1. During the same summer that these events were happening in Thessaly, the consul sent <…> as his lieutenant to Illyricum to attack two wealthy towns. This commander overpowered Ceremia and forced it to submit. Then he returned everything to the proper owner, intending to foster a belief in his clemency and thereby win over the inhabitants of Carnus, which was fortified. When he failed either to drive the Carni into surrendering or to take their city by siege, he looted Ceremia, previously left untouched, so that his army would derive some benefit from the exhausting labour of the two sieges.
The other consul, Gaius Cassius, accomplished nothing of note in Gaul, the province that he had been allotted; he then made a fruitless attempt to lead his legions through Illyricum into Macedonia. Word that the consul had embarked on this journey reached the Senate through envoys from Aquileia. They were complaining that their colony was young, insecure, and not yet sufficiently fortified against the hostile peoples of the Istrians and the Illyrians. The envoys begged the Senate to have some regard for its defence. When asked whether they wished to have the task entrusted to the consul Gaius Cassius, the envoys answered that Cassius had pressed troops into service at Aquileia and departed for Macedonia via Illyricum.
At first this seemed unbelievable, and the senators all assumed that the consul was making war on the Carni or perhaps the Istrians. The Aquileienses replied that they neither knew nor dared to assert anything more than that thirty days’ worth of food had been given to the soldiers and that guides who knew the routes from Italy to Macedonia had been sought out and taken along. The Senate was outraged that the consul had been so bold as to abandon his own province, cross into another’s, lead an army by an unfamiliar, treacherous route amongst foreign peoples, and leave the way into Italy open to so many peoples.* In a full session they decreed that Gaius Sulpicius, the praetor, should name three envoys from the Senate to set out from Rome that very day and to track down Gaius Cassius as quickly as possible, wherever he might be. They were to communicate to him that he was not to attack anybody except those the Senate had voted he should wage war on. The men who went as envoys were Marcus Cornelius Cethegus, Marcus Fulvius, and Publius Marcius Rex. For the time being, anxiety about the consul and his army postponed concern about fortifying Aquileia.
2. Next some representatives from several peoples of the two Spanish provinces were brought before the Senate. They complained about the greed and arrogance of Roman officials; on bended knee they begged the Senate not to let Rome’s own allies be robbed and persecuted more scandalously than its enemies. The ambassadors bewailed other outrages too, and it was indeed clear that their property had been seized. As a result, Lucius Canuleius, the praetor who had drawn Spain as his lot, was charged with appointing five assessors of senatorial rank for each man from whom the Spaniards were demanding restitution; in addition, Canuleius was to give the Spaniards the power to choose whichever patrons they wished to act as their advocates. The representatives were summoned to the Curia where the Senate’s decree was read aloud, and they were directed to name their advocates. Four were named: Marcus Porcius Cato, Publius Cornelius Scipio (the son of Gnaeus), Lucius Aemilius Paullus, and Gaius Sulpicius Galus.*
The assessors began with Marcus Titinius, who had been the praetor in Nearer Spain during the consulship of Aulus Manlius and Marcus Junius.* Twice they deferred judgement on the defendant; on the third occasion they found him innocent. Then a difference of opinion arose between the representatives from the two provinces: the people from Nearer Spain wanted Marcus Cato and Publius Scipio as their advocates while those from Farther Spain wanted Lucius Paullus and Sulpicius Galus. Publius Furius Philo was brought up before the assessors by the people of Nearer Spain and Marcus Matienus by those from Farther Spain. Furius had been a praetor three years earlier, in the consulship of Spurius Postumius and Quintus Mucius,* and Matienus had held the office two years before, during the consulship of Lucius Postumius and Marcus Popillius.* They were charged with very grave crimes, and their cases were deferred. When the trial began anew, the defence offered on their behalf was that they had gone into exile. Furius went to Praeneste for his exile and Matienus to Tibur.
There was a rumour that the advocates were precluding accusations against well-known and powerful men. The praetor Canuleius compounded this suspicion by discontinuing the proceedings and turning to conducting the draft; he then abruptly departed for his province before more men could be harassed by the Spaniards. Although the events of the past were thus obliterated by silence, the Senate issued a decree on behalf of the Spaniards for the future. By its terms no Roman magistrate was to assess the value of grain for purposes of taxation, or to compel Spaniards to sell their one-twentieth quotas at a price of his choice; and local governors were not to be installed in Spanish towns to exact money.*
3. There was yet another delegation from Spain, from a completely new class of men. They explained that they were sons of Roman soldiers and Spanish women, who were not officially entitled to marriages recognized by Roman law,* and that there were more than 4,000 of them. They asked to be given a town where they could live. The Senate decided that these men should submit their names to Lucius Canuleius; they should also give him the names of any freedmen they might have. It was agreed that a colony should be established at Carteia by the ocean; current residents of Carteia who preferred to remain there could enrol in the colony and be assigned land. This was to be a Latin colony* and to be known as a freedmen’s colony.
In this same period there arrived from Africa both Prince Gulussa, the son of Masinissa, acting as his father’s emissary, and some Carthaginians.* Gulussa was given an audience with the Senate first. He outlined his father’s contributions to the Macedonian war, and he pledged that Masinissa would provide anything else they cared to demand, as the Roman people deserved. He also cautioned the conscript fathers to beware of trickery from the Carthaginians: they had made plans for assembling a very large fleet, ostensibly for the Romans and against the Macedonians; but once the fleet was finished and marshalled for battle, the Carthaginians would be able to choose their own friends and foes. <…>
[There is now a very large gap in the manuscript: approximately three-fifths of Book 43 is lost, covering the rest of the year 171 and the first part of 170. At the beginning of the missing section must have been the rest of the Senate’s audience with Gulussa and the Carthaginians. The lost pages end with an account of an uprising in Spain (where the narrative resumes in chap. 4). Some of the material in between can be reconstructed from various sources, including the Periocha for Book 43. This notes that Publius Licinius Crassus attacked and abused several Greek cities, as did Lucius Hortensius, the praetor in charge of the fleet; it also mentions Perseus’ victorious campaigns over the Thracians, the Dardani, and the Illyrians (referred to in chap. 19 below). Other sources specify Perseus’ victories over the Romans: a cavalry action against Licinius (now a proconsul) near Larisa, a raid against the Roman fleet at Oreus, the defeat of Aulus Hostilius Mancinus, the consul for Macedonia in 170, at Elimea, and the latter’s refusal of a direct challenge from Perseus. An apparently major episode not included in the Periocha but discussed by Polybius (27.16) and Diodorus (30.5a) was a nearly successful attempt by two men from Epirus to kidnap Hostilius and deliver him to Perseus. Livy almost certainly recounted this episode, but to judge from what remains of Book 43, the Periocha probably accurately reflects an emphasis on Perseus’ successes and the Romans’ abuse of their Greek allies, such as the sacking of Coronea and Abdera. (The latter episode receives attention in chap. 4.)
Luce plausibly suggests that Livy devoted Book 43 to Roman failures (Livy, 120). Obviously Book 43 is the focal point of the pentad, and since Book 42 ends with Roman successes and Book 44 begins with a renewed sense of Roman purpose and competence, making the central book the nadir of the Romans’ fortunes against Perseus would give a strong shape to the pentad.
The narrative now abruptly resumes at the very end of the quelling of the revolt in Spain. According to the Periocha, the rebellion collapsed when the leader, one Olonicus, was killed. The text indicates that there were two leaders and that the Romans displayed their heads (presumably to prove that they were dead and perhaps to terrify their followers into submission). The rebels then rushed to make amends.]
4. <…> The Romans entered the camp, flourishing their opponents’ heads and inspiring such fear that the camp could have been taken if the infantry had been brought up immediately. Even so, there was widespread flight, and some people thought that messengers should be sent to beg for peace. Several cities surrendered as soon as they heard the news. They exonerated themselves, casting blame instead on the madness of the two men who had, of their own accord, offered themselves for punishment. The praetor pardoned these peoples and set out for the other cities. Because everyone was complying with his orders, the Roman forces remained inactive during the praetor’s travels through territory that had recently been engulfed in the flames of wide-scale revolt, but now lay tamed.
The praetor’s mild methods, by which he had subdued the most aggressive people without shedding a drop of blood, pleased the people and the Senate all the more because Licinius, the consul, and Lucretius, the praetor, had conducted the war in Greece with excessive cruelty and greed. In Lucretius’ absence, the tribunes of the plebs launched vicious attacks on him in constant public meetings, although the defence was offered on his behalf that he was away on public business. In those days, however, even Rome’s environs were so unknown that he was actually then on his own estate at Antium,* spending his war-booty on establishing a route for water from the Loracina river to Antium. He is reputed to have contracted this job out for 130,000 asses; he also adorned a shrine of Aesculapius with paintings from the booty.
The resentment and shame attached to Lucretius were diverted to his successor Hortensius by representatives from Abdera. In front of the Curia they wept and complained that their town had been stormed and then looted by Hortensius; the explanation for the city’s destruction was that when he demanded 100,000 denarii and 50,000 measures of wheat, they had asked for time to send envoys about this matter to Rome and the consul Hostilius. Scarcely had they approached the consul when they heard that the town had been stormed, the leading citizens beheaded, and everyone else sold at public auction. These events seemed outrageous to the senators, and they issued the same decree* covering the people of Abdera as they had for the Coronaei the year before. They also ordered the praetor Quintus Maenius to make an announcement about these matters in a public meeting, and two envoys, Gaius Sempronius Blaesus and Sextus Julius Caesar, were sent to liberate the people of Abdera. The same men were charged with informing the consul Hostilius and the praetor Hortensius that the Senate considered the war undertaken against the Abderites unjust and judged it right that all those forced into slavery should be sought out and liberated.
5. Complaints about Gaius Cassius were brought before the Senate at the same time. He had been consul the year before and was currently serving as a military tribune with Aulus Hostilius in Macedonia. It was representatives from Cincibilus, a king of the Gauls, who came. His brother delivered the speech in the Senate, complaining that Gaius Cassius had devastated the fields of people dwelling in the Alps who were Roman allies, and then had hauled away to slavery several thousand people.
At the same time representatives came from the Carni and the Istrians and the Iapydes. They said that Cassius had demanded guides from them to show him the way as he led his army to Macedonia; he had left them peaceably, as if he were going to wage a different war. Then, they said, he had turned around in the middle of his journey and scoured their fields as if he was at war with them; murder, looting, and arson were committed here, there, and everywhere; nor did they yet know why the consul regarded them as enemies.
The Senate gave as its reply both to the Gauls’ absent leader and to these peoples that it had not known that the behaviour of which they complained would occur, nor did the Senate consider it acceptable if it had; at the same time, without a hearing, it was unjust to condemn a man of consular status in his absence when he was away on public business; when Gaius Cassius returned from Macedonia, should they then wish to accuse him in person, the situation would be investigated and the Senate would see to it that he gave satisfaction.* In addition to giving this reply, the Senate resolved to send ambassadors to the local communities, two to the princeling on the far side of the Alps and three to the peoples mentioned, to make a public declaration of the Senate’s position. The Senate decided that gifts of 2,000 asses each should be sent to the representatives; for the two princeling brothers, there were special gifts: two torques, fashioned from five pounds of gold, and five silver dishes weighing twenty pounds, and two horses elaborately decked out and attended by stable boys, equestrian weaponry, and military cloaks; and there was clothing for their attendants, free and slave alike. That is what was sent. Upon the Gauls’ request, they were also allowed to buy ten horses and to take them out of Italy. The ambassadors sent with the Gauls across the Alps were Gaius Laelius and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus; Gnaeus Sicinius, Publius Cornelius Blasio, and Titus Memmius went to the other peoples.
6. Embassies from many Greek and Asian cities converged on Rome simultaneously. The Athenians were granted the first hearing. They explained that they had sent whatever ships and soldiers they had to the consul Publius Licinius and the praetor Gaius Lucretius; the latter two, making no use of the manpower, had demanded 100,000 measures of grain from them and, the Athenians said, they had collected it so as not to fail in their duties, despite the fact that the land they cultivated was so infertile that they fed their own farmers with grain purchased abroad; and they were still prepared to supply whatever else was demanded from them.
The Milesians, without reference to their previous contributions, promised that they stood ready to supply whatever the Senate wished to ask for the war. The people of Alabanda officially noted the fact that they had erected a temple of the City of Rome and instituted annual games in honour of that divinity;* further, that they had brought a golden crown weighing fifty pounds, to be deposited on the Capitol as a gift to Jupiter Optimus Maximus; there were also 300 cavalry shields which they would deliver once they had been told to whom these should be given. The people of Alabanda sought permission to place their gift on the Capitol and to offer sacrifices. The people of Lampsacus made the same request, having brought a crown of eighty pounds and having noted the fact that they had severed their ties with Perseus after the Roman army had entered Macedonia, although they had been subjects of Perseus and of Philip before him; in return for this, and because they had furnished all manner of supplies for the Roman generals, they asked only that they be admitted into an official friendship with the Roman people, and that if there were peace with Perseus, there would be a special provision to shield them from falling under his control again.
The other embassies received cordial answers; and Quintus Maenius, the praetor, was ordered to enrol the Lampsaceni in the register of allies. Gifts of 2,000 asses were distributed to each embassy. The group from Alabanda was directed to take the shields back with them to the consul Aulus Hostilius in Macedonia.
Also at this time the Carthaginians’ representatives and Masinissa’s came from Africa again. The Carthaginians declared that they had brought down to the sea 1,000,000 measures of wheat and 500,000 of barley in order to convey it wherever the Senate should decide; they knew that this performance of their duty was less than the Roman people deserved and less than their own willingness to contribute, but that often on other occasions, during periods of plenty for both peoples, they had fulfilled the obligations of grateful and faithful allies. Masinissa’s envoys, too, promised the same amount of wheat, as well as 1,200 cavalry and twelve elephants; and if there were any other need, the Senate had only to command: the king would provide it as readily as he had furnished what he had promised of his own volition. Thanks were conveyed to the Carthaginians and the king, and the envoys were asked to transport the promised supplies to the consul Hostilius in Macedonia. Gifts of 2,000 asses each were sent to the envoys.
7. Envoys from Crete reported that they had sent to Macedonia the number of archers the consul Publius Licinius had asked for. When questioned, however, they did not deny that more archers were fighting with Perseus than with the Romans. They were told that if the Cretans were well and truly committed to having a stronger alliance with the Romans than with Perseus, the Roman Senate would in turn respond to them as it did to reliable allies. In the meantime, the envoys should report to their people that the Senate wished the Cretans to see to it that the soldiers in the garrisons of King Perseus were recalled at the very first opportunity.
After the Cretans had been dismissed with this answer, the Chalcidians were called in. The very entrance of the delegation was moving. Their leader, Micythio, was lame and was carried on a litter. It instantly seemed that his business with the Senate was of dire necessity: either he did not think he should seek to be excused on the grounds of his health, despite his affliction; or his request had been denied.* Micythio prefaced his remarks by saying that the only spark of life left to him was the power of speech to deplore the misfortunes of his country. He proceeded to recount the favours his city had done for Roman commanders and troops, both in the past and in the war with Perseus. He then explained first how Gaius Lucretius, the Roman praetor, had treated his people with arrogance, cruelty, and greed. Next he told them that Lucius Hortensius’ conduct was even worse at that very minute. While the Chalcidians believed that rather than forsake their alliance they should endure anything—even worse treatment than what they had experienced—at the same time they believed that where Lucretius and Hortensius were concerned, it would have been safer to shut the gates in their faces rather than allow them into the city. The cities that had excluded Lucretius and Hortensius—Emathia, Amphipolis, Maronea, and Aenus—were intact; but in the case of Chalcis, the shrines had been stripped of their ornaments, and Gaius Lucretius had the fruits carried to Antium by his templerobbing vessels; free persons had been pressed into slavery; the wealth of allies of the Roman people had been and was being stolen on a daily basis. Following the practice instituted by Gaius Lucretius, Hortensius also billeted sailors in Chalcidian towns both winter and summer, and their homes were filled with a rabble of seamen; these men, who had no scruples about what they said or did, were coming and going freely amongst the Chalcidians themselves and their wives and children.
8. The Senate decided to summon Lucretius so he could make his case in person and defend himself. But far more was said once he was present than he had been accused of in his absence, and his accusers were joined by two very influential and powerful men, the tribunes of the plebs Manius Juventius Thalna and Gnaeus Aufidius. Not just lambasting him in the Senate, they even dragged him out into a public meeting, covered him with reproaches, and set a date for his trial.
At the Senate’s direction, the praetor Quintus Maenius responded to the Chalcidians that the Senate knew the truth of what they said about their meritorious conduct towards the Roman people both before and during the current war, and that this conduct was valued as it deserved to be. As for the previous actions of Gaius Lucretius and the current behaviour of Lucius Hortensius of which they complained—how could anyone think that these actions and this behaviour occurred at the Senate’s will, anyone, that is, who knew that the Roman people waged war against Perseus, and before him against his father Philip, for the freedom of Greece,* and not so that their allies and friends should suffer at the hands of Roman magistrates? He said that they would communicate in writing to the praetor, Lucius Hortensius, that the behaviour the Chalcidians objected to was unacceptable to the Senate; if any free men had been enslaved, he was to see to it that they be sought out at the very first opportunity and restored to liberty; moreover, that the Senate judged it right that except for the captains, no sailors should be quartered in civilian homes. This was written to Hortensius at the Senate’s direction.
Gifts of 2,000 asses each were given to the envoys, and conveyances were hired at public expense to take Micythio comfortably to Brundisium. When the day came for Gaius Lucretius’ trial, the tribunes prosecuted him before the people and set a fine of 1,000,000 asses. When the assembly was held, all thirty-five tribes voted to condemn him.
9. Nothing worthy of record happened in Liguria that year: the enemy did not take up arms, and the consul did not lead his legions into the field. Once he had assured himself sufficiently about peace for the year, the consul sent the soldiers of the two Roman legions home—within sixty days of his entering the province. Then, having settled the forces of the Latin and Italian allies into winter quarters at Luna and Pisa early on, he himself with the cavalry toured most of the towns in the province of Gaul.
Although Macedonia was the only scene of outright conflict, there were nevertheless suspicions about Gentius, the Illyrian king. Consequently the Senate decided that eight ships should be fitted out and sent from Brundisium to Gaius Furius, the junior officer at Issa who was in charge of the island with a force of two ships. Two thousand soldiers were embarked on these eight ships. The praetor Marcus Raecius conscripted the men, by senatorial decree, from the part of Italy lying opposite Illyricum. At the same time the consul Hostilius sent Appius Claudius into Illyricum with 4,000 infantry to protect the people dwelling on its borders. As the latter was not content with the manpower he had brought with him, he petitioned for assistance from allies and armed an additional force of about 8,000 men of various races. Once he had traversed the entire region he settled at the Dassaretian town of Lychnidus.
10. Not far from there lay Uscana,* which bordered Perseus’ dominions. It had 10,000 citizens and a small garrison of Cretans for protection. Messengers repeatedly came from there in secret to Claudius, saying that if he moved his forces closer, there would be those who were ready to hand over the town. And, they added, it was worth the effort: the booty was enough to satisfy not just himself and his personal friends but the soldiers too. The expectations stirred by greed so blinded Appius’ mind that he did not detain any of those who approached him, he did not require hostages as a guarantee against any act of treachery, he did not send anyone to reconnoitre, and he did not obtain an oath of good faith. He simply arranged a date, set out from Lychnidus, and encamped about twelve miles from the city to which he was marching. He advanced from his camp about the fourth watch,* leaving approximately 1,000 men to guard the camp. Disorganized, spread out in a long column, dispersed and scattered by the nocturnal journey, his forces made their way to the city. Their carelessness increased once they saw not a single armed man on the walls. But as soon as they were within missile range, simultaneous attacks were launched from two gates; and at the cry of those mounting the attack, an enormous cacophony arose from the walls as the women shrieked and bronze clanged on all sides, and an unorganized crowd, together with a rabble of slaves, screamed and shouted. The vocal intimidation coming at them from every direction was so effective that the Romans could not withstand even the first wave of the onslaught. As a result, more died fleeing than fighting: barely 2,000 men escaped with their leader to the camp. The added distance to the camp afforded the enemy on their heels more opportunity to hunt down the exhausted Romans. Appius did not remain in the camp long enough even to regroup his men from their scattered flight, though this would have afforded safety to those wandering in the fields; instead he led the survivors of the debacle straight back to Lychnidus.
11. Word of this episode and of other failed operations in Macedonia reached Rome through one Sextus Digitius, a military tribune who had gone to the city to offer sacrifices. These developments filled the fathers with the fear that they might suffer some greater disgrace. They dispatched Marcus Fulvius Flaccus and Marcus Caninius Rebilus as envoys to Macedonia; they were to discover what was going on and report back. In addition, the consul Aulus Atilius was to announce an assembly for the consular elections so that they could take place in January, and he himself was to come to the city at the very first opportunity. Meanwhile, the praetor Marcus Raecius was charged with issuing a decree to summon all senators from around Italy back to Rome, unless they were absent on public business; those who were in Rome were not to go more than a mile from the city.
These measures were taken in accordance with the senatorial orders. The consular elections took place on the twenty-sixth of January. The men elected as consuls were Quintus Marcius Philippus, for the second time, and Gnaeus Servilius Caepio. Two days later the praetors were chosen: Gaius Decimius, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, Gaius Sulpicius Galus, Gaius Marcius Figulus, Servius Cornelius Lentulus, and Publius Fonteius Capito. In addition to the two urban praetorships, four areas of responsibility were decreed for the incoming praetors: Spain, Sardinia, Sicily, and the fleet.
The Senate’s envoys returned from Macedonia at the very end of February. They reported on Perseus’ successful undertakings of that summer and the degree to which Rome’s allies were in the grip of fear, now that the king had brought so many cities back under his control. Moreover, the consul’s army lacked its full complement because of leaves of absence; they had been granted freely, out of the desire to curry political favour. The consul held the military tribunes responsible for this state of affairs; they in turn cast the blame on him. The envoys, in reporting that the casualties were mostly emergency conscripts from the area and not of Italian stock, minimized the disgrace caused by Claudius’ rashness. The incoming consuls were directed to bring the matter of Macedonia to the Senate for discussion as soon as they had entered their magistracies. Italy and Macedonia were designated as their provinces.
There was an intercalation that year: an additional month was inserted the third day after the Terminalia.* Three priests died during the year. Lucius Flamininus, the augur, died <…>.* Two pontiffs, Lucius Furius Philus and Gaius Livius Salinator, passed away. The pontiffs appointed Titus Manlius Torquatus to Furius’ place, and Marcus Servilius to that of Livius.
12. At the beginning of the following year, when the new consuls introduced discussion of the provinces, it was agreed that at the very first opportunity they should either settle between themselves the responsibility for Macedonia and Italy or draw lots. It was decided to establish what supplementary forces the circumstances called for in each province before the drawing of the lots, while the outcome was unknown; this way personal influence would have no weight. In the case of Macedonia the decision was for 6,000 Roman infantry, 6,000 of the Latin and Italian allies, 250 Roman cavalry, and 300 allied cavalry; the old soldiers were to be discharged so that in each Roman legion there would not be more than the 6,000 infantry and 300 cavalry. In the case of the second consul, no definite limit was set as to the number of Roman citizens he could enrol as reinforcements: the only limit was that he should conscript two legions, each of which was to have 5,200 infantry and 300 cavalry. The number of Latins assigned to the second consul was higher than for his colleague: 10,000 infantry and 600 cavalry. Moreover, four legions were to be conscripted, to be deployed if need arose. The consuls were not permitted to appoint the military tribunes for these legions; the people elected them. From the Latin and Italian allies 16,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry were called up. It was agreed that this army should simply be at the ready so that it could go anywhere circumstance might demand. Macedonia was the greatest source of concern. For the fleet, the order was that 1,000 sailors, Roman citizens from the order of freedmen, and 500 from Italy should be enlisted; an equal number was to be enlisted from Sicily; and the consul who obtained Macedonia as his province was charged with the responsibility of transporting these men there, wherever the fleet happened to be.
The reinforcements for the army in Spain were set at 3,000 Roman infantry and 300 cavalry. The number of soldiers in the legions there was also limited to 5,200 infantry and 300 cavalry; and the praetor who obtained Spain was ordered to call up 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry from the allies.
13. I am not unaware that the heedlessness underlying the widespread modern refusal to believe that gods issue portents also causes prodigies no longer to be announced in public or included in the historical record. Nevertheless, as I write about bygone affairs, my mind in some way takes on an antique cast, and a certain spirit of religious respect prevents me from regarding as unworthy of recording in my history matters that the deeply sagacious men of old deemed meritorious of public attention.* At Anagnia, two prodigies were announced that year: a comet was seen in the sky, and a heifer spoke; she was being maintained at public expense. During the very same days the sky at Minturnae had glowed with the appearance of something on fire. At Reate there was a shower of stones. The statue of Apollo on the citadel at Cumae shed tears for three days and three nights. Within the city of Rome, two temple attendants reported prodigies: one said that in the temple of Fortuna a crested snake was seen by quite a number of people; the second reported that in the shrine of Fortuna Primigenia on the Quirinal two different prodigies occurred: a palm tree bloomed in the forecourt, and there was a shower of blood during daylight hours. Two prodigies were not taken up: one because it took place in a private location (Titus Marcius Figulus declared that a palm tree bloomed in his impluvium*), and the other because it happened on foreign territory (it was said that at Fregellae in the house of a Lucius Atreius a spear, which he had bought for his son’s military service, had been on fire for over two hours one day, but had emerged completely unscorched). The decemvirs consulted their books for the public prodigies. They decreed the gods to whom the consuls should sacrifice forty full-grown animals; further, they announced that there should be a supplication, all the magistrates should sacrifice full-grown animals at all the sacred couches, and the people should wear wreaths.* Everything was done in accordance with the decemvirs’ dictates.
14. Then the elections for choosing the censors were announced. Leading citizens contended for the office: Gaius Valerius Laevinus, Lucius Postumius Albinus, Publius Mucius Scaevola, Marcus Junius Brutus, Gaius Claudius Pulcher, and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus. The Roman people elected the last two as their censors.*
Because of the Macedonian war there was more anxiety about the conduct of the draft than at other times. In a meeting of the Senate the consuls consequently blamed the plebs, because even the younger men* were not responding to the call. The praetors Gaius Sulpicius and Marcus Claudius argued against the consuls in defence of the plebs, saying that the draft did not pose a challenge for consuls in general, but only for politically ambitious ones; such consuls would not make anyone become a soldier against his will. So that the conscript fathers could see for themselves that this was the case, with the Senate’s approval the praetors would carry out the draft themselves, although the weight of their magisterial power and their authority were less.
The task was entrusted to the praetors, with great willingness on the part of the fathers, but not without insult to the consuls. The censors lent their aid to the undertaking by issuing the following decree in a public meeting: while conducting the census, they would add to the oath shared by all citizens sworn answers to these questions: ‘Are you less than forty-six years old?’; and ‘Have you registered for the draft in accordance with the edict of the censors Gaius Claudius and Tiberius Sempronius?’; and ‘If you are not drafted, will you continue to register for the draft, as long as conscription may occur while these men remain in office?’ Further, since the story was circulating that many men in the Macedonian legions were on leave indefinitely because the commanders were trying to garner popularity, the censors decreed that soldiers who enlisted in the consulship of Publius Aelius and Gaius Popillius* or subsequent consuls and who were in Italy should return to their province within thirty days after registering with the censors, and that the names of those men who were still under the authority of their father or grandfather* should be submitted to the censors. The censors said that they would investigate the reasons behind each discharge from military service; where premature dismissals seemed to them based on favouritism, they would order the men to continue to serve. When this decree and the censors’ declaration had been disseminated throughout the town centres and gathering places, such a crowd of men under forty-six converged on Rome that the unusual crush was a burden to the city.
15. In addition to the conscription of men designated to be sent out as reinforcements, four legions were enlisted by the praetor Gaius Sulpicius, and the draft was completed within eleven days. Then the consuls drew lots for their provinces. The praetors had drawn theirs earlier to ensure the administration of justice: the urban praetorship had fallen to Gaius Sulpicius, and Gaius Decimius was in charge of legal affairs involving foreigners; Marcus Claudius Marcellus drew Spain, Servius Cornelius Lentulus Sicily, Publius Fonteius Capito Sardinia, and Gaius Marcius Figulus the fleet. Of the consuls, Gnaeus Servilius obtained Italy and Quintus Marcius Macedonia. Marcius left as soon as the Latin Festival was over.
Caepio* then referred to the Senate the question of which two of the new legions he should take with him to Gaul. The senators decreed that the praetors Gaius Sulpicius and Marcus Claudius should give to the consul the legions that seemed best to them out of those they had conscripted. The consul endured his subordination to the praetors’ judgement with ill-grace. He dismissed the Senate and, standing at the tribunal of the praetors, he demanded that they give him two legions in accordance with the Senate’s decree. The praetors followed the consul’s judgement in making the selection.
The censors then revised the roll of the Senate. Marcus Aemilius Lepidus was named princeps senatus* for a third census period. Seven men were expelled from the Senate. In reviewing the census of the people, the censors learned from the lists how many soldiers from Macedonia had deserted their posts; these they compelled to return to their province. The censors studied the reasons for the leaves of the men who had been discharged, and where the discharge appeared not to have been earned, they forced the soldier to swear to the following: ‘Do you solemnly swear that you will return to the province of Macedonia, in accordance with the decree of the censors Gaius Claudius and Tiberius Sempronius, inasmuch as you are able to do so in good faith?’
16. The censors were especially harsh and severe in reviewing the equestrians.* They stripped many men of their horses. This action antagonized the equestrian order. And then the censors fuelled the flames of resentment with an edict, in which they decreed that no one who had contracted to collect public taxes or undertake public works in the censorship of Quintus Fulvius and Aulus Postumius could attend the auction at which they would take bids on these contracts; nor could such a man be a partner or an associate in a transaction at the auction. Despite repeated complaints, the established tax-collectors could not persuade the Senate to rein in censorial power. Finally they won over Publius Rutilius, a tribune of the plebs, to promote their cause; he was angry at the censors because of a personal dispute. The censors had ordered a client of his, a freedman, to demolish a house-wall along the Sacred Way, opposite the public shrines, because it had been built up against public property. As a private citizen he had appealed to the tribunes. When no one besides Rutilius intervened, the censors sent men to confiscate property as surety, and at a public meeting they fined him. This had been the origin of the dispute.
When the established contractors had recourse to the tribune, without warning and all on his own he promulgated a motion to treat as void the contracts for all taxes and public works that Gaius Claudius and Tiberius Sempronius* had let; these were to be bid on again so that everyone, without distinction, would have the right to buy up and undertake them. The tribune of the plebs set a date for a meeting of the assembly to discuss the motion. When the day came and the censors appeared to speak against it, there was silence as long as Gracchus was speaking; but Claudius was drowned out by shouting and ordered the herald to obtain him a hearing. When silence had been imposed, Rutilius protested that in calling for silence Claudius had taken over his meeting and thus demeaned his authority. With that, Rutilius left the Capitoline (which was where the assembly was meeting).
The following day Rutilius provoked a massive disturbance. He began by declaring Tiberius Gracchus’ property forfeit to the gods since Tiberius too had demeaned his authority by not complying when Rutilius intervened on behalf of the man who appealed to him over the fine and the impounding of property as security. Rutilius charged Gaius Claudius with having taken over the public meeting. Further, Rutilius announced that he considered both censors guilty of treason, and he asked the urban praetor, Gaius Sulpicius, to set a date for their impeachment. The censors offered no resistance to having judgement passed on them by the people at the very first opportunity. The twenty-third and twenty-fourth of September were set as the dates for the treason trial. The censors proceeded directly to the Hall of Liberty. There they sealed the public records and closed their office and dismissed the public slaves, declaring that they would conduct no public business before the people had passed judgement on them.
Claudius’ trial took place first. At the point when eight out of the twelve equestrian centuries, as well as many other centuries of the first class, had voted against the censor, the leading citizens publicly removed their golden rings and put on mourning robes in order to go around the plebs as suppliants.* But Tiberius Gracchus is said to have done the most to alter opinion; for, when the plebs cried out on all sides that there was no danger to Gracchus, he swore a solemn oath that if his colleague were convicted, he would accompany him into exile without awaiting the outcome of his own trial. Just the same, Claudius was nearly cheated of his hopes: his conviction failed by only eight centuries. Once Claudius had been absolved, the tribune of the plebs declined to proceed with the charge against Gracchus.
17. The same year representatives from Aquileia made a formal request to have the number of colonists increased; 1,500 households were enrolled by senatorial decree. The committee of three sent out to see to their settlement consisted of Titus Annius Luscus, Publius Decius Subolo, and Marcus Cornelius Cethegus.
Also that year the envoys who had been sent to Greece, Gaius Popillius and Gnaeus Octavius, first announced at Thebes and then circulated around the cities of the Peloponnese the Senate’s decree that no one should supply Roman magistrates with anything for the war except what the Senate had previously determined. The decree had the further effect of inspiring confidence that, in the future, people would be relieved of the burdens that were draining them dry as commander after commander made demand after demand.
The council of the Achaeans met with the envoys at Aegium. The exchange was pleasant on both sides; the Romans left these utterly reliable people with the highest of expectations for future relations. They then crossed over to Aetolia. Matters there had not yet reached open revolt, but there was an all-pervasive sense of mistrust and accusations piled upon counter-accusations. For these reasons the envoys demanded hostages but did not impose a resolution on the situation before they went on to Acarnania. The Acarnanians met with the envoys at Thyrreum. There was factional strife there too: certain leading men made a formal request that garrisons be introduced into their towns, in response to the insane impulse of some men to align their people with Macedonia; another group objected that allied cities at peace should not receive the same demeaning treatment customarily dealt out to captured enemy cities. This latter petition seemed reasonable to the envoys. They returned to Hostilius, the proconsul at Larisa, since he was the one who had sent them out. He kept Octavius with him and sent Popillius with about 1,000 men to Ambracia for the winter.
18. At the beginning of the winter Perseus did not dare to venture beyond the borders of Macedonia, out of fear that the Romans would invade his kingdom somewhere if it were left empty; but around the solstice, when the depth of the snow makes the mountains impassable from the Thessalian side, he thought he saw a chance to crush the hopes and spirits of his neighbours such that they would pose no threat while he was occupied with the Roman war. Cotys ensured peace from Thrace, and Cephalus, with his recent abrupt defection from the Romans, did the same from Epirus; Perseus’ own recent war had just brought the Dardani securely under control. He could see that only the section of Macedonia adjacent to Illyricum was at risk. The Illyrians were indeed restless and offered a way in for the Romans. If, however, he subdued the closest Illyrians, King Gentius too, who had been wavering for a long time already, could be won over. Perseus accordingly set out and went to Stuberra with 10,000 infantrymen (some of whom were phalanx troops), 2,000 light-armed troops, and 500 cavalry.
Once there, he procured many days’ worth of supplies, and directed the siege machinery to be brought along behind him; three days later he pitched camp at Uscana, which is the largest city in the territory of the Penestae. Before resorting to force, however, he sent men ahead to test the attitudes first of the garrison’s leaders and then of the townsfolk. This garrison consisted of Romans and a corps of Illyrian youth. Once Perseus learned from his men’s report that no one was disposed to peace, he started his offensive and attempted to besiege the city. The Macedonians attacked relentlessly, night and day, with one wave of soldiers succeeding another, some tackling the walls with ladders, others assailing the gate with torches. The city’s defenders nonetheless sustained the onslaught, hoping that in their exposed position the Macedonians could not endure the winter’s force for very long and that the respite from the Roman war would not be such as to allow them to linger. But the defenders’ defiance crumpled when they observed sheds being brought up to shield the siege-workers and towers being erected. For aside from the fact that they could not match their opponents’ manpower, they had no reserves of food or any supplies on hand (as happens with an unexpected siege). There was consequently no hope of resisting. Gaius Carvilius of Spoletium and Gaius Afranius were sent from the Roman garrison to petition Perseus, preferably to allow them to depart with their weapons and personal property and then, failing that, at least to guarantee their lives and freedom. The king’s promises were more generous than his behaviour: after he had directed the Romans to leave the city with their weapons, he first stripped them of these. Upon their departure, the troop of Illyrians, 500 in all, and the people of Uscana surrendered themselves and the city.
19. Perseus left an occupying force there and marched the whole herd of captives, which was nearly as numerous as his army, to Stuberra. Except for the officers, Perseus distributed the approximately 400 Romans among the citizenry for safekeeping and sold the population of Uscana and the Illyrians. He then marched his army back to the land of the Penestae in order to establish control over Oaeneum. The location of this town is generally a good one, and in particular there is a pass there to the Labeatae, Gentius’ kingdom. As Perseus was passing a heavily manned stronghold, known as Draudacum, one of the men familiar with the region said that there was no point in taking Oaeneum unless he controlled Draudacum too, for the latter was better situated in all respects. The moment Perseus approached with his army, everyone surrendered. Puffed up by this unexpectedly swift capitulation, and observing how much fear his battle column inspired, Perseus took control of eleven more strongholds also by intimidation. In a few cases actual force was required; the rest surrendered voluntarily. Perseus also captured 1,500 Roman soldiers who had been posted in these garrisons. In negotiating with them Perseus derived great benefit from Carvilius of Spoletium’s assertions that the Macedonian had not treated the Romans cruelly.
When Perseus reached Oaeneum, it could not be taken without a full-scale assault. Its strength lay in having rather more men of military age than the other places, in the fortified walls of the town, and in being enclosed on one side by a river, known as the Artatus, and on the other by a mountain which was very high and difficult of access. These factors gave the townspeople some hope of resisting. Perseus invested the town and began constructing a ramp on the upper side of the city; its height would bring him up over the city walls. While this was being done, there were frequent skirmishes. The townsfolk defended their walls and impeded the enemy’s projects with regular sallies. In these they suffered many casualties while the survivors were weak from struggling round the clock and from their wounds.
As soon as the ramp reached the city wall, a royal troop, known as ‘the Conquerors’,* went across while an attack was launched against the city from ladders set up simultaneously at multiple locations. All the adult males were slaughtered; the women and children were kept under guard; the rest of the plunder went to the army. Returning triumphantly to Stuberra, Perseus sent Pleuratus, an Illyrian who was living in exile with him, and Adaeus, a Macedonian from Beroea, as envoys to Gentius. Perseus instructed them to recount his accomplishments against the Romans and Dardani during that summer and winter; they were also to report his recent accomplishments during his winter expedition in Illyricum; and they were to exhort Gentius to join in an alliance with him and the Macedonians.
20. The envoys crossed the summit of Mount Scordus and the wastelands of Illyricum, which the Macedonians had intentionally stripped bare to deprive the Dardani of an easy approach into Illyricum or Macedonia, and finally, after great effort, reached Scodra. King Gentius was at Lissus. The envoys were summoned there, and he listened to them in a receptive way as they recounted what they had been charged to impart. But the reply they brought back was equivocal: Gentius by no means lacked the will to make war on the Romans, but he was greatly lacking in the financial resources to do so as he wished. The messengers reported this response to Perseus at Stuberra just when he was engaged in selling the captives from Illyricum. The same messengers were immediately dispatched again, accompanied by a certain Glaucias from the corps of bodyguards, but without any mention of money, the sole means that could impel the impoverished barbarian to fight. Perseus then pillaged Ancyra and marched his army back into the territory of the Penestae. He reinforced the garrisons at Uscana and all the strongholds around it that he had captured, and then returned to Macedonia.
21. A Roman lieutenant, Lucius Coelius, had oversight of Illyricum. He had not dared to enter the area when Perseus was there. After the latter’s departure he at last attempted to take back Uscana in the land of the Penestae. The Macedonian garrison there inflicted multiple injuries on his men and repulsed him. Coelius marched his forces back to Lychnidus. A few days later he sent a man of Fregellae, Marcus Trebellius, with a fairly powerful force to the Penestae to collect hostages from those towns that had maintained their allegiance faithfully. Coelius directed Trebellius then to proceed to the Parthini, who had also pledged to give hostages. Trebellius encountered no resistance from either people in exacting hostages. The cavalrymen of the Penestae were sent to Apollonia, while those of the Parthini went to Dyrrachium, better known to the Greeks of those days as Epidamnus.
Appius Claudius, wishing to erase the ignominy he had incurred in Illyricum, started to besiege Phanote, a fortress in Epirus. In addition to his Roman forces he brought Chaonian and Thesprotian auxiliaries, for a total of roughly 6,000 men. But it was not worth the effort: a man named Cleuas whom Perseus had left there was defending the fortress with a strong garrison.
Perseus himself proceeded to Elimea, where he conducted a lustrum of the army. He then marched to Stratus at the invitation of the Epirotae. At the time, Stratus was the most powerful city in Aetolia; it was situated above the Ambracian Gulf near the Inachus river. Perseus started out with 10,000 infantry and 300 cavalry; the equestrian force was somewhat reduced because of the narrowness and roughness of the roads. When on the third day he reached Mount Citium, he crossed it with difficulty because of the depth of the snow, and he could scarcely find a place to camp. He continued on, more because it was impossible to stay than because there was anything tolerable about either the route or the weather. After great difficulty, especially for the pack animals, Perseus encamped the next day at a temple of Jupiter Nicaeus, as he is called. Then, after a massive march, he rested for <…> days* at the Aratthus river, impeded by the height of the water. In this span of time a bridge was finished. He marched his forces across and after a day’s journey met Archidamus, the Aetolian leader who was offering to betray Stratus to him.
22. That day he pitched camp on the edge of Aetolian territory; two days after that he reached Stratus where he set up camp next to the Inachus river. Expecting the Aetolians to pour out of every gate and entrust themselves to him, he discovered instead that the gates were barred and that on the very night of his arrival a Roman garrison, led by their officer Gaius Popillius, had been admitted. While Archidamus was there, the city leaders had been impelled by his influence to invite the king; but after Archidamus’ departure, they were less active and gave an opposing faction the chance to call in Popillius from Ambracia with his 1,000 infantry. Dinarchus too, the commander of the Aetolian cavalry, came at the same time with 600 infantry and <…> cavalry. It was common knowledge that he had set off for Stratus as if to join Perseus, but that as circumstances changed, so too did his purpose; thus he had attached himself to the Romans, his intended adversaries.
Popillius was no less cautious than he had to be, surrounded by such fickle minds. He kept the keys to the gates and the defence of the walls under his own control from the start; and he moved Dinarchus and his Aetolians, along with the fighting force of Stratus, into the citadel, under the pretext that they were its garrison. Perseus attempted to negotiate from the hills overlooking the upper part of the city, but when he observed that the occupants were standing firm and even fending him off with long-distance missiles, he established his camp five miles from the city across the Petitarus river. There he convened a council of war. Archidamus and the Epirotae deserters wanted to stay, but the leading Macedonians thought they should not contend with the least hospitable part of the year, when they had no supplies on hand and, as the besiegers, would suffer deprivation before the people they were besieging, especially since the enemy’s winter quarters were not far away. Perseus was frightened and moved his camp to Aperantia. Archidamus had great influence and status among the Aperanti, and for that reason Perseus received universal welcome. Archidamus himself was given command over their fortress, with a troop of 800 soldiers.
23. Perseus’ return to Macedonia involved just as much trouble for the pack animals and his men as the outward journey had. The report of his march on Stratus, however, dislodged Appius from the siege of Phanote. Cleuas, with a band of energetic young men, pursued Appius along the almost impassable foothills of the mountains where he killed about 1,000 and captured about 200 from Appius’ heavily encumbered column. After traversing the mountainous passes, Appius set up a base for a few days on the plain they call Meleon.
Meanwhile, Cleuas was joined by Philostratus, who had a band of Epirotae with him, and crossed to the territory of Antigonea. The Macedonians set out to pillage; Philostratus established himself with his cohort in a hidden location and lay in wait. Then troops charged out of Antigonea against the scattered pillagers. Chasing headlong after the fleeing Macedonians, the Antigonean troops hurled themselves into the valley occupied by the enemy. About 1,000 Antigonenses were killed there, and about 100 were taken prisoner. After this completely successful enterprise, Cleuas and Philostratus moved their camp close to Appius’ base to prevent the Roman army from attacking their allies.
As Appius was spending his time there to no purpose, he dismissed the Chaonian and Thesprotian contingents as well as the rest of the Epirotae and retreated with the Italian soldiers to Illyricum. He dispersed his men into winter quarters among the allied cities of the Parthini and returned to Rome to offer sacrifices.
Perseus recalled 1,000 infantry and 200 cavalry from the land of the Penestae and sent them to Cassandrea to serve as a garrison. The messengers came back from Gentius bearing the same report. Perseus did not stop trying to win him over, sending one embassy after the other, for it was clear what a bulwark he would provide. At the same time, the Macedonian king could not bring himself to expend his capital for a cause of the greatest import in every respect.