyn’s other function, which he carried out for the remainder of the campaign, was to identify and requisition suitable sites for Main and Rear HQs in the field. His first visit to France began on the evening of D-Day itself, when he travelled over to Normandy in an MTB with Colonel Jones, the Main HQ Camp Commandant, Wing Commander Spencer from Second Tactical Air Force and three others. They arrived at dawn on the following morning, making them the first officers of any of 21st Army Group’s HQs to set foot in France. They spent several days looking for sites, by which time the beachhead had expanded significantly, and eventually settled on one at Le Tronquay, southwest of Bayeux. Llewellyn had been instructed by Freddie to obtain Monty’s approval and duly went to Tac to obtain it. Monty queried whether the site might be within range of enemy artillery and suggested two alternatives, both of which, as Llewellyn reminded him, had been allocated for other functions. In the end, Monty grudgingly conceded, but on his return to Main, Llewellyn was told by Freddie that he had been banned from visiting Tac in the future. He asked Gannon if he could obtain a transfer, but was told that he was too valuable to move.

The restrictions on travel under which Freddie laboured did not apply with quite the same force to other senior officers at Main. Belchem and Williams flew over to see Monty almost every day and Williams sometimes stayed on for several days. He was impressed by how well informed Monty was on operations through the reports of his LOs, but felt he should have better access to intelligence. After a few weeks he and Monty decided that Tac HQ should have its own ULTRA reading capability, and Joe Ewart was attached to it for this purpose for the rest of the campaign. Others were summoned at need, including Graham to discuss administrative issues and White to resolve communications problems. Gannon travelled by MTB to consult with Monty in person on 14 and 15 June. He had been hard at work since D-Day providing new unit commanding officers and formation commanders. On one single day, for instance, Monty required replacements for eight COs and two brigade commanders who had been killed or wounded. Whilst the attrition did not continue at this pace every day, the demand remained heavy throughout the Normandy campaign, especially for infantry officers. On 24 June Gannon was asked to provide a new GOC for 3 Division as Tom Rennie had been wounded. Monty asked for Lashmer Whistler, a brigade commander who had already been earmarked for another job; his posting was rapidly changed.

In the first weeks of the campaign Charles Richardson doubled up as both BGS (Plans), which required him to issue a series of appreciations on the current position and the options to be entertained for the future, and 21st Army Group’s Liaison Officer to the Allied Expeditionary Air Force. It was the latter job which consumed most of his time, and he had his own caravan parked in the grounds of Bentley Priory at Stanmore. He thus took part in a series of conferences at which all the ‘air barons’ were present, including not only Leigh-Mallory, who was supposed to coordinate their activities, but also Tedder, in his capacity as Deputy Supreme Commander with specific responsibility for air matters, Coningham, the AOC-in-C of Second Tactical Air Force, the AOC-in-Cs of Bomber and Coastal Commands and the Commanding Generals of the US Strategic, Eighth and Ninth Air Forces. Few of these men rated Leigh-Mallory very highly, partly because his background was in fighters, whereas most of them were experts in either bombing or tactical support, and partly because his stance was perceived as too close to that of the army. Richardson described them as ‘this incomparable collection of prima donnas’,¹ who could be relied on to air their own prejudices in any context.

Leigh-Mallory was genuinely disposed to be helpful to 21st Army Group, although his refusal to countenance landings by 1 Airborne Division in support of Monty’s plan to encircle Caen² resulted in a temporary rupture in the relationship, partially repaired a few days later when, on a visit to Tac, he offered to support the army with medium bombers. On the other hand, both Tedder and Coningham were beginning to complain about the inability of 21st Army Group to secure the key German airfields around Caen, notably at Carpiquet. This demonstrated a failure to understand that, if Monty was successful at Caen, the airfields would follow, and that in the meantime their full cooperation was required. It also downplayed the fact that army engineers and specialist RAF units were building and commissioning airfields all over the British sector, with ten delivered by the end of June and a further seven by the end of July.

At Second Army HQ some of these disagreements began to affect army/air cooperation, largely because Coningham was inclined to impose his own views. Relations between Dempsey and Harry Broadhurst, now commanding 83 Group RAF in support of Second Army, had been difficult in Sicily but were now cordial. On the other hand, the lack of operational experience at the HQ resulted in a less than optimal performance and Richardson was seconded to Dempsey for a week to sort it out. Within that time he managed to arrange matters so that the high levels of mutual understanding considered normal at Eighth Army were now also inculcated into Second Army, resulting in a much improved level of ground support.

Broadhurst, for his part, never thought that the lack of airfields was a major problem and neither did his American counterpart, Major General Pete Quesada. Broadhurst’s relationship with Coningham was as frosty as it had been in North Africa, so it was fortunate for him that Coningham refused to relocate to Normandy on the grounds that most of his forces were compelled to remain in England. Moreover, Coningham’s jealousy of Monty, which had developed in the Middle East, where in his opinion Eighth Army received all the credit and the air forces very little, was affecting his judgement. In these circumstances it was easy for Monty to justify dealing with the RAF primarily through Broadhurst, leaving Freddie to act as the main channel of communication with Coningham.

Although the great majority of those in Main and Rear HQs remained in England, a number of officers and men moved over to Normandy in small parties early in the campaign, an example being a detachment to work with Second Army’s Chief Engineer on Works Services. Monty’s senior advisers on the various arms, Dennis, Inglis and Richards, also had to be on the ground as much as possible. Richards flew over a few days after the landings and established his own small HQ in the area selected by Llewellyn. Thereafter he spent his days visiting both formation HQs and individual units and assessing the performance of the latter and their equipment, reporting back to Main, but seeing Monty on a number of occasions. The issues about the overall inferiority of the Allied tanks relative to their German opponents were much as they had been in Sicily, except that, and partly as a result of Richards’s representations to Monty at that time, all armoured regiments now had a troop in each squadron of Sherman Firefly or Challenger tanks, with their excellent 17-pounder guns.³ The specialized AFVs in 79 Division, led by Monty’s brother-in-law Percy Hobart, had performed extremely effectively, and Richards was especially pleased with the performance of the amphibious DD tanks. Like many others, however, he was concerned about the inability of any of the tanks to tackle the bocage country with its seemingly impenetrable banked-up hedgerows. The problem was in due course at least partly resolved by welding on a device at the front of a number of tanks, then known as ‘Rhinos’, which enabled them to drive gaps through the banks.

Administratively, the work done in preparation for the invasion proved to have been well planned. In the initial stages three beach areas were formed, one under XXX Corps and two under I Corps. So that the two corps did not have to look over their shoulders, No. 11 Lines of Communication Area, including an advanced HQ of 21st Army Group Q (Movements & Transportation), assumed the direction of these on D+5 under the command of Second Army. The original intention was for 21st Army Group Lines of Communication to take over on D+18, but the lack of progress in expanding the beachhead meant that this was delayed until D+37. In the meantime, BUCO, MOVCO and TURCO all functioned smoothly and supplies and reinforcements arrived on schedule over the first two weeks. As soon as they were firmly established the two corps immediately formed their own Field Maintenance Centres, augmented by those of other corps as they arrived. Two Army Roadheads were established, one for Second Army, the other for First Canadian Army once it had moved to France. These were later folded into the Rear Maintenance Area for the British sector, which was laid out in a huge area along the roads radiating from Bayeux and operated under the direct control of 21st Army Group.

The capture of Port-en-Bessin on D+1 provided a welcome surprise. The little port was both substantially undamaged and found to have a greater capacity than expected. It was capable of taking tankers with a draught of 14 feet, making it ideal for bulk petrol discharge and storage as well as mixed cargo. The first mixed cargo was unloaded on D+5 and the first bulk petrol on D+19. In the meantime, work began on the construction of pipelines into both the British and American sectors.

By D+4 the first of the concrete caissons for MULBERRY B, the artificial harbour in the British sector, had been dropped into position, and on the following day there were sufficient in place for craft to discharge on to the beach in sheltered water. They were followed by blockships to complete the artificial breakwaters. Preliminary work began on the two prefabricated piers, which were towed across the English Channel. One was for the discharge of stores from conventional ships, the other for the unloading of LSTs. On 19 June, however, before they could be fully commissioned, disaster struck. The worst Channel storm ever recorded blew up and lasted for three full days. A large number of ships were driven on to the shore and MULBERRY B was badly damaged, whilst MULBERRY A in the American sector was effectively destroyed. However, it was immediately cannibalized to repair MULBERRY B, which began to take stores ships on 23 June, but could not accept LSTs until as late as 17 July. First US Army was compelled to land all its requirements over open beaches until Cherbourg could be made available. It did this so effectively that it actually produced better results than the British MULBERRY/beach combination.

The storm had a considerable impact on operations. Unloading was severely disrupted and, whilst a good reserve of POL had been built up, there was already a shortage of field artillery ammunition by the time it began, and it was only by changing the priority away from tank and AA ammunition, both of which had seen far less usage than expected, that the stocks could be restored. This was vital, as Monty was poised to launch a major operation which would require significant artillery support.

Operation EPSOM, launched on 25 June, was similar to the attack on Villers-Bocage in that it involved a right hook from the western side of the British front. However, it did not have the same primary objective, to envelop Caen. Whilst this might be achieved if success allowed its exploitation, Monty’s main purpose was to continue to draw the German panzer divisions on to the British front. With Cherbourg about to fall, he considered that this would allow Bradley to push south more readily from the base of the Cotentin Peninsula.

EPSOM was carried out largely by Dick O’Connor’s VIII Corps, comprising 11 Armoured, 15 Scottish and 43 Wessex Divisions, all of which were untested in action. The corps’ arrival had been delayed for 48 hours by the Channel storm and it was not until 25 June that all the divisions were in position. On that day an attack was mounted by 49 Division in the neighbouring XXX Corps, with the objective of pushing back the Panzer Lehr Division and creating a buffer on the right of VIII Corps. On the following day VIII Corps itself advanced, led by 15 Division. The Scots made good progress at first, but even with the support of 11 Armoured Division, they were unable to reach their immediate objective, the River Odon at Tourville. On the following day, however, whilst 43 Division moved up on the left, 15 Division managed to capture one of the bridges over the river, allowing 11 Armoured Division to create a small bridgehead on 29 June and to seize the strategically important Hill 112, which not only dominated the Odon Valley but also overlooked the Orne Valley to its east. A furious counterattack by II Panzer Corps ensued, and Dempsey, fearful of another and even stronger attack on one of the flanks, ordered withdrawal, which was in hindsight a great mistake as no such attack was planned and valuable ground was lost unnecessarily. Monty called an end to the operation on 30 June.

In one way EPSOM succeeded in its objective, as Second Army had attracted no fewer than seven panzer divisions on to its front west of Caen. However, First US Army had not been able to take advantage of their absence to begin its thrust southwards, so the only immediate result was a new salient. Caen itself had not been seriously threatened, but if nothing else the operation had demonstrated that the former Home Forces Divisions were, for all their lack of experience, more effective than their ex-Eighth Army counterparts.

Although Monty himself believed that his strategy was bringing results, he could no longer completely ignore the criticism which it was attracting. This came from a number of quarters, led by senior officers at SHAEF, notably Tedder and Freddie Morgan, the former COSSAC, but also in the US Army, although Bradley himself remained conspicuously loyal. There was also unease both in Downing Street and at the War Office. Monty realized that there was no alternative to a frontal attack on Caen, but he wished this to be accomplished with the minimum of casualties, as it was by now clear that the attrition of manpower in Second Army could not be afforded at the rate experienced over the previous four weeks. The last three British divisions, Guards Armoured, 53 Welsh and 59 Staffordshire, had now arrived and, subject only to room being found for them in the severely crowded beachhead, 2 Canadian, 4 Canadian Armoured and the Polish Armoured Divisions were due to follow. After that, the barrel would have to be scraped for reinforcements.

The need to conserve manpower if at all possible meant that any attack on Caen would have to rely heavily on bombarding the defenders, using artillery, naval guns and, if at all possible, air power. Richardson was sent to Stanmore to plead the case for the last of these, receiving initially no commitment at all from the ‘air barons’. Appealing to Tedder, he was advised to see ‘Bomber’ Harris at his HQ at High Wycombe. Having discovered why Richardson was there, Harris sent for Air Vice Marshal Bennettt of the Pathfinder Force to ask whether he thought it possible. Bennett confirmed that his men could do it and he and Richardson immediately produced an outline plan. To Richardson’s astonishment, Harris then suggested that he should have a good dinner in London before crossing to France and lent him his Bentley for the evening.

Operation CHARNWOOD opened on the night of 7 July, when 467 bombers dropped 2,560 tons of bombs on the northern suburbs of Caen. On the following morning, John Crocker’s 1 Corps began its advance into the city, with 59 Division in the centre, 3 Division on the left and 3 Canadian Division on the right. Over two days’ hard fighting the Germans were pushed back across the Orne, where they remained entrenched. The northern half of the city had been taken, but only by wreaking devastation, the victims of which were largely the remaining citizens. Richardson, who visited shortly afterwards, found the impact of the bombing disappointing, and this was confirmed by a RAF survey conducted in the immediate aftermath. The morale of the troops had been lifted, but the fighting had been just as intense as ever; indeed, the ruined buildings were ideal for defenders. Rather more important was the capture of the large airfield at Carpiquet, which Tedder and Coningham had been calling for so volubly since D-Day. Its possession, however, was not about to silence them or Monty’s many other critics.