AS THE BRITISH were extending their dominions in India and then led the grab for China, France focused on its holdings in Indochina and the Russian Empire pushed into China from the north. During this time there was no Germany yet that could have joined this movement of European powers, which also included Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands among its active protagonists. Prussia followed global politics attentively and waited for an opportunity to catch up. The economic theory that overseas colonies were essential for the prosperity of the homeland had taken hold in every European country able to devote attention to events beyond its borders. Enticed by what already seemed like China’s infinite market potential, Prussia built its own East Asia squadron and sent it to the Far East in 1860.
The Bay of Kiautschou (Jiaozhou), further north than the havens of the Portuguese in Macao and the British in Hong Kong yet closer to the capital, Beijing, soon caught the Prussians’ interest. Yet the time for a takeover was not yet ripe. The Prussians first signed commercial treaties with China and Japan in 1861. The pact with China required mediation by the British and French, as the Chinese saw no reason to become involved with such an insignificant country.17 In 1868 and 1871 Ferdinand von Richthofen was sent to reconnoitre the region; he also recommended the Bay of Kiautschou as a suitable naval base.
After the founding of the German Empire in 1871 the government continued Prussia’s efforts to catch up, especially with the British, in the race for colonies.
The search for a good gateway to China comparable to the British crown colony of Hong Kong continued for several years. After the Sino–Japanese Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 the Germans blocked the cession of Liaodong to Japan in the hope that China would return the favour by granting Germany its own commercial and military base on the mainland. When that hope went unfulfilled, German policymakers, under pressure from industrial leaders, decided to use force.
Near Shanghai north of Wusong in 1896, German cruisers steamed up the Huangpu River and anchored in the Yangtse River at Nanjing, where German military advisors had been attacked. After negotiations with local authorities had been completed and Germany’s demands met, the cruiser Prinzess Wilhelm continued further up the river, all the way to Hangkow, where such a large, let alone foreign, ship had never before been seen. That same year Admiral Tirpitz, himself a former commander of the East Asia Squadron, inspected the Bay of Kiautschou up close; next year the Bay of Samsah on the coast of Fujian Province opposite Taiwan was also considered. Yet the final choice was Kiautschou, not least because coal could be mined in the vicinity of this secure harbour. An excuse to forcibly occupy the bay presented itself soon afterwards.18
Following the French Jesuits, who had been under state protection since the seventeenth century, all Roman Catholic missionaries in China were placed under French protection at the end of the eighteenth century. Therefore the first German missionaries of the Verbi Dei Society, also known as the Steyler Mission, had to enter China with French passports. Given the rivalries among European states at the time, that solution appealed neither to the missionaries nor the German authorities. Following negotiations among all concerned parties, the Vatican agreed to place the Steyler missionaries under the protection of Germany. The transfer of authority took place in June 1890. The first challenge was not long in coming.
On 1 November 1897 two Steyler missionaries, Fathers Franz Nies and Richard Henle, were attacked and killed by members of the ‘Broadsword Association’ (dadaohui) in a village called Zhangjiazhuang. The German emperor Wilhelm II used the incident as an excuse to occupy Kiautschou Bay. The Chinese government had not even been informed of the matter when the East Asia Squadron was ordered to take the bay.
German marines landed on 14 November. The Chinese made no attempts to fight back. During the ensuing negotiations the Germans refused to leave Chinese territory. While xenophobic sentiment stemming from these recurring violations of national sovereignty escalated among a Chinese population that decried these incidents as insulting, the government in Beijing again found itself unable to effectively resist the Europeans’ demands. China therefore agreed to pay the costs for damage to Catholic churches and replace the German missionaries’ stolen property. The churches were also to be clearly marked by plaques stating that they were protected by the Emperor of China.
The Germans also made sure that a governor who was particularly hostile to the foreigners, Li Bingheng, was demoted, with the assurance that this man would never again hold political office in which he could promote his personal beliefs. More important for the Germans, of course, were the greater aims of the talks. After issuing an ultimatum the Germans were allowed to lease an area of 552 sq.km in the Bay of Kiautschou, including large and small islands, for 99 years. Soon afterward Germany officially declared the ‘German Protectorate of Kiautschou.’ The Chinese side transferred authority within the leased areas to Germany.
In addition the new colonial masters were granted a concession to mine coal in the region. To transport it they demanded and received the right to build two railways. Mining was permitted within a corridor of 15 km on either side of the railway between the cities of Tsingtao and Jinan. A neutral area of 50 km around the bay was declared a buffer zone that German troops could enter freely. Any Chinese administrative activity there would have to be approved first by the Germans. The treaty was ratified on 6 March 1898.
Germany’s European rivals soon followed up with their own demands for Chinese concessions. Russia received Port Arthur, while the British obtained 99-year leases on Weihai in the northeast and the ‘New Territories’ on the mainland side of their colony Hong Kong. Guangzhouwan, a bay in southern China, was leased to France for 99 years.
One year later the German patrons of the Steyler missionaries responded to a new challenge from the enraged local population. The incident also plainly exposed the close ties between missionaries and economic interests. While on a tour of various Christian congregations in southern Shandong Province, in November 1898 a priest named Georg M. Stenz became involved in a local disturbance apparently sparked by misdeeds of Chinese converts. The demonstrators captured and assaulted the priest, who was released only after Chinese authorities intervened two days later, and taken to Tsingtao for medical treatment.
The German Catholic bishop in Kiautschou first tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Chinese governor of Jinanfu to pay compensation. The next administrative level, in Rizhao, likewise refused to respond. Finally talks opened with the Chinese administrative head of South Shandong, who was basically well-disposed to the missionaries. The two sides agreed on a generous compensation payment and prosecution of all those involved in the attack on Father Stenz. In addition the bureaucrat in Rizhao was ordered to apologize solemnly. That would have been the end of the matter had the Germans not sent a punitive expedition to Rizhao in spring 1899, in which the by-then-recovered Father Stenz took an active part.
When several political parties in Germany sharply criticized the expedition, a report by the German governor of Kiautschou, Paul Jaeschke, came to its defence, saying he had ‘considered the expedition necessary for purely economic reasons’.19 The operation’s purpose had been to intimidate the Chinese and help assert Germany’s interests more quickly. Jaeschke’s justification suggests that the colonial authorities, whether military or civilian, rather greeted the extremely provocative behaviour of some missionaries and Chinese converts. The explosions of rage among the Chinese people, who felt their traditions and customs had been deeply insulted, seem to have been welcome pretexts for the colonialists to flex their military muscle and soften the Chinese up for even more demands.20