1. When the consuls Lucius Postumius Albinus and Marcus Popillius Laenas brought the disposition of provinces and armies before the Senate, both men were assigned to Liguria. They were also directed to conscript troops: two new legions of Roman citizens apiece and 10,000 infantry and 600 cavalry from the Latin and Italian allies to use in governing their province, as well as reinforcements for Spain consisting of 3,000 Roman infantry and 200 cavalry. In addition, they were instructed to draft 1,500 Roman infantry and 100 cavalry for the praetor assigned to Sardinia; he was to take these and cross over to Corsica and conduct the military operations there. In the interim the former praetor, Marcus Atilius, would continue to govern Sardinia.
Then the praetors drew lots for their areas of responsibility: Aulus Atilius Serranus drew urban jurisdiction, and Gaius Cluvius Saxula jurisdiction involving Romans and foreigners; Numerius Fabius Buteo drew Nearer Spain, and Gaius Matienus Farther Spain; Marcus Furius Crassipes drew Sicily, and Gaius Cicereius Sardinia.
Before the magistrates set out for their provinces, the Senate agreed that the consul Lucius Postumius should go to Campania to establish boundaries between public and private land. It was well known that some individuals had gradually encroached on the former and were now treating it as their own.*
Postumius had a grudge against the citizens of Praeneste* for not having honoured him publicly or privately when he had gone as a private citizen to sacrifice at their temple of Fortuna. So before he set out from Rome, he sent a dispatch to Praeneste: the chief magistrate was to meet him along the way, to provide, at public expense, a place for him to stay, and to supply pack animals upon his departure. Before this consul, no one was ever an expense or a burden to the allies in any way.* Magistrates were supplied with pack animals and tents and all other military equipment expressly so that they would not make such demands on the allies. They did partake of private hospitality, which they cultivated readily and graciously; and they hosted at Rome the people who customarily lodged them when they were on the road.* Envoys on emergency business might require a single mule from the towns through which they had to travel, but the allies incurred no other cost because of Roman magistrates. Even if the consul’s wrath was justified, he should not have vented it during his magistracy. At the same time, the passivity of the Praenestini, whether born of too much restraint or too much fear, in effect gave Roman magistrates the right to make increasingly burdensome demands, as if this precedent conferred legitimacy on them.
2. At the beginning of this year, the ambassadors who had been sent to Aetolia and Macedonia* reported that they had not been able to meet with Perseus: they had been told by some people that he was away while others claimed with equal falsity that he was ill. Just the same, it had been readily apparent that preparations for war were under way and that the king would no longer postpone recourse to arms. Also, factional strife among the Aetolians was intensifying by the day, and the ambassadors had not been able to use their authority to bring to heel the instigators of the dissension.
With war against Macedonia on the horizon, it was decided to expiate all prodigies and to use the prayers prescribed in the oracular books to seek reconciliation with the gods before hostilities could begin. It was reported that at Lanuvium a vision of an enormous fleet had been seen in the heavens, and at Privernum dark-coloured wool had sprouted from the ground; at Remens in the Veientine district there had been a shower of stones; the whole of the Pomptine area had been enveloped in clouds—so to speak—of locusts; and ploughing anywhere in the Gallic territory had turned up fish in the freshly dug soil. These were the prodigies for which the oracular books were consulted. The decemvirs decreed which victims should be offered to which gods. Their decree further called for a supplication to expiate the prodigies, and another prayer (following the one of the previous year) for the health of the people, and a festival. These ceremonies took place in accordance with the decemvirs’ written instructions.
3. It was this year also that the temple of Juno Lacinia was stripped of its roof. Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, the censor, was building a temple for Fortuna Equestris that he had vowed* when fighting against the Celtiberi during his praetorship in Spain. Driven by competitive zeal, he wanted his temple to be larger and more magnificent than any other in Rome. Thinking that marble roof-tiles would be a great adornment to the temple, he went to Bruttium and stripped the temple of Juno Lacinia of half its roof—calculating that this would suffice to cover the one he was constructing. The ships for loading and transporting the tiles were standing by, and his authority as censor deterred the terrified allies from preventing the sacrilege.
When Fulvius returned to Rome, the tiles were unloaded from the ships and carried to the temple. Despite the silence surrounding their origin, it could not be kept secret. There was an uproar in the Curia, and on all sides the cry went out that the consuls should bring the matter before the Senate for a formal discussion. When the censor responded to the summons to the Curia, one and all attacked him to his face with greater venom for thinking that the only proper way to desecrate the most sacred temple in the area—one which neither Pyrrhus nor Hannibal* had desecrated—was to strip the roof and leave the temple practically ruined. Fulvius had removed the tiles and left the untiled sub-roof open to the eroding force of the rain. And this was a man who had been appointed censor to regulate others’ conduct? He had been charged to enforce the maintenance of public shrines and to <…> places that were supposed to be protected in accordance with ancestral custom? Fulvius, the one who wandered about the towns of the allies, ruining their temples and exposing the sub-roofs of sacred buildings? Treating the allies’ homes in this fashion would be outrage enough, but he was wrecking temples of the immortal gods! Building temples from the ruins of temples, he brought sacrilege on the Roman people—as if the immortal gods were not the same everywhere, as if it were right for some to be worshipped and honoured with the spoils of others!
Although the sentiments of the senators were apparent before the matter was put to a vote, when it was they voted unanimously that the roof-tiles should be taken back and reinstalled and that sacrifices should be offered to appease Juno. The religious ceremony was carried out carefully; but the contractors who returned the tiles reported that they had been left in the temple precinct since no artisan could devise a way to reattach them.
4. Among the praetors who had departed for provinces abroad Numerius Fabius died at Massilia, while travelling to Nearer Spain. When messengers from Massilia brought the news, the Senate decided that his predecessors, Publius Furius and Gnaeus Servilius, should determine by lot which of them would stay on in Spain with an extended command. The fortunate outcome of the lot was that Publius Furius, who had been in charge of the province previously, remained there.
That same year the Senate decreed that the land captured in Ligurian and Gallic territory should be divided up into individual plots since much of it was unoccupied. In accordance with the Senate’s decree, the urban praetor, Aulus Atilius, appointed a commission of ten men: Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, Gaius Cassius, Titus Aebutius Parrus, Gaius Tremellius, Publius Cornelius Cethegus, Quintus and Lucius Appuleius, Marcus Caecilius, Gaius Salonius, and Gaius Munatius. They distributed ten iugera to each citizen and three iugera to the Latin allies.
At the same time these matters were going on, there arrived at Rome ambassadors from Aetolia with news of internal quarrels and upheaval, and ambassadors from Thessaly bringing word about events in Macedonia.
5. Perseus was turning over in his mind the war that Philip had planned before his death. By sending embassies and making promises (without actually acting on them), Perseus was ingratiating himself with all the Greek peoples and cities. Moreover, a large segment of the population was sympathetic to him. In fact, they tended to prefer him to Eumenes, although all the cities of Greece and most of the leading men were bound to Eumenes by his gifts and benefactions, and he ruled in such a way that the cities under his control did not wish to exchange their position for that of any free state.
Perseus, by contrast, was rumoured to have killed his wife with his own hand after the death of his father; further, as for Apelles,* once he had been Perseus’ confederate in the assassination of his brother, and for that reason Philip sought to bring him to justice. Apelles went into exile, but was summoned back after Philip’s death and promised great rewards for having done such a deed; then Perseus secretly had him killed. Besides, although Perseus was notorious for many assassinations, of both Macedonians and foreigners, and lacked any commendable quality, the cities generally favoured him over King Eumenes, who was pious to his relatives, just to his subjects, and generous to all. They may have been swayed by the reputation and grandeur of the Macedonian kings and scorned the newly created kingdom,* or perhaps they desired a change of circumstances, or perhaps they did not wish to become subject to the Romans.
The Aetolians, moreover, were not the only ones in internal conflict because of a crushing weight of debt; the case was the same with the Thessalians.* And this evil, like a contagious disease, had also spread to Perrhaebia. When it was reported that the Thessalians were in arms, the Senate sent Appius Claudius as an envoy to assess the situation and resolve it. First he rebuked the leaders of both sides. Then, with the acquiescence of the creditors, who had encumbered their loans with unfair interest rates, he reduced the debt load and made the legally owed amount payable in instalments over ten years. Appius also resolved the problems in Perrhaebia in the same way. Meanwhile, at Delphi, Marcus Marcellus listened to the arguments of the Aetolians, who argued as fiercely as they had engaged in civil war. Perceiving that the two parties were well matched in recklessness and effrontery, he was not inclined to issue a decree to lessen or increase the burden for either side; rather, he sought from both that they stop fighting, resolve their quarrels, and then put the whole matter behind them. Confidence in the reconciliation was strengthened on both sides by an exchange of hostages; by mutual agreement these were to be kept at Corinth.
6. After the conference with the Aetolians at Delphi, Marcellus crossed to Aegium in the Peloponnese where he had convened a meeting with the Achaeans. After commending them for holding fast to their old decree banning the Macedonian kings from crossing their borders, he emphasized the Romans’ hatred of Perseus. Wishing to fan the flames of this, Eumenes came to Rome, bringing with him a report he had compiled from an investigation into Perseus’ military preparations. At the same time five ambassadors were sent to the king to assess the state of affairs in Macedonia. The same men were directed to go on to see Ptolemy in Alexandria and renew the alliance with him. These ambassadors were Gaius Valerius, Gnaeus Lutatius Cerco, Quintus Baebius Sulca, Marcus Cornelius Mammula, and Marcus Caecilius Denter.
Around the same time ambassadors came from King Antiochus. Their leader, one Apollonius, was granted an audience with the Senate. He gave many valid reasons for the king’s tardy payment of tribute,* and he explained that he had brought all of it with him so that the king need be granted no special treatment other than the graceperiod. Moreover, he had also brought a gift of gold vases weighing 500 pounds; the king sought, he said, to renew for himself the alliance and treaty that had existed with his father and to request the Roman people to ask of him whatever should be required of a king who was a good and loyal ally; he would stop at nothing in the execution of his duty. During Antiochus’ stay in Rome,* Apollonius added, the Senate had treated him so honourably and the young men with such kindness that in all levels of society he had been regarded as a king and not a hostage.
The embassy was favourably received, and the urban praetor Aulus Atilius was directed to renew with Antiochus the alliance that had been in effect with his father. The urban quaestors accepted the tribute, and the censors took the gold vases, which they were charged with placing in whichever temples they thought appropriate. The ambassador was sent a gift of 100,000 asses,* and he was granted a house without rent where he could be a guest, with his expenses taken care of while he remained in Italy. (The envoys who had been in Syria had announced that he was highly esteemed by the king and most favourably disposed to the Roman people.)
7. The provincial activities of the year were as follows. Gaius Cicereius, the praetor in Corsica,* fought a pitched battle in which 7,000 Corsicans were killed and more than 1,700 captured. During the battle the praetor vowed a temple to Juno Moneta. The Corsicans subsequently sued for peace and were assessed 200,000 pounds of wax. Having subjugated Corsica, Cicereius crossed over to Sardinia.
Fighting also took place in Liguria outside Carystus, a town in the territory of the Statellates where a large army of Ligures had gathered. When the consul Marcus Popillius first approached, they stayed within the walls, but once they perceived that the Roman was about to attack the town, they marched out and drew up their battle line before the gates. This had been the consul’s aim in threatening the assault, and he began it immediately. The battle went on for more than three hours with no prospect of victory on either side. When the consul realized that the Ligurian standards were holding on every front, he ordered the cavalry to mount and make a simultaneous three-pronged push to create maximum chaos. A sizeable group of horsemen forced back the middle of the line and drove behind the ranks. Then, thrown into panic, the Ligures turned and fled in every direction. The Roman cavalry had concentrated on blocking the route into the town, and only a very few Ligures slipped through. Many of them had been killed in the lengthy battle, and others were cut down in the random retreat. The reported totals are 10,000 killed, more than 700 captured, and eighty-two battle standards seized. Nor was it a bloodless victory: the Romans lost over 3,000 soldiers since those in the front lines had fallen when both sides were refusing to yield.
8. After the battle the Ligures who had scattered in flight regrouped and surrendered. They recognized that their casualties outnumbered the survivors: no more than 10,000 men remained. In fact they did not negotiate at all, hoping rather that the consul would not treat them any more savagely than previous commanders had. But he stripped them all of their weapons, destroyed their town, and sold them and their belongings. Then he sent a letter to the Senate reporting on his accomplishments.
The other consul, Postumius, had become utterly immersed in the investigation of landownership in Campania, and so the praetor Aulus Atilius read Popillius’ letter out in the Curia. The Senate was appalled: the Statellates, the only Ligurian tribe that had not taken up arms against the Romans, had been attacked when they were not themselves starting a war; afterwards, when they entrusted themselves to the good faith of the Roman people, they had been tortured and killed with the most extreme cruelty; thousands upon thousands of innocent people had been sold into slavery even as they invoked the good faith of the Romans. The worst possible precedent had been set, a warning against anyone ever again daring to surrender. These peaceable people had been dispersed here and there as slaves to men who had recently been Rome’s real enemies.
For all these reasons the Senate agreed that the consul Marcus Popillius should give back the money he had received for the Ligures and liberate them, and that he should undertake to restore their property, to the extent that he was able to retrieve it. Their weapons were to be returned, and these steps were to be taken at the very first opportunity. Further, the consul was not to leave his province until he had re-established in their own homes the Ligures who had voluntarily surrendered. The consul was additionally reminded that a victory acquired glory from the defeat of aggressors, not from abuse of the crushed.*
9. The consul exhibited the same intemperate rage in defying the Senate as he had in his savagery towards the Ligures. He immediately sent his legions into winter quarters at Pisa and returned to Rome, angry at the senators and furious with the praetor. He summoned the Senate at once to a meeting in the temple of Bellona, where he attacked the praetor at length: Atilius ought to have brought a motion before the Senate to honour the immortal gods officially for a great military accomplishment; instead, he had initiated a senatorial decree against the consul and in favour of the enemy; thus had Popillius’ victory been handed to the Ligures, to whom Atilius, a praetor, had practically ordered the consul to surrender himself. So Popillius was fining the praetor and demanding that the senators revoke the decree passed against him and order a thanksgiving. This they ought to have voted upon in his absence when he had sent the letter about what he had done for the commonwealth. They ought to do it now, primarily to honour the gods but also to indicate at least a modicum of respect for him.
Several senators rebuked him as harshly as they had in his absence, and he returned to his province having achieved neither aim.
The other consul, Postumius, spent the summer investigating landownership and returned to Rome for the elections without even having seen his province. He presided over the selection of Gaius Popillius Laenas and Publius Aelius Ligus as consuls. The praetors then chosen were Gaius Licinius Crassus, Marcus Junius Pennus, Spurius Lucretius, Spurius Cluvius, Gnaeus Sicinius (for the second time), and Gaius Memmius.
10. A lustrum was conducted that year. The censors were Quintus Fulvius Flaccus and Aulus Postumius Albinus; the latter conducted it. The number of Roman citizens was 269,015. The reduced total reflected the consul Lucius Postumius’ public declaration that the Latin allies who had been obliged, in accordance with Gaius Claudius’ decree,* to return to their own cities be counted there and not in Rome. The census was conducted harmoniously and to the benefit of the common good.* The censors ranked as aerarii and removed from their voting tribe all those whom they demoted from the Senate or stripped of equestrian status; and neither censor vetoed a decision of the other to demote someone. Fulvius dedicated the temple of Fortuna Equestris seven years after he had vowed it while fighting the Celtiberi in Spain as a proconsul, and he put on theatrical shows for four days, with another day in the Circus.
That year Lucius Cornelius Lentulus, the decemvir for sacred rites, died, and Aulus Postumius Albinus was appointed in his place. An unexpected infestation of locusts came in such numbers from the sea that their swarms smothered the fields of Apulia. The incoming praetor, Gnaeus Sicinius, was specially empowered to go there to free the crops of this plague; even after a large group of men was mustered, it took him rather a long time to remove the insects.
The beginning of the following year, in which Gaius Popillius and Publius Aelius were consuls, was taken up with residual conflicts from the previous year. The senators wished to discuss the Ligurian situation again and to renew the resolution they had passed in response to it; accordingly, the consul Aelius brought the matter before them. Popillius pleaded with both his colleague and the Senate on behalf of his brother, stating openly that he would veto any decree against the latter. His colleague was deterred, but the senators stood their course all the more, now equally opposed to both consuls. And so when the subject of the provinces arose and Macedonia seemed desirable because of the impending war with Perseus, both consuls were instead appointed to Liguria: the senators refused to assign Macedonia unless the matter of Marcus Popillius was put before them. Furthermore, the consuls’ requests for permission to recruit new armies or to reinforce the old were both rejected. Reinforcements were also denied to the praetors who were seeking them for Spain (Marcus Junius for Nearer Spain and Spurius Lucretius for Farther Spain). Gaius Licinius Crassus had drawn urban jurisdiction and Gnaeus Sicinius jurisdiction involving foreigners. Gaius Memmius drew Sicily, and Spurius Cluvius Sardinia. The consuls, enraged at the Senate’s decisions, set the Latin Festival for the first possible day and announced that they were on the verge of departing for their province and would conduct no public business other than what pertained to the administration of the provinces.
11. According to Valerius Antias, during this consulship King Eumenes’ brother Attalus came to Rome as an ambassador to lay charges against Perseus and to disclose his preparations for war. The annals of most historians* and especially those whom you would prefer to believe report that Eumenes himself came. So, when Eumenes arrived in Rome, he was received with great honour, because people considered this treatment consistent with his own merits as well as with the innumerable favours that had been heaped upon him. The praetor brought him before the Senate where he explained that his reason for coming to Rome—beyond a desire to see the gods and men whose generosity had placed him in circumstances beyond his most impossible dreams—had been to forewarn the Senate lest Perseus’ enterprises proceed unimpeded.
Consequently, Eumenes related first Philip’s schemes: Perseus’ brother Demetrius, who had opposed attacking Rome, had been murdered; the Bastarnae, who could assist in the crossing to Italy, had been roused from their homes. Death had caught up with Philip while he was contemplating this project, and he had left his kingdom to the person whom he had perceived to be the most hostile to the Romans. Thus it was that Perseus inherited not just the monarchy but also the war his father had left behind, and for a long time now his every thought had been revolving around nurturing and fostering it.
Macedonia, Eumenes went on to say, was full of young men, the fruit of the long peace, and Perseus’ resources were at their peak. He too was in the prime of life: his body was strong and vigorous, and his mind deeply familiar with age-old theoretical and practical aspects of warfare. Already as a boy he had shared his father’s tent, and the latter had sent him on many different missions, not just in border conflicts, but even in the war against Rome. So, from the time when he had inherited the kingdom he had achieved with remarkable success many objectives that had eluded Philip, though the latter had tried every form of force and cunning alike. Perseus’ power had accrued the kind of authority that results from numerous important benefactions over a long period of time.
12. Indeed, Eumenes said, all the Greek and Asian cities held Perseus’ majesty in awe. Eumenes himself could not see which favours or what generosity had achieved such regard for Perseus, nor say for certain whether he obtained it through good fortune or, reluctant as Eumenes was to suggest it, whether resentment of the Romans enhanced Perseus’ popularity. Even among kings Perseus’ standing was remarkable. Not as the wooer but as the wooed had he married the daughter of Seleucus; and he had given his sister in marriage to Prusias in response to earnest appeals from the latter. Both weddings were celebrated with felicitations and gifts from countless delegations, and the most prominent peoples joined the processions to lend their blessing.
Philip, Eumenes said, had sought to win over the Boeotians, but they could never be induced to sign a treaty of alliance with him; now their treaty with Perseus was inscribed on stone in three places, one at Thebes, the second at Dium in its extremely holy and renowned temple, and the third at Delphi. Indeed, unless a few men at the council of the Achaeans had held out the threat of Roman force, the matter of Perseus’ entrée to Achaea would have been nearly assured. But by Hercules, as for the honours these people had conferred on Eumenes—and it was difficult to say whether his public or personal services to them were the greater—some of these had lapsed through disregard and neglect, while others had been eliminated out of hostility. Was there anyone now, Eumenes asked, who did not know that during their internal conflict the Aetolians had turned to Perseus instead of the Romans? And though he could rely on these friendships and alliances, Perseus had made such preparations for war at home that he did not need outsiders. He would not need provisions from his own or enemy territory because he had amassed enough food to support 30,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry for ten years. His finances were such that in addition to the Macedonian forces he had pay ready for 10,000 mercenaries also for ten years, and this did not include the annual revenue from the royal mines. In his armouries he had accumulated weaponry for three such armies. And should Macedonia prove lacking, he had at his disposal the youth of Thrace, which he could draw upon as if from a spring that never runs dry.
13. The rest of Eumenes’ address was an exhortation:
‘I am not tossing around rumours of doubtful veracity in presenting this information to you, conscript fathers; nor do I believe it more readily because I would prefer accusations made against a personal enemy of mine to be true. On the contrary, they have been investigated and thoroughly looked into, just as if you had dispatched me as a spy and I were reporting on matters I had seen with my own eyes. Nor would I have abandoned my kingdom, which owes its greatness and distinction to you, to cross a vast expanse of water in order to discredit myself by reporting groundless stories. Rather, I have observed the most brilliant cities of Asia and Greece revealing their intentions more and more as each day passes; should this be allowed to continue, they will reach the point of no return and no repentance. I have also observed that Perseus is not restricting himself to Macedonia: some places he has taken by force and others, which could resist his physical might, he has enfolded in embraces of partiality and benevolence.
‘I saw too the disparity of circumstance: as he pursued war with you, you held out the security of peace to him (though it certainly seemed to me that he was not just preparing for war but virtually waging it). Abrupolis,* your friend and ally, he expelled from his kingdom; Arthetaurus* the Illyrian, another friend and ally of yours, Perseus had killed because he learned of messages Arthetaurus sent you; the Thebans Eversa and Callicritus* also, leaders of their city, he had eliminated for having denounced him rather freely in the Boeotians’ council, saying that they would report to you what was transpiring. He aided the Byzantines in violation of your treaty; he attacked the Dolopes; intending to use the lower orders to destroy their betters in a civil war, he brought his army into Thessaly and Doris. In Thessaly and Perrhaebia, he disrupted everything and created universal confusion by feeding the expectation that debts would be cancelled; his purpose was to crush the aristocrats with men who would then be personally indebted to him. Since he did these things while you stood by and did not interfere, and since he perceives that you have conceded Greece to him, he takes for granted that he will encounter no armed opposition before he crosses into Italy. You will judge just how safe and honourable this is for you; for my part I thought it positively shameful that Perseus should reach Italy in arms before I, your ally, could do so to warn you. Now that I have fulfilled my duty and in some sense have released myself from my obligation, what more can I do than beseech the gods and goddesses that you take thought for yourselves and your state and us, your allies and friends, who depend on you?’
14. This speech disturbed the conscript fathers. At the time, however, the Curia had been veiled in such silence that no one knew anything except that the king had been there. Only when the war was finally over did the king’s words and the reply leak out.
A few days later Perseus’ ambassadors were granted a meeting with the Senate, but the ears and thoughts of the latter had already been pre-empted by Eumenes’ words. The ambassadors’ excuses and entreaties were totally rejected. Especially grating was the arrogance of Harpalus, the leader of the embassy. He said that the king yearned and strove to be believed when he pleaded that he had never said or done anything with hostile intent; at the same time, if he should detect a relentless hunt for a motive for war, he would defend himself with a bold spirit. War was an impartial business, Harpalus ended, and its outcome never certain.
Every city in Greece and Asia was deeply concerned about what Perseus’ envoys and Eumenes had said in the Senate. Eumenes’ arrival prompted the majority of them to send their own envoys, ostensibly for other reasons, but with the thought that his presence would precipitate a change of one kind or another. The leader of the Rhodians’ embassy was hot-tempered and not about to promote falsities as true. He was convinced that Eumenes had implicated their city in his accusations against Perseus, and so, relying on his host and patrons, he tried every possible means to get a chance to debate the king in the Senate. Having failed to gain his object, he inveighed against the king in an uncontrolled and reckless speech: Eumenes had stirred up the Lycians against the Rhodians and been more burdensome than Antiochus to Asia. Although popular in appeal and not displeasing to the common people of Asia (where Perseus’ popularity had also spread), the speech was anathema to the Senate and disadvantageous to the Rhodian and his city. In fact, the general hostility towards Eumenes enhanced the Romans’ partiality for him; they decorated him with every honour and showered him with magnificent gifts, including a curule chair and an ivory staff.*
15. The moment the embassies were dismissed Harpalus rushed hastily back to Macedonia to inform the king that he had left the Romans not yet actually marshalling for war but so antagonistic that obviously there would be no further delay. Perseus himself, aside from the fact that he was expecting this to happen, now actively desired it since he believed he was at the height of his power.
He detested Eumenes above all others. Choosing him as the first casualty of the war, Perseus arranged his assassination at the hands of one of the allied commanders, a Cretan named Evander, and three Macedonians who were used to this kind of dirty work. Perseus gave them a letter of introduction to his guest-friend Praxo, an important and wealthy woman at Delphi. It was generally known that Eumenes was on his way up there to sacrifice to Apollo. Having arrived ahead of him, Evander and the conspirators scouted the area thoroughly in search of a suitable location for the execution of their task. Along the ascent to the temple from Cirrha, before one reaches the part that is more crowded with buildings, on the left there was a stone wall along the path, which was almost flush with the base of the wall, and passers-by had to go in single file; on the right-hand side an earthslide had created a steep slope of some height. The assassins concealed themselves behind the wall, where they had built up steps so that they could attack Eumenes as if from a rampart when he approached.
A crowd of friends and attendants surrounded Eumenes as he began the climb from the sea, but the narrow passageway eventually thinned them into a column. When they reached the point where it was necessary to go in single file, a prominent Aetolian named Pantaleon, with whom the king had started a conversation, led the way along the path. At that moment the assassins jumped up and sent two huge boulders rolling down. One struck the king in the head and the other in the shoulder; knocked unconscious, Eumenes slipped off the path and down the slope and lay collapsed under a heap of rocks. The rest of the friends and attendants, seeing him fall, took flight, but Pantaleon courageously stayed behind to protect him.
16. The brigands could have easily slipped around the wall and rushed down to finish off the wounded king, but instead they fled to the top of Mount Parnassus as if they had completed their task. Their pace was such that when one of them had difficulty following the steep, pathless flight and slowed down the escape, his comrades killed him to prevent his being captured and exposing the plot.*
As for the king, his friends, followed by his attendants and slaves, came running back to his body. When they lifted him, they realized from the warmth of his body and his breathing that he was alive, though still senseless and stunned from the blow. Hope of survival was minimal, practically non-existent. Some of the attendants pursued the tracks of the assassins, but after an exhausting climb to the top of Parnassus they returned empty-handed. The Macedonians had undertaken the enterprise with as much careful thought as audacity, but they abandoned it in a careless and craven manner.
The king had already recovered his senses the very next day, and his friends transferred him to a ship. They sailed to Corinth, where the ship was dragged across the neck of the Isthmus,* and continued over to Aegina.* There he was nursed in such secrecy and seclusion that a rumour that he had died made its way to Asia. His brother Attalus accepted the report with more haste than was compatible with true brotherly feeling and addressed Eumenes’ wife and the head of the palace guard as if he had indisputably inherited the kingdom. This came to Eumenes’ attention later on, and although he had initially decided to dissemble and keep it quiet, at their first meeting he did not refrain from accusing his brother of courting his wife with unseemly speed.* The rumour about Eumenes’ death reached Rome as well.
17. About the same time Gaius Valerius came back from Greece. He was the envoy who had gone to investigate the conditions in that region and to look into King Perseus’ plans. Everything he reported concurred with the charges levelled by Eumenes. He had also brought back with him Praxo from Delphi, whose house had sheltered the assassins, and Lucius Rammius of Brundisium, who disclosed the following information. Rammius was a leading citizen of Brundisium who was accustomed to hosting all the Roman generals and their envoys, as well as important foreigners, especially those associated with kings. That had been the origin of his acquaintance with Perseus, whom he had not then met directly. Lured by a letter that promised closer ties and consequently enormous wealth, he went to visit the king. Rammius rapidly began to be considered an intimate and to be drawn deeper than he wished into secret conversations. For the king promised great rewards and then started asking him—since all those Roman generals and envoys routinely availed themselves of Rammius’ hospitality—to undertake to poison any of them Perseus instructed him to. Perseus knew that the preparation of poison involved much trouble and risk, that many people would necessarily be involved, and that the results were unpredictable: the poison might or might not be powerful enough to do its job; it might or might not safely escape detection. But he said he would supply some that would not leave a trace during or after its administration. Rammius was terrified that if he refused, he might be the first to have the poison tested on him, so he promised to do it and left for Brundisium. He did not wish to return there before making contact with Gaius Valerius, who was reported to be near Chalcis. Having first disclosed the plot to Valerius, Rammius then accompanied him to Rome at his behest. Rammius was admitted to the Senate and revealed what had happened.
18. This information, on top of what Eumenes had said, hastened the decision to declare Perseus a public enemy: they could see that he was not just preparing war with the mind of a king, but that he was proceeding with all the underhanded and criminal activities of assassins and poisoners.
The conduct of the war was referred to the new consuls; for the time being, however, the decision was made that the praetor Gnaeus Sicinius, who had jurisdiction involving Romans and foreigners, should recruit soldiers to be marched to Brundisium at the very first opportunity so that they could be taken across to Apollonia in Epirus to occupy the coastal cities. There, whichever consul was allotted Macedonia would be able to put in safely with the fleet and conveniently disembark his troops.
Eumenes was detained for a considerable time at Aegina by his recuperation, which was fraught with difficulty. He set out for Pergamum as soon as it was safe and prepared for war with the utmost energy, for the recent attack had reinvigorated his old hatred of Perseus. Ambassadors from Rome went to him there to offer congratulations on his escape from such grave danger.
As the Macedonian war had been postponed for a year, when the rest of the praetors had already set out for their provinces, Marcus Junius and Spurius Lucretius, who had been assigned to Spain, went on importuning the Senate with the same petition. Finally they succeeded in obtaining reinforcements for their armies: they were directed to conscript 3,000 infantry and 150 cavalry for the Roman legions, and the allies were to supply 5,000 infantry and 300 cavalry for their troops. This force was transported to Spain along with the new praetors.
19. That same year, after the consul Postumius’ investigation had recovered for the state a considerable amount of Campanian territory which private individuals had appropriated as their own, Marcus Lucretius, a tribune of the plebs, proposed a law that the censors should rent out this land for cultivation. Because this had not been done in all the many years since the fall of Capua, the greed of private citizens had been let loose on the unregistered territory.
Though there had not yet been a formal declaration of war, nevertheless the decision had been made, and the Senate was waiting to see which of the kings would side with them and which with Perseus. At this juncture ambassadors from King Ariarathes* came to Rome bringing with them the king’s young son. They said that the king had sent his son to Rome to be educated so that from boyhood on he would be familiar with the Romans and their customs; the king sought their willingness not just to put him in the care of personal friends but also to treat him as a public charge, as if he were a ward of the state.* The embassy pleased the Senate, and it was decided that the praetor Gnaeus Sicinius should give a contract for the furnishing of a house where the king’s son and his companions could live.
Ambassadors from some of the Thracian tribes were granted the official alliance and friendship that they had come for, as well as a gift of 2,000 asses each. The formation of an alliance with these people in particular caused general rejoicing since Thrace lay to the rear of Macedonia. At the same time, however, in order to explore the state of affairs in Asia and the islands, Tiberius Claudius Nero and Marcus Decimius were dispatched as envoys with orders to go to Crete and Rhodes, where they could simultaneously renew alliances and observe whether Perseus had been meddling with the allies’ state of mind.
20. On a stormy night, while the city was taut with suspense because of the impending war, a bolt of lightning struck and destroyed the columna rostrata;* it had been set up on the Capitoline during the First Punic War to commemorate the victory of the consul Marcus Aemilius (the one whose colleague was Servius Fulvius). This event was regarded as a portent and reported to the Senate. The senators ordered the matter to be referred to the haruspices and also directed the decemvirs to consult the sacred books. The decemvirs proclaimed that the city had to undergo a ceremonial cleansing, that a supplication and public appeal to the gods were necessary, and that there should be a sacrifice with full-grown victims both at Rome on the Capitoline and in Campania on the promontory of Minerva; in addition, there should be a ten-day festival for Jupiter Optimus Maximus as soon as possible. All these procedures were carefully carried out. The haruspices answered that the divine sign would turn out to be for the good and that it portended territorial expansion and the death of enemies since the ships’ prows knocked over by the storm had been enemy spoils. Other events combined to heighten the atmosphere of superstition: it had been announced that at Saturnia it had rained blood in the town centre for three days in a row; at Calatia a donkey was born with three legs, and a bull and five cows had been killed by a single stroke of lightning; at Auximum it had rained earth. In response to these prodigies too, divine rites were performed, there was a one-day supplication, and a holiday was observed.
21. The consuls still had not departed for their province, because they would not comply with the Senate’s desire to discuss Marcus Popillius and the senators in turn had resolved not to make decisions about anything else first. Resentment towards Popillius was further increased by his dispatches reporting that in his capacity as proconsul he had fought the Ligurian Statellates again and had killed 6,000 of them. This unjustified act of war drove the rest of the Ligures to arms. So then a protest was launched in the Senate, not just against the absent Marcus Popillius who, in contravention of human and divine law, had made war on people who had surrendered and had driven peaceful people to rebellion, but also against the consuls, who had not gone to their province. Prompted by the unanimous reaction of the senators, two tribunes of the plebs, Marcus Marcius Sermo and Quintus Marcius Scylla, warned that they would fine the consuls unless they went to their province. They also read out in the Senate the motion they intended to promulgate with respect to the defeated Ligures. It prescribed that if any one of the defeated Statellates had not been restored to freedom by the first of August next, the Senate was on oath to appoint someone to investigate the matter and punish whoever had been responsible for this malicious enslavement. Once they had the backing of the Senate, the tribunes promulgated their motion.
Before the consuls left, Gaius Cicereius, who had been a praetor the year before, was granted an audience with the Senate in the temple of Bellona. He recounted what he had accomplished in Corsica. When his request for a triumph was denied, he held one on the Alban Mount, which had become the customary ceremony in the absence of public authorization. The plebs approved and voted almost unanimously for the Marcian motion about the Ligures. In accordance with the plebiscite the praetor Gaius Licinius asked the Senate who it wished to conduct the investigation specified by the resolution; the senators directed him to undertake it himself.
22. Then at last the consuls set out for their province and took over the army from Marcus Popillius. He, however, dared not to return to Rome because he might have to stand trial, in the face of the Senate’s hostility and the even greater animosity of the general population, before the praetor who had referred to the Senate the investigation now threatened against him. The tribunes of the plebs countered Popillius’ recalcitrance with the announcement of a second motion to the effect that if he did not come back to the city before the thirteenth of November, Gaius Licinius would judge and sentence him in his absence. Thus ensnared, Popillius returned to Rome and entered the Senate amidst a sea of resentment. There, many people lambasted him viciously, and the Senate passed a decree that the praetors Gaius Licinius and Gnaeus Sicinius should have responsibility for liberating those Ligures who had not been in arms after the consulship of Quintus Fulvius and Lucius Manlius,* and that the consul Gaius Popillius should give them land on the other side of the Po. In accordance with this decree many thousands of men were freed, taken across the Po, and given land. In accordance with the Marcian resolution, Marcus Popillius stood trial before Gaius Licinius for two days. On the third day, the praetor, succumbing to the influence of the absent consul and the entreaties of Popillius’ family, ordered the defendant to return on the fifteenth of March. On that day new magistrates would take up their duties, and Licinius would return to private life and not have to pass judgement. With this deceitful manoeuvre he evaded the resolution about the Ligures.
23. Ambassadors from Carthage and Masinissa’s son Gulussa were in Rome at this time, and they had a heated argument at a meeting of the Senate. The Carthaginians’ complaint was that Masinissa, in addition to the land investigated on the spot by the envoys earlier sent from Rome, had forcibly taken possession of more than seventy towns and strongholds in Carthaginian territory in the past two years. He had done this lightly, free from scruples. The Carthaginians said too that they were bound by their treaty and did not retaliate; they were forbidden to bear arms outside their territory; although they knew that fending off Numidian incursions would not take them outside their own territory, they were deterred by a clause of the treaty that was crystal clear: they were expressly forbidden to wage war with the allies of the Roman people. But now the Carthaginians could no longer endure Masinissa’s arrogance, cruelty, and greed. The ambassadors said that they had been sent to beseech the Senate to grant them one of three things: either that the Senate establish, on equal terms between the allied king and their people, what belonged to each; or that the Carthaginians might be allowed to engage in limited, defensive warfare against unfair attacks; or finally, if political favouritism mattered more than the truth to the Senate, that they might establish once and for all what they wished to give Masinissa from other people’s territory. While Masinissa would make no boundary except at the caprice of his own pleasure, no doubt the senators would be less open-handed, and the Carthaginians themselves would know exactly what had been given away. If the Carthaginians could obtain none of these objects, if they had committed some injury since the treaty established by Publius Scipio,* then let the Romans themselves exact the punishment. They preferred the security of Roman domination to a freedom vulnerable to Masinissa’s assaults: ultimately, they said, they preferred to die rather than to draw breath only at the whim of a viciously savage butcher. With tears forming as they spoke, the ambassadors prostrated themselves and, thus crouched on the ground, they roused pity for themselves and antagonism towards the king in equal measure.
24. The Senate decided to ask Gulussa for his response to the Carthaginians, unless he preferred to explain first what business had brought him to Rome. Gulussa replied that it was difficult for him to discuss matters on which he had no instructions from his father; nor would it have been easy for his father to issue such instructions since the Carthaginians had not announced what they intended to do or even that they were going to Rome at all. Their leaders had held clandestine meetings for several nights in the temple of Aesculapius, and no information had leaked out except that ambassadors were being sent to Rome with secret instructions. This was the reason his father had sent him to Rome—to entreat the Senate not to accept accusations made against Masinissa by their mutual enemies, who hated Masinissa solely for his unwavering fidelity to the Roman people.
When both sides had been heard out and the Senate was asked for a judgement on the Carthaginian demands, the following response was resolved upon: it was agreed that Gulussa should set out for Numidia immediately and tell his father both to send envoys as quickly as possible to the Senate to reply to the Carthaginians’ complaints and to alert the Carthaginians to come to Rome to dispute the issue. The senators said that they had acted and would act out of respect for Masinissa in whatever other matters they could; but that partiality would not substitute for justice. They wished everyone to keep possession of what was rightfully his and intended not to create new boundaries but rather to respect the old ones: they had granted to the defeated Carthaginians both their city and their lands, but not permission to seize unlawfully in peacetime what they had not taken by right of war. The prince and the Carthaginians were then sent away. According to custom, gifts were conferred on both parties, and they were also courteously treated to other traditional forms of hospitality.
25. This same period saw the return of Gnaeus Servilius Caepio, Appius Claudius Centho, and Titus Annius Luscus, the envoys who had been sent to Macedonia to demand reparations and renounce the alliance with the king. Their systematic report of what they had heard and observed further enflamed the Senate, which was already fuming against Perseus of its own accord. The envoys had seen for themselves that mobilization was proceeding at full strength in every Macedonian town. When they had reached the king, they had been denied access to him day after day; in the end, they gave up hope of talking with him and left. Then at last, while already en route, they were recalled and brought to see him. The essence of their remarks to him had been that a treaty had been struck with Philip and renewed with Perseus after his father’s death; according to it he was expressly forbidden to bear arms beyond the borders of his kingdom and to attack allies of the Roman people. The envoys next laid out what they had recently heard when Eumenes presented all his well-corroborated findings in the Senate. To these they added the secret meetings at Samothrace that the king had held for many days with delegations from the cities of Asia. In conclusion, the envoys gave the Senate’s opinion that by all rights satisfaction should be given for these violations and that anything Perseus held in contravention of the treaty should be returned to the Romans and their allies.
The king’s immediate reaction was rage, and he spoke with intemperate fury, accusing the Romans of greed and arrogance and ranting that embassy after embassy came to spy on his words and deeds because, in the Romans’ view of what was right, he was supposed to talk and act completely in accordance with their imperial whims; finally, after a long, shrill tirade, he had told the envoys to come back the next day as he wished to give them his response in writing. The document they subsequently received went as follows: the treaty made with his father had nothing to do with him; he had suffered its renewal not because it had met with his official approval but because upon first inheriting the kingdom he had been in no position to reject anything. If they wished to make a fresh treaty with him, they ought first to agree on its terms. If they could accept that the treaty must be based on equality, he would see what it entailed for him, and he imagined that the Romans would consult their public interest. At this point Perseus had started to sweep out, and there had been a move to clear everyone from the palace. So then the envoys had renounced the friendship and the alliance. Perseus, infuriated by this announcement, had stopped short and declared to them in ringing tones that they had three days to get themselves out of his kingdom. And so they left him, having met with no civility or hospitality during their stay or upon their departure.*
After the subsequent audience with the Thessalian and Aetolian envoys, the Senate sent a message to the consuls: the Senate wished whichever of the consuls was available to come to Rome and hold the elections so that the senators could know as soon as possible which leaders would next be at the disposal of the state.
26. The consuls of that year engaged in no public activities worthy of record;* it had seemed more beneficial to the general welfare that the Ligures, now thoroughly outraged, should be brought under control and appeased.
While the Macedonian war was still pending, envoys from Issa* brought under suspicion the Illyrian king Gentius also, simultaneously complaining that he had ravaged their borders and reporting that the Macedonian and Illyrian kings were of one mind: by common consent they were mustering for war against Rome, and the Illyrians in Rome under the guise of an embassy were actually spies sent by Perseus to discover what was going on. The Illyrians were summoned before the Senate. When they said that they had been sent by their king to defend any charges that the Issaei might bring against him, they were asked why they had not then presented themselves to a magistrate; in this way they might receive lodging and entertainment, as was customary, and their presence and the purpose of their visit might be known. When they fumbled for an answer, they were directed to leave the Curia, and it was agreed not to grant them an official reply, such as genuine envoys received, since they had not sought an audience with the Senate. The senators decided to send envoys to the king to report the allies’ complaints to him and the fact that the Senate did not think it right for him to inflict harm on Roman allies. Aulus Terentius Varro, Gaius Plaetorius, and Gaius Cicereius were dispatched on this mission.
The envoys who had been sent to make the circuit of allied kings returned from Asia and reported that they had met with Eumenes in Aegina, Antiochus in Syria, and Ptolemy in Alexandria. All three had been solicited by delegations from Perseus, but remained steadfast in their loyalty, and promised to deliver everything the Roman people asked of them. The envoys had also visited the allied cities and found them generally loyal, except for the Rhodians, who were wavering, infected with Perseus’ scheming. Rhodian ambassadors had come to defend their city against the rumours they knew were being bandied about. The Senate, however, refused to grant them a hearing until the new consuls had entered their magistracies.
27. The senators resolved not to postpone mobilization. The praetor Gaius Licinius was assigned the task of refitting and equipping for use fifty ships from the old quinqueremes in the dockyards at Rome. If it was not possible to reach this total, he should write to his colleague Gaius Memmius in Sicily to refit and prepare for action the ships there in order to send them to Brundisium at the very first opportunity. For twenty-five of the ships the praetor Gaius Licinius was ordered to recruit crews of Roman citizens of freedmen status; Gnaeus Sicinius was to muster from among the Latin and Italian allies the same size crews for the other twenty-five. The latter praetor was also to requisition 8,000 infantry and 400 cavalry from the Latin and Italian allies. Aulus Atilius Serranus, who had been a praetor the year before, was selected to take charge of this force at Brundisium and conduct it to Macedonia. In order for the praetor Gaius Sicinius to have the army ready for the crossing, the praetor Gaius Licinius wrote, by order of the Senate, to the consul Gaius Popillius that he should order both the second legion, which was the most experienced in Liguria, and 4,000 infantry and 200 cavalry from the Latin and Italian allies to be at Brundisium by the thirteenth of February. Gnaeus Sicinius was ordered to contain the situation in Macedonia with this fleet and army until his successor should arrive, and his authority was extended for the year.
Everything the Senate voted on was carried out vigorously. Thirty-eight quinqueremes were brought out of the dockyards; Lucius Porcius Licinius was put in charge of conducting them to Brundisium. Twelve were sent from Sicily. Three envoys—Sextus Digitius, Titus Juventius, and Marcus Caecilius—were sent to Apulia and Calabria to buy grain for the fleet and the army. Gnaeus Sicinius assumed military attire and left Rome for Brundisium where everything was in readiness.
28. Towards the end of the year the consul Gaius Popillius returned to Rome. He was rather later than the Senate had recommended; the idea had been that with such a serious war pending, it would be in the public interest if the magistrates were elected at the very first opportunity. And so the Senate was by no means a sympathetic audience when the consul described in the temple of Bellona his actions in Liguria. There were frequent shouts of disapproval as well as questions as to why he had not freed the Ligures who had been victimized by his brother’s wickedness.
The consular elections were held on the eighteenth of February, as had been announced. Publius Licinius Crassus and Gaius Cassius Longinus were elected as consuls. The next day the praetors were chosen: Gaius Sulpicius Galba, Lucius Furius Philus, Lucius Canuleius Dives, Gaius Lucretius Gallus, Gaius Caninius Rebilus, and Lucius Villius Annalis. They were given for their areas of responsibility the two juristic positions in Rome, Spain, Sicily, and Sardinia; one man’s duties thus remained unspecified and left to the Senate’s discretion.
The Senate directed the incoming consuls, on the day they entered office, to make appropriate sacrifices with full-grown victims and to pray for a successful conclusion to the war that the Roman people intended to wage. The Senate decreed on the same day that the consul, Gaius Popillius, should vow ten days of games to Jupiter Optimus Maximus as well as gifts at all the sacred couches, if the Republic should remain in the same condition for ten years. Thus, in accordance with this decree, the consul gave his oath on the Capitol for the holding of games and the distribution of gifts, at whatever cost the Senate chose, provided that at least 150 senators were in attendance at the time.* This vow was made with Lepidus, the pontifex maximus, pronouncing the formulaic prayer.
Two public priests died that year: Lucius Aemilius Papus, a decemvir for sacrifices, and Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, the pontifex who had been censor the year before. This man came to a shameful end.* Of his two sons, who were fighting in Illyricum at the time, it was reported that one had died, and the other was dangerously ill with a serious disease. Grief and fear combined to overwhelm Fulvius’ mind; the next morning, upon entering the bedroom, the household slaves found him dangling from a noose. It was the received opinion that he was less than sane after his censorship; the general belief was that an enraged Juno Lacinia had driven him mad for violating her temple. The decemvir appointed in Aemilius’ place was Marcus Valerius Messalla; and Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, an exceptionally young man for a priesthood, was appointed to replace Fulvius.
29. During the consulship of Publius Licinius and Gaius Cassius not just the city of Rome, nor the Italian peninsula, but every king and city in Europe and Asia had become preoccupied with the war between the Macedonians and the Romans. Eumenes was motivated not just by his long-standing hatred, but also by the fresh cause for anger: Perseus’ villainy at Delphi had nearly caused him to be slaughtered like a sacrificial animal. Prusias, king of Bithynia, had decided to stay neutral and await the outcome, for he concluded that the Romans could not think it right for him to take up arms against his brother-in-law, and if Perseus should win, his sister could arrange for him to be pardoned. Ariarathes, the Cappadocian king, aside from the fact that he had pledged auxiliary troops to the Romans in his own name, had shared strategy with Eumenes in all matters concerning war and peace ever since they had become related by marriage.
Antiochus, it is true, had designs on Egypt, having a low opinion of the king’s youth and his guardians’ lack of initiative; he thought that by provoking a quarrel over Coele Syria,* he could furnish himself with grounds for war, and that he could wage it without interference since the Romans would be busy with their own war against the Macedonians. Even so, both through a delegation of his own men to the Senate and in person to the Senate’s envoys, he had gone to great lengths in pledging everything for that war. Ptolemy still had guardians at the time because of his youth, and they prepared for the war against Antiochus to maintain the claim to Coele Syria while simultaneously promising the Romans everything regarding the Macedonian war.
Masinissa assisted the Romans with grain and undertook to send his son Misacenes and auxiliaries with elephants to join the fight. At the same time, he arranged his plans to suit every possible outcome: if the Romans should win, his standing with them would remain the same and he would not attempt further incursions since the Romans would not permit any aggression against the Carthaginians; if the might of Rome—which was shielding the Carthaginians—should be crushed, then all Africa would be his. The Illyrian king Gentius had certainly managed to make the Romans mistrust him, but he had not determined which side he would support, and it seemed likely that some impulse, rather than careful thought, would attach him to one side or the other. Cotys the Thracian, king of the Odrysae, was on the side of Macedonia.
30. Such were the sentiments of the various kings towards the war. Of the autonomous communities and peoples, almost everywhere the masses favoured the less desirable elements—as is generally the case—and tended to side with Macedonia and its king. Among the more important citizens you might observe a range of positions. Some people had been so effusive towards the Romans that their boundless partisanship undermined their credibility; a few of these were attracted by the justice of Roman rule, but most calculated that a display of dedication would promote their position in their own cities. Other people fawned on the king: dire financial straits and the hopelessness of their own affairs should there be no change drove some men headlong into any new enterprise; and some capricious spirits turned to Perseus because the wind of popularity was blowing his way. A third group, the best and most thoughtful, preferred to be under Roman rule rather than that of the king, if it were simply a case of picking the more powerful master; given a choice of destinies, however, they wished that neither side would topple the other and emerge on top, but rather that each might maintain its strength and thus yield a lasting peace through a balance of power. For the cities, poised between Rome and Macedonia, this arrangement would be the best set of circumstances since one power would constantly protect the weak from the aggression of the other. Those who felt this way observed silently and safely from afar the rivalries among the supporters of the two sides.
In accordance with the Senate’s decree, on the day they entered office the consuls made offerings of full-size victims around all the shrines where there was customarily a lectisternium for the better part of the year.* Having concluded from the omens that the gods were pleased with the offerings, they reported to the Senate that the sacrifices and prayers pertaining to the war had been properly performed. The haruspices responded that any new undertaking embarked on should be hastened: victory, a triumph, the expansion of the empire lay in the portents. The senators, offering a prayer for the prosperity and good fortune of the Roman people, directed the consuls to assemble the Roman people in the comitia centuriata* on the first possible day and to put to them the following: whereas Perseus, the son of Philip and the king of Macedonia, had attacked allies of the Roman people, in contravention of the treaty made with Philip and renewed with Perseus after Philip’s death, whereas he had devastated lands and occupied cities, and whereas he had entered into plans to prepare war against the Roman people, readying weapons, an army, and a fleet to this end, unless he should give satisfaction for these actions, they would go to war with him. This motion was brought to the people.
31. Then the Senate decreed that the consuls should either settle between themselves or determine by lot which of them was to have Italy as his province and which Macedonia. The one responsible for Macedonia was to prosecute the war against Perseus and his followers if they refused to give satisfaction to the Roman people. It was agreed that four new legions should be enrolled, two for each of the consuls. Special arrangements were made for Macedonia. While in keeping with established practice, the other consul would have 5,200 infantry assigned to each legion, for Macedonia 6,000 infantry and 300 cavalry were ordered to be enlisted for each legion. The second consul was also to have additional forces from the allies: he was to take to Macedonia 16,000 infantry and 800 cavalry in addition to the 600 cavalry Gnaeus Sicinius had taken there. For Italy, 12,000 allied infantry and 600 cavalry seemed sufficient. Another special arrangement made for Macedonia involved the draft: the consul could enlist as he pleased veteran centurions and soldiers up to the age of fifty. The Macedonian war led that year to an innovation regarding the military tribunes: by senatorial decree the consuls proposed to the people that the military tribunes for the year not be chosen by popular vote, but that the selection be left to the discretion and judgement of the consuls and praetors.
Among the praetors, areas of command were divided in the following manner: the one whose lot it was to go wherever the Senate decided was sent to the fleet at Brundisium to inspect the crews. He was to dismiss men who appeared to be unfit, select freedmen as substitutes, and see to it that there was a balance of two Roman citizens for every ally. It was further decided that the two praetors who drew Sicily and Sardinia should be charged with extracting a second tithe from the islands so that the supplies for the fleet and the army might come from them. This food was to be transported to the troops in Macedonia. Gaius Caninius Rebilus drew Sicily, and Lucius Furius Philus Sardinia. Lucius Canuleius Dives drew Spain. Gaius Sulpicius Galba drew urban jurisdiction, and Lucius Villius Annalis jurisdiction involving foreigners. Gaius Lucretius Gallus drew the lot to remain at the Senate’s disposal.
32. Between the consuls there was not so much a fully fledged argument as some quibbling about the provinces. Cassius said that he was prepared to claim Macedonia without any drawing of lots and that his colleague could not draw lots without violating his oath. For when Licinius had been a praetor, in order to avoid going to his province he had sworn publicly that there were sacrifices for him to perform in a particular place on particular days and that these could not be done properly in his absence.* In Cassius’ view, these rites could no more be done properly in Licinius’ absence if he were a consul than if he were a praetor—unless of course the Senate decided to have a higher regard for Licinius’ wishes as a consul than for his oath as a praetor; Cassius, however, would leave his fate in the hands of the Senate. After deliberating, the senators deemed it arrogant to deny a province to a man whom the Roman people had chosen to entrust with the consulship, and so they directed the consuls to draw lots. Macedonia fell to Publius Licinius and Italy to Gaius Cassius. Then the legions were assigned by lot: the first and third were to cross to Macedonia, the second and fourth to remain in Italy.
The consuls conducted the draft much more scrupulously than at other times. Licinius mustered veteran centurions and soldiers as well, and large numbers volunteered since they saw that those who had served in the earlier Macedonian war and against Antiochus in Asia had become wealthy men. Since the military tribunes were enrolling centurions in order of arrival rather than by experience,* twenty-three men who had held the position of chief centurion appealed to the tribunes of the plebs. Two from their college, Marcus Fulvius Nobilior and Marcus Claudius Marcellus, referred the matter to the consuls on the grounds that it should be investigated by the men who had been given responsibility for the levy and the war. The other tribunes said they themselves would look into the case of anyone who appealed and come to the aid of their fellow citizens if there were any injustice.
33. The inquiry took place in front of the official seats of the tribunes;* it was attended by Marcus Popillius as a consular representative for the centurions, the centurions, and the consul. The consul insisted on a public debate, and so a meeting of the people was convened. Marcus Popillius, who had been consul two years previously, spoke on behalf of the centurions in the following fashion. He said that these military men had honourably completed full terms of service and worn out their bodies with age and constant work; nevertheless, they were not at all unwilling to make their contribution for the state; their only request was not to be assigned to a rank lower than what they had held while on active service.
The consul Publius Licinius called for a public reading of the Senate’s decrees: first, its vote for war against Perseus; second, the decision that as many veteran centurions as possible should be enlisted for this war and that there should be no exemption from military service for anyone under fifty. He then pleaded that in a new war, so close to Italy, against an unusually powerful king, the tribunes of the plebs should not hinder the military tribunes as they conducted the draft, nor prevent the consul from assigning each man to the position where he would be most useful to the state. If any of this was unclear, they should refer it to the Senate.
34. After the consul said what he had wanted to, Spurius Ligustinus, one of those who had appealed to the tribunes, asked the consuls and the tribunes for permission to say a few words to the crowd. When this was granted he spoke as follows:
‘Citizens of Rome, I am Spurius Ligustinus, a Sabine by birth, of the Crustuminian tribe.* My father left me a iugerum of land and the small cottage in which I was born and brought up, and I live there to this day. As soon as I came of age, my father married me to the daughter of his brother. She brought nothing with her but her free-born status and her chastity, together with a fecundity sufficient for even a wealthy home. We have six sons, and two daughters, both of whom are already married. Four of my sons have assumed the toga virilis, and two wear the toga praetexta.*
‘I became a soldier in the consulship of Publius Sulpicius and Gaius Aurelius.* As an ordinary infantryman in the army that was taken to Macedonia I served for two years against King Philip; in the third year, because of my bravery, Titus Quinctius Flamininus raised me to the rank of centurion of the tenth company of hastati.* When Philip and the Macedonians were defeated and we were brought back to Italy and discharged, I immediately set out for Spain as a volunteer with the consul Marcus Porcius.* Of all generals alive, he was a harsher critic and judge of personal courage, as men who have known him and other leaders, who have their own extensive military experience, acknowledge. This general considered me worthy of promotion to first centurion of the first company of the hastati. The third time when, again as a volunteer, I enlisted in the army sent against the Aetolians and King Antiochus, I was made first centurion of the principes by Manius Acilius. After King Antiochus had been driven out and the Aetolians subdued, we were brought back to Italy; and then I served twice when legions were called up for a year’s campaigning. Then I fought twice in Spain, once with the praetor Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, and then again under the praetor Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus.* I was chosen by Flaccus to be among those who, because of their bravery, accompanied him from the province to participate in his triumph; I returned to the province at Tiberius Gracchus’ request.
‘Four times within a few years I was chief centurion; thirty-four times I was recognized by my generals for bravery; I have been awarded six civic crowns.* I have served twenty-two years in the army, and I am over fifty years old. But even if I had not served all these years and even if my age did not exempt me, it would still be fair to excuse me, Publius Licinius, since I can give you four soldiers to take my place.* But I prefer that you take these words as spoken for my case: I myself, as long as a recruiter judges me fit to fight, will never seek to exempt myself. The military tribunes have the power to place me at whatever rank they think fit; it is up to me to see that no one in the army outstrips me in courage: both my generals and my comrades stand as witnesses that I have always served in this fashion. You too, my fellow soldiers, though you act lawfully in exercising your right to appeal, still it is fitting that just as when you were young men you never challenged the authority of the magistrates and the Senate, now also you should submit to the power of the consuls and the Senate, and you should regard as an honour any way you can defend your country.’
35. After this speech the consul, Publius Licinius, showered Spurius with praise and brought him from the public meeting to the Senate. There the Senate also officially conferred its gratitude on him, and in recognition of his bravery, the military tribunes made him chief centurion of the first legion. The rest of the centurions withdrew their appeal and complied obediently with the draft.
The Latin Festival took place on the first of June so that the consuls could leave earlier for their provinces.* Once the ceremony was over, the praetor Gaius Lucretius left for Brundisium where everything necessary for the fleet had been sent in advance. In addition to the forces that the consuls were mustering, the praetor Gaius Sulpicius Galba had been entrusted with enlisting four city legions,* with the usual number of infantry and cavalry, and he was also supposed to select from the Senate four military tribunes to be the commanders. He was to order up 15,000 infantry and 1,200 cavalry from the Latin and Italian allies; this army was to be ready for deployment wherever the Senate should decide.
In response to a request from the consul Publius Licinius, his Roman and allied forces were augmented with auxiliaries: 2,000 Ligures, Cretan archers—the exact number the Cretans supplied when asked for auxiliaries is uncertain—and also Numidian cavalry and elephants. Lucius Postumius Albinus, Quintus Terentius Culleo, and Gaius Aburius were sent to Masinissa and the Carthaginians to obtain these. It was agreed also that three envoys should go to Crete; these were Aulus Postumius Albinus, Gaius Decimius, and Aulus Licinius Nerva.
36. Also at this time envoys from King Perseus arrived.* The decision was made not to receive them within the city since the Senate had decided on war against the Macedonians and their king and the Roman people had ratified the decision. The envoys, brought before the Senate in the temple of Bellona, spoke as follows. King Perseus was wondering why forces had been sent to Macedonia; if he could convince the Senate to recall them, the king would, at the Senate’s discretion, make amends for the commission of any injuries the allies complained about.
Spurius Carvilius had been sent back from Greece by Gnaeus Sicinius for this very purpose and was at the meeting of the Senate. He brought forward as accusations the hostile invasion of Perrhaebia, the conquest of several cities in Thessaly, and the other activities that the king was engaged in or was setting into motion.* The ambassadors were ordered to reply to these points. When they hesitated, claiming that they had not been empowered to handle anything else, they were told to report back to their king that the consul Publius Licinius would shortly be in Macedonia with his army; if the king intended to make reparations, he could send his envoys to Licinius. It was, moreover, pointless to send them to Rome, for none of them would be permitted to travel through Italy. With this the ambassadors were dismissed. The consul Publius Licinius was instructed to tell them to leave Italy within fifteen days and to send Spurius Carvilius to keep them under observation until they boarded ship.
These were the events at Rome before the consuls left for their provinces. Gaius Sicinius had been sent ahead to the fleet and troops at Brundisium before the expiration of his magistracy. Having conveyed 5,000 infantry and 300 cavalry to Epirus, he set up camp at Nymphaeum in the territory of Apollonia. From there he dispatched military tribunes with 2,000 soldiers to occupy the fortresses of the Dassaretii and the Illyrians since these people were seeking help in guarding themselves against an attack from their neighbours the Macedonians.
37. A few days later, Quintus Marcius, Aulus Atilius, Publius and Servius Cornelius Lentulus, and Lucius Decimius, the envoys sent to Greece, sailed to Corcyra with 1,000 soldiers. There they apportioned amongst themselves both the regions that each would visit and the troops. Decimius was sent to Gentius, the Illyrian king; if he discovered that Gentius had any regard for his friendship with the Roman people, his mission was to try in addition to coax him into a military alliance. The Lentuli were sent to Cephallania so that they could cross to the Peloponnese and make the rounds of the western coast before winter. Marcius and Atilius were assigned to travel around Epirus, Aetolia, and Thessaly; from there, they were to look into the situation in Boeotia and Euboea and then to cross to the Peloponnese. They agreed to rejoin the Lentuli there.
Before the envoys left Corcyra, a letter arrived from Perseus asking what could be the Romans’ reason in coming to Greece or for occupying its cities. A formal written response seemed undesirable; instead, the messenger who had brought the letter was given a verbal reply to the effect that the Romans were acting to protect these cities.
The Lentuli made the circuit of the towns in the Peloponnese, encouraging all the communities, without distinction, to assist the Romans against Perseus with the same spirit and loyalty with which they had helped in the wars against first Philip and then Antiochus. The result was muttering amongst the crowds. The Achaeans were upset that although they had stood by the Romans in every way from the beginnings of the war with Macedonia and had fought against Philip and the Macedonians, their status was no higher than that of the Messenians and the Eleans, who had fought for Antiochus against the Roman people; and the Messenians and the Eleans, who had recently been incorporated into the Achaean League, were complaining that they were actually being handed over to the victorious Achaeans as spoils of war.*
38. Marcius and Atilius made their way up to Gitana, an Epirote city ten miles from the sea. At the meeting with the Epirotae, they were heard with great approval on all sides, and these people sent 400 of their young men to serve as a garrison for the Orestae,* who had been liberated from the Macedonians. The envoys continued on into Aetolia and waited there a few days until a successor was installed to replace the chief magistrate, who had recently died. Once Lyciscus, a man well known to favour the Roman side, took up his duties, the Romans moved on to Thessaly.
Representatives from the Acarnanians* and Boeotian exiles* came to them there. The Acarnanians were given a message to take home: this was their opportunity to atone for what they had done to the Roman people in the wars against Philip and Antiochus when they had been duped by the kings’ promises; where they had once met with Roman forbearance when they little deserved it, they would now find generosity if they truly deserved it. The Boeotians were reproved for having made an alliance with Perseus. They cast the blame on Ismenias, the leader of the other faction, and said that some cities had been drawn into the matter against their will. Marcius replied that these circumstances would come out into the open because the Romans were about to grant each city autonomy.*
A council of the Thessalians took place at Larisa. On both sides there were abundant grounds for gratitude: the Thessalians were grateful for the gift of their freedom;* and the Roman envoys because the Thessalian people had assiduously rendered aid first in the war against Philip and then again in the war against Antiochus. After a reminder of shared service, the general population was eager to decide in favour of everything the Romans wanted.
After this meeting envoys from King Perseus came, private individuals relying particularly on the guest-friendship between Perseus’ father and Marcius. The envoys started with a reminder of this relationship and requested that the king be given an opportunity to come and confer with Marcius. Marcius replied that he too had heard from his father of the bond of amity and of the guest-friendship with Philip,* indeed that he had undertaken this embassy with that relationship in mind. As for a conference, were his health sufficiently good, he would not have postponed it; so now, as soon as he could, the Romans would go to the Peneus river, at the crossing from Homolium to Dium, and messengers would be sent in advance to alert the king.
39. And so for the time being, because Marcius, in saying that he had undertaken the embassy on Perseus’ behalf, had cast a faint whisper of hope in his direction, Perseus withdrew from Dium to the inner recesses of his kingdom. A few days later they met at the appointed place. A great retinue of his companions and attendants accompanied the king, crowding around him. The Roman ambassadors arrived with an equally large throng, composed of many escorts from Larisa as well as delegations from the cities; these people had converged on Larisa and wished to report at home whatever trustworthy information they could glean. There was an innate element of curiosity for ordinary mortals in witnessing a meeting between the famous king and the representatives of the greatest people on earth. When they stood within eyesight, separated by the river, there was a brief delay for an exchange about which party should make the crossing. The royal party thought this was owed to the majesty of the king; the Romans considered that it was, on the contrary, owed to the name of the Roman people, especially since Perseus had requested the conference. At last Marcius ended the delay with a joke, saying, ‘Let the younger come to the elder,’ and, because his cognomen was Philip, ‘Let the son come to the father.’ The king was easily won over by this. Then there was a second dispute as to the number of men that should accompany him. The king thought that crossing with his entire retinue was fair; the Roman ambassadors told him to come with three men, or if he wished to bring such a throng, to give hostages to prevent any trickery during the conference. So he handed over as hostages Hippias and Pantauchus, his chief companions and the same men whom he had sent as his ambassadors. The hostages had been required less as a pledge of good faith than to show the allies that the king was not meeting with the Roman ambassadors on an equal footing. Nevertheless, the greeting was not antagonistic, but rather cordial and welcoming; then they took the seats arranged for them.
40. After a brief silence Marcius said: ‘I imagine that you expect us to reply to the letter that you sent to Corcyra, in which you questioned why we came as we did, ambassadors accompanied by soldiers, and why we are spreading garrisons among individual cities. I am apprehensive both about not responding to your query, lest you think this arrogance, and about telling the truth, lest when you hear it, you think it excessively harsh. But since a reprimand, whether physical or verbal, is justified when a person violates a treaty, just as I would prefer war against you to be entrusted to someone other than myself, so I will submit to the painful experience of saying unpalatable things to a guest-friend, no matter what; in the same way do doctors apply bitter-tasting remedies to effect physical well-being.
‘The Senate believes that ever since you inherited the throne, you have only once acted as you ought to have done: you sent ambassadors to Rome to renew the treaty. And yet the Senate thinks that you would have done better not to renew it at all rather than to do so only to violate it. You expelled Abrupolis, a friend and ally of the Roman people, from his kingdom; by granting refuge to Arthetaurus’ murderers after they had killed the king who was, of all the Illyrians, the Romans’ most faithful adherent, you gave the impression—I won’t put it more strongly than that—that you were pleased by his assassination; in contravention of the treaty, you went to Delphi with an army by way of Thessaly and Malian territory; also in contravention of the treaty you sent auxiliary forces to Byzantium; with the Boeotians, our allies, you struck a secret treaty under oath, which was not permitted; and I prefer to ask rather than to make an accusation about who killed the Theban envoys Eversa and Callicritus when they were on their way to us. Does it seem possible that the civil war and assassination of leading men in Aetolia could have arisen through agents other than yours? The Dolopes were wiped out by you personally. King Eumenes, when he was returning from Rome to his kingdom, was nearly slaughtered at Delphi, just like a sacrificial victim, in a holy area before the altar; I shrink from stating whom he blames; as for the secret crimes which your host at Brundisium has revealed—no doubt all has been described to you in letters from Rome and reported by your envoys as well. In one way only could you have prevented me from saying these things, and that is by not asking why our troops are being transported to Macedonia or why we are sending garrisons to the cities of our allies. Since you ask, I should have been more arrogant in keeping quiet than in telling you the truth. Indeed, because of the hospitality between our fathers, I am receptive to what you have to say, and I hope that you will supply me with some means of putting your case before the Senate.’
41. The king replied: ‘I could make a good case if I were arguing it before impartial arbitrators, not men who are the accusers as well as the arbitrators. As for the charges made against me, however, some of them I think perhaps I should glory in, not blush to confess, and some, consisting of words, can be refuted by words. For what, if I were a defendant under your laws today, could either your Brundisian informant or King Eumenes charge me with such that they could represent themselves as accusers rather than muckrakers? No doubt Eumenes is on bad terms with no one other than me—even though he has made a burden of himself to so many men, whether in affairs of state or personal matters; and no doubt I could not find anyone more suited to be my accomplice in criminal activities than Rammius, a man whom I had never seen before and was not to see afterwards. I am also supposed to account for the deaths of the Thebans who, all agree, were lost at sea, and of Arthetaurus for whom there is, however, no charge other than that his murderers went into exile in my kingdom. I will not mount a defence against this unfair argument as long as you also agree to accept responsibility for any crimes committed by men who have gone into exile in Italy or Rome. If you and everyone else in the world refuse to adopt this view, then I will count myself among the rest of you. And by Hercules, what good does it do to offer a man exile if there is no place for him to go into exile?* Nevertheless, as soon as I learned from your warning that those men were in Macedonia, I had them hunted down and ordered them to leave, forever banned from my kingdom.
‘Those are the points on which I have actually been charged, as if I were defending myself in a criminal prosecution; but the following matters are brought against me as a king, and involve a difference of opinion over my treaty with you. For if the treaty was drawn up in such a way that I am not allowed to protect myself and my kingdom even if someone attacks me, I must confess that I violated the treaty in using force to defend myself against Abrupolis, an ally of the Roman people. But if, on the contrary, both the treaty and the principles of international law permit answering force with force, what then was it right for me to do, when Abrupolis laid waste to areas of my kingdom as far as Amphipolis, and carried off many free citizens, a large number of slaves, and many thousand cattle? Should I have kept quiet and been passive until, armed to the hilt, he made his way to Pella and right into my palace? Grant that I was justified in fighting,* was it somehow unacceptable that he was defeated and suffered everything else that befalls the defeated? When I, the person who was attacked, had to endure the consequences, how can he, the person who started the war, complain of what happened to him?
‘I am not about to defend myself in the same way, Romans, for coercing the Dolopes into submission: even if they did not deserve it, I acted within my rights, since they were within my kingdom and my jurisdiction, assigned to my father by your decree. Moreover, if it were necessary to justify my situation not to you, and not to your allies, but to people who condemn the harsh and unjust exercise of power even over slaves, I would still not be considered to have vented my rage against them beyond what is reasonable and fair: given the way they killed Euphranor, the governor I appointed for them, death was the lightest of punishments for them.
42. ‘But then when I had gone to visit Larisa and Antronae and Pteleon, by a route near Delphi, I continued on up to Delphi to offer sacrifices and release myself from vows made long ago. For the sake of exaggerating my guilt, these circumstances have been linked with the fact that I travelled with my army—as if I went to occupy cities and install garrisons in their citadels, exactly the actions I now object to your taking. Summon a meeting of the Greek cities through which I passed; should anyone at all complain of an injury from one of my soldiers, then shall I accept that I gave the impression of pretending to offer sacrifice while pursuing another goal. I sent garrisons to the Aetolians and the Byzantines, and I made a treaty of friendship with the Boeotians. These activities, whatever their nature, my representatives not only announced, but repeatedly justified to your Senate, where, Quintus Marcius, I have critics who are not so well inclined towards me as you, my supporter and guest-friend by birth. But Eumenes had not yet come to Rome to make his accusations; it was he who made everything suspicious and odious by misrepresenting and twisting it around; and it was he who attempted to persuade you that Greece could not be free and enjoy your favour as long as the kingdom of Macedonia remained secure in its position. But the wheel will come full circle: soon someone will assert that the removal of Antiochus beyond the Taurus Mountains was to no avail; that Eumenes is a much greater threat to Asia than Antiochus was; that your allies will not be able to sleep at night as long as the royal house of Pergamum stands; its citadel sits in surveillance over the heads of the neighbouring states.
‘Quintus Marcius and Aulus Atilius, I know that the things of which you have accused me or against which I have defended myself will be defined by the ears and thoughts of those listening, and that what matters is not what I did or to what end, but whatever view you take of it. I know full well that I have not intentionally done anything wrong and if, through a lapse of judgement, I have, I know that I can be set straight and put on the right course by your reproaches. Certainly I have done nothing irreparable, nor anything you could think necessitates the forceful reprisals of war; or your reputation for clemency and uprightness has spread through the world to no purpose, if for reasons that scarcely constitute grounds for grievance or complaint, you take up arms and make war on kings who are your allies.’
43. Marcius listened to the king’s speech with approval and proposed sending envoys to Rome. Since the king’s friends also thought that every possibility should be tested to the fullest and that nothing that gave grounds for hope should be passed over, the rest of the conference concerned which route would be safe for the messengers. For this purpose, although the request for a truce seemed unavoidable under the circumstances and although Marcius had wanted and sought nothing else from the conference, he granted it in a grudging way, as if it were a great favour to the petitioner. For at the time the Romans had nothing—no army, no general—sufficiently prepared for the war while Perseus had everything completely ready and in order: had not the fruitless hope of peace blinded him, he could have commenced hostilities at a time entirely advantageous to him and inopportune for his enemies.
Pledges to honour the truce were exchanged, and the Roman embassy immediately left the conference and went to Boeotia. An uprising had recently begun there. Certain groups were seceding from the federation of the united league of Boeotians because the Roman ambassadors’ response—that it would be clear exactly which peoples found the formation of an alliance with the king unacceptable—had been made public.* First envoys from Chaeronea and then some from Thebes met the Romans along the way, claiming that they had not been at the meeting when this alliance was voted on. Giving these envoys no immediate reply, the Romans directed them to follow along to Chalcis.
At Thebes, an enormous fracas had arisen from a different factional quarrel.* At the elections of the praetor and the boeotarchs, the defeated party, as revenge for the humiliation, got together a herd of voters and issued an order at Thebes barring the boeotarchs from the cities. These men all retreated into exile at Thespiae; they were readily taken in there, only to be recalled to Thebes once popular opinion changed. Back at Thebes, they decreed that a punishment of exile should be imposed on the twelve men who had convened the assembly and the council on their personal authority alone. Then the new praetor, Ismenias, an influential man from a noble family, condemned them to death after they had left. They had fled to Chalcis, and from there they had set out to meet the Romans at Larisa where they had accused Ismenias of being behind the alliance with Perseus. These party politics were the source of the fracas. Representatives from each party approached the Romans, the exiles and Ismenias’ accusers on the one side and Ismenias himself on the other.
44. After their arrival in Chalcis, in a move that was extremely gratifying to the Romans, one by one leaders from the other cities issued proclamations rejecting the alliance with the king and attached themselves to the Romans; and Ismenias reached the decision that committing the Boeotian people as a whole to the Romans was the right course of action. This provoked a fight, and had he not escaped to the Roman ambassadors’ headquarters, he would have been killed by the exiles and their supporters. Thebes itself, too, the principal city in Boeotia, was in a state of tremendous upheaval, with some tugging the city towards the king and others towards the Romans. Further, a crowd of Coronaei and Haliarti* had gathered there to defend the resolution to ally with the king. The steadfastness of their leaders, however, who kept pointing to the calamitous fates of Philip and Antiochus to illustrate the extent of the Romans’ power and good fortune, finally overcame the common people, and they decreed that the alliance with the king should be abolished. They sent to Chalcis those who had supported making the alliance so that they could effect a reconciliation with the Roman embassy, and they directed that the city be entrusted to the good faith of the ambassadors. Marcius and Atilius listened to the Thebans with pleasure and advised both them and each of the other cities to send ambassadors to Rome to renew friendly relations. Above all, they ordered the exiles reinstated and issued their own decree condemning those who supported the alliance with the king. And so, having achieved their greatest desire, namely the dissolution of the Boeotian League, they set out for the Peloponnese after they had summoned Servius Cornelius to Chalcis.
An assembly was arranged for them at Argos, where they asked the Achaeans for nothing except a contribution of 1,000 soldiers. This garrison was sent to protect Chalcis while the Roman army was on its way to Greece. As winter set in, Marcius and Atilius returned to Rome with their mission accomplished.
45. Around the same time a delegation was dispatched from Rome to travel throughout Asia and the islands; the three ambassadors were Tiberius Claudius, Spurius Postumius, and Marcus Junius. They went around encouraging the allies to join the Romans in undertaking the war against Perseus. The wealthier the city, the more carefully the ambassadors proceeded, for the smaller ones tended to be influenced by the authority of the greater ones. The Rhodians were considered to be of the greatest importance in every way, since they could not simply support the war, but also promote it actively with their own resources. On the proposal of Agesilochus, they had forty ships prepared. When he was their chief magistrate—what they call the prytanis—he had persuaded the Rhodians with speech after speech to abandon the hope of supporting kings, which they knew from experience to be useless, and to keep the Roman alliance, the only one in the world at that time to be counted on for strength or reliability; war with Perseus was imminent; the Romans would require the same naval equipment that they had seen in the previous war against Philip and more recently Antiochus; unless the Rhodians themselves had already started to repair the ships and to fit them out with crews, they would have to rush about madly if the fleet suddenly had to be made ready and dispatched all at the same time; it was all the more important to act vigorously so that the irrefutable testimony of their actions could disprove the accusations brought by Eumenes. Roused by these speeches, the Rhodians displayed their fleet of forty ships, equipped and furnished, to the Romans when they arrived so that it was obvious that no exhortations were needed. This delegation did much to tip the balance when it came to winning over minds among the cities of Asia. Only Decimius, tainted with the suspicion of having taken bribes from the Illyrian kings,* went back to Rome without having achieved anything.
46. When Perseus returned to Macedonia after his conference with the Romans, he sent ambassadors to Rome to pursue the peace negotiations he had embarked on with Marcius. Also, he wrote letters to Byzantium, Rhodes, and other cities and gave them to envoys to deliver. The substance of the letters was the same for everybody: that he had spoken with the Romans’ delegation; what had been said on both sides was presented in such a way as to make it seem that he had got the better in the debate. To the Rhodians, Perseus’ envoys added their complete confidence that there would be peace, on the grounds that Marcius and Atilius had authorized the sending of ambassadors to Rome; if the Romans continued to stir up war in contravention of the treaty, then the Rhodians should strive, with all their influence and with every resource, to re-establish the peace; if they accomplished nothing by entreaty, they would have to act to prevent the regulation and domination of the whole world from passing into the hands of a single people. This was advantageous for everyone else, but especially for the Rhodians inasmuch as they surpassed other cities in standing and resources; if everybody looked to the Romans alone, the Rhodians’ assets would become subject to Roman control.
The warmth of the reception for the ambassadors’ letter and speeches exceeded their weight in changing people’s minds: the influence of the nobles’ party had begun to prevail. The official response was that the Rhodians favoured peace: if there were a war, that the king should seek and expect nothing from the Rhodians that would sever the long-standing friendship between them and the Romans, forged by many great services in peace and war.
On the way back from Rhodes the envoys also went to the cities of Boeotia—Thebes,* Coronea, and Haliartus—thinking that these had been forced against their will to renounce the alliance with the king and attach themselves to the Romans. The Thebans did not yield an inch, although they were furious with the Romans for having condemned their leaders and having had the exiles recalled. The Coronaei and Haliarti, because of a certain inherent fondness for kings, sent envoys to Macedonia to request a garrison with which they could defend themselves against the Thebans’ wanton arrogance. This delegation was told by the king that he could not send a garrison because of the truce he had made with the Romans; but he urged them to avenge the Thebans’ transgressions in any way they could, provided that the Romans were not given reason to retaliate.
47. Upon their return to Rome, Marcius and Atilius made a formal report on their embassy on the Capitoline; they boasted above all that they had tricked the king with a truce and the hope of peace. For while they were completely unprepared for war, he had been so thoroughly ready that he could have seized all the key locations well before a Roman army reached Greece. But now, after the interval of a truce, they would meet on equal terms: the king would be no more prepared, and the Romans could start the war better equipped in every respect. They also boasted that they had skilfully fragmented the Boeotians’ league so that they could never again be linked to the king by mutual consent.
Most of the Senate approved of these actions as products of the highest strategic thinking; the older men and those who remembered traditional ways said that they could not recognize Roman practices in this embassy.* Their ancestors had not conducted war with trickery and nocturnal battles, nor by false retreats and the sudden resumption of fighting when the enemy had relaxed his guard, nor in order to glory in guile more than genuine courage; they were accustomed to declare war before waging it, even to announce and sometimes specify the place where they intended to fight.* In the same spirit of good faith Pyrrhus’ doctor was denounced to the king when he was plotting against his life; in the same spirit of good faith the betrayer of their children was bound and turned over to the Falisci.* These were the ways of the Roman, not the cunning of the Carthaginians nor the craftiness of the Greeks, for whom it was more glorious to fool an enemy than to overcome him by force. Occasionally, deceit can be momentarily more profitable than courage; but a man’s spirit is fully conquered only when he has been made to acknowledge that he has been defeated not by artifice* or misfortune, but in a just and righteous war where one force is pitted directly against the other. This was the opinion of the older men, who found the new and excessively clever wisdom less pleasing; but that part of the Senate for whom expediency mattered more than honour prevailed. Consequently, Marcius’ earlier embassy was approved, and he was also sent back to Greece with <…> quinqueremes and directed to do whatever else seemed to him to be in the best interests of the state. The senators also dispatched Aulus Atilius to occupy Larisa in Thessaly, fearing that if the time limit on the truce should expire, Perseus could send a garrison there and have the capital of Thessaly under his control. Atilius was directed to requisition 2,000 infantry from Gnaeus Sicinius to handle this assignment. Publius Lentulus, who had come back from Achaea, was given 300 Italian soldiers to try to keep Boeotia under control from Thebes.
48. Once these arrangements were made, the Senate agreed to give an audience to Perseus’ envoys,* despite the fact that plans for the war had been fixed. The envoys said almost exactly what the king had in the conference. They answered the charge of the conspiracy against Eumenes’ life with the greatest thoroughness but the least plausibility, for the case was clear. Everything else was an earnest entreaty. Their auditors’ minds, however, were incapable of being persuaded or swayed, and the Senate warned the delegation to remove itself beyond the city walls immediately and depart from Italy within thirty days.
Next, Publius Licinius, the consul who had been put in charge of Macedonia, was instructed to name the earliest possible day for the army to assemble. Gaius Lucretius, the praetor responsible for the fleet, set out from Rome with forty quinqueremes, as it had been agreed that some of the refurbished ships should be left near the city for other purposes. The praetor sent his brother, Marcus Lucretius, with a single quinquereme and instructions to join the fleet at Cephallania with ships collected from the allies, in accordance with the treaty. Gathering one trireme from Rhegium, two from Locri, and four from the territory of Uria, Marcus sailed along the shore of Italy, past the farthest promontory of Calabria and crossed the Ionian Sea to Dyrrachium. There he collected ten small craft from the Dyrrachini themselves, twelve from the Issaei, and fifty-four from King Gentius (accepting the pretence that they had been made ready for Roman use), and took all these to Corcyra two days later; from there he crossed directly to Cephallania. The praetor, Gaius Lucretius, set out from Naples, crossed the straits of Sicily, and arrived at Cephallania four days later. The fleet stood at anchor there, waiting until the land forces made the crossing and the supply ships that had fallen out of line while at sea should catch up.
49. In that same period, as it happened, the consul Publius Licinius pronounced vows on the Capitol, adopted military attire, and set out from the city. Such a departure is always conducted with great solemnity and majesty; it especially attracts people’s gaze and thoughts when they escort a consul setting out against an enemy who is endowed with consequence and renown, either for his innate character or for his good fortune. Not just respect for the office draws people, but also a passion for the spectacle itself, so that they can see the leader to whose authority and judgement they have entrusted the supreme defence of the state. Then their minds dwell on the hazards of war, the uncertainty of fortune, and the danger of combat for both sides: they think of defeats and victories, the disasters too often caused by imprudence and rashness on the part of leaders, but also the successes brought about by the virtues of foresight and courage. What mortal can know the character and luck of the consul they are sending to war? Will they soon see him holding a triumph and climbing the Capitol with his victorious army, on his way back to the same gods who attended his departure? Or will they be offering that joy to their enemies? In this particular case, he was being sent against King Perseus, who derived his reputation from the Macedonian people, renowned in war, and from his father Philip, distinguished for his many successful actions, even in the war with the Romans; from the time when Perseus had inherited the kingdom, his name and predictions of war had been constantly and inseparably discussed.
With such thoughts did men of every class accompany the consul on his departure. Two men of consular rank were sent with him as military tribunes, Gaius Claudius and Quintus Mucius; there were three prominent young men as well, Publius Lentulus and the two Manlii Acidini, one the son of Manius Manlius and the other of Lucius Manlius. Accompanied by them, the consul went to the army at Brundisium, and from there he crossed with his total force at Nymphaeum in the territory of Apollonia where he pitched camp.
50. A few days earlier Perseus held a council, once the ambassadors had returned from Rome and cut short any hope of peace. There were differing views, and the debate went on for some time. Some thought that some kind of indemnity should be paid, if the Romans assessed it, or that some territory had to be conceded, if the penalty took this form; in short, whatever had to be endured for the sake of peace should not be rejected; nor should the king undertake anything where he would be risking himself and his kingdom on a throw of the dice, since the stakes were so high. As long as his right to the kingdom remained undisputed, then many events could bring the time and day when, as well as recovering his losses, he could also become a source of fear to the very people whom he currently feared.
But a significant majority was of a more belligerent cast of mind.* They claimed that whatever concession he made, he would immediately have to concede his kingdom too. For the Romans did not need money or land; but they knew this, that everything mortal, most especially powerful kingdoms and empires, was susceptible to much misfortune: they themselves had smashed the might of the Carthaginians and placed them under the yoke of an overwhelmingly powerful king on their border; they had banished Antiochus and his descendants beyond the Taurus Mountains; the kingdom of Macedonia alone remained both close to them and seemingly capable, if the Roman people’s good fortune should fail them anywhere, of reanimating its kings with the spirit of yesteryear. So, while his resources were unimpaired, Perseus ought to make up his mind whether he preferred to concede everything bit by bit, until he was reduced to his last penny and an exile from his kingdom, or to beg the Romans to let him grow old, scorned and impoverished, on Samothrace* or some other island, a private citizen who had outlived his kingdom; or whether he chose to take up arms in defence of his station and his dignity—as was becoming to a man of courage—and either suffer whatever misfortune the war brought or, should he prove the victor, to liberate the world from Roman domination. It was no less unthinkable for the Romans to be driven out of Greece than that Hannibal was forced out of Italy. And, by Hercules, they did not see how it was consistent for him to have used force to preempt his brother’s unlawful attempt to take over the kingdom* and to yield it to outsiders after securing it for himself. Ultimately, their discussion of war and peace was predicated on the universal agreement that nothing is more shameful than to have surrendered without a fight, and that nothing is more glorious than to have risked everything for the sake of dignity and majesty.
51. The council was at Pella, the ancient royal seat of the Macedonians. The king proclaimed, ‘So then let us make war, since this seems best, and may the gods be favourable!’ He sent word to his governors and assembled all his forces at Citium, a town in Macedonia. He himself offered a sacrifice on a royal scale, with 100 animals for Minerva, whom the Macedonians call Alcidemos,* and then, with a band of courtiers* and bodyguards, he set out for Citium.
All the Macedonian and allied forces had gathered there. Perseus pitched his camp in front of the city and lined up all the soldiers in a plain.* The sum total of the forces was 43,000; nearly half of them were the phalanx troops commanded by Hippias of Beroea. From all the peltasts, there was a select force of 2,000 especially strong and youthful troops; this division is known as the ‘agema’* and was led by Leonnatus and Thrasippus, both Eulyestae.* Antiphilus of Edessa was in charge of the remaining peltasts, about 3,000 men. The Paeones from both Paroria and Parstrymonia—which lie on the edge of Thrace—and the Agrianes, mixed together with native Thracians, numbered about 3,000 also. These men had been armed and assembled by Didas of Paeonia, the person who had killed the young Demetrius.*
There were also 2,000 Gauls under arms, commanded by Asclepiodotus from Heraclea Sintice. The 3,000 free Thracians had their own general. About the same number of Cretans were under their own generals, Susus of Phalasarna and Syllus of Gnossus. And Leonides the Lacedaemonian was in charge of a mixed force of 500 Greeks. He was reputedly from the royal family, and had been sentenced to exile at a full meeting of the Achaeans, after his letters to Perseus were intercepted. The Achaean Lycon was in charge of the Aetolians and the Boeotians, who numbered at most 500 altogether. This mixture of so many peoples and so many races comprised an auxiliary force of approximately 12,000 soldiers.
The cavalry, drawn from all over Macedonia, numbered 3,000. Cotys, too, was there, the son of Seuthes and king of the Odrysae people; he had 1,000 select horsemen and nearly the same number of infantry. So the total of the entire army was 39,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. It was generally agreed that, except for the army Alexander the Great took to Asia, no Macedonian king had ever possessed so much manpower.
52. It was now the twenty-sixth year since Philip had sued for and been granted peace. Throughout this whole time Macedonia had remained free from war, producing a new generation, most of which was now of military age and, having engaged in skirmishes with their Thracian neighbours, had been tested but not worn out by nearly constant military activity. Since first Philip and then Perseus had long contemplated war against Rome, everything had been brought to the peak of readiness.
The troops were lined up for battle and went through a brief practice manoeuvre, not a fully fledged one, but enough to show that they had done more than stand at arms; and exactly as they were, in full battle gear, they were summoned by Perseus to an assembly. He stood on the tribunal with his two sons at his side: the elder was Philip, who was his brother by birth but a son by adoption; the younger one, known as Alexander, was his biological child. Perseus urged the soldiers on to war. He recalled the Romans’ insulting behaviour towards him and his father: how all these indignities had driven the latter to rise up against his conquerors, and how Philip had been overtaken by fate in the midst of his preparations for war; as for Perseus himself, the Romans had simultaneously sent ambassadors to him and soldiers to occupy the cities of Greece. Then the winter had been taken up with a misleading conference,* ostensibly for the sake of re-establishing peace, but actually so that they would have time to prepare. Now the consul was on his way with two Roman legions, each consisting of 6,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, and nearly the same number of allied foot and horse. Supposing in addition there were auxiliary troops from the kings, Eumenes and Masinissa, there would be no more than 27,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry.
Now that they had heard about the enemy numbers, Perseus said, the Macedonian forces should consider their own army, specifically how superior they were in both number and quality to those raw recruits hastily pressed into service. They themselves had been trained from boyhood in the art of fighting and had been disciplined and toughened by so many campaigns. The Roman auxiliaries were Lydians and Phrygians and Numidians while theirs were Thracians and Gauls, the fiercest of all races. Among their opponents, each poverty-stricken soldier had what weaponry he could provide for himself; the Macedonians were equipped from the royal stockpiles, accumulated over many years through his father’s care and outlay. The Romans’ supplies would be coming to them from a great distance, subject to all the accidents that happen at sea; but he had set aside ten years’ worth of both money and grain, in addition to the profits from the mines. Everything that could be prepared with the gods’ favour and the king’s care, the Macedonians had in full and abundant supply. So, said Perseus, it was up to them to show that same spirit possessed by their ancestors, who subjugated Europe completely before crossing to Asia and opening up by military force a world unknown even by word of mouth; they had not stopped conquering until there was nothing this side of the Red Sea* left for them to conquer.
But now, by Hercules, Fortune had announced a competition not for the most remote shores of India but for control of Macedonia itself. The Romans, when they fought against his father, had flaunted a specious banner about the liberation of Greece; now they openly sought to enslave Macedonia so that there would not be a king on the border of their empire and no race distinguished in warfare could retain a military arsenal. For if the Macedonians wished to refrain from war and give in to the Romans’ demands, they would have to hand over to arrogant masters not just their king and their kingdom, but also their weapons.
53. Throughout the speech Perseus was applauded enthusiastically at frequent intervals. But at that moment there arose such a roar from the men—simultaneously threatening and full of indignation, but partly also urging the king to have confidence—that Perseus brought his words to a close and ordered the troops to prepare for the march; for word was already going around that the Romans were moving out from their encampment at Nymphaeum.
After dismissing the assembly, Perseus turned to receiving delegations from the cities of Macedonia. These had come to promise for the war grain and whatever cash each one could. He thanked them all but refused every offer, saying that the royal stockpiles were sufficient for his needs. He requisitioned only vehicles to transport the catapults, the huge supply of missiles already prepared, and other military equipment.
Then he set out with his entire army for Eordaea; they made camp at the lake known as Begorritis; the following day he advanced into Elimea to the Haliacmon river. Then he traversed the so-called Cambunian Mountains through a narrow pass and made his way down to Azorus, Pythium, and Doliche; the locals call them Tripolis. These three towns hesitated for a time because they had given hostages to the people of Larisa,* but faced with an immediate threat they surrendered. Perseus spoke to them in a friendly way. He was convinced that the Perrhaebi too would choose surrender; the inhabitants exhibited no hesitation, and he took over the city of <…> as soon as he arrived. He was forced to assault Chyretiae and moreover was driven back on the first day by a fierce onslaught of soldiers at the gate; the following day, he attacked in full strength and received everyone’s capitulation by nightfall.
54. The next town, Mylae, was so thoroughly fortified that insuperable confidence in the fortifications made the residents more aggressive; not satisfied with barring the gates before the king, they hurled impudent insults at him and the Macedonians. Since this behaviour made the invaders all the more keen to attack, the defenders, with no hope of mercy, were forced to become yet more active in their own self-protection. And so for three days the city was besieged and defended with great spirit on both sides. The large number of Macedonians ensured a constant stream of reinforcements to keep up the fighting; but the townspeople, with the same men guarding the walls day and night, grew exhausted from wounds and sleepless nights and the ceaseless struggle. On the fourth day, when ladders were being set up all around the walls and extra pressure was being applied to the gate, the townsfolk repulsed an attack on the walls and gathered to protect the gate by rushing forth in a sudden sally against the enemy. Since unthinking passion more than true belief in their strength impelled them, the small band of weary men was forced back by fresh troops. They turned their backs, and fleeing through the open gate, allowed the enemy in. And so the city was seized and looted; also the persons of free birth who survived the slaughter were put up for sale.
Abandoning the city, almost completely sacked and burned, Perseus moved his base to Phalanna and the following day went on to Gyrton. Learning there that Titus Minucius Rufus and Hippias, the chief magistrate of the Thessalians, had entered it with a garrison, he did not even attempt to assail it but went on his way and took Elatia and Gonnus, where his unexpected arrival had petrified the inhabitants. Both towns lie in the pass where one approaches Tempe, but Gonnus is closer, so he left it guarded with a more substantial garrison of cavalry and infantry, as well as with a triple ditch and rampart.
He himself proceeded to Sycurium and decided to await the approach of the enemy there; at the same time he told his army to forage widely in the adjacent enemy territory, for Sycurium is in the foothills of Mount Ossa. Where Ossa slopes down to the south, it commands the plains of Thessaly; Macedonia and Magnesia lie to its rear. In addition to these advantages were the very wholesome climate and the abundance of water, which lasts all year and flows from multiple surrounding springs.
55. In this same period the Roman consul was en route to Thessaly with his army. Initially his progress through Epirus was easy, but subsequently, after he had crossed into Athamania, where the terrain was rough and nearly pathless, it was only with great difficulty that he made his way to Gomphi by slow stages. Had the king drawn up his forces at the time and place of his choosing and challenged the consul while he was leading this inexperienced army of exhausted men and horses, even the Romans acknowledge that they would have suffered a major reverse.* So once the consul reached Gomphi without a fight, beyond the joy at having crossed through a dangerous pass, the Romans felt contempt for enemies who were so blind to their own best chances. The consul offered the proper sacrifice, distributed food to the soldiers, and waited for a few days to rest the animals and his men. Then he heard that the Macedonians were criss-crossing Thessaly freely and pillaging the fields of the allies. Since his troops were sufficiently rested by then, he marched to Larisa. When he was about three miles away, he pitched camp at Tripolis, which they call Scaea, overlooking the Peneus river.
Meanwhile Eumenes arrived in Chalcis with the navy, accompanied by his brothers Attalus and Athenaeus; he had left his brother Philetaurus at Pergamum to look after the kingdom. Leaving Athenaeus at Chalcis in charge of 2,000 infantry, Eumenes took Attalus, 4,000 infantry, and 1,000 cavalry and joined the consul. The other Roman allies from all over Greece assembled there too, but most of these were so few that they have been forgotten. The people of Apollonia sent 300 cavalry and 100 infantry; from the Aetolians came the equivalent of one cavalry squadron, which was their entire mounted force; there were still at most 300 Thessalians in the Roman camp, although the hope had been for their entire cavalry; the Achaeans contributed around 1,500 of their young men, who were mostly equipped with Cretan weaponry.
56. Also during the same period, the praetor who was in charge of the fleet at Cephallania, Gaius Lucretius, instructed his brother, Marcus Lucretius, to sail with the fleet around Cape Malea to Chalcis while he himself took a trireme to the Gulf of Corinth to secure control of Boeotia. His voyage was rather slow because he was ill. When Marcus Lucretius reached Chalcis, he heard that Publius Lentulus was attacking Haliartus, so he sent a messenger to direct him, by the praetor’s orders, to withdraw. The lieutenant, who had mounted the attack with Boeotian youths who were Roman sympathizers, withdrew from the walls. His abandonment of the siege created the opportunity for it to be resumed anew: in fact, Marcus Lucretius immediately invested Haliartus with troops from the fleet: 10,000 armed men as well as the 2,000 of Eumenes’ men who had been left with Athenaeus. Just as they were preparing to attack, the praetor arrived from Creusa.
Around the same time, ships from the allies gathered at Chalcis: there were two Carthaginian quinqueremes, two triremes from Heraclea on the Pontus, four from Chalcedon and another four from Samos, and five quadriremes from Rhodes. The praetor sent these back to the allies since there was no fighting going on at sea. Quintus Marcius also came to Chalcis with his ships;* he had taken Phthiotic Alope and attacked so-called ‘Hanging’ Larisa.*
Such was the state of affairs in Boeotia while Perseus was encamped at Sycurium, as noted above. Once the crops in the immediate neighbourhood had been harvested, he sent troops to pillage the territory of Pherae. His scheme was to be able to entrap the Romans as they were drawn further and further from their camp to help the cities of their allies. When he observed that this raiding did not prompt them to move at all, he recalled his troops to camp and distributed the booty (except for the human beings) among his troops; most of it consisted of various types of livestock, and so it served for a feast.
57. Then the consul and the king held simultaneous councils of war to discuss how to commence their military operations. Confidence was high among the king’s advisers because the enemy had not interfered with their pillaging of Pheraean land. Consequently they thought that the king should proceed directly to the enemy’s camp without giving the Romans opportunity for further delay. The Romans, too, recognized that their hesitation shamed them in the eyes of their allies, who deeply resented the fact that the Pheraeans had not been given any assistance.
While the Romans—and Eumenes and Attalus, who were also at the meeting—were considering what to do, an alarmed messenger reported that the enemy was at hand with a large force. The council was dismissed, and the signal was immediately given to take up arms. It was decided to send out 100 cavalry and the same number of javelin-throwers (on foot) from Eumenes’ forces. Around the fourth hour of the day, when Perseus was a little more than a mile from the Roman encampment, he ordered the infantry to halt. He rode out with his cavalry and skirmishers; Cotys and the leaders of the other auxiliaries accompanied him. They were less than half a mile from the Roman camp when the enemy cavalry came into view:* there were two squadrons of the cavalry, mostly Galatians commanded by Cassignatus, and about 150 light-armed Mysians and Cretans. The king paused, uncertain about the strength of the enemy. Then he dispatched from his column two Thracian squadrons, two Macedonian squadrons, and two cohorts of Cretans and Thracians. The battle proved indecisive since they were fighting with equal numbers and neither side received reinforcements. Around thirty of Eumenes’ men died, including the Galatian leader Cassignatus.
At that point Perseus withdrew his forces to Sycurium; but the next day, at the same time, he moved his troops into position in the same place. Carts with water accompanied them, for the twelve-mile route had no water and a great deal of dust; and it was clear the soldiers would have had to fight in a dehydrated condition if they had engaged at the first sight of the enemy. Since the Romans made no move, having withdrawn even their outposts within their defences, the king’s army also returned to camp. The royal forces followed the same procedure for several days, hoping that the Roman cavalry would attack the rear of their column as they withdrew and that, once the fight was under way, they could lure the Romans farther from their camp; at that moment, wherever they happened to be, they could easily reverse the tide of battle since they were superior in cavalry and skirmishers.
58. When this strategy failed, the king moved his camp closer to the enemy and fortified a site five miles away. Then, at dawn, Perseus drew up the line of infantry in the same place as usual and marched his entire cavalry and light-armed forces up to the camp of the enemy. The sight of the cloud of dust, both closer and thicker than before, triggered alarm in the Romans’ camp. At first they did not really believe the man who spread the word, as every day previously the enemy had never appeared before the fourth hour; this time it was sunrise. Then the shouting and rushing back of many men from the gates dispelled all doubt. Total panic struck. The tribunes, prefects, and centurions rushed to the consul’s quarters while the soldiers ran to their tents.
Perseus had drawn up his men less than half a mile from the outer wall, around a small hill called Callinicus.* King Cotys commanded the left wing with all his people; the cavalry squadrons alternated with the light-armed troops. The Macedonian cavalry was on the right wing, with the Cretans interspersed among their squadrons; Midon of Beroea commanded the light-armed troops, and Meno of Antigonea the cavalry and the unit as a whole. Just within the wing positions were stationed the king’s cavalry and a mixed group consisting of the elite auxiliaries of several peoples: Patrocles of Antigonea and Didas, the governor of Paeonia, commanded these forces. The king was in the very middle, surrounded by the unit they call the agema and the cavalry of the Sacred Squadron.* Perseus posted the slingers and the javelin-throwers out in front of him: each division had 400 men; he put Ion of Thessalonica and Artemon, from Dolopia, in charge of them. Such was the arrangement of the king’s forces.
The consul had the infantry drawn up within the outer wall, and he sent out the entire cavalry along with the light-armed troops; they were drawn up in front of the wall. The consul’s brother, Gaius Licinius Crassus, commanded the right wing, comprised of the entire Italian cavalry interspersed with skirmishers; on the left, Marcus Valerius Laevinus led the allied cavalry from Greece; the Greeks’ light-armed troops occupied the centre of the line, together with special elite cavalry under Quintus Mucius. Out in front of the standards of these men 200 Gallic horsemen were drawn up, as well as 300 Cyrtii from Eumenes’ auxiliaries. Four hundred Thessalian horsemen were positioned slightly beyond the left wing. King Eumenes and Attalus were stationed with their entire force at the rear, between the last row of troops and the wall.
59. When the columns were drawn up more or less in this fashion, with nearly equal numbers of cavalry and light-armed troops on each side, they rushed together. The fighting started between the slingers and javelin-throwers, who had been sent out ahead. Right at the start the Thracians, acting like wild animals released from lengthy captivity, hurled themselves with such shouting against the Italian cavalry on the right wing that they unnerved their opponents, although normally they were fearless because of their experience and aptitude for war. Wielding long spears, the Thracians at one moment attacked the infantry, at another slashed the horses’ legs, and at another pierced their sides.
Charging the centre, Perseus scattered the Greeks with his first assault.* They were routed, and the enemy pressed hard on their heels. At first the Thessalian cavalry had been mere observers, held as reserves a slight distance from the left wing and apart from the fray, but they proved most useful when the battle had turned against the Romans. By gradually giving way, but maintaining formation, they joined Eumenes’ auxiliaries, and together with him they provided their allies with a safe retreat between their own ranks, as the men scattered in their flight; and, as the enemy pressed forward in only loose formation, the Thessalians even had the nerve to advance and gathered up many of their men fleeing towards them. The king’s men, already dispersed in the general pursuit, did not dare to join battle with the Thessalian cavalry as it approached steadily in battle order.
Just as the king, having won the cavalry battle, cried out that his triumph would have been complete if the infantry had contributed even the slightest push, his phalanx opportunely appeared. For Hippias and Leonnatus had heard that the cavalry had been victorious and on their own initiative hastily brought forward this force in order to join the daring enterprise. As the king hesitated, caught between hope and apprehension at taking such a bold step, Evander the Cretan, whose services he had relied on in the plot against Eumenes at Delphi, spotted the column of infantry advancing under its standards. He raced up to the king and strenuously advised him not to be elated by luck and risk everything on a needless throw of the dice; if, satisfied with the current success, he stopped for the day, he would have either the preconditions for an honourable peace or more allies for the war, who would flock to the winning side should he choose to fight on. The king’s mind was receptive to this advice, and so, praising Evander, he ordered the standards to be reversed, the infantry to march back to camp, and the cavalry’s retreat to be sounded.
60. That day the Romans lost 200 horsemen and no fewer than 2,000 infantry; around 600 were taken prisoner. On the king’s side, though, twenty horsemen and forty infantrymen fell. All the victors were in high spirits as they returned to camp, but the Thracians outdid the rest with their coarse glee; they rode back singing and carrying enemy heads fixed on their spears.
Among the Romans there was not just sorrow because the battle had gone badly, but also anxiety that the enemy might make an immediate assault on the camp. Eumenes urged the consul to transfer it across the Peneus so that they could use the river for protection until the distressed soldiers’ morale revived. The shame of admitting his fear galled the consul, but reason won out, and he led his forces across in the silence of the night and fortified a camp on the farther bank.
The next day the king set out to provoke his enemies into fighting. When he saw them safely encamped on the other side of the river, he acknowledged that he had in fact erred by not having pressed home the victory the day before, but that it was rather more serious to have given up overnight. For, even had he deployed none of his other men and sent out just the light-armed troops, the majority of his opponents might have been wiped out during their panic-stricken crossing of the river.
Safe in their camp, the Romans had indeed shaken off their fear for the moment; but, among the other factors, the damage to their reputation disturbed them the most. And in a meeting presided over by the consul, one by one each man blamed the Aetolians:* they had been the source of the panic and flight; the rest of the Greek allies had copied the Aetolians’ fear. The five Aetolian leaders who were said to have been seen first turning their backs were sent to Rome. The Thessalians were praised in an assembly, and their leaders were also given special gifts for their bravery.
61. The spoils from the enemy casualties were brought to the king. These he conferred as gifts: remarkable weapons to some, horses to others, slaves to certain others. There were more than 1,500 shields; the corslets and sets of body armour totalled more than 1,000; even greater was the number of helmets, swords, and missiles of every type. These gifts, which were impressive and pleasing in themselves, were amplified by the words of the king when he assembled his troops to address them:
‘You have before you a war with a foregone conclusion. You routed the Roman cavalry, which was the strength of the enemy forces and which they vaunted as invincible. Their cavalry is composed of their most prominent young men, and the cavalry in turn is the nursery of their Senate: from there they choose consuls to be enrolled as “fathers”; from there they choose their generals. Just now we distributed among you spoils from these men. No less do you have victory over the legions of the infantry: escaping you by fleeing under cover of night, they filled the river with the terror of shipwrecked men as they swam all over the place. Crossing the Peneus will be easier for us, when we are pursuing defeated men, than it was for them in their fear. As soon as we reach the other side, we will assail their camp, which we would have taken today had they not fled. And if they wish to challenge us in combat, you may expect the same outcome from an infantry contest as in the cavalry battle.’
His victorious forces, hot-blooded, their shoulders draped with the spoils of their slaughtered opponents, drank in his approval of them, and based their expectations of the future on what had transpired. And the infantry, especially those in the Macedonian phalanxes, fired by their comrades’ glory, desired to serve their king and to win for themselves equal glory from the enemy. The assembly was dismissed, and the next day the king went to Mopselus and set up camp there.* This is a knoll that rises up before Tempe, and it is about halfway from Larisa for one travelling to Gonnus.
62. The Romans stayed along the bank of the Peneus, but transferred their camp to a more secure location. They were joined there by the Numidian Misacenes, who came with 1,000 cavalry, the same number of infantry, and twenty-two elephants.
In this period the king held a meeting about the general state of affairs. Since the overconfidence born of his success had subsided, some of his friends dared to recommend that he take advantage of his good luck to seek favourable peace-terms, rather than let unwarranted expectations lead him into irreversible misfortune. They said that it was characteristic of the wise man, whose success was well earned, to set a limit on it and not to put too much trust in the sunny skies of momentary good fortune. The king should send men to the consul to renew the treaty with the same terms on which his father Philip had accepted peace from Titus Quinctius Flamininus, after the latter’s victory. There was no more splendid way to end a war than with such a memorable battle, and no firmer assurance of lasting peace could be given than one that could make the Romans, weakened by their loss, more inclined to come to terms. But if the Romans, with their innate stubbornness, should then reject fair terms, gods and men alike would be witnesses to both Perseus’ restraint and the Romans’ bottomless arrogance. The king’s mind was never disposed to reject such advice and so, since this position met with the approval of the majority, it was adopted.
The envoys sent to the consul were heard out in a fully attended meeting. They asked for peace, guaranteeing in return that Perseus would make as large a financial contribution as his father Philip had promised and that he would cede as soon as possible those cities, fields, and places that his father had. Such was the envoys’ offer. During the consultation that took place after their departure, Roman resolve prevailed. In those days it was their practice to maintain a positive outlook in adversity and to contain their joy when conditions turned favourable. They decided to answer that peace would be granted if the king gave the Senate the unconditional right to decide every matter concerning the king and all of Macedonia.
When the envoys brought this response, the Romans’ characteristic stubbornness stunned those unfamiliar with it, and most people rejected any further discussion of peace, saying that the men who had scorned their offer would soon be begging for it. The very same arrogance, however, unnerved Perseus, on the grounds that it must come from total confidence in their power. He increased the amount of money, as if he could buy peace, and he persisted in trying to sway the consul’s mind. But the consul did not deviate from the original answer, and the king despaired of peace. Returning to Sycurium, where he had started out, he prepared to chance the fortunes of war again.
63. As word of the cavalry battle spread through Greece,* the direction of popular sentiment became manifest. Not just supporters of Macedonia, but the large number who were indebted to the Romans for considerable favours—and some too who had encountered Perseus’ might and arrogance—rejoiced to hear the news; they had no other reason than that vulgar enthusiasm for favouring a puny underdog that the common herd indeed adopts at sporting events.
Meanwhile, in Boeotia the praetor Lucretius was vigorously prosecuting the siege of Haliartus. The besieged party, who had no outside help and expected none (other than the youth of Coronea, who had slipped within the walls at the beginning of the siege), nevertheless resisted, though more by willpower than by actual strength. They made frequent attacks on the siege-works; and when a battering ram was moved into position, they crushed it to the ground, now with huge rocks and now with a leaden weight; and any place they failed to prevent it from smashing the wall, they built an emergency fortification at the break, hastily piling up pieces of masonry left over from the destruction.
As the siege-works were not advancing the assault rapidly enough, the praetor ordered ladders to be distributed amongst the maniples so that he could mount a comprehensive attack on the walls by encircling them. He calculated that his numbers would suffice for this purpose since it was neither important nor possible to attack the section of the city ringed by swampland. He himself marched 2,000 select troops up to the section where two turrets and what was left of the wall that had been between them had collapsed. His intention was to attempt to cross the ruins so that while the townsfolk made a counter-assault on him, whatever other part of the wall was left defenceless could be taken by the men with their ladders. The townspeople vigorously prepared themselves to repel his assault. They heaped bundles of dry brushwood in the ruin-strewn area; and standing there with burning torches, they threatened to ignite the barrier so that a fiery barricade between them and the enemy would allow them time to interpose an inner wall. Chance interfered with their effort: suddenly rain pounded down so heavily that it made lighting anything difficult and extinguished what was already burning. And so it was that a passage opened up through the smoking, scattered brushwood and, with everyone focused on the defence of that one place, the walls too were taken from the ladders in many locations simultaneously. In the immediate chaos of the city’s defeat, the elderly and the young who happened to be in the way were cut down at random; the armed men fled together to the citadel. But the next day they surrendered and were sold into slavery, for no hope remained. There were in fact about 2,500 of them. The adornments of the city, statues, paintings, and any kind of valuable booty, were taken down to the ships; the city was razed to the ground.
From there the army marched to Thebes, where it was admitted without resistance. The praetor entrusted the city to the exiles and those belonging to the Roman faction; he auctioned the property of men from the other faction and that of supporters of the king and the Macedonians. After these actions in Boeotia, the praetor returned to the sea and the fleet.
64. During this activity in Boeotia, Perseus spent several days encamped at Sycurium. Then he heard that the Romans were hastily seizing crops reaped from fields round about, that the soldiers were then husking the ears in front of their tents so that the grain could be ground more pure, and that they had made great heaps of straw throughout the camp. This struck Perseus as the perfect chance to start a fire, and so he ordered torches, pine wood, and flammable projectiles of tow smeared with pitch to be made ready. He set out in the middle of the night so that his approach at dawn might go unnoticed. But the outposts were seized in vain: the uproar and tumult of their men roused the others, and the signal to take up arms was given immediately. The soldiers took their positions simultaneously along the wall and at the gates. Any hope of an assault was lost. Perseus immediately counter-marched his battle line and ordered the equipment carts to go first and then the infantry, preceded by their standards. He himself remained with the cavalry and the light-armed troops to bring up the rear; his thought was—and this is what happened—that the enemy would try to pick off the end of the column. The light-armed troops were involved in a skirmish, mostly with individuals making sallies; the cavalry and infantry returned to camp without any trouble.
After harvesting the crops in that area, the Romans moved their camp to Crannon, where the fields lay untouched.* They felt secure having their base there, both because of the remote location and because of the lack of water along the route between Sycurium and Crannon. Early one morning, however, the king’s cavalry and lightarmed troops unexpectedly appeared on the hills overlooking the camp and caused widespread panic. These forces had set out from Sycurium at noon the day before; at daybreak they had left the column of infantry on the nearest plain. Perseus waited on the hillside for a little, thinking that the Romans’ cavalry might be lured into battle. When they did not come out, he sent a horseman to order the infantry to withdraw to Sycurium, and he followed shortly afterwards. The Roman cavalry pursued them at a slight distance in order to be able at any point to attack stragglers or anyone who fell out of formation; but once the Romans perceived Perseus’ forces retreating in an orderly fashion, remaining in formation rank by rank, they too returned to camp.
65. And so the king, vexed at the length of the journey, moved his camp to Mopselus; and the Romans, having harvested the crops of Crannon, moved on to the land around Phalanna. When the king learned from a deserter that the Romans were criss-crossing the fields there freely, without any armed protection, and were cutting down crops, he set out with <…> cavalry and 2,000 Thracians and Cretans. Travelling in loose formation they made as much speed as possible and caught up with the unsuspecting Romans. Nearly 1,000 carts with their teams, most fully laden, were seized along with about 600 men. The king delegated the protection of the booty and the task of bringing it back to camp to 300 Cretans. He himself regrouped the cavalry, which was engaged in widespread slaughter, and together with the infantry advanced on the nearest outpost, assuming that not much of a fight would be required to overpower it.
Lucius Pompeius was the military tribune in charge. He withdrew his troops, who had been shaken by the enemy’s sudden approach, to a nearby hill and prepared to use the location to defend himself since he was ill-matched in numbers and strength. He gathered the soldiers into a circle there so that they could protect themselves from arrows and javelins by interlocking their shields. Perseus surrounded the hill with his soldiers, ordering some of them to try to assail it on all sides and to engage in hand-to-hand combat, and directing others to launch missiles from farther away.
Extreme terror engulfed the Romans, for packed together they could not repel those who were struggling up the hill, and whenever they broke ranks for a sally, they exposed themselves to darts and arrows. The cestrosphondene in particular inflicted heavy damage. It was a new type of weapon, invented for that war. A jagged projectile, the length of two hands, was attached to a shaft that was half a forearm long and as thick as a finger; three thin fir-wood ridges were twisted around it, as with arrows; the sling had in the middle two thongs of unequal length; when the slinger balanced a projectile in it and swung it by the strap with great torque, the projectile was discharged and shot out like a missile.*
When some of the Romans had been wounded by this and every other kind of missile and in their state of exhaustion they could scarcely hold their weapons, the king pressed them to surrender, offered pledges of good faith, and at times held out rewards. He could not sway the resolution of one single person, and then unexpectedly a gleam of hope shone forth when they had consigned themselves to death. For when those of the foragers who escaped reported to the consul that the outpost was completely surrounded, he was concerned by the danger to so many citizens—there were about 800 of them and all Romans—and set out from camp with the cavalry and the lightarmed troops, joined by the new auxiliaries, that is, the Numidian infantry, cavalry, and elephants; and he ordered the military tribunes to follow with the legions. He led the way to the hill with the light-armed troops of the auxiliaries, backed up by his skirmishers. At the consul’s side were Eumenes, Attalus, and the Numidian prince Misacenes.
66. At the first sight of their comrades’ standards, the beleaguered Romans, who had indeed been on the edge of despair, experienced renewed confidence. Perseus should have been content in the first place with his fortuitous success (the capture and killing of some of the foragers) and should not have wasted his time trying to take the outpost; alternatively, having made some sort of assault on it, he should have escaped while he could, once he knew that he did not have enough manpower with him. Instead, carried away by his success, he himself awaited the enemy’s approach and hastily sent some men to summon the phalanx. This force would have arrived too late for the circumstances and in a rush, and while still in complete disarray from its hasty approach, would have found itself facing troops that were organized and marshalled for combat.
The consul was the first to arrive and immediately joined battle. At first the Macedonians fought back. They were unevenly matched in every aspect; they had already lost 300 infantry and twenty-four cavalrymen from the elite wing known as the Sacred Squadron; even its commander, Antimachus, was one of the victims. Then they tried to retreat, but the escape route was practically more chaotic than the battle itself. The phalanx that had been summoned by the terrified messenger was marching on the double when it came to a standstill, blocked at a narrow spot first by the column of captives and then by the wagons laden with grain. There was great confusion on both sides. No one would wait for the column of captives to be led out of the way somehow or other, but the troops toppled the carts down the hill—for there was no other way to clear a passage—and whipped the mules to the point where they attacked the crowd. Scarcely had the soldiers extracted themselves from the disorder of the column of captives when they ran into the king’s battle column and his defeated cavalry. Then, moreover, the outcry from those directing the phalanx to retreat caused a panic bordering on total collapse: if their enemies had dared to enter the pass and pursue them further, they could have inflicted a crushing defeat. But the consul rescued the garrison from the hilltop and, content with the modest success, led his forces back to camp.
According to some sources, there was a major battle on that occasion: the enemy lost 8,000 men, including the king’s generals Sopater and Antipater; about 2,800 were taken alive; and twenty-seven standards were seized. Nor did the Romans escape without loss: over 4,300 of the consul’s army died, and five standards were taken from the allied left wing.
67. That day reinvigorated the Romans and demoralized Perseus. Having spent a few days at Mopselus, mostly seeing to the burial of the men he had lost, he left a sufficiently strong garrison at Gonnus and retreated to Macedonia. He instructed someone named Timotheus, one of his commanders whom he left with a small troop at Phila, to try to win over Magnesia from close at hand. Back at Pella, Perseus sent his troops into their winter quarters and went to Thessalonica with Cotys. There was a story circulating there that a Thracian prince named Autlesbis and Corragus, one of Eumenes’ commanders, had invaded Cotys’ territory and taken over the region known as Marene. Accordingly Perseus, thinking that he should let Cotys defend his own kingdom, sent him on his way with generous gifts; he gave Cotys’ cavalry 200 talents, or half a year’s wage, although he had initially agreed to pay them for a year’s service.
Once the consul heard that Perseus had left, he moved his camp to Gonnus to see whether he could take over the town. Situated in the very gateway to Tempe, the town provides Macedonia with an extremely secure barrier and offers the Macedonians an unobstructed descent into Thessaly. Given the impregnability of the location and its strong garrison, the consul abandoned the enterprise. Redirecting his route into Perrhaebia he took Malloea with a single assault and destroyed it; then he recovered Tripolis as well as the rest of Perrhaebia and returned to Larisa.
From there he sent Eumenes and Attalus home and distributed Misacenes and the Numidians into winter quarters in the nearest Thessalian cities. He also spread some of his troops around Thessaly so that they could have comfortable winter quarters and provide protection for the cities. He dispatched his subordinate Quintus Mucius with 2,000 men to occupy Ambracia, and he dismissed all the allies from the Greek communities except for the Achaeans. He himself took part of the army to Phthiotic Achaea where he razed Pteleum* to the ground (deserted after the townspeople had fled) and accepted the voluntary surrender of Antronae from its inhabitants. Then he moved his army to Larisa. The city itself had been abandoned; the entire population had retreated to the citadel. This he prepared to attack. The Macedonian troops installed by the king were terrified and left first; once they had been abandoned, the townspeople immediately gave themselves up. Just as the consul was debating whether to attack Demetrias or to investigate the situation in Boeotia first, the Thebans, harassed by the Coronaei, asked him to come to Boeotia. In response to their appeals and because Boeotia was a better place to winter than Magnesia, he marched his army there.